NEOCRITICISM. - Term with which the philosophical currents that take up and develop the themes of Kantian philosophy (v. CRITICISM; KANT) are usually designated; it is therefore considered equivalent to Neo-Kantianism. Neo-criticism constitutes a vast and complex movement that spread, in the 19th century, especially in Germany, France and Italy. Everywhere it presents the character of a reaction to post-Kantian idealism and tends to overcome positivistic materialism, although for the most part the aim of the Neo-Kantians consists in the attempt to reconcile the critical demand with the presuppositions of positivism.
In Germany Neo-criticism properly so called begins around 1860; J. Fries (v.) and F. Benecke may be considered its precursors. In the second half of the century a new fervor of historical and philosophical studies arises, which contributes to spreading Kant's works and to deepening knowledge of them. Important above all are K. Fischer (1824-1907) and O. Liebmann (1840-1912: Kant und die Epigonen, Stuttgart 1864), who gave the decisive impulse to the Neo-critical movement. Seven fundamental directions are usually distinguished within German Neo-criticism. The first is called physiological Neo-criticism, inasmuch as the a priori forms are reduced to simple physiological conditions of knowledge. The physicist H. v. Helmholtz (1821-94) holds that representations are signs or symbols, which do not prove the existence of external objects, while F. A. Lange (v.), opposing materialism by considering, in Kant's footsteps, matter as a simple representation, excludes, on the other hand, any possibility of transcendental deduction, reducing both the forms of sensibility and the categories to forms of psychophysical organization. The second direction, called metaphysical Neo-criticism, directly gathers the impulse given to the movement by the work of O. Liebmann; it usually includes the thought of E. Zeller (v.), one of the greatest champions of the return to Kant, and of J. Volkelt (v.). Although on empiricist and relativistic foundations, they maintain the possibility of a critical metaphysics. Toward the complete exclusion of any metaphysical inquiry, on the other hand, tends realistic Neo-criticism, which has its greatest exponent in A. Riehl (v.), who rigorously maintains the reduction of philosophy to a scientific theory of knowledge; he accepts the thing in itself and the Kantian apriorism, attributing to the latter a social value. Toward the end of the 19th century a phase of Neo-criticism is determined by the so-called Marburg School (v.), founded by H. Cohen (v.), with a logistico-methodological orientation. For Cohen the task of philosophy is to bring to light the logical structures of knowledge, which is essentially mathematical science of nature; intuition is assimilated to conceptual thought, which identifies itself with its own content. Aesthetics, morality and religion fall within the domain of conceptual knowledge. P. Natorp (v.) too is a champion of a logical intellectualism, of Platonic tone; he emphasizes the unity of thought and being, understood as the construction of being on the part of thought; mathematics is the example of a cognitive, constructive process, which can extend to an indefinitely vaster field. To the Marburg School belongs moreover M. E. Cassirer (1874-1945), who deals with the problem of knowledge especially from the historical point of view. In parallel with methodological Neo-criticism, axiological Neo-criticism develops, proper to the school founded by W. Windelband (v.), called the South-West German or Baden school. From Kantian ethics Windelband takes the concept of "duty", unifying in it all the branches of philosophical speculation. Thought too is subject to a ought-to-be, which constitutes the criterion of truth; philosophy does not create, but must discern the values, proper to normal consciousness, which constitute human culture. M. H. Rickert (v.), a disciple of Windelband, develops the master's theories in the sense of a transcendental idealism; he distinguishes the natural sciences from the cultural sciences, having as their object the individual, in its relations with value, which, in its logical priority, transcends at once the subject and the object. Similarly H. Münsterberg (1863-1916) opposes to the objectified truth of science a system of values independent of temporality. Neo-criticism in this form cannot give rise to any deduction of the categories. This appears evident in the work of M. B. Bauch (b. 1877), for whom the system of the categories, that is, according to his conception, of the laws of nature, is capable of continuous increase and is integrated with the system of cultural values. Among the pupils of W. Windelband, E. Lask (1875-1915) must moreover be remembered; among the pupils of M. H. Rickert, W. Metzger (1879-1910). The relativism of G. Simmel (v.) may also be considered included in the Neo-critical movement, since he transposes the doctrine of the Kantian a priori into the field of history, sociology, social psychology, and ethics. A last current, which draws its fundamental themes from the doctrine of Fries, interprets criticism in a psychological sense; its representatives are H. Cornelius (b. 1863) and above all L. Nelson (1882-1927).
In France the greatest exponent of Neo-criticism is Ch. Renouvier (v.): he takes up the foundations of the Kantian doctrine, in order to transform them into a radical phenomenism; he decisively rejects the thing in itself, understanding representation as a relation between subject and object, such that these exist only in and for the relation. The categories, whose list Renouvier renews, belong neither to the subject alone, nor to the object alone, but are modes of representation itself; the series of representations constituting the universe is finite; the infinite concerns only the possible, not the true. In this sense the Kantian antinomies are resolved; Renouvier accepts only their theses, rejecting the antitheses as illusory; the world is discontinuous and in it a free causality is conceivable. Freedom, the indispensable foundation of moral action, leads man to opt for the recognition of universal contingency, since judgment too has the character of an act of will. Among Renouvier's disciples are to be numbered V. Brochard (1884-1907), G. Milhaud (1858-1918), who emphasizes the distinction between logical certainty, necessarily limited and relative, and intuitive certainty, which does not shrink from contradiction and is at the basis of all knowledge, and O. Hamelin (v.), who reconstructs the table of the categories on rational foundations, according to the schema of the Hegelian dialectic.
Also in Italy, neo-criticism responded to the aim of reconciling confidence in the positive sciences with the need to safeguard the world of spiritual and cultural values. A. Testa (1784-1860) is considered a precursor of the movement; he strove to make Kantian thought known in Italy, setting it against the currents then prevailing. But only in the second half of the 19th century did Italian scholars become numerous who, coming into contact with the representatives of German neo-criticism, devoted themselves to spreading and deepening the knowledge of Kant. Among them C. Cantoni (v.) gave a broad exposition of Kantian philosophy (E. Kant, 3 vols., Milan 1879-84), one of the most complete works on the subject. Cantoni sees in criticism, which he develops in a realistic sense, the possibility of closely linking philosophy with the sciences and with all the spheres of human spirituality. F. Masci (v.), considered the greatest representative of Italian neo-criticism, instead emphasizes the subjective value of the a priori, which nevertheless remains fully valid for objective reality, inasmuch as matter and spirit constitute a single psycho-physical substance, which evolves in the sense of a progressive strengthening of the spirit. Also belonging to Italian neo-criticism are: F. Tocco (v.), A. Chiappelli (v.), G. Barzelotti (v.), S. Turbiglio (1842-1901), G. Zuccante (v.), A. Faggi (b. 1868), L. Credaro (1860-1939), F. De Sarlo (v.), P. Martinetti (v.).
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M. Elena Reina