Reincarnation

REINCARNATION. — A term used to indicate the passage of the soul from one human body to another. It has a narrower meaning than metempsychosis (from the Greek μετὰ, in the sense of “passage,” and ἐμψυχίω, “I animate”), which denotes the transmigration of the human soul through various bodies of human beings, animals, plants, etc. The word “metensomatosis” is also used in the same sense (σῶμα = “body,” and παλγγεωσία, “rebirth”).

I. IN NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS

The idea that the soul can, after death, animate other bodies belongs to the common heritage of primitive peoples, among whom the phenomena of hallucination and dreaming suggested the possibility that the soul might temporarily leave the body; while the insufficiently clear awareness of the distinction between human and animal nature, insofar as both are animated and living, as found in totemistic beliefs (ν. ΤΟΤΕΜΙΣΜΟ), made possible the belief that the soul, especially that of the dead, might go on to animate individuals of a given animal species. Naturally, in this passage there is originally no concept of moral sanction; nor was there such a concept at first among the Indians, who, like other primitive peoples, regarded the moon as the dwelling place of the souls of the dead and the rain as the vehicle of their return to fertilize and reanimate the earth.

Brahmanic speculation, in its final development as contained in the Upanishads, added to this primitive animistic concept that of reincarnation (samsara), regarded as the punishment for having failed, through liberating meditation, to attain an understanding of the substantial identity of the self with the world, in which liberation consists. Buddhism, which marks the final stage of Brahmanic speculation, accepts the postulate of reincarnation but regards it, with its developments according to the law of karma (ν.), as the consequence of having failed to attain knowledge not of the identity of the self with the cosmos, but of the empirical reality of suffering and of the means of annihilating it, as taught by the Buddha.

The doctrine of reincarnation is also found in Greece, where the primitive animistic conception was developed through an influence not from Egypt, as Herodotus would have it (II, 123), but from the Indian East, by way of Asia Minor, where Persia ruled from the borders of India to the shores of Ionia. The Orphic movement, which developed in Greece in the sixth century, regarded reincarnation as a means of expiation intended to restore to the soul the purity of its divine origin, obscured because it had descended to dwell in the human body as a result of an original sin; the breaking of this cycle of rebirths (ὁ κύκλος τῆς γενέσεως, ὁ τῆς μοίρας τροχός) is described as the joy of the bird breaking the bonds that hold it captive (ν. ORFICI, MISTERI).

Pythagoras was indebted to Orphism, and his doctrine on this subject is therefore called Orphic-Pythagorean (cf. Senofane, in Diogene, VIII, 36; Ovidio, Met., XV; Empedocle, De nat., I, 3-20 and Pindaro, Ol., 2, 62 sg.). Plato too, in his psychology, depends on Orphism, insofar as he also teaches (Cratyl., 400 BC; Phaedr., 246 BD; Phaedon, 113 D; Tim., 41 A; cf. Proclo, In Tim., 5, 300 A; Simplicio, De caelo, 2, 61 b; Olimpiodoro, In Phaedon., II 6 a) that the human soul first lived among the stars, where the natural and moral laws were revealed to it; then, by virtue of a fatal law (which philosophically must be understood as the necessary union of soul and body in forming the human individual, and mythically as the guilt of the Titans who devoured Dionysus), it descended into the body, which for it is a prison (σῶμα-σῆμα). Neopythagoreanism (ν.) and Neoplatonism (ν.) follow in Plato’s wake. Plotinus explains the fatal law that induces the soul, of divine origin, to become embodied as arising from the desire it feels to possess itself more fully by individuating itself in a body. Only through the practice of an ascetic and purifying life (κάθαρσις) that shortens the cycle of rebirths can it, through ecstasy, be reunited with the One, which attracts and absorbs it, forming with it a single being and causing it to lose the sense of its individuality, which is the principle of its inferiority.

