METHODOLOGY. – The word method (μεθοδος, from μετα, through, and οδος, way), sometimes used by the ancients in the sense of “inquiry,” later came to denote more precisely the procedure of inquiry, the direction taken by thought, or the ordered set of operations to be performed in order to attain a given end. Method (a generic concept for designating the doctrine and study of method) may thus be defined as the systematic examination of the means employed to realize a specific end. It is therefore of essential, though theoretical, value as an examination of the means and their correspondence to the end; yet it also assumes a practical character, in that the scientific knowledge of the means becomes the norm for their practical application. Method thus becomes a normative discipline, prescribing the paths to be followed (and at the same time indicating the errors to be avoided) with a view to achieving the proposed aims. These distinctions are essential for understanding the various linguistic uses of the word “method” and their intimate connection with the problem of the relationship between theory and practice. The term is sometimes used to characterize the whole of Aristotelian logic (as the theoretical study of methods of reasoning); but more often “method” refers to applied logic, and (in treatises of Scholastic philosophy) to that part of logic which treats the application of logic in general and in the individual sciences. At other times, method, dissociated from traditional logic, presents itself directly (as, for example, in Descartes’ *Discours de méthode*) as a set of rules or precepts “for rightly conducting the reason and seeking truth in the sciences.”
It must also be observed that, although method may be broadly defined as the study of the means to be employed in order to attain a given end, it is not possible to define this end unambiguously. In a very broad sense, any object may become an end, and method tends to merge with the study of technique; but even within the field of science and philosophy, different ends may be proposed: thus, the formal discipline of reasoning, the construction of experimental science, the construction of philosophy, the attainment of operative awareness, or the clarification of ideas represent logically and historically distinct aims, each requiring different methods. This explains why the word “method” may receive various qualifications (analytic, synthetic, intuitive, experimental, a priori, a posteriori, regressive, critical, transcendental, dialectical, phenomenological, pragmatist, semantic, etc.) in accordance with the diverse ends, means, or procedures suited to the nature of the respective aims and fields of inquiry. It is therefore necessary to distinguish general method from particular methods, which undertake the study of the methods employed in the various disciplines.
Classical method is conditioned above all by the ideal of a demonstrative science (in the Aristotelian sense): Aristotle’s logic (essentially expounded in the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*) is largely an inquiry into the conditions of scientific knowledge; this inquiry brings to light the great importance of the syllogism (q.v.) as the organ of demonstration (q.v.), and the central function of induction (in the classical sense, as the universalization of the implicit universal contained in the particular) for the determination of the premises of demonstration. The syllogistic formulation of reasoning is important for deciding the degree of soundness and certainty of individual propositions, and for uncovering errors or fallacies; it also serves to provide a rigorous discipline for discussion (developed especially in Scholasticism). The transformation of the ideal of knowledge at the dawn of the modern age, however, imposed a series of new tasks upon method: classical logic appeared sterile for the purposes of discovery, and the method of Scholastic abstraction was inadequate for the construction of a modern natural science, which was increasingly to be based upon the solid foundation of experience.
Bacon’s problem of method (*Novum Organum*, 1620) may be formulated thus: “How is nature to be interrogated, how is experience to be utilized in the construction of science?” First of all, it is necessary to avoid idols (i.e., prejudices of every kind), then to collect the greatest possible number of particular cases relating to a given question, in order to institute a systematic comparison and thereby derive (by induction [q.v.]) the general. The problem of method presents itself differently in Descartes (*Regulae ad directionem ingenii*, 1628; *Discours*, op. cit., 1637): according to his conception of knowledge and science, Descartes always has before him the model of mathematical evidence; and he therefore recommends a procedure of analysis (analogous to that which led him to the discovery of analytic geometry) by virtue of which it is possible to arrive at the first intuitive elements, the simple natures, which ensure the rationality of the whole.
But empiricism and rationalism, as distinct methodological orientations, are one-sided, and through their opposition generate antinomies: this was clearly seen by Kant (q.v.). Kant’s critical method involves a kind of regression to the transcendental conditions which render knowledge possible: the analysis thus undertaken of the cognitive function aims to regulate the use of reason, and hence to establish the limits and scope of scientific knowledge. Post-Kantian idealism transforms the critical method into a progressive dialectic (q.v.), which permits an organic deduction of the various cognitive determinations: the dialectical method has also been employed for the construction of a philosophy of nature, which was to have replaced Newtonian science. But after Hegel, idealism (q.v.) underwent a profound revision; and it is interesting to note how, at the end of this process, Croce (*Teoria e storia della storiografia*, 3rd ed., Bari 1927, p. 138),
renouncing the definition of philosophy in terms of metaphysics, instead defined it “as the method of judgment, that is, of historical knowledge” (i.e., as the theoretical awareness of the only knowledge critically possible).
But contemporary methodology still presents a variety of other currents, to which particular reference is made today when one speaks of methodology: these share the common aim of being predominantly analytical rather than prescriptive or normative. They do not intend, that is, to provide a priori norms for attaining truth or to trace the path that must be followed; rather, they seek to study the path actually taken in order to achieve a greater awareness of both scientific and philosophical work. Scientific methodology, promoted by the great contemporary scientific progress, is devoted to the study of scientific methods, the various procedures of investigation, and the relationships between theory and experience. It has increasingly clarified the importance of linguistic analysis (v.) and the precise conditions for the use of concepts; the logical positivists or neopositivists (originating initially in the so-called Vienna Circle and now widespread in America) have also demonstrated the utility of symbolic logic (v.) for conducting this study thoroughly. In this way, one seeks to satisfy some of the most pressing demands of contemporary thought: to clarify the meaning of concepts, to distinguish between problems and pseudo-problems, to determine the logical form of theories, and to analyze logically the relationships between different theories. Operational methodology (developed especially in Italy by S. Ceccato) poses, with regard to every question, the question: “By what operations does one speak of...?”; and, abandoning all theoretical-epistemological concerns, it aims essentially to analyze the activity of the scientist or philosopher, that is, to make explicit the cycle of operations they perform when employing a language or constructing a theory. Contemporary methodology thus provides different criteria of analysis with which to satisfy its fundamental demand for greater awareness, while at the same time laying the foundations for a more rigorous discipline of linguistic communication. V. also NEOPOSITIVISM, SCIENCE.