Detraction

DETRACTION. - I. DEFINITION. - Detraction (from the Latin detrahere = "to take away") is the unjust denigration of another's reputation, by spreading true or false reports of hidden defects of one's neighbor.

For there to be detraction, the following are required: 1) an injury to reputation; 2) the lack of a proportionate cause that would justly require the disclosure of those vices; 3) the absence of the defamed person.

Detraction is formal when there is the intention to defame; it is material when it is caused only by thoughtlessness or by frivolity or by excessive talkativeness. The disclosure, without necessity, of hidden defects that really exist is simple detraction or defamation; the spreading of false defamatory reports is calumny.

II. VARIOUS KINDS OF DETRACTION

St. Thomas in 2ᵃ-2ᵇᶜ, q. 73, a. 1, ad 3ᵐ, enumerates 6 different ways of defaming: 1) by calumny, 2) by exaggerating in recounting defects, 3) by disclosing a hidden piece of news, 4) by attributing evil intentions, 5) by denying the good of others, 6) by malicious reticence. Other authors add two more ways: 7) by belittling the good of others, 8) by studied coldness in praising. In the first four the defamation is explicit and positive, whereas in the remaining ones it is veiled and indirect, by denying or belittling a good quality. It should be noted that often some forms of veiled defamation are more malicious and harmful than the direct ways, e.g.: "If I told everything I know... About certain other facts it is better to keep silent...". Moreover, certain silences made on purpose, worse still if accompanied by a smile or a movement of the head, while others question us about the honesty of a third party, are true d.

III. THE RIGHT TO FAME

The gravity of d. is easily understood by considering how necessary reputation is in relations with other men, for gaining trust and friendship, for obtaining positions, work, and loans.

Reputation can be "true" when the good name is founded on the real existence of the good qualities attributed; "apparent" if one enjoys the good name without the merits attributed by opinion existing. One who has not publicly committed evil ordinarily has a right to a good name and must be considered honest. The right to a good name belongs first of all to persons who enjoy true reputation, the fruit of their honesty. Over this good they have an absolute and universal right, which must always be respected and by everyone. It follows that it will always be sinful to harm the good reputation of the good, even if it has been tarnished by public calumny. The right to reputation extends also to false reputation; therefore men who commit faults and know how to appear honest in public ordinarily have a right to a good name. This right is not of the same nature as that of the good: it is not demanded by a nonexistent interior goodness, but by the inconveniences that, in the contrary case, would arise against the public and private good. If all private faults could be published, the public good would suffer: the defamed person would lose all authority over his subordinates; his word would become ineffective, even his relatives would be dishonored; an interminable series of quarrels and hatreds would ensue, with the consequent disturbance of private and public peace and tranquility. Other inconveniences would work against the private good: reputation, even for one who has failed, is a preservative against worse vices, which the fear of losing a good name induces the guilty party to restrain his own faults. Such a right to reputation ceases when there arises a proportionate cause to justify or require the publication of hidden faults.

IV. MALICE OF CALUMNY AND DEFAMATION

Calumny by its very nature is more serious than simple defamation, because it adds lying to it. Calumny and simple d. have in common the malice of offending justice and charity. 1) They offend justice, because they take from one's neighbor a good that belongs to him, his reputation, to which all those who have not publicly committed evil have a right. 2) They offend charity, which forbids harming one's neighbor in any way. St. Thomas in 2a-2ae, q. 73, a. 2, judges d. to be the most serious sin against one's neighbor, after homicide and adultery, and therefore more serious than theft. He explains the reason with the words of Holy Scripture: « Melius est nomen bonum, quam divitiae multae » (Prov. 21, 1).

Both calumny and simple d. constitute sin. St. Paul places this sin among those that exclude from the kingdom of God (cf. Rom. 29-30; I Cor. 6, 10). St. Thomas in 2a-2ae, q. 73, a. 1 affirms that d. is a sin « valde grave, quia inter res temporales videtur fama esse pretiosior, per cuius defectum impeditur homo a multis bene agendis ». St. Bernard presents the defamer as the killer of three souls: he kills himself, he kills the one who listens to him, he kills the one defamed (cf. Serm., XVII, de diversi, n. 4, 5).

