Gratitude

GRATITUDINE. —

I. NOTION

From the Latin gratindo, it is the virtue that inclines man to acknowledge (with the mind and with words) the benefits received and, at least in some manner, to repay them. St Augustine calls it “the virtue by which the will to remember benefits and friendships is manifested” (De dicersis quaest., 83, p. 31: PL 40, 21). It is connected with the virtue of justice. Unlike obedience and filial piety, which entail an obligation customarily called “legal,” gratitude entails only a duty of propriety or “moral” duty; that is, an obligation whose fulfillment cannot be demanded in strict justice, but only on the grounds of a certain honesty or equity. The transgression of this duty is rarely so grave as to constitute a mortal sin; nevertheless, its practice is of great importance, not only for the spiritual life, but also for peaceful and joyful human coexistence.

Gratitude arises only from a benefit received; gratitude, however, as a special virtue, arises only from benefits received from equals or inferiors. Indeed, gratitude to God for the benefits received from him is called the virtue of religion; that owed to parents belongs to the virtue of filial piety; and finally, that owed to superiors, from whom one receives the benefits of governance and the common good, is reduced to the virtue of observance.

Three elements constitute the virtue of gratitude: a) recognizing and remembering the benefits received; b) expressing in words one’s gratitude for the benefit received; c) repaying it through actions, insofar as possible (Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2ᵃc, q. 107, a. 2). These might also be called the three degrees of the virtue of gratitude.

II. QUALITIES

Gratitude must be: a) prompt, that is, it must be shown immediately upon receiving the benefit (cf. ibid., 2ᵃ-2ᵃc, q. 107, a. 2); b) inward, and not merely outward; that is, it must proceed from sincere, intimate affection and must not simply be expressed in cold words; c) humble, that is, one must acknowledge that the benefit is something useful; for whoever despises the gift cannot be said to possess the virtue of gratitude; d) disinterested; the gratitude expressed must not have the purpose of obtaining new and greater benefits, as often happens among beggars.

III. VICES OPPOSED TO G

By excess, opposed to it is the repayment of a benefit made either with undue haste or to one to whom it is not due, because this would show rather that one does not wish in any way to be bound to the benefactor (ibid., 2ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 106, a. 4). A much more frequent vice, and one opposed to g. by deficiency, is ingratitude. It may be: a) material: when, without there being true contempt, one either neglects the obligation of g. or does something against the benefactor. Ordinarily it does not go beyond venial sin; indeed, it is not even a special sin: rather, it is one of the circumstances of the sin committed against the benefactor. Various degrees of this form of ingratitude are usually enumerated: concealing the benefit; failing to give thanks; failing publicly to acknowledge the benefit received; b) formal: when the benefactor or the benefit is despised; it may be a grave sin if this contempt gravely offends the benefactor and thus seriously injures charity. The degrees of this form of ingratitude are: a) repaying good with evil (cf. Ier. 18, 20); b) publicly disparaging the benefit. In this way the Israelites sinned when in the desert they complained of having been brought out of Egypt; c) regarding the benefit as almost an injury.