BERYTUS, SCHOOL OF. — Among the most celebrated of antiquity (3rd–6th centuries). The city (Βηρυπός, Βερυτύς), described by St. Gregory Thaumaturgus as “the most Romanized” in the East (PG 10, 1065), was an Augustan colony with Italic rights (Dig., 50, 15, 1).
Its chief glory was the higher School of Law, already praised in 239 by the same Thaumaturgus (PG 10, 1065); hence Libanius (Or., 652) and Zacharias Scholasticus (PG 85, 1017) call Berytus “mother of the laws,” as does Justinian, who terms it *legum civitas* (Const. Tanta, § 9 gr.) and *legum nutrix* (Const. Omnem, 7); St. Gregory Nazianzen (Carm., II, 2, 5, n. 227) defines it *legum sedes Romanorum* (PG 37, 1538).
It was founded toward the end of the 2nd century A.D., if not earlier, since P. Collinet argues that Berytus was the center for the publication and deposit of imperial constitutions for the East. It must have flourished throughout the 3rd century, for the *Constitutio Cum vos*, in recognizing that students normally completed their courses at age 25, exempted them from public munera, with the option of deferring their “service” until after their 25th year. Its period of greatest splendor began in the mid-5th century, when the School, like those of the *regiae urbes* (Constantinople and Rome), received from the emperors Theodosius II and Valentinian III (cf. Cod. Iust., 11, 19 [18]) the charter of official state recognition for schools (*privilegium studi*), as Justinian acknowledges in the *Constitutio Omnem* (7). Its professors then bore the title of Ecumenical Masters, οἱ τῆς οἰκουμένης, some of whom—such as Cyril Patricius, Domninus, Demosthenes, Eudoxius, Amblicus, and Leontius—were remembered for centuries in Byzantine doctrinal tradition; indeed, according to Heimbach, they constitute a “new school,” and their opinions appear in the *Scholia* to the *Basilica*.
This development of the School seems due to Bishop Eustathius, who before 449 erected the cathedral, obtained from Theodosius II the elevation of the city to metropolitan status (Cod. Iust., 11, 22)—previously (449–50) reserved for Tyre—and provided the School with a new seat (*auditoria legum*) among the cathedral buildings (cf. Zacharias Scholasticus: PG 85, 1023–1025), thus more easily securing the *privilegium studi*. Among the professors was Eusebius, brother of the Bishop.
Justinian took a great interest in the School, issuing the *Constitutio Omnem* to reorganize legal studies. Under the previous *ratio studiorum* (that of the “Ecumenical Masters”), the course comprised four obligatory years and a fifth optional year. First-year students, nicknamed *Dupondii* (“two-as”), studied Gaius’ *Institutiones* and Ulpian’s *Libri singulares*; second-year students (*Edictales*) read Ulpian’s *Libri ad Edictum*; third-year (*Papinianistae*) the *Responsa* of Papinian; fourth-year (*Lytae* = “solvers” of cases) practiced on Paul’s *Responsa*. The fifth year of advanced study, whose students were called *Prolytae* (i.e., “advanced beyond the *Lytae* in legal expertise,” “pre-solvers” [cf. Du Cange]), was devoted to imperial constitutions, some of which included ecclesiastical law, a subject of interest not only to future magistrates but also to the clergy. Justinian’s reform (effective from January 1, 534) made the fifth year obligatory for all and replaced the previous textbooks with his three new legislative works, distributed as follows: first year, the *Institutes* and the *prota* of the *Digest* (books 1–4); second, third, and fourth years, the *Digest*; fifth year, the *Codex*. He preserved the academic terminology but replaced the ridiculous nickname *Dupondii* with *Iustiniani novi*.
Instruction was given in Latin until the end of the 4th century (cf. St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, *loc. cit.*); thereafter Greek prevailed, as it was the ecclesiastical language of the East. Vacations were observed, at least during the 5th–6th centuries, on Saturday afternoons and Sundays (cf. *Life of Severus*, 16).
Students from all parts of the Empire formed student associations and engaged in playful or boisterous pranks (especially against “freshmen”), some of which were prohibited by the *Constitutio Omnem* (5 and 6) as in poor taste. There were also pious associations for Christian religious practices, while many pagan students practiced magic. Following serious incidents, magical books were confiscated and burned before the church of the *Theotokos*, in the presence of civil and ecclesiastical authorities (*Life of Severus*).
Upon completing their studies, students entered judicial or administrative careers (cf. *Const. Omnem*, § 6). Many embraced the ecclesiastical or monastic state, including such figures as Severus of Antioch and his biographer Zacharias Scholasticus, bishop of Mytilene, as well as martyrs like St. Pamphilus of Caesarea, SS. Aphian and Edesius (3rd century), and the two brothers SS. Arcadius and John of Constantinople (5th century).
