REINCARNAZIONE

**REINCARNATION**

The term is used to denote the passage of the soul from one human body to another. It has a narrower meaning than *metempsychosis* (from Gr. *μετά*, in the sense of "passage"), and *ἐξυπνάζει* "I animate" which indicates the transmigration of the human soul through various bodies of men, animals, and plants, etc. The word *metensomatosis* (σῶμα = "body," and *παλιγγενεσία* = "rebirth") is also used with the same meaning.

I. IN NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS

The idea that the soul, after death, may animate other bodies belongs to the common heritage of primitive peoples, among whom the phenomena of hallucination and dreams suggested the possibility for the soul to temporarily leave the body; while the unclear distinction between human and animal nature, insofar as both are animate and living—as found in totemic beliefs (v. TOTEMISM)—made it possible to believe that the soul, especially of the dead, could animate individuals of a given animal species. Naturally, in this passage there is originally no concept of moral sanction; nor, initially, among the Indians, who, like other primitive peoples, considered the moon as the abode of the souls of the dead and rain as the vehicle of their return to fertilize and animate the earth.

Brahmanic speculation, in its final evolution contained in the *Upanishads*, added to this primitive animistic concept that of reincarnation (*samsara*), regarded as a penalty for not having attained, through liberating meditation, the understanding of the substantial identity of the self with the world, which constitutes liberation. Buddhism, which marks the final stage of Brahmanic speculation, accepts the postulate of reincarnation but considers it, along with its developments karma (v.), as a consequence of not having attained the knowledge not of the identity of the self with the cosmos, but of the empirical reality of suffering and the means to overcome it, as taught by the Buddha.

The doctrine of reincarnation is also found in Greece, where the primitive animistic conception was developed not by Egyptian influence, as Herodotus (II, 123) would have it, but by Indian influence from the East through Asia Minor, where Persia held sway from the borders of India to the shores of Ionia. The Orphic movement, which developed in Greece in the 6th century, regarded reincarnation as a means of expiation to restore the soul to the purity of its divine origin, obscured by its descent into the human body due to a primordial fault. The breaking of this cycle of rebirths (6 x 20 x 25, 7½ x 20, 8½ x 20, 9½ x 20, 10½ x 20) is described as the joy of the bird breaking the bonds that hold it captive (v. ORPHICS, MYSTERIES).

Pythagoras is indebted to Orphism for this doctrine, hence his teaching in this regard is called Orphico-Pythagorean (cf. Xenophanes, in Diogenes, VIII, 36; Ovid, *Met.*, XV; Empedocles, *De nat.*, I, 3-20; and Pindar, *Ol.*, 2, 62 sq.). Plato’s psychology also depends on Orphism, for he too (Cratyl., 400 BC; Phaedr., 246 BD; Phaedo, 113 D; Tim., 41 A; cf. Proclus, *In Tim.*, 5, 300 A; Simplicius, *De caelo*, 2, 91 b; Olympiodorus, *In Phaedon.*, 6 a) teaches that the human soul first lived among the stars, where it was revealed the natural and moral laws; then, by a fatal law (which philosophically must be understood as the necessary union of soul and body to form the human individual, and mythically as the fault of the Titans who devoured Dionysus), it descended into the body, which for it is a prison (σῶμα-σήμερον). In the wake of Plato, the Neopythagoreans (v.) and Neoplatonists (v.) followed. Plotinus explains the fatal law that induces the soul, of divine origin, to become embodied, through its desire to possess itself more fully by individuating itself in a body. Only through the practice of an ascetic and purifying life (καθαρός) that shortens the cycle of rebirths can it, through ecstasy, reunite with the One that attracts and absorbs it, forming with it a single being, causing it to lose the sense of its individuality, which is the principle of its inferiority.

