On Exhortation to Chastity
1 Introduction. Virginity Classified Under Three Several Species PL 2, 913
V.
On Exhortation to Chastity.
[Translated by the Rev. S. Thelwall.]
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Chapter I.—Introduction. Virginity Classified Under Three Several Species.
I doubt not, brother, that after the premission in peace of your wife, you, being wholly bent upon the composing of your mind (to a right frame), are seriously thinking about the end of your lone life, and of course are standing in need of counsel. Although, in cases of this kind, each individual ought to hold colloquy with his own faith, and consult its strength; still, inasmuch as, in this (particular) species (of trial), the necessity of the flesh (which generally is faith’s antagonist at the bar of the same inner consciousness, to which I have alluded) sets cogitation astir, faith has need of counsel from without, as an advocate, as it were, to oppose the necessities of the flesh: which necessity, indeed, may very easily be circumscribed, if the will rather than the indulgence of God be considered. No one deserves (favour) by availing himself of the indulgence, but by rendering a prompt obedience to the will, (of his master). The will of God is our sanctification, for He wishes His “image”—us—to become likewise His “likeness;” that we may be “holy” just as Himself is “holy.” That good—sanctification, I mean—I distribute into several species, that in some one of those species we may be found. The first species is, virginity from one’s birth: the second, virginity from one’s second birth, that is, from the font; which (second virginity) either in the marriage state keeps (its subject) pure by mutual compact, or else perseveres in widowhood from choice: a third grade remains, monogamy, when, after the interception of a marriage once contracted, there is thereafter a renunciation of sexual connection. The first virginity is (the virginity) of happiness, (and consists in) total ignorance of that from which you will afterwards wish to be freed: the second, of virtue, (and consists in) contemning that the power of which you know full well: the remaining species, (that) of marrying no more after the disjunction of matrimony by death, besides being the glory of virtue, is (the glory) of moderation likewise; for moderation is the not regretting a thing which has been taken away, and taken away by the Lord God, without whose will neither does a leaf glide down from a tree, nor a sparrow of one farthing’s worth fall to the earth.
Non dubito, frater, te post uxorem in pace praemissam, ad compositionem animi conversum, de exitu singularitatis cogitare, et utique consilii indigere. Quamquam in hujusmodi cum fide sua conloqui debet unusquisque, ejusque vires consulere; tamen quoniam, in ista specie, carnis necessitas cogitatum movet, quae fere apud eamdem conscientiam fidei resistit, opus est fidei extrinsecus consilio, tanquam advocato adversus carnis necessitates. Quae quidem necessitas facillime circumscribi potest, si voluntas potuis Dei, quam indulgentia consideratur. Nemo indulgentia utendo promeretur, sed voluntati obsequendo. Voluntas Dei est sanctificatio nostra. Vult enim imaginem suam nos etiam similitudinem fieri, ut simus sancti, sicuti ipse sanctus est. Id bonum, sanctificationem dico, in species distribuit complures, ut in aliqua earum deprehendamur. Prima species, virginitas a nativitate. Secunda virginitas, a secunda nativitate, id est a lavacro, quae aut in matrimonio purificat ex compacto, aut in viduitate perseverat ex arbitrio. Tertius gradus superest monogamia, cum post matrimonium unum interceptum exinde sexui renuntiatur. Prima virginitas felicitatis est, non nosse in totum a quo postea optabis liberari. Secunda virtutis est, contemnere cujus vim optime noris. Reliqua species hactenus nubendi post matrimonium morte disjunctum, praeter virtutis, etiam modestiae laus est. Modestia est enim, ablatum non desiderare, et ablatum a Domino Deo; sine cujus voluntate nec folium de arbore delabitur, nec passer assis unius ad terram cadit.