The earthquake of July 6, 551, which destroyed the city and buried 30,000 people (cf. Agathias, *Hist.*, 2,15: PG 88, 1360–62; and *Frag. hist. Tusculana*, 4: PG 85, 1821–24), marked the end of the illustrious School. Recently, five columns with their capitals belonging to the portico of the ancient school have come to light. Temporarily transferred to Sidon, it was later returned to Berytus; but in 560 a fire destroyed its new temporary buildings. By 660 the city lay in ruins; in 635 it fell to the Arabs.
“It was the School of Berytus that in a sense preserved Roman Law for posterity. Without this Eastern center, Justinian would not have found the men, the resources, or the culture sufficient to gather in the *Codex* and the *Digest* so many relics of ancient doctrine” (C. Ferrini).
As for its influence on the substantive development of law, this cannot be precisely determined: the question touches upon the broader and much-debated issue among scholars regarding the ideal contribution of Eastern schools to the internal evolution of Roman law—an influence that some acknowledge and extol (Collinet), while others categorically deny (Riccobono).
For the question of the influence on the doctrinal development of Roman Law: G. Rotondo, Procedimenti scolastici delle riforme di Giustiniano (inedito), in Scritti Giuridici, I, Milano 1922, pp. 437-52; P. De Francisci, L’azione degli elementi stranieri sullo sviluppo e sulla crisi del Diritto romano, in Archivio Giuridico, 93 (1925), pp. 195-97; E. Albertario, Introduzione storica allo studio del Diritto romano giustinianeo, Milano 1935, pp. 81-133 (critical essay reproduced in Studi di Diritto romano, V, Milano 1937, pp. 145-94); E. Volterra, Diritto romano e Diritti orientali, Bologna 1937; S. Riccobono, La perdita della scienza romanistica con la scomparsa del Ferrini, in Miscellanea Contardo Ferrini, Roma 1947, pp. 45-58; P. Collinet, La nature des actions, des interdits et des exceptions dans l’oeuvre de Justinien, Parigi 1947 (posthumous): the author’s thesis, that through the work of the Bolognese masters Roman Law passed from a formalistic phase to a substantive one as understood and constructed in the modern world, is entirely rejected by Prof. S. Riccobono, La definizione del Ius al tempio di Adriano, Palermo 1949 (extract from Annali del Sem. Giuridico di Palermo, 20 (1949), pp. 105 and 123).
BERKELEY, GEORGE. English philosopher and Anglican bishop, b. 11 March 1685 at Dysert, in the county of Kilkenny in Ireland, from an immigrant Anglican family, d. at Oxford 14 Jan. 1753. At the age of 15 he entered Trinity College, the celebrated University of Dublin, where he completed his studies brilliantly and later became a teacher of Greek, Hebrew, and theology. During this period he wrote the Commonplace Book (published only by Fraser in 1871; a much better edition by Johnston, 1930), a book of personal notes and reflections, very useful for understanding the formation and development of his thought. At the same University B. held the office of preacher after being ordained in 1709. In that same year he published his first work, Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, and the following year, 1710, his principal work, Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Towards the end of 1712 he went to London, where he met many leading scholars of the time and engaged in controversy with the freethinkers, publishing various articles in the journal The Guardian. In 1713 he published Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in which he presented, in a more lively and literary form, the same ideas as the Treatise.
In 1714 he visited Italy for the first time and returned in 1716, remaining there for four years; passing through Paris he had the opportunity to converse with Malebranche. Returning to London, after striving for an ethical-religious reform, which he saw as the only effective remedy for the ills of his country, he hoped to carry out his plan for the evangelization of the American Indians by founding a missionary institute on the Bermudas: with his wife, some companions, and an exceptional supply of books, he set sail in 1728 for the New World. However, after a three-year stay in Rhode Island (during which he composed the dialogue Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher against the freethinkers), his hopes were dashed by the failure to receive promised subsidies, and he returned to London. In 1734 he was appointed Bishop of Cloyne in Ireland. In this office he displayed active zeal in every field, with broad tolerance toward Catholics, who constituted the overwhelming majority of his diocese. Besides various publications on different subjects, in 1744, during an epidemic, B. published a curious medico-philosophical work, Siris (from seppè = tar), A Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Enquiries Concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water, inspired by the therapeutic qualities of tar-water which he had tested in America. From a philosophical standpoint this last work reveals a partly new conception of the world, with a mystical-Neoplatonic background, without however reaching, as some claim, a true antithesis to his earlier thought. In 1751 B. resigned his see and retired to Oxford, where he spent the last years of his life until his death.