In the Christian world, the position is diametrically opposed, although traces of those doctrines are not lacking, especially in certain writers inspired by Platonism and Neoplatonism. Thus, in St. Justin (Dial., 4: PG 6, 481-84), a certain preexistence of the soul is affirmed, of which it has no consciousness, just as it has no consciousness of the successive existences that follow the present one. Clement of Alexandria does not seem to have admitted any form of preexistence, despite certain inconclusive texts (Strom., IV, 26; Quis dives salvetur, 3, 26, 33, 36); elsewhere, however, he alludes to a disguising of souls (Strom., III, 3: ed. Potter I, 516), but seems to be referring to philosophical speculations, and clearly affirms the μετανομαλίασις (transcorporation) of Egyptian theology, from which it passed into other currents (and certainly he has Pythagoras in mind, Strom., VI, 4: ed. Potter II, 757). Nor is Origen’s theory concerning universal ἀποκατάστασις, or restoration, intrinsically connected with metempsychosis properly so called, even though he admits the preexistence of souls and, in De Principiis (II, 8,4: PG 2, 224), seeks to reconcile Christianity with Platonic theories. A strong controversy arose against Origen, especially after his death, and particularly in the sixth century, continuing through the condemnation of Patriarch Menna of Constantinople and his particular Council, and that of the Council of Constantinople in 543, with the approval of Pope Vigilius (cf. Denz-U, 211; Hefele-Leclercq, II, b. p. 1184; R. Hedde. Métempsycose, in DThC, X, cols. 1587-88).

The absence of any genuine Christian current favorable to Origenist theories in general and to metempsychosis in particular is also evident from certain references found in anti-heretical works, in which at times one goes so far as to conceal those theories (e.g., in St. Epiphanius, Haeres., 21, c. 2; 66, 28; St. Basil, In Haexaemeron, hom. VIII, 2; Dionysius Ps.-Areopagite, Hierar. Eccles., c. VII, 2).

Although there is no explicit definition concerning the irrevocability of the soul after death and the impossibility of any substantial change in its dispositions, there are nevertheless unequivocal declarations of the Church’s magisterium, according to which judgment takes place immediately after death and is decisive for all eternity (ν. GIUDIZIO DIVINO). Thus, the Second Council of Lyons (1274, Denz-U, 464); Benedict XII in the constitution Benedictus Deus (29 January 1336; Denz-U, 530-31); and the Council of Florence in the Decretum pro Graecis (4 June 1439; Denz-U, 693).

This doctrine of the Church clearly derives from the Gospel, where the contrast between the «blessings» and the «woes» in the Sermon on the Mount is resolved in a reversal of positions after death, when he who «now» laughs will «then» weep, and vice versa (Lk. 6, 20-26; Mt. 5, 3-12), and this definitively, as is evident from the parable of the rich man and the beggar

Lazarus (Lk. 16, 19-31) and from that of the ten virgins (Mt. 25, 1-13), in which the impossibility of any change of fortune is clear, since the time for decisions has ended. Thus the exhortations of Jesus to vigilance, activity, and perseverance have meaning (Mt. 24, 42-51; 25, 13; Mk. 13, 33; Lk. 12, 35-40), since after the «night» no one can work any longer (cf. Jn. 9,4). The same thought and the same exhortations are found in the Apostles (cf. Gal. 6, 9-10; I Cor. 9, 24 ff.; II Cor. 5, 1-10; I Thess. 5, 2-3; I Pt. 1, 3-8; II Pt. 3,10; Jas. 4, 13-15; Rev. 11, 10-11; 16, 15). St. Paul in particular teaches clearly (I Cor. 15, 24-28) that with judgment the economy of salvation is closed for all, without any possibility of an «eternal return» or a universal apostasy. Indeed, the affirmation of an essential and irrevocable decision entails the exclusion of any transmigration and reappearance of the soul in new lives.