2 The Blame of Our Misdeeds Not to Be Cast Upon God. The One Power Which Rests with Man is the Power of Volition PL 2, 915
What moderation, in short, is there in that utterance, “The Lord gave, the Lord hath taken away; as seemed (good) to the Lord, so hath it been done!” And accordingly, if we renew nuptials which have been taken away, doubtless we strive against the will of God, willing to have over again a thing which He has not willed us to have. For had He willed (that we should), He would not have taken it away; unless we interpret this, too, to be the will of God, as if He again willed us to have what He just now did not will. It is not the part of good and solid faith to refer all things to the will of God in such a manner as that; and that each individual should so flatter himself by saying that “nothing is done without His permission,” as to make us fail to understand that there is a something in our own power. Else every sin will be excused if we persist in contending that nothing is done by us without the will of God; and that definition will go to the destruction of (our) whole discipline, (nay), even of God Himself; if either He produce by His own will things which He wills not, or else (if) there is nothing which God wills not. But as there are some things which He forbids, against which He denounces even eternal punishment—for, of course, things which He forbids, and by which withal He is offended, He does not will—so too, on the contrary, what He does will, He enjoins and sets down as acceptable, and repays with the reward of eternity. And so, when we have learnt from His precepts each (class of actions), what He does not will and what He does, we still have a volition and an arbitrating power of electing the one; just as it is written, “Behold, I have set before thee good and evil: for thou hast tasted of the tree of knowledge.” And accordingly we ought not to lay to the account of the Lord’s will that which lies subject to our own choice; (on the hypothesis) that He does not will, or else (positively) nills what is good, who does nill what is evil. Thus, it is a volition of our own when we will what is evil, in antagonism to God’s will, who wills what is good. Further, if you inquire whence comes that volition whereby we will anything in antagonism to the will of God, I shall say, It has its source in ourselves. And I shall not make the assertion rashly—for you must needs correspond to the seed whence you spring—if indeed it be true, (as it is), that the originator of our race and our sin, Adam, willed the sin which he committed. For the devil did not impose upon him the volition to sin, but subministered material to the volition. On the other hand, the will of God had come to be a question of obedience. In like manner you, too, if you fail to obey God, who has trained you by setting before you the precept of free action, will, through the liberty of your will, willingly turn into the downward course of doing what God nills: and thus you think yourself to have been subverted by the devil; who, albeit he does will that you should will something which God nills still does not make you will it, inasmuch as he did not reduce those our protoplasts to the volition of sin; nay, nor (did reduce them at all) against their will, or in ignorance as to what God nilled. For, of course, He nilled (a thing) to be done when He made death the destined consequence of its commission. Thus the work of the devil is one: to make trial whether you do will that which it rests with you to will. But when you have willed, it follows that he subjects you to himself; not by having wrought volition in you, but by having found a favourable opportunity in your volition. Therefore, since the only thing which is in our power is volition—and it is herein that our mind toward God is put to proof, whether we will the things which coincide with His will—deeply and anxiously must the will of God be pondered again and again, I say, (to see) what even in secret He may will.
Quam denique modesta illa vox est: Dominus dedit, Dominus abstulit (Job, I, 21), ut Domino visum est, ita factum est: et ideo si nuptias sublatas restauremus, sine dubio contra voluntatem Dei nitimur, volentes habere rursus, quod habere nos noluit. Si enim voluisset, non abstulisset. Nisi si et hoc voluntatem Dei interpretamur, quasi et rursus nos voluerit habere quod jam noluit. Non est bonae et solidae fidei, sic omnia ad voluntatem Dei referre, et ita adulari sibi unumquemque, dicendo nihil fieri sine nutu ejus, ut non intelligamus esse aliquid in nobis ipsis. Caeterum, excusabitur omne delictum, si contenderimus nihil fieri in nobis sine Dei voluntate; et ibit definitio ista in destructionem totius disciplinae, etiam ipsius Dei, si aut quae non vult de sua voluntate producit, aut nihil est quod Deus non vult. Sed quomodo vetat quaedam, quibus etiam supplicium aeternum comminatur? utique enim quae vetat non vult, a quibus et offenditur: sicut et quae vult, praecipit, et accipit, et aeternitatis mercede dispungit. Itaque cum utrumque ex praeceptis ejus didicerimus, quid velit, et quid nolit; tamen nobis est voluntas et arbitrium eligendi alterum, sicut scriptum est: Ecce posui ante te bonum et malum , gustasti enim de arbore agnitionis. Et ideo non debemus quod nostro expositum est arbitrio, in Dei referre voluntatem, quos vult ipse et velle, qui malum non vult. Ita nostra est voluntas, cum malum volumus adversus Dei voluntatem, qui bonum vult. Porro, si quaeris unde venit ea voluntas, qua quid volumus adversus Dei voluntatem, dicam: ex nobis ipsis. Nec temere; semini enim tuo respondeas necesse est: siquidem ille princeps et generis et delicti, Adam, voluit quod deliquit. Neque enim diabolus voluntatem ei imposuit deliquendi, sed materiam voluntati subministravit. Caeterum, voluntas Dei in obaudientiam venerat. Proinde et tu, si non obaudieris Deo, qui te, proposito praecepto, liberae potestatis instituit, per voluntatis libertatem volens deverges in id quod Deus non vult, et ita te putas a diabolo subversum, qui etsi quid vult te velle quod Deus non vult, non tamen facit ut et velis; quia nec tunc istos protoplastos ad voluntatem delicti subegit; imo neque invitos, neque ignorantes quid Deus nollet; utique enim nolebat fieri, cum admisso mortem destinabat. Ita diaboli opus unum est, tentare quod in te est, an velis. At ubi voluisti, sequitur ut te sibi subigat, non operatus in te voluntatem, sed nactus occasionem voluntatis. Igitur cum solum sit in nobis velle, et in hoc probetur nostra erga Deum mens, an ea velimus quae cum voluntate ipsius faciant.
