COUSIN, VICTOR. – Philosopher, born in Paris on 28 November 1792, died at Cannes on 14 January 1867. He taught at the École Normale from 1814 to 1820, and at the Sorbonne from 1828. After the July Revolution of 1830 he was a Peer of France, Councillor of State, director of the École Normale, rector of the University, and Minister of Public Instruction (an office he held for only eight months, in 1840). Upon the fall of Luigi Filippo (1848), he withdrew from politics and, in 1852, also from teaching.
C. was among the most celebrated philosophers of his time, both in France and abroad (he was discussed in Italy, among others, by P. Galluppi, A. Rosmini, and V. Gioberti), although his fame subsequently declined rapidly. In reality, although he has great merits in the history of philosophy, especially medieval philosophy, as a philosopher he lacks true speculative depth. His characteristic philosophical position was eclecticism (v.), to which he was the first to give an organic and systematic form.
Eclecticism, as a system, arises from the following considerations: “Metaphysics, like morality, is founded upon psychology, that is, upon facts of consciousness which no one can absolutely deny... Reflection strives to grasp and express this reality in all its extent. It may well happen that it takes the part for the whole; but, in any case, that part which it manages to discern is not a chimera... The success of a system is a demonstration of the truth of some part of it; and since history takes account exclusively of systems that have had an echo... it must be concluded that the history of philosophy is not a sterile succession of chimeras, but a rich collection of partial truths, precious fragments of the whole truth” (Cours de l'histoire de la philosophie moderne, 1st series, IV, new ed., Paris 1846–47, lectures XVII–XVIII).
There have been so many systems since the beginning of the history of philosophy that by now the entire truth has been expressed in those fragments. It is only necessary to discern and reunite them. Now, in every human being there is a kind of sense of truth, capable of judging with certainty not contingent realities but eternal truths: it may be called reason, conscience, common sense, or simply the human spirit, thought. By employing this criterion, once the errors of the various systems have been discarded (errors arising from having elevated one part of the truth into the total truth), we shall be able to bring to light a remainder which will be the complete truth in a state of clear consciousness. For C., this is “réaliser l'éclectisme”.
Later, in the preface to the 1853 edition of Du vrai du beau et du bien, eclecticism, which had previously been a system for C., became nothing more than “a purely historical method, subordinated to spiritualism, which is our true doctrine, our true banner”. And again, in 1861 (in the preface to the 4th ed. of the Introduction à l'histoire de la philosophie): “Eclecticism is not a system; it is a method, a certain way of considering things... too reasonable to be entirely new.”
C.’s subsequent activity aimed at freeing speculation from the limitations and superficiality of the psychological school, which had reached its extreme form with Condillac; as such, it exercised a lasting and beneficial influence, particularly upon French philosophy. From the psychological school C. wished to retain, and defended to the end, the positive method, which bases philosophy upon the observation of the facts of consciousness; but he maintained firmly that among these facts there are some irreducible to sensibility, namely, voluntary and rational facts.
According to C., the two fundamental laws of reason are that of causality and that of substance; Aristotle’s ten categories and Kant’s twelve are reducible to these. They possess absolute value, and not, as Kant believes, “relative to the human condition”. “Reason is impersonal”, since “its character of universality and necessity is the opposite of individuality” (preface to the 1st ed. of the Fragments philosophiques, 1826).
The doctrine maintained until approximately 1833—that there exists only a single substance and that particular substances must be called its phenomena (cf. cited preface), a doctrine reducible to a weak and inconsequential Spinozism amalgamated with German idealism—was reproached to C., from several quarters and not without foundation, as pantheism. He vigorously defended himself against this accusation, asserting that the one substance was to be understood, in Platonic fashion, as God in the theistic sense; and that he had never intended to affirm that the ego and the non-ego were simple modifications of the one substance, as is shown by the fact that “my entire moral and political philosophy rests upon the notion of the ego considered as an essential force endowed with freedom” (Notice to the 3rd ed. of the Fragments philosophiques, 1838). In fact, C. was a determined, though not always consistent, spiritualist; and he clearly affirmed both the spirituality of God in the theistic sense and the spirituality of the human soul, whose individual immortality he demonstrated from the earliest years of his teaching by means of the moral argument deduced from God’s justice. But he was unable to give his system a firmly coherent form.
Regarding the Christian religion, he declared “a respect which no proof has disturbed or diminished, because it derives from the most intimate convictions and from philosophy itself” (preface to the 4th ed. of the Introduction à l'histoire de la philosophie, 1861). And when, under the reign of Luigi Filippo, he was the arbiter of the public school system in France, he wished teachers to be required to respect the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. In his early years, however, he professed rather the concept of a natural religion in the deist sense (v. DEISMO), from which he seems, indeed, never to have completely freed himself.
Principal works: Du vrai, du beau, du bien (1st ed., Paris 1818); Cours de l'histoire de la philosophie moderne (1st series [courses of 1815–20], 5 vols., there 1841; 2nd series [courses of 1828–29], 3 vols., there 1841. The work was placed on the Index [decree of 8 August 1844]. The individual parts were subsequently elaborated and published under distinct titles: Cours d'histoire de la philosophie morale au XVIIIe siècle (5 vols., there 1840–41); Fragments philosophiques (there 1826; Italian translation by P. Galluppi, 2 vols., Naples 1831–32); De la métaphysique d'Aristote (Paris 1835); Etudes sur Jacqueline Pascal (there 1844).
In addition: translation of the complete works of Plato (13 vols., there 1825–40); edition of Proclus (6 vols., there 1820–27; 1 vol., quarto, there 1864); Abelardo (1 vol., there 1836; 2 vols., there 1859); Descartes (11 vols., there 1824–26).