**

II. CATHOLIC DOCTRINE

The ancient pagan doctrines of metempsychosis have been revived in modern times by the followers of spiritism and theosophy, who, however, prefer to substitute the term *reincarnation* (as well as *ensomatosis*, *metensomatosis*, *palingenesis*) to emphasize that they limit the transmigration of the soul to human bodies alone, whereas metempsychosis can extend to animals and even plants.

In the Christian world, the position is diametrically opposed, although traces of those doctrines are not lacking, especially in some writers influenced by Platonism and Neoplatonism. Thus, in St. Justin (Dial., 4: PG 6, 481-84) a certain pre-existence of the soul is affirmed, of which it is not conscious, nor does it have consciousness of the successive existences that follow the present one. Clement of Alexandria does not seem to have admitted a form of pre-existence, despite some inconclusive texts (Strom., IV, 26; *Quis dives salvetur*, 3, 26, 33, 36); elsewhere he alludes to a transmigration of souls (Strom., III, 3: ed. Potter I, 516), but seems to refer to philosophical speculations, and clearly affirms the Egyptian theology’s belief in the *transcorporation*, which passed into other schools (and he certainly has in mind Pythagoras, Strom., VI, 4: ed. Potter II, 757). Nor is Origen’s theory of universal *ἀποκατάστασις* or restoration closely connected with metempsychosis proper, even though he admits the pre-existence of souls and in *De Principiis* (II, 8, 4: PG 2, 224) attempts to reconcile Christianity with Platonic theories. A strong controversy arose against Origen, especially after his death, and particularly in the 6th century, culminating in the condemnation by Patriarch Mennas of Constantinople and his particular council, and by the Council of Constantinople in 543, with the approval of Pope Vigilius (cf. Denz-U., 211; Hefele-Leclercq, II, b, p. 1184; R. Hedde, *Mètempsycose*, in DTHC, X, cols. 1587-88).

The absence of any genuine Christian current favorable to Origenist theories in general and to metempsychosis in particular is also evident from certain allusions found in anti-heretical works, where those theories are sometimes ridiculed (e.g., in St. Epiphanius, *Haeres.*, 21, c. 2, 66, 28; St. Basil, *In Hexaemeron*, hom., VIII, 2; Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, *Hier. Eccles.*, c. VII, 2).

Even though there is no explicit definition regarding the irreformability of the soul after death and the impossibility of a substantial change in its dispositions, there are nonetheless unequivocal declarations of the ecclesiastical magisterium according to which the sanction occurs immediately after death and is decisive for all eternity (v. DIVINE JUDGMENT). Thus the Second Council of Lyon (1274, Denz-U., 464); Benedict XII in the constitution *Benedictus Deus* (20 January 1336; Denz-U., 530-31); the Council of Florence in the *Decretum pro Graecis* (4 June 1439; Denz-U., 693).

This doctrine of the Church clearly derives from the Gospel, where the contrast between the Beatitudes and the "woes" in the Sermon on the Mount is resolved in a reversal of positions after death, when those who "now" laugh "then" will weep, and vice versa (Lk. 6:20-26; Mt. 5:3-12), and this in a definitive manner, as is evident from the parable of the rich man and the beggar Lazarus (Lk. 16:19-31) and that of the ten virgins (Mt. 25:1-13), in which the impossibility of a change in fate is clear, since the time for decisions has ended. Thus, Jesus' exhortations to vigilance, activity, and perseverance make sense (Mt. 24:42-51; 25:13; Mk. 13:33; Lk. 12:35-40), since after the "night" no one can work any longer (cf. Jn. 9:4). The same thought and exhortations are found in the Apostles (cf. Gal. 6:9-10; 1 Cor. 9:24 ff.; 2 Cor. 5:1-10; 1 Thess. 5:2-3; 1 Pet. 1:3-8; 2 Pet. 3:10; Jas. 4:13-15; Rev. 11:10-11; 16:15). Especially St. Paul clearly teaches (1 Cor. 15:24-28) that with the judgment the economy of salvation is closed for all, without any possibility of an eternal return or a universal apocatastasis. Indeed, the affirmation of an essential and irrevocable decision excludes any transmigration and the reappearance of the soul in new lives.