3 Of Indulgence and Pure Volition. The Question Illustrated PL 2, 916
For what things are manifest we all know; and in what sense these very things are manifest must be thoroughly examined. For, albeit some things seem to savour of “the will of God,” seeing that they are allowed by Him, it does not forthwith follow that everything which is permitted proceeds out of the mere and absolute will of him who permits. Indulgence is the source of all permission. And albeit indulgence is not independent of volition, still, inasmuch as it has its cause in him to whom the indulgence is granted, it comes (as it were) from unwilling volition, having experienced a producing cause of itself which constrains volition. See what is the nature of a volition of which some second party is the cause. There is, again, a second species of pure volition to be considered. God wills us to do some acts pleasing to Himself, in which it is not indulgence which patronizes, but discipline which lords it. If, however, He has given a preference over these to some other acts—(acts), of course, which He more wills—is there a doubt that the acts which we are to pursue are those which He more wills; since those which He less wills (because He wills others more) are to be similarly regarded as if He did not will them? For, by showing what He more wills, He has effaced the lesser volition by the greater. And in as far as He has proposed each (volition) to your knowledge, in so far has He defined it to be your duty to pursue that which He has declared that He more wills. Then, if the object of His declaring has been that you may pursue that which He more wills; doubtless, unless you do so, you savour of contrariety to His volition, by savouring of contrariety to His superior volition; and you rather offend than merit reward, by doing what He wills indeed, and rejecting what He more wills. Partly, you sin; partly, if you sin not, still you deserve no reward. Moreover, is not even the unwillingness to deserve reward a sin?
If, therefore, second marriage finds the source of its allowance in that “will of God” which is called indulgence, we shall deny that that which has indulgence for its cause is volition pure; if in that to which some other—that, namely, which regards continence as more desirable—is preferred as superior, we shall have learned (by what has been argued above), that the not-superior is rescinded by the superior. Suffer me to have touched upon these considerations, in order that I may now follow the course of the apostle’s words. But, in the first place, I shall not be thought irreligious if I remark on what he himself professes; (namely), that he has introduced all indulgence in regard to marriage from his own (judgment)—that is, from human sense, not from divine prescript. For, withal, when he has laid down the definitive rule with reference to “the widowed and the unwedded,” that they are to “marry if they cannot contain,” because “better it is to marry than to burn,” he turns round to the other class, and says: “But to the wedded I make official declaration—not indeed I, but the Lord.” Thus he shows, by the transfer of his own personality to the Lord, that what he had said above he had pronounced not in the Lord’s person, but in his own: “Better it is to marry than to burn.” Now, although that expression pertain to such as are “apprehended” by the faith in an unwedded or widowed condition, still, inasmuch as all cling to it with a view to licence in the way of marrying, I should wish to give a thorough treatment to the inquiry what kind of good he is pointing out which is “better than” a penalty; which cannot seem good but by comparison with something very bad; so that the reason why “marrying” is good, is that “burning” is worse. “Good” is worthy of the name if it continue to keep that name without comparison, I say not with evil, but even with some second good; so that, even if it is compared to some other good, and is by some other cast into the shade, it do nevertheless remain in possession of the name “good.” If, however, it is the nature of an evil which is the means which compels the predicating “good,” it is not so much “good” as a species of inferior evil, which by being obscured by a superior evil is driven to the name of good. Take away, in short, the condition of comparison, so as not to say, “Better it is to marry than to burn;” and I question whether you will have the hardihood to say, “Better it is to marry,” not adding what that is which is better. Therefore what is not better, of course is not good either; inasmuch as you have taken away and removed the condition of comparison, which, while it makes the thing “better,” so compels it to be regarded as “good.” “Better it is to marry than to burn” is to be understood in the same way as, “Better it is to lack one eye than two:” if, however, you withdraw from the comparison, it will not be “better” to have one eye, inasmuch as it is not “good” either. Let none therefore catch at a defence (of marriage) from this paragraph, which properly refers to “the unmarried and widows,” for whom no (matrimonial) conjunction is yet reckoned: although I hope I have shown that even such must understand the nature of the permission.
