METHODOLOGY. – The word method (μέθοδος, from μετὰ, through, and ὁδός, way), sometimes used by the ancients in the sense of “inquiry,” subsequently came to signify ever more distinctly the procedure of inquiry, the direction followed by thought, or the ordered set of operations that must be carried out in order to achieve an end. M. (which is a generic concept designating the doctrine and study of method) may therefore be defined as the systematic study of the means employed to accomplish a given purpose. It thus has an essentially theoretical value, insofar as it examines the means and their correspondence to the end; but at the same time it assumes a practical character, insofar as scientific knowledge of the means becomes the norm for their practical application. M. thereby becomes a normative discipline, prescribing the paths to be followed (and at the same time indicating the errors to be avoided) in order to attain the proposed ends. These distinctions are essential for understanding the various linguistic uses of the word “m.” and their intimate connection with the problem of the relations between theory and practice. The term is sometimes used to characterize the whole of Aristotelian logic (as the theoretical study of methods of reasoning); but more often m. means applied logic, and (in treatises on scholastic philosophy) that part of logic whose object is the application of logic in general and in the individual sciences; at other times m., dissociated from traditional logic, presents itself directly (as, for example, in Descartes’ Discours de la méthode) as a set of rules or counsels “for properly conducting reason and seeking truth in the sciences.” It should also be observed that—although m. may generically be defined as the study of the means to be used in order to attain a given end—it is not possible to define this end univocally. In a very broad sense anything can become an end, and m. tends to merge with the study of technique; but even while remaining within the fields of science and philosophy, it is possible to set oneself different ends: thus the formal discipline of reasoning, the construction of experimental science, the construction of philosophy, the attainment of operative awareness, or the clarification of ideas represent logically and historically distinct ends, requiring different methods. This explains how the word “method” may receive various qualifications (analytical, synthetic, intuitive, experimental, a priori, a posteriori, regressive, critical, transcendental, dialectical, phenomenological, pragmatist, semantic...), in accordance both with the various ends and with the means or procedures corresponding to the nature of the respective purposes and fields of inquiry. It is therefore necessary to distinguish a general m. from the particular m. that undertake the study of the methods used in the various disciplines.
Classical m. is conditioned above all by the ideal of a demonstrative science (in the Aristotelian sense): Aristotle’s logic (set out essentially in the Prior and Posterior Analytics) is largely an inquiry into the conditions of scientific knowledge; this inquiry brings to light syllogism (v.) demonstration (v.), and the central function of induction (in the classical sense, as universalizing abstraction, intuition of the universal implicitly present as form in the particular) in determining the premises of demonstration. Casting reasonings into syllogistic form is important for deciding the degree of soundness and certainty of individual propositions, and for discovering errors or sophisms; it also serves to provide a rigorous discipline of discussion (developed above all in scholasticism). The transformation of the ideal of knowledge at the dawn of the modern age nevertheless brought a series of new tasks for m.: classical logic appeared sterile for the purposes of invention, and the method of scholastic abstraction inadequate to the construction of a modern science of nature, increasingly tending to build itself upon the solid foundation of experience. The problem of method in Bacon (Novum Organum, 1620) may be formulated as follows: “how should nature be interrogated, and experience used to construct science?” First of all, the idols (that is, prejudices of every kind) must be avoided; then the greatest possible number of particular cases relating to a given question must be collected, in order to institute a systematic comparison and thus derive (by induction [v.]) the general. The problem of method appears differently in Descartes (Regulae ad directionem ingenii, 1628?; Discours, cited, 1637): according to his conception of knowledge and science, Descartes always has before him the model of mathematical evidence; he therefore recommends a procedure of analysis (analogous to that which led him himself to the discovery of analytic geometry), by virtue of which it is possible to arrive at the first intuitive elements, the simple natures, which ensure the rationality of the whole.
But empiricism and rationalism, insofar as they are distinct methodological orientations, are one-sided, and through their opposition generate antinomies: Kant (v.) clearly perceived this. The Kantian critical method entails a kind of regression to the transcendental conditions that make knowledge possible: the analysis of the cognitive function thus undertaken aims to discipline the use of reason, and consequently to establish the limits and scope of scientific knowledge. Post-Kantian idealism transforms the dialectic (v.), permitting an organic deduction of the various determinations of knowledge: the dialectical method was also employed in the construction of a philosophy of nature that was intended to replace Newtonian science. idealism (v.) underwent a profound revision; and it is interesting to note how, at the end of this process, Croce (Teoria e storia della storiografia, 3ᵃ ed., Bari 1927, p. 138), renouncing a definition of philosophy in terms of metaphysics, instead defined it “as m. of judgment, that is, of historical knowledge” (that is, as theoretical awareness of the only knowledge that is critically possible).
But contemporary methodology still presents a variety of other currents, to which reference is made especially today when speaking of methodology: they have in common a predominantly analytical, rather than prescriptive and normative, purpose; that is, they do not intend to provide a priori rules for attaining truth, or to trace the path that must be followed, but rather to study the path actually taken in order to achieve a greater awareness of both scientific and philosophical activity. Scientific methodology, fostered by the great progress of contemporary science, is devoted to the study of scientific methods, the various procedures of inquiry, and the relations between theory and experience. It has increasingly clarified the language (v.) and of specifying the conditions under which concepts are employed; logical positivists, or neopositivists (initially associated with the so-called Vienna Circle and today widespread in America), have also symbolic logic (v.) for pursuing this study in depth. In this way, it meets some of the most pressing needs of contemporary thought: namely, clarifying the meaning of concepts, distinguishing between problems and pseudoproblems, determining the logical form of theories, and logically analyzing the relations between different theories. Operational methodology (developed especially in Italy by S. Ceccato), with regard to every question, poses the inquiry: “with what operations does one speak of...?”; and, abandoning every theoretical-epistemological concern, it aims essentially to analyze the activity of the scientist or philosopher, that is, to make explicit the cycle of operations they perform when they employ a language or construct a theory. Contemporary methodology thus provides various criteria of analysis with which to satisfy its fundamental demand for greater awareness, while at the same time laying the foundations for a more rigorous discipline of linguistic communication. V. NEOPOSITIVISMO; SCIENZA.