Thought. — The starting point of B.’s philosophical system, developed with the explicit intent of combating atheism, scepticism, and rationalism of his time, is to be found in Cartesian subjectivism and in Locke’s empirical nominalism, not without a direct dependence on Malebranche’s spiritualism. Proceeding from the Cartesian presupposition that the object, insofar as it is given in knowledge, is only an idea or representation, and pushing further the critique that Locke had directed against the objectivity of secondary qualities of bodies, B. arrives at the clear denial of matter as an objective reality, descending into our representations. Indeed, he affirms, the same reasons that demonstrate the subjectivity of secondary qualities—sounds, colours, etc.—also apply to primary qualities, namely extension and motion. These too (B. strives to demonstrate this in his careful Theory of Vision) are irredeemably subjective, inasmuch as space is not, as is commonly believed, a datum of external perception, but rather the purely ideal result of previous experiences and psychological associations. Once the objectivity of space is denied, there is no longer any reason to admit, with Locke, beyond our representations of bodies, an unknown material substance (Principles, § 73): the body is nothing other than the complex of our ideas or representations, “what is seen, smelled, touched.” “Matter” is ultimately a mere name (nominalism) by which we designate the aggregate of our sensible representations; the being of bodies consists in their appearing to our consciousness, in their being perceived, “their esse is percipi” (Principles, § 3). To think, as existing beyond our representations, of an unknown and ineffable material substance, as their substratum or origin or cause, is to mistake a pure “scholastic abstraction” for reality.
Yet if it is true, B. affirms, that bodies are nothing but ideas, it does not follow that reality is denied or destroyed: the world is not an illusion or hallucination. Reality remains firm and steadfast; yet it is entirely resolved into the spiritual world. Substantial reality, albeit relative, is our spirit, the ego, which cannot be reduced to a mere bundle of representations but is intuited as subject and active principle of ideas, which it can indeed revive and reproduce through imagination and memory. This spiritual activity of our ego, however, has an evident limit: the world of external sensations is not within our arbitrary power; the corporeal universe does not depend on us (Principles, § 29, 146). From this immediate datum of psychological reflection B. concludes that the ideas of the world derive to our spirit directly from God: He, infinite and absolute Spirit, is the supreme and fundamental reality, eternal productive activity of ideas, which impresses upon our spirit according to a regularly uniform order and succession, in which consists the so-called natural law (Principles, § 30). Consequently, the reality and consistency of the world does not depend at all on my present perception, or on that of any other finite spirit, but solely on the activity of absolute Spirit: it is in this independence from any particular spirit that, according to B., the reality of ideas identified with things consists.
Thus, more than in a modern sense of idealism, BERKELEY’s system resolves itself into an immaterialistic and theistic realism. Against the sceptics he can affirm that not only is knowledge of reality possible for us, but indeed this coincides with our very ideas and knowledge; and against atheism BERKELEY arrives at the affirmation of God, not as a mere first cause of a material and objective world, but rather as the immediate centre and origin of our very spiritual life: a conception, as we see, essentially mystical, in accord with the frankly religious temperament of BERKELEY, and one which is accentuated in his last philosophical work, Siris.
In harmony with the fundamental lines of his system, BERKELEY resolves the remaining philosophical problems, for example, those of truth and causality. True is everything that is thought and willed by God, false what is thought only by our spirit; every original simple perception (intuition) is true; error arises from our fallacious associations of primitive data. Moreover, false and unreal is every product of abstraction: abstract ideas, against which he directed a tenacious and subtle critique, have for BERKELEY no existence, not even in the mind. As for causality, it belongs solely to spirit. There is no causal nexus between representations in themselves (Principles, §§ 64–65), but only an order of succession and of finality, according to the will and Providence of God: Who can freely suspend or break that order by miracle. Mechanism, therefore, as a system of interpretation of reality, is false, though it may have a utilitarian and practical moment. Similarly, the sciences have only a purely practical value; truth and reality are a conquest to which only philosophy can attain.
BERKELEY’s system, the penetrating and original philosophical genius, is an extreme reaction against materialism; yet it contains its own portion of truth, as does every product of genius. Even for traditional philosophy the universe exists insofar as it is thought and willed by God; it is not the knowledge of God in function of things, but rather things in function of that knowledge. This was BERKELEY’s fundamental intuition. But his error, grave and in no way excusable for the patent insufficiency of his logical and metaphysical presuppositions, was to deny the reality of matter as distinct from spirit. True it is that nothing exists independently of the actual thought and will of God, yet this does not remove the fact that things have their own proper reality; to deny this is to open the door to idealism and pantheism. Even the affirmation of the reality and substantiality of our ego as spirit will not withstand the logical development that BERKELEY’s presuppositions will find in another great English philosopher, HUME (v.); and the same may be said analogously of causality, which BERKELEY denied to matter and reserved to the ego.
It is moreover not difficult to see how, in the