Alte et impresse recogitandam esse dico Dei voluptatem, quid etiam in occulto velit. Quae enim in manifesto, scimus omnes; eaque ipsa qualiter in manifesto sint, perspiciendum est. Nam etsi quaedam videntur voluntatem Dei sapere, dum a Deo permittuntur, non statim omne quod permittitur, ex mera et tota voluntate procedit ejus qui permittit. Ex indulgentia est, quodcumque permittitur; quae etsi sine voluntate non est, quia tamen aliquam habet caussam in illo cui indulgetur, quasi de invita venit voluntate, passa caussam sui, quae cogit voluntatem. Vide qualis sit voluntas, cujus alter est caussa. Secunda item species consideranda est non purae voluntatis. Vult nos Deus agere quaedam placita sibi, in quibus non indulgentia patrocinatur, sed disciplina dominatur. Si tamen alia istis praeposuit, utique quae magis vult, dubiumne est ea nobis sectanda esse, quae mavult; cum quae minus vult, quia alia magis vult, perinde habenda sint atque si nolit? Nam ostendens quid magis velit, minorem voluntatem majore delevit. Quantoque notitiae tuae utramque proposuit, tanto definiit id te sectari debere, quod declaravit se magis velle. Ergo si ideo declaravit ut id secteris quod magis vult, sine dubio nisi ita facis contra voluntatem ejus sapis, sapiendo contra potiorem ejus voluntatem: magisque offendis quam promereris, quod vult quidem faciendo, et quod mavult respuendo. Ex parte delinquis; ex parte, si non delinquis, non tamen promereris. Porro et promereri nolle, delinquere est. Secundum igitur matrimonium, si est ex illa Dei voluntate, quae indulgentia vocatur, negabimus meram voluntatem, cui indulgentia est caussa; si ex ea, cui potior alia praeponitur continentiae magis appetendae, didicerimus non potiorem a potiore rescindi. Haec praestrinxerim, ut jam Apostoli voces decurram. In primis autem non videbor irreligiosus, si, quod ipse profitetur, animadvertam; omnem illum indulgentiam nuptiarum, de suo, id est, de humano sensu, non de divino praescripto induxisse. Nam et cum de viduis et innuptis definiit uti nubant, si continere non possunt, quia melius sit nubere quam uri; conversus ad alteram speciem: Nuptis autem denuntio, inquit, non quidem ego, sed Dominus . Ita ostendit, ex tralatione personae suae in Dominum, id quod supra dixerat, non ex Domini persona, sed ex sua pronuntiasse, Melius est nubere quam uri. Quae vox licet ad eos pertineat, qui innupti, vel vidui a fide deprehenduntur; quia tamen omnes eam ad nubendi licentiam amplectuntur, velim pertractare, quale bonum ostendat, quod melius est poena: quod non potest videri bonum, nisi pessimo comparatum; ut ideo bonum sit nubere, quia deterius est ardere. Bonum ita est, si perseveret nomen obtinens sine comparatione, non dico mali, sed etiam boni alterius; ut et si bono alii comparatur, et alio adumbratur, nihilominus remaneat in boni nomine. Caeterum, si per mali conditionem cogitur bonum dici, non tam bonum est quam genus mali inferioris, quod a superiore malo obscuratum ad nomen boni impellitur. Aufer denique conditionem comparationis, ut non dicas: melius est nubere quam uri; et quaero, an dicere audeas: melius est nubere; non adjiciens quid sit id, quod melius est. Ergo quod non melius, utique nec bonum; quia abstulisti et removisti conditionem comparationis, quae dum melius illud facit, ita bonum haberi cogit. Melius est nubere quam uri; sic accipiendum est, quomodo melius est uno oculo quam duobus carere: si tamen a comparatione discedas, non erit melius unum oculum habere, quia nec bonum. Nemo igitur captet ex hoc capitulo defensionem, quod proprie ad innuptos et viduos spectat, quibus nulla adhuc conjunctio numeratur. Quamquam ostenderim etiam illis intelligendam esse permissi conditionem.
