GRATITUDE. - I. NOZIONE. - From the Latin gratitudo, it is the virtue that inclines a person to acknowledge (with the mind and with words) the benefits received and, at least in some way, to requite them. St. Augustine calls it "the virtue by which the will to remember benefits and friendships is manifested" (De diversis quaest., 83, p. 31: PL 40, 21). It is connected to the virtue of justice. Unlike obedience and piety, which entail an obligation customarily called "legal," gratitude entails only a duty of propriety or "moral" obligation; that is, an obligation whose fulfillment cannot be demanded in strict justice, but only by a certain honesty or equity. The transgression of this duty is rarely so grave as to constitute mortal sin; nevertheless its practice is of great importance, not only for the spiritual life, but also for a peaceful and joyful human coexistence.
Gratitude arises only from a benefit received; gratitude, however, as a special virtue arises only from benefits received from equals or inferiors. Indeed, thankfulness to God for the benefits received from him is called the virtue of religion; that owed to parents belongs to the virtue of piety; and finally that owed to superiors, from whom one receives the benefits of governance and of the common good, is reduced to the virtue of observance.
Three elements constitute the virtue of gratitude: a) to acknowledge and remember the benefits received; b) to manifest with words the thankfulness for the benefit received; c) to requite it in deeds, as far as is possible (Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2ᵃc, q. 107, a. 2). These could also be called the three degrees of the virtue of gratitude.
II. QUALITY
Gratitude must be: a) prompt, that is, it must be shown immediately upon receiving the benefit (cf. ibid., 2ᵃ-2ᵃc, q. 107, a. 2); b) internal, and not merely external; that is, it must proceed from a sincere, intimate affection and must not simply be expressed in cold words; c) humble, that is, it must acknowledge that the benefit is something useful; for whoever despises the gift cannot be said to be endowed with the virtue of gratitude; d) disinterested; the gratitude that is expressed must not have the purpose of procuring new and greater benefits, as often happens with beggars.
III. VICES OPPOSED TO GRATITUDE
By excess, the repayment of a benefit is opposed when it is made either with immoderate haste or to someone to whom it is not due, because this would rather show a wish in no way to be bound to the benefactor (ibid., 2ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 106, a. 4). A far more frequent vice, and one opposed to g. by defect, is ingratitude. It can be: a) material: when, without there being true contempt, either the obligation of g. is neglected or something is done against the benefactor. Ordinarily it does not go beyond venial sin; indeed it is not even a special sin: it is rather one of the circumstances of the sin against the benefactor. Various degrees of this form of ingratitude are usually enumerated: to conceal the benefit; not to give thanks; not to acknowledge publicly the benefit received; b) formal: when the benefactor or the benefit is despised; it can be a grave sin if this contempt gravely offends the benefactor and thus gravely injures charity. The degrees of this form of ingratitude are: a) to repay good with evil (cf. Jer. 18:20); b) to revile the benefit publicly. In this way the Israelites sinned when in the desert they complained of having been led out of Egypt; c) to regard the benefit almost as an injury.
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Giuseppe Sette