The same doctrine can be discerned in numerous texts of the Fathers of the Church (cf. II Clem. 8, 3; St. Cyprian, Ad Dem., 25; St. Basil, Hom. 7, in divites, n. 8; PG 31, 301; St. John Chrysostom, De Poen. hom., 9; PG 49, 346; St. Ambrose, In Psalm., 118, 2, 14; De excess. frater., II, 48); cf. B. Bartmann, Manuale di teologia dogmatica, III, Italian trans., 2nd ed., Alba 1951, p. 384. Other texts in Rouet de Journel, Enchir. Patrist., nos. 103, 487, 560, 561, 576, 578, 693, 886, 887, 966, 980, 1172, 1200, 1325, 1364, 2268, 2321.
III. THE THOUGHT OF ST. THOMAS. — Scholastic theology reaffirms and rationally explains the doctrine of Holy Scripture and the Fathers, emphasizing the distinction between status viae and status termini, in which latter one can no longer merit, in view of a disposition of God justified by obvious and compelling reasons. It does not follow, however, that even during the scholastic period the Manichaean idea, already combated by the Fathers, failed to echo here and there, as is evident from two passages in the Summa de Catharis of Fr. Rainerio Sacconi (ed. Dondaine, in the Liber de duobus principiis, Rome 1939, p. 71). The question is still current in the time of St. Thomas, who examines it from every aspect, and especially: 1) with regard to the philosophical presupposition of the «eternity of the world» (C. Gent., II, chs. 38, 81, 83); 2) with regard to the «Pythagorean» presupposition already criticized by Aristotle (ibid., II, chs. 44, 73); 3) with regard to the «dualistic» presupposition in the general critique of Manichaeism (ibid., II, ch. 83, § Quidam autem) and Origenism (ibid.); 4) with regard to the presupposition of «pre-existence» (ibid., II, ch. 83, § Item si omnes); 5) with regard to the theory of the «periodic return» (ibid., III, ch. 144, § Privatio enim).

St. Thomas’s firm and categorical rejection of all those elements that might justify metempsychosis is based on a fundamental principle, according to which «the proportion of the soul of man to the body of man is equal to the proportion of the soul of this man to the body of this man» (ibid., II, ch. 73, § Praeterea Aristoteles). This metaphysical-psychological argument is the linchpin of St. Thomas’s philosophical refutation; he further demonstrates, by the authority of Revelation and by metaphysical and theological reasons, that the final transformation will be definitive in character (ibid., IV, ch. 82), and that souls have their will immutably fixed upon good or evil, according to the state in which they found themselves at the moment of passing from this life (ibid., IV, chs. 91–93).

IV. MODERN DEVIATIONS

This doctrine, in conformity with the Church’s magisterium and the data of Revelation, is common among Catholics. Among Protestants, by contrast, certain sects revived the theory of apocatastasis; such were the Anabaptists and some more recent figures, such as U. Janni (cf. « Ultra », Problemi relativi alla finalità del creato e alla nostra vita dopo la morte, Modena 1930). Schleiermacher in particular introduced into Protestantism the idea of a possible conversion after death (cf. Bartmann, op. cit., III, p. 385).