4 Further Remarks Upon the Apostle's Language PL 2, 919
However, touching second marriage, we know plainly that the apostle has pronounced: “Thou hast been loosed from a wife; seek not a wife. But if thou shalt marry, thou wilt not sin.” Still, as in the former case, he has introduced the order of this discourse too from his personal suggestion, not from a divine precept. But there is a wide difference between a precept of God and a suggestion of man. “Precept of the Lord,” says he, “I have not; but I give advice, as having obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful.” In fact, neither in the Gospel nor in Paul’s own Epistles will you find a precept of God as the source whence repetition of marriage is permitted. Whence the doctrine that unity (of marriage) must be observed derives confirmation; inasmuch as that which is not found to be permitted by the Lord is acknowledged to be forbidden. Add (to this consideration) the fact, that even this very introduction of human advice, as if already beginning to reflect upon its own extravagance, immediately restrains and recalls itself, while it subjoins, “However, such shall have pressure of the flesh;” while he says that he “spares them;” while he adds that “the time is wound up,” so that “it behoves even such as have wives to act as if they had not;” while he compares the solicitude of the wedded and of the unwedded: for, in teaching, by means of these considerations, the reasons why marrying is not expedient, he dissuades from that to which he had above granted indulgence. And this is the case with regard to first marriage: how much more with regard to second! When, however, he exhorts us to the imitation of his own example, of course, in showing what he does wish us to be; that is, continent; he equally declares what he does not wish us to be, that is, incontinent. Thus he, too, while he wills one thing, gives no spontaneous or true permission to that which he nills. For had he willed, he would not have permitted; nay, rather, he would have commanded. “But see again: a woman when her husband is dead, he says, can marry, if she wish to marry any one, only ‘in the Lord.’” Ah! but “happier will she be,” he says, “if she shall remain permanently as she is, according to my opinion. I think, moreover, I too have the Spirit of God.” We see two advices: that whereby, above, he grants the indulgence of marrying; and that whereby, just afterwards, he teaches continence with regard to marrying. “To which, then,” you say, “shall we assent?” Look at them carefully, and choose. In granting indulgence, he alleges the advice of a prudent man; in enjoining continence, he affirms the advice of the Holy Spirit. Follow the admonition which has divinity for its patron. It is true that believers likewise “have the Spirit of God;” but not all believers are apostles. When then, he who had called himself a “believer,” added thereafter that he “had the Spirit of God,” which no one would doubt even in the case of an (ordinary) believer; his reason for saying so was, that he might reassert for himself apostolic dignity. For apostles have the Holy Spirit properly, who have Him fully, in the operations of prophecy, and the efficacy of (healing) virtues, and the evidences of tongues; not partially, as all others have. Thus he attached the Holy Spirit’s authority to that form (of advice) to which he willed us rather to attend; and forthwith it became not an advice of the Holy Spirit, but, in consideration of His majesty, a precept.
