COUSIN, VICTOR. — Philosopher, b. in Paris on 28 Nov. 1792, d. at Cannes on 14 Jan. 1867. He taught at the École Normale from 1814 to 1820, and at the Sorbonne from 1828. After the July Revolution of 1830 he became a Peer of France, a Councillor of State, director of the École Normale, rector of the University, and Minister of Public Instruction (a post he held for only eight months in 1840). With the fall of Louis-Philippe in 1848 he withdrew from politics and in 1852 also from teaching.
Cousin was among the most celebrated philosophers of his time, both in France and abroad (discussed in Italy, among others, by P. Galluppi, A. Rosmini, and V. Gioberti), though his fame later declined rapidly. In reality, while he has great merits in the history of philosophy, especially medieval philosophy, as a philosopher he lacks true speculative depth. His characteristic philosophical position was eclecticism (v.), which he was the first to give organic and systematic form.
Eclecticism, as a system, arises from the following considerations: “Metaphysics, like morals, is founded upon psychology, that is, upon facts of consciousness that no one can absolutely deny... Reflection strives to grasp and express this reality in all its extent. It may well take the part for the whole; but in any case, that part which reflection succeeds in discerning is no chimera... The good success of a system is a demonstration of the truth of some of its parts; and since history takes account exclusively of systems that have had resonance..., it must be concluded that the history of philosophy is not a barren succession of chimeras, but a rich collection of partial truths, precious fragments of the whole truth” (Cours de l'histoire de la philosophie moderne, 1st series, IV, new ed., Paris 1846-47, lectures XVII-XVIII).
So many systems have appeared since the origin of the history of philosophy that the entire truth has now been expressed in these fragments. It remains only to discern them and reunite them. Now, in every man there is a kind of sense of truth, capable of judging with certainty not contingent realities, but eternal truths: it may be called reason, conscience, common sense, or simply human spirit, thought. By using this criterion we may, discarding the errors of the various systems (errors that arise from having elevated a part of the truth to the status of total truth), bring to light a residue that will be the complete truth in a state of clear consciousness. This is, for Cousin, “réaliser l'éclectisme.”
Later, in the preface to the 1853 edition of Du vrai, du beau et du bien, eclecticism, which had first been for Cousin a system, is no more than “a purely historical method, subordinate to spiritualism, which is our true doctrine, our true banner.” And again in 1861 (in the preface to the 4th ed. of Introduction à l'histoire de la philosophie): “Eclecticism is not a system, it is a method, a certain way of considering things... too reasonable to be entirely new.”
Cousin’s later activity aimed to free speculation from the narrowness and superficiality of the psychological school, which had reached its extreme form with Condillac, and in this respect he exercised a lasting beneficial influence, particularly on French philosophy. From the psychological school Cousin wished to preserve and defend to the end the positive method, which founds philosophy on the observation of facts of consciousness; but he maintained that among these facts there are some not reducible to sensibility, namely the voluntary and the rational.
According to Cousin, there are two fundamental laws of reason: that of causality and that of substance; to these are reducible the ten categories of Aristotle and the twelve of Kant. They have absolute value, and not, as Kant thinks, “relative to the human condition.” Reason is impersonal, since “its character of universality and necessity is the opposite of individuality” (preface to the 1st ed. of Fragments philosophiques, 1826).
The doctrine held around 1833, that there exists only one substance and that particular substances must be called its phenomena (cf. cited preface), a doctrine that reduces to a failure and inconsistent Spinozism amalgamated with German idealism, was reproached by many, not without foundation, as pantheism. To this accusation he vigorously defended himself, asserting that the single substance was to be understood, in a Platonic sense, as God in a theistic sense; and that he had never intended to affirm that the ego and the non-ego are simple modifications of the single substance, so much so that “all my moral and political philosophy rests on the notion of the ego considered as an essential force, a given of freedom” (Notice to the 3rd ed. of Fragments philosophiques, 1838). In fact, Cousin was a decided, though not always consistent, spiritualist; and he clearly affirmed both the spirituality of God in a theistic sense and the spirituality of the human soul, whose individual immortality he demonstrated from his earliest years of teaching by the moral argument drawn from the justice of God. Yet he was unable to give his system a solidly coherent form.
As regards the Christian religion, he professed “a respect that no proof has disturbed or diminished, because it derives from the most intimate convictions and from philosophy itself” (preface to the 4th ed. of Introduction à l'histoire de la philosophie, 1861). And when, under the reign of Louis-Philippe, he was the arbiter of public education in France, he required that teachers respect the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. In his early years, however, he rather professed the concept of a natural religion in a deistic sense (v. DEISM), from which he seems not to have entirely freed himself.
Principal works: Du vrai, du beau, du bien (1st ed. Paris 1818); Cours de l'histoire de la philosophie moderne (1st series [courses of 1815-20], 5 vols., ibid. 1841; 2nd series [courses of 1828-29], 3 vols., ibid. 1841. The work was placed on the Index [decr. 8 Aug. 1844]). The individual parts were later reworked and published under distinct titles: Cours d'histoire de la philosophie morale au XVIIIe siècle (5 vols., ibid. 1840-41); Fragments philosophiques (ibid. 1826; Ital. trans. by P. Galluppi, 2 vols., Naples 1831-32); De la métaphysique d'Aristote (Paris 1835); Etudes sur Jacqueline Pascal (ibid. 1844).
Also: translation of the complete works of Plato (13 vols., ibid. 1825-40); edition of Proclus (6 vols., ibid. 1820-27; 1 vol., 4th ed., ibid. 1864); Abelard (1 vol., ibid. 1836; 2 vols., ibid. 1859); Descartes (11 vols., ibid. 1824-26).