GERBET, PHILIPPE. - Controversialist, born at Poligny on 5 Feb. 1798, died at Perpignan on 8 Aug. 1864. In Paris he formed a friendship with Lamennais, whose thought he ardently admired and propagated both from the chair and in his writings: *Des doctrines philosophiques sur la certitude dans leurs rapports avec les fondements de la théologie* (Paris 1826); *Coup d'œil sur la controverse chrétienne depuis les premiers siècles jusqu'à nos jours* (ibid. 1828); *Sommaire d'un système des connaissances humaines*, published the following year.
When, however, in 1834 Lamennais’s doctrines were condemned, G. abandoned his master and even wrote against him in *Précis de l'histoire de philosophie* (ibid. 1834). From 1839 to 1849 he was in Rome. The fruit of this sojourn is the two-volume work *Esquisse de Rome chrétienne* (ibid. 1844–50). Returning to France, he became vicar general at Amiens, and in 1854 was appointed bishop of Perpignan. Of his episcopal activity the most important is the *Instruction pastorale*
critical sense, the developments of thought throughout the entire century; hence in his work three periods may be distinguished:
1) In his early writings (*L'immaterialité de l'âme démontrée contre Mr. Locke*, etc., Turin 1747; *Défense du sentiment du malheur*, etc., 1714) he is frankly Cartesian, acutely criticizing Locke (whom he nevertheless appreciates) and enthusiastically embracing Malebranche’s ontologism and occasionalism;
2) In mature years and study he professes a more independent Platonism with an eclectic tendency (*Introduzione allo studio della religione*, Turin 1755, a work of the history of philosophy containing in an appendix two notable dissertations: *Dell'esistenza di Dio e dell'immaterialità delle nature intelligenti* and *Dell'origine del senso morale*; *Recueil de dissertations*..., Paris 1760; etc.);
3) Finally he treated, on spiritualistic and Christian bases, the moral and social problems then in full development, in which Rousseau and the masters of irreligious empiricism seemed to prevail (*De l'ordre*, Turin 1770–73; *Discours philosophiques sur l'homme*, 1770–1769; *De l'homme sous l'empire de la loi*, 1774; *Précis d'un cours d'instructions sur l'origine, les droits, et les devoirs de l'autorité souveraine*, 1779).
His strictly religious-cultural activity includes ascetico-religious writings (*Vita del b. Sauli*, Rome 1805; *Breve esposizione dei caratteri della vera religione*, Turin 1767, a little work once widely circulated and translated even into Polish, etc.), positive theology (*Saggio d'inscrizione teologica*, Rome 1776), moral theology (see above) or polemical works (in refutation of Raynal, Eybel, Febronius, Pfaff and others).
From a comprehensive standpoint, G.’s philosophical thought, which may be defined as a critical and progressive spiritualism, rests on a twofold underlying postulate: confidence in the cognitive powers of the human spirit and, at the same time, in the intrinsic necessary harmony between reason and faith; it unfolds along the following lines: 1) defence of Cartesian-Malebranchian spiritualism against Lockean and later sensistic empiricism; 2) a more general defence of rationalism against empiricism, and above all of Christian spiritualism against materialistic naturalism and pathetic tendencies; 3) study of problems in mathematical and natural philosophy; 4) critical study of moral and political problems, both fundamental and of current interest.
In political doctrine G. accepts the concept of equality but eliminates its deviations: men are equal by nature, yet relative inequalities necessarily subsist among them, and hence the state of nature does not in itself conflict with the state of society. This does not, however, imply unqualified approval of society as it is constituted: indeed, G. opposes the conception of patrimonial State and every paternalistic form of government whenever it lacks the positive and conscious contribution of its subjects.
His most important work is *Réflexions sur la théorie et la pratique de l'éducation contre les principes de J.-J. Rousseau* (Turin 1763; later republished under the title *Anti-Emile* in *Opere*, I, pp. 3 ff.), which offers a serene, calm and complete examination and refutation of *Emile*. The Genevan philosopher, intent on defending education derived from nature and subordinating that which comes from men, had based his observations on three principles: 1) the child is born good, so the first movements of nature are always upright and hence should not be repressed; 2) society corrupts the child, who should therefore have no contact with it; 3) at the age of 10 or 12 the child’s reason is not yet developed, so instruction in religion and subjects cultivating reason should be deferred.
Against these observations G. maintains: 1) Daily experience teaches that inclinations arising from pleasant or unpleasant sensations develop with full force without being restrained or moderated by reason, which is still too weak in the child. If they are not repressed and controlled from the outset, bad habits will form that later reason will have to condemn but will be able to overcome only with great difficulty. 2) Nature itself has made man social, so every individual must be educated with a view to society, of which he can never dispense. Everything in the universe is interconnected; and just as in the physical world corporeal natures, losing the relations binding them to one another, lose their activity, so intelligent natures, made to occupy a place in the moral world, i.e. in society, cannot sever the bonds uniting them without forfeiting their nature and depriving themselves of the exercise of their noblest functions. A perfect man can never be made unless he is made a perfect citizen. 3) The child, moreover, is capable of reasoning long before the age of 10 or 12; he can indeed well discern when he is punished justly or unjustly, can distinguish a good action from a bad one, and it is therefore harmful to leave this capacity uncultivated; rather it should be cultivated and refined. In particular, the idea of God is not so sublime that it cannot be acquired without danger of false speculations even before the age of 10 or 12, as Rousseau claims, because the child knows perfectly well that a house, a statue, a painting were not made by themselves; he immediately asks: who made this? Consequently it is harmful to postpone religious instruction beyond the time when passions would find in religion a guiding norm and a dominating force. And G. concludes: “The contempt for every revealed religion and for Christianity in particular, I would almost say the forgetting of divinity, the hatred of every established government, revolt against every legitimate authority, an unbridled spirit of independence and freedom, obedience struck from the dictionary of children, a false indulgence in not repressing the outbursts of their natural freedom, a false restraint in not reasoning with them or cultivating their minds with anything worthy of their age: these are the fruits of the new plan of education.”
The subtlety of G.’s observations was acknowledged even by Rousseau himself, who declared that G.’s work was the only one he had had the patience to read to the end, though he regretted that the author had not understood him.