Caeterum, de secundo matrimonio scimus plane Apostolum pronuntiasse, Solutus es ab uxore, ne quaesieris uxorem: sed si duxeris, non delinquis. Perinde tamen et hujus sermonis ordinem, de consilio suo, non de divino praecepto introducit. Multum autem interest inter Dei praeceptum, et consilium hominis. Praeceptum Domini, inquit, non habeo; sed consilium do, quasi misericordiam consecutus a Domino fidelis esse. Caeterum, neque in Evangelio, neque in ipsius Pauli Epistolis, ex praecepto Dei invenias permissam matrimonii separationem. Unde unum habendum confirmatur; quia quod a Domino permissum non invenitur, id ignoscitur. Adde quod et haec ipsa humani consilii interjectio quasi jam recogitationem excessus sui passa, statim se refraenat et revocat, cum subjungit: Verumtamen hujusmodi, pressuram carnis habebunt; cum parcere se eis dicit; cum tempus in collectum esse adjicit, quo oporteat etiam habentes matrimonia pro non habentibus agere: cum sollicitudinem nuptorum et innuptorum committit. Per haec enim docens, cur non expediat nubere, dissuadet ab eo quod supra indulserat. Et hoc de primo matrimonio; quanto magis de secundo? Cum vero nos ad exemplum suum hortatur, utique ostendens quid nos velit esse, id est continentes, pariter declarat quid nos esse nolit, id est incontinentes. Ita et ipse cum aliud vult, id quod non vult nec sponte nec veritate permittit. Si enim vellet, non permisisset, imo imperasset. Sed ecce rursus , mulierem marito defuncto dicit nubere posse, si cui velit, tantum in Domino. At enim felicior erit, inquit, si sic permanserit secundum meum consilium. Puto autem, et ego Dei spiritum habeo. Videmus duo consilia, quo supra nubendi veniam facit, et quo postmodum continentiam nubendi indicit. Cui ergo, inquis, adsentabimur? Inspice, et lege. Cum veniam facit, hominis prudentis consilium adlegat. Cum continentiam indicit, Spiritus Sancti consilium affirmat. Sequere admonitionem cui divinitas patrocinatur. Spiritum quidem Dei etiam fideles habent, sed non omnes fideles Apostoli. Cum ergo qui se fidelem dixerat, adjecit postea, Spiritum Dei se habere, quod nemo dubitaret etiam de fideli; idcirco id dixit, ut sibi Apostoli fastigium redderet. Proprie enim Apostoli Spiritum Sanctum habent in operibus prophetiae et efficacia virtutum, documentisque linguarum, non ex parte, quod caeteri. Ita Spiritus Sancti auctoritatem ad eam speciem adire fecit, cui nos magis obsequi voluit; et factum est jam non consilium divini Spiritus, sed pro ejus majestate praeceptum.
5 Unity of Marriage Taught by Its First Institution, and by the Apostle's Application of that Primal Type to Christ and the Church PL 2, 920
For the laying down of the law of once marrying, the very origin of the human race is our authority; witnessing as it emphatically does what God constituted in the beginning for a type to be examined with care by posterity. For when He had moulded man, and had foreseen that a peer was necessary for him, He borrowed from his ribs one, and fashioned for him one woman; whereas, of course, neither the Artificer nor the material would have been insufficient (for the creation of more). There were more ribs in Adam, and hands that knew no weariness in God; but not more wives in the eye of God. And accordingly the man of God, Adam, and the woman of God, Eve, discharging mutually (the duties of) one marriage, sanctioned for mankind a type by (the considerations of) the authoritative precedent of their origin and the primal will of God. Finally, “there shall be,” said He, “two in one flesh,” not three nor four. On any other hypothesis, there would no longer be “one flesh,” nor “two (joined) into one flesh.” These will be so, if the conjunction and the growing together in unity take place once for all. If, however, (it take place) a second time, or oftener, immediately (the flesh) ceases to be “one,” and there will not be “two (joined) into one flesh,” but plainly one rib (divided) into more. But when the apostle interprets, “The two shall be (joined) into one flesh” of the Church and Christ, according to the spiritual nuptials of the Church and Christ (for Christ is one, and one is His Church), we are bound to recognise a duplication and additional enforcement for us of the law of unity of marriage, not only in accordance with the foundation of our race, but in accordance with the sacrament of Christ. From one marriage do we derive our origin in each case; carnally in Adam, spiritually in Christ. The two births combine in laying down one prescriptive rule of monogamy. In regard of each of the two, is he degenerate who transgresses the limit of monogamy. Plurality of marriage began with an accursed man. Lamech was the first who, by marrying himself to two women, caused three to be (joined) “into one flesh.”
Ad legem semel nubendi dirigendam, ipsa origo humani generis patrocinatur, contestans quid Deus in primordio constituerit, in formam posteritati recensendam.
Nam cum hominem figurasset, eique parem necessariam propexisset, unam de costis ejus mutuatus, unam illi foeminam finxit; cum utique nec artifex, nