PUBLIC OPINION. —
I. NOTION
Public opinion is not simply the sum of individual opinions, but rather a set of ideas, sentiments, judgments, and practical positions which, at a given time, represents and expresses a collective attitude, shaping the psychology of individuals and resulting from an intimate persuasion, produced more or less spontaneously, whereby a fairly large number of people think and feel uniformly about some fact or problem of the day.In the case of public opinion, the term “opinion” does not have precisely the same meaning as when “opinion” certainty (v.) doubt (v.), as the second degree of knowledge, consisting in imperfect assent that oscillates between doubt (the first degree), which is indecision between two contrary theses, and certainty (the third degree), which is firm and sure adherence to one side. Individual opinion is adherence to a thesis, but accompanied by fear of error, owing to the absence of intrinsic objective evidence (certainty of reason) or of evidence founded on other certainties (certainty of faith: cf. Sum. Theol., 2º-2º, q. 2, a. 1; De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1).
Public opinion, however, may result from acts of assent that subjectively constitute certainty, and in any case from more or less spontaneous and more or less rational adherence on the part of many people to ideas which, through collective communication or under the influence of more powerful personalities, propaganda centres, political and social organizations, etc., have succeeded in winning over their thought or feeling. A phenomenon therefore occurs similar to that involved in the formation of the practical conscience. In practical life, in fact, the judgments of many concerning action do not rise above the level of opinion, given the complexity of the circumstances surrounding the human act and the difficulties arising from an often disordered or confused inner state. In order to pass to action, one then resorts to some reflective principle, which helps to form a prudent practical judgment, that is, one in conformity with right appetite, so that the transition to action is legitimate (cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, De Beatitudine, « de actibus humanis et habitibus », Torino 1951, pp. 384, 389). The advice of a wise and prudent person can assist in such a pronouncement of conscience, and at times even replaces, by its authority, personal considerations concerning the reasons for a choice and the legitimacy of a position.
The same applies in the field of public opinion; since it generally involves knowing and judging contingent and complex facts, or choosing a line of action on the basis of motives that are not always fully convincing, or even behaving according to dictates of conscience often beset by passions and interests, it is difficult, and for many almost impossible, to form a personal certainty. Many others do not undertake the work of investigation and judgment out of laziness, scepticism, or some other reason. The thought or authority of certain individuals then intervenes; through the skilful presentation of ideas (whether true or false in themselves), accompanied by psychological motives and emotional charges (popular themes), they establish a cur-
rent moving in a certain direction, which many follow with firm assent. This is one of the forms of psychological interaction, as sociologists call it, which essentially consists in persuading others to embrace one’s own viewpoints and to follow one’s own practical directions. The importance and dangers of this phenomenon are evident.
II. IMPORTANCE
Machiavelli had already hinted at (and Locke subsequently demonstrated in Essay concerning Human Understanding, London 1690) the enormous importance, for public life, of knowing and arousing opinions in others. G. B. Vico highlighted the fact that the renewal of institutions is the result of the transformations carried out in what Montesquieu would later call the “general spirit” and Rousseau the “general will.” According to Vico, public opinion governs customs and law, just as it governs language. The people give the laws whatever meaning they wish, and the rulers must, more or less willingly, adapt themselves to the meaning of the people, just as they must acknowledge the people’s sovereignty over language (cf. Scienza Nuova, IV, 6).The Romans already spoke of communis opinio, vox populi, fama popularis, rumores, and the phenomenon was also known to the Greeks, especially in Athens. In the Middle Ages it was also considered by jurists as a general consensus, capable of providing arguments, indications, or testimony. It has always influenced the development of public life, the political configuration of society, and the establishment and downfall of public authorities. Although it does not concern exclusively political and social reality (since it may also have other objects, such as fashion, sport, works of art, etc.), its greatest importance is nevertheless manifested above all in that field, since public opinion unquestionably exerts the most effective influence in determining choices and refusals in public life; and it is difficult, and in the long run impossible, to govern without it or against it, at least in modern democratically constituted society, in which the people hold the instruments capable of determining and influencing the public authorities; to the point that one may say, with William Temple, that public opinion is the foundation on which the authority of rulers rests (Essay upon the Origin and Nature of Government, London 1672).