The same doctrine can be discerned in numerous texts of the Fathers of the Church (cf. 2 Clem. 8:3; St. Cyprian, *Ad Demetr.*, 25; St. Basil, *Hom. 7 in divites*, n. 8: PG 31, 301; St. John Chrysostom, *De Poenitentia hom.*, 9: PG 49, 346; St. Ambrose, *In Psalm.* 118,2,14; *De excessu fratris*, II, 48); cf. B. Bartmann, *Manuale di teologia dogmatica*, III, Italian trans., 2nd ed., Alba 1951, p. 384. Other texts in Rouët de Journel, *Enchiridion Patristicum*, nos. 103, 487, 560, 561, 576, 578, 693, 886, 887, 966, 980, 1172, 1200, 1325, 1364, 2268, 2321.

III. The thought of St. Thomas. — Scholastic theology reaffirms and rationally explains the doctrine of Holy Scripture and the Fathers, emphasizing the distinction between the *status viae* and the *status termini*, in the latter of which no merit can be gained, given a disposition of God justified by obvious and convincing reasons. It is not said, however, that even in the period of Scholasticism the Manichaean idea, already refuted by the Fathers, did not echo here and there, as is evident from two passages in the *Summa de Catharis* of Fr. Rainerio Sacconi (ed. Dondaine, in *Liber de duobus principiis*, Rome 1939, p. 71). The question was still current in the time of St. Thomas, who examined it in all its aspects, particularly: 1) with regard to the philosophical presupposition of "the eternity of the world" (*Contra Gentiles*, II, chaps. 38, 81, 83); 2) with regard to the "Pythagorean" presupposition already criticized by Aristotle (ibid., II, chap. 44, 73); 3) with regard to the dualistic presupposition in the global critique of Manichaeism (ibid., II, chap. 83, § *Quidam autem*) and Origenism (ibid.); 4) with regard to the presupposition of "pre-existence" (ibid., II, chap. 83, § *Item si omnes*); 5) with regard to the theory of "periodic return" (ibid., III, chap. 144, § *Privatio enim*).

St. Thomas’s firm and categorical rejection of all those elements that might justify metempsychosis is based on a fundamental principle, according to which "the proportion of the soul of man to the body of man is equal to the proportion of the soul of this man to the body of this man" (ibid., II, chap. 73, § *Praeterea Aristoteles*). This metaphysical-psychological reason is the pivot of the philosophical refutation made by St. Thomas, who further demonstrates, by the authority of Revelation and with metaphysical and theological arguments, that the final transformation will have a definitive character (ibid., IV, chap. 82), and that souls have their will immutably fixed in good or evil according to the state in which they were at the moment of death (ibid., IV, chaps. 91-93).

IV. Modern developments

This doctrine, in conformity with ecclesiastical teaching and the data of Revelation, is common among Catholics. Among Protestants, however, some sects revived the theory of apocatastasis; thus the Anabaptists and some more recent figures, such as U. Janni (cf. *Ultra*, *Problemi relativi alla finalità del creato e alla nostra vita dopo la morte*, Modena 1930). But especially Schleiermacher introduced into Protestantism the idea of a possible conversion after death (cf. Bartmann, *op. cit.*, III, p. 385).