Others likewise revived the theory of r. in various forms and with different emphases: G. Cardano, B. Telesio, G. Bruno, Van Helmont, C. Bonnet, Bellanche, P. Leroux, J. Reynaud, Ch. Fourier, etc. theosophy (v.) and anthroposophy have restored the doctrine of metempsychosis to currency, teaching the succession of lives, which they call r., with reference to Greek and Latin sources, to more recent authors of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, and, especially in the case of Blavatsky and Besant, to the ancient philosophies and religious speculations of India. The immense cycle of births and deaths is governed by « Karma », according to which every soul, upon leaving one body, takes on another and begins a new life, in a better or worse condition according to what it has sown in the preceding life, without entirely excluding the possibility that it may be reborn in an animal, plant, or mineral species if the preceding life was sinful. If it « reincarnates » in a human body and improves, there is a progressive ascent toward perfection, which is attained by entering into the universal essence, Nirvana, where man is absorbed (cf. L. de Grandmaison, Théosophie, in DFC, IV, col. 1659; id., Le lotus bleu, Parigi 1910; R. Guenon, Le theosophisme, ivi 1921). The followers of spiritism, especially French spiritism, likewise uphold r. in place of Purgatory. According to them, the person has many successive existences, of which he has no recollection. In them he expiates the sins previously committed. When the spirit has been fully purified, the cycle will end; but the soul reaches this complete purification inevitably, through an almost automatic process, since, personally, not knowing the faults, it could not expiate them (cf. L. Roure, Spiritisme, in DThC, XIV, coll. 2518-19; A. Kardec, Le livre des esprits, Parigi 1857; Th. Mainage, La religion spirite, ivi 1921).

V. OSSERVAZIONI CRITICHE

The opposition between these doctrines and the Catholic one is evident from what has been said; moreover, the Holy Office declared (1919) that theosophical doctrines are incompatible with Catholic doctrine. But in addition, the reasons already mentioned above militate against such conceptions; on the basis of St. Thomas’s thought, they may be summarized as follows: if the soul is the substantial form of the body (cf. Denz-U, 480 ff., 738, 1655), giving it its specific being and therefore having with it one single substantial being, it follows that it can be united only to this body (cf. St. Thomas, De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 9, ad 4; II Sent., d. 17, q. 2, a. 2). There is a close proportion between this soul and this body (cf. Summ. Theol., 1ª, q. 76, a. 5). The soul always retains the determinations acquired in its union with this body, as its form, and cannot become the form of another body (cf. II Sent., d. 17, q. 2, in c. e ad 4).

The arguments advanced in favor of r., on the other hand, do not prove the point. Indeed: a) its supporters appeal to the unequal distribution of evils during the present sojourn on earth: this would depend on other, previous, sinful existences, from which one would need to be purified. But it is known that the unequal distribution of goods, with the permission or toleration of evils, depends instead on the different bestowal of God’s love (cf. C. Gent., II, cap. 44), which assigns to each person a path to follow in preparation for eternal life. The evils of the present life serve for purification from actual sins, not from those of a previous life of which no one has any memory. b) They also appeal to the great diversity, already present in native dispositions, between souls, whereas bodies are similar. But it is sufficient to observe that the whole world is made up of inequalities, from inanimate nature to spiritual nature, and that differences in genius, virtue, and intelligence depend both on a different divine bestowal, on the influence of parents (heredity), and on the particular constitution of each individual in the union of the soul with a determinate body. c) They further say that, given the length of the journey toward infinity, a single existence is not enough. The answer is that even millions of existences would not suffice, whereas one is called to fulfill in the single life at one’s disposal God’s design, with the help of his Grace. d) They point out that here below the good are often victims of the wicked, and yet society does not collapse but progresses: this is because the better individuals always return, preserving and developing sound traditions. The answer is that moral progress in humanity is often problematic and, in any case, whenever it is real, it is explained by entirely different reasons.

Moreover, there are irrefutable arguments against r.: 1) the absence of any memory of one or more previous existences. Theosophists seek to justify themselves by saying that between the two existences there is something like an interval in which everything becomes tendency, and there is no longer any act of knowledge, and therefore on returning to existence it is impossible to remember: but at least a confused memory ought to remain; 2) the impossibility of giving r. the character of a moral sanction, since it is unclear how there can be punishment if there is no memory of the guilt that must be expiated; 3) the impossibility of reconciling r. with the spirituality of the soul, which, if it needed such transmigrations in order to purify itself, would not be spiritual, since for a spiritual being the change and reordering of the will suffice for purification. The theory of r. is therefore in conflict both with Catholic doctrine and with the principles of a sound philosophy that remains faithful to the data of experience and the postulates of reason.