V. GRAVITY OF DEFAMATION

The gravity of the sin of d. depends on the extent of the harm done to another's reputation and on the malice of the defamer's intention. A long series of elements combine to determine the extent of the harm: the nature and importance of the defects or vices revealed; the dignity and standing of the defamer; the moral worth, credulity, malevolence, talkativeness and number of the listeners; the condition, authority and office of the defamed person; the depth of the impression produced by the defamatory words; the anticipated displeasure of the defamed person; the material and pecuniary damages caused; the loss of advantageous opportunities and of facilities for doing good" (cf. A. Thouvenin, Médicance, in DThC, X, col. 491). To this must then be added the weight of the motives that drive one to defamation: hatred, revenge, jealousy, or the simple need to talk. For a grave fault it is not necessary that the defamation arise from perverse feelings; it is enough that it produce grave consequences for the neighbor's esteem that were foreseen; indeed, a grave responsibility is contracted even for a voluntary act in its cause.

VI. WHEN IT IS LAWFUL TO REVEAL HIDDEN DEFECTS

While calumny is always unlawful, because it is against the truth, the revelation of true hidden defects can be lawful whenever it is justified by a proportionate cause. This can be: 1) the duty to defend religion and its principles (a faithful person is bound to warn the priests of the work of clandestine diffusion of heretical or immoral doctrines: of the existence of a hidden impediment to the administration of a Sacrament); 2) the duty to act according to justice (an inspector must report the defects found in inspections); 3) the duty to provide for the good of society (to publish the defects of a candidate in order to prevent the offices of the State from falling into the hands of an incompetent person); 4) the interest of the guilty party (to reveal the vices of a son to his parents for his correction); 5) the good of a third party (to warn someone to abandon the company of a corrupter, who appears good); 6) the interest of the speaker (to reveal to the judge hidden offenses suffered in order to obtain protection and reparation, to seek counsel or to relieve oneself).

VII. LA DIVULGAZIONE DI DELITTI PUBBLICI

A fact already known to the public, or which will soon be, is said to be notorious. It is notorious "de iure" if it is made known by a judge's sentence; it is notorious "de facto" if, although no judge's sentence exists, it is known to the public or will soon be. A fact can be notorious in one place and not in another. News of a crime already condemned by the judge may lawfully be divulged, because by the condemnation the judge has deprived the guilty party of the right to reputation. It is not forbidden to speak publicly of a crime in places where it is notorious "de facto", because there reputation is already lost; but if the crime has already been forgotten by most, it cannot be recalled without sufficient reason, because the offender has already recovered the right to reputation. It is unlawful to make a crime known in places where it is not notorious, because the person defamed still has the right to reputation.

VIII. DEFAMATION THROUGH THE PRESS

For the press the same norms apply to which private persons are bound, bearing in mind that for the press the circumstance of public utility very often occurs, which legitimizes the dissemination of defamatory news. 1) It is unlawful to spread calumnies even if they have already been spread by other newspapers and are known to many. 2) The publication of defamatory news whose truth has not been ascertained is always unlawful. 3) It is lawful to disseminate notorious defamatory news; it is also lawful for hidden private facts if there is a just and proportionate reason. 4) The defects of the public administration may lawfully be stigmatized by the press, provided that no greater evil follows from it.

IX. COOPERATORS IN DETRACTION

It is important to know the ways of cooperating in defamation, because responsibility and the eventual obligation to make reparation fall more or less upon the cooperators. 1) Direct cooperators are those who instigate others to defame and offer them the occasion, or steer the conversation toward the defects of one's neighbor, or express praise precisely in order to move others to criticism, or approve defamatory judgments. By their instigation and approval they cooperate in an unjust action: they are bound to make reparation by denying the reports if they are false, by speaking well of those persons if there has been only defamation. 2) Those also are cooperators who inwardly take pleasure in hearing their neighbor defamed. They are not bound to make reparation; however, they sin, because they take pleasure in their neighbor's evil and in an unjust action. 3) Indirect cooperators are those who, being able to, do not prevent the defamation: they sin by omission, gravely, when there is certainty that the defamation is grave and unjust, there is a concrete possibility of preventing the defamation, and no grave difficulties stand in the way.

X. REPARATION OF REPUTATION

1) The calumniator is obliged to restore reputation by openly confessing that he has lied. 2) The simple detractor must use the means suitable and useful for restoring the good name, bringing to light the good qualities of the defamed person. 3) Both the calumniator and the simple defamer are obliged to repair all the material damages derived from the defamation and previously foreseen.

While, however, the calumniator is obliged to a total reparation, the simple detractor seems bound only to a partial reparation, because the damages derive from two factors: the spread of the news and the reality of the offense. 4) One is dispensed from repairing reputation: a) by the pardon of the defamed person; b) if the offense becomes public knowledge through the intervention of other causes; c) if the defamation was forgotten; d) if the defamation was repaired by other means, as, for example, by the judge's verdict of acquittal; e) if reparation is materially or morally impossible, as in the case in which the repairing detractor would suffer damages much more serious than those of the defamed person (v. RESTITUZIONE).

Giuseppe Sette