Especially with the French Revolution, public opinion gained ground as a force operating within society and became increasingly vigorous in asserting and organizing itself, until, together with journalism (v.), it came to constitute the so-called “fourth power.” The Encyclopedists left an extensive literature on the subject. Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Spencer in particular muero highlighted the importance of this kind of “social consensus.” Today, moreover, the influence of public opinion, especially through the great means of publicity and propaganda, is decisive in every field, from the commercial to the cultural. Once the people have expressed a parliamentary majority through free suffrage, on the basis of a preference determined largely by public opinion, the latter remains the means by which the people can influence Parliament and the government. In this sense, sociologists generally distinguish “dynamic” public opinion (nourished by rational values, progressive, operative) from “static” public opinion, which is passively accepted and autocratically imposed, especially in absolutist regimes or among masses skillfully manipulated and reduced to blind conformity.
III. DANGERS
The dangers that public opinion may represent for individuals and society are therefore also evident. In reality, powerful organizations today often stifle every spontaneity of public opinion, reducing it to an irrational conformism that negates spontaneous reason and lowers the intellectual and ethical level of man. Unfortunately, this also often occurs in relation to religious and moral questions, which cannot be objects of public opinion but of personally matured adherence or faith; consequently, one witnesses phenomena of collective deception on a colossal scale, and often finds the saying vox populi, vox Dei to be without foundation. In this sphere, extremely serious moral, pastoral, and pedagogical problems arise, creating the need for a careful study of the phenomena of public opinion and of the means by which to form it, correct it, and guide it according to truth and honesty.IV. STUDY OF P. O. — In more recent times, public opinion has been subjected to scientific study according to its various aspects: historical, philosophical, psychological, sociological, and ethical. An attempt has also been made to establish a special science, demodoxology, that is, the science of public opinion. According to others, public opinion can be studied within a special branch of sociology. In order to pursue this scientific study of public opinion and its means, special schools have been established, generally incorporated as institutes or specializations within university faculties. The United States of America took the lead as early as the second half of the last century, subsequently followed by the principal countries. In the Catholic world, particular mention may be made of the schools of journalism established at the Catholic Faculty of Lille (where journalism had been taught since 1896), at the Catholic University of Louvain, the Associations de Propagandistas Católicos of Madrid, various American universities, the University of St. Thomas of Manila, and the international Institute Pro Deo of Rome.
BIBLI. I. Bryce, Public Opinion, in The Americ. Commonwealth, II, 4th ed., Chicago 1891, pp. 239–64; W. I. Shepard, Public Opinion, in Americ. Journ. of Sociology, 15 (1909), pp. 32–60; S. Tarde, L'opinion et la foule, Paris 1910; S. Le Bon, Les opinions et les croyances : genèse-évolution, ibid. 1911; A. V. Dicey, Lectures on the relation between love and public opinion in England, London 1914; W. Mac-Dougall, The Group Mind, Cambridge, Mass. 1920; F. Tönnies, Kritik der öffentl. Meinung, Berlin 1922; W. Lippmann, Public Opinion, New York 1922; id., The Phantom Public, ibid. 1925; A. L. Lowell, Public opinion and popular government, ibid. 1926; I. Rassak, Psychologie de l'opinion et de la propagande politique, ibid. 1927; G. Münzner, Öffentl. Meinung und Presse, sozialwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen, II, Karlsruhe 1928; N. Angell, The Public Mind, London 1926; R. E. Park - E. W. Burgess, Introduct. to the science of sociology, Chicago 1936, pp. 816–37; F. A. Perini-Bembo, Giornalismo e o. p., Padua 1938; F. A. Morlion, L'apostolato dell'o. p., Rome 1947; id., Filosofia dell'o. p., ibid. 1949; id., Appunti di demodossalogia (handouts at Edizioni Universitarie Internazionali), ibid. 1950. Raimondo Spiazzi