ECLECTICISM. — From ἐκλέγω (I choose). In general, it is any philosophical and scientific tendency that selects different doctrines from various and opposing systems, coordinating them in a new synthesis. It was at times confused with syncretism (from συγκεράννυμι, “I mix”), which is its degenerate form.
The term is also accepted in the history of religions; but it has a more common and more proper use in philosophy. Rare among the Greeks, and, in the writings that have come down to us, only in adjectival and adverbial form. With reference to philosophy, it is found in a single text of Diogenes Laertius (3rd century A.D.), who mentions (Vitae, Prooemium, 21) an ἐκλεκτικὴ αἱρεσις (eclectic school) founded by Potamone of Alexandria, a contemporary, according to the Suda, of Augustus. An eclectic school of medicine is mentioned in a text attributed to Galen. Completely unknown, therefore, is whether “eclectic” was used among the Latins (cf. the Thesaurus linguae latinae, Leipzig 1900 ff.). It reappears from the 16th century onward, although sporadically and without acquiring a clearly defined technical meaning. Reinhold (1758–1829) criticizes “a presumed philosophy which is called eclectic by its followers, because it leaves the most complete freedom… to choose from all possible systems whatever each individual writer believes can accord with ordinary human intelligence” (Über das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens; Jena 1791).
Eclecticism acquired greater concreteness with Cousin (v.). He launched his eclecticism in the opening lecture of the 1818 course (delivered in December 1817); he had probably encountered the term among the Germans; the first germ of the idea may perhaps have come to him from Leibniz. Two periods must be distinguished in V. Cousin’s eclecticism: in the first, extending at least until 1839, it is not only a method of inquiry but also a system; in the second, clearly attested from 1853, it is denied as a system and survives only as a method. After Cousin, the term eclecticism, less used by his followers, is frequent among his adversaries, who make it virtually equivalent to syncretism, or simply a synonym for spiritualism. It nevertheless became established in the general history of philosophy to designate an unoriginal philosophical mode of thought which, without the guidance of profound and well-formed metaphysical principles, believes it can discern, by the sole criterion of common sense, whatever is true in conflicting systems.
When it is of this kind, eclecticism, both as a system and as a method, inevitably lapses into syncretism: “I believe,” Rosmini wrote, not without reason, in 1837, “that it would be too difficult for Mr. Cousin to avoid the charge of that syncretism which is certainly different from eclecticism, although the slide from the latter to the former is not difficult” (Lettera al dr. Luigi Gentili, in Opere, ed. naz., II, Rome 1934, p. 380). When, on the other hand, the selection and coordination of various elements drawn from different systems are carried out on the basis of solid and deeply considered principles that serve as a guiding norm for a new synthesis, it may be said that, in substance, eclecticism is sur-
passed. Indeed, if eclecticism were to be defined as the investigation and assimilation, insofar as it has been recognized as just, of the thought of others, none of the most vigorous philosophers could avoid being called eclectic. In the first case, therefore, there is eclecticism but not genuine philosophy; in the second, genuine philosophy but not eclecticism.
Meanwhile, the famous sonnet by Agostino Carracci, in praise of Niccolò dell'Abate, is probably a forgery by Malvasia; nor did the Carracci themselves proceed from a programmatic line as precise as it was artistically impracticable, such as that indicated in the sonnet: “whoever seeks and desires to become a good painter — should have the design of Rome at hand — the movement, with Venetian shadowing — and the worthy coloring of Lombardy — Michelangelo’s terrible path — Titian’s true naturalism — Correggio’s pure and sovereign style — and the proper symmetry of a Raphael — Tibaldi’s decorum and foundation — the invention of the learned Primaticcio — and a little of Parmigianino’s grace....” From a theoretical point of view, the position of the Carracci is merely critical and not artistic, and thus their e. has no particular foundation. In reality, an artist who rapidly undergoes and assimilates figurative influences, without thereby lacking personality, may generally be defined as eclectic. In this respect, even a great painter such as Raffaello was an eclectic.
On the other hand, the need for an eclectic position on the part of the artist already appears as a clear fact in the artistic theory of Mannerism, particularly in Armentino (Veri precetti della pittura, I, Milano 1820, p. 74), where he discusses the said manner, which consists in “recognizing and imitating what is good through the efforts of the most excellent,” that is, the possibility of attaining the level of art by drawing the best from the useful achievements of the great masters of the Renaissance.