Others also revived the theory of r. in various forms and with different nuances: thus G. Cardano, B. Telesio, G. Bruno, Van Helmont, C. Bonnet, Ballanche, P. Leroux, J. Reynaud, Ch. Fourier, etc. But especially the followers of Theosophy (v.) and Anthroposophy have revived the doctrine of metempsychosis, teaching the succession of lives, which they call r., with reference to Greek and Latin sources, to more recent authors from the 2nd-7th centuries, and especially to Blavatsky and Besant, to the ancient philosophies and religious speculations of India. The immense cycle of births and deaths is governed by "Karma," according to which every soul, leaving one body, takes on another, beginning a new life in a better or worse state according to what it has sown in the previous life, without entirely excluding the possibility of its being reborn in an animal or vegetable or mineral species if the previous life was sinful. If it "reincarnates" in a human body and improves, there is a progressive ascent to perfection, which is achieved with entry into the universal essence, Nirvana, where man is absorbed (cf. L. de Grandmaison, *Théosophie*, in DFC, IV, col. 1659; id., *Le lotus bleu*, Paris 1910; R. Guénon, *Le théosophisme*, ibid. 1921). The followers of Spiritism, especially French, also uphold r. in place of Purgatory. The person, according to them, has many successive existences, of which they have no memory. In these they expiate sins committed previously. When the spirit is fully purified, the cycle will end; but this complete purification the soul attains inevitably, through an almost automatic process, since personally, not knowing its faults, it could not expiate them (cf. L. Roure, *Spiritisme*, in DThC, XIV, cols. 2518-19; A. Kardec, *Le livre des esprits*, Paris 1857; Th. Mainage, *La religion spirite*, ibid. 1921).

V. Critical observations

The opposition between these doctrines and the Catholic one is evident, after what has been said; moreover, the Holy Office declared (1919) that Theosophical doctrines are not compatible with Catholic doctrine. But in addition, these conceptions are opposed by the reasons already mentioned above, which, based on the thought of St. Thomas, can be summarized as follows: if the soul is the substantial form of the body (cf. Denz.-U., 480 ff., 738, 1655), which gives it its specific being and therefore has with it a single substantial being, it follows that it can only be united to this body (cf. St. Thomas, *De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 9, ad 4; *In II Sent.*, d. 17, q. 2, a. 2). There is a strict proportion between such a soul and such a body (cf. *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 76, a. 5). The soul always retains the determinations it had in union with this body as its form, and cannot become the form of another body (cf. *In II Sent.*, d. 17, q. 2, in c. and ad 4).

The arguments advanced in favor of reincarnation do not prove II. Indeed:

a) Its supporters appeal to the unequal distribution of evils in the present life on earth: this would depend on prior sinful existences from which one must be purified. But it is known that the unequal distribution of goods, with the permission or tolerance of evils, depends instead on the varying bestowal of God’s love (cf. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, cap. 44), which assigns to each a path to follow in preparation for eternal life. The evils of the present life serve for the purification of present sins, not of those from a prior life of which no one has any memory.

b) They also point to the great diversity, already by native disposition, among souls, while bodies are similar. But it suffices to observe that the whole world is made up of inequalities, from inanimate nature to spiritual nature, and that the diversity of genius, virtue, and intelligence depends both on a different divine gift and on the influence of parents (heredity) and on the particular constitution of each individual in the union of soul to a given body.

c) They further argue that for the soul’s journey toward the infinite, a single existence is insufficient. The reply is that not even millions of existences would suffice, whereas instead one is called to fulfill, within the single life at one’s disposal, God’s design with the aid of His grace.

d) They note that here below the good are often victims of the wicked, and yet society does not collapse but progresses: this is because the better individuals always return, upholding and developing sound traditions. The reply is that moral progress in humanity is often questionable and, when real, is explained by quite other reasons.

Moreover, there are against reincarnation arguments that are unanswerable:

1) the absence of any memory of one or more prior existences. Theosophists try to justify themselves by saying that between two existences there is a kind of interval in which everything becomes tendency, no longer an act of knowledge, and thus upon return to existence no memory is possible; yet at least some confused memory should remain;

2) the impossibility of giving reincarnation the character of moral sanction, since it is not clear how there could be punishment if there is no memory of the fault to be expiated;

3) the impossibility of reconciling reincarnation with the spirituality of the soul, which, if it required such transmigrations for purification, would not be spiritual, for a spiritual being, to purify itself, needs only the change and reordering of its will.

The theory of reincarnation is therefore in contrast both with Catholic doctrine and with the principles of sound philosophy that remain faithful to the data of experience and to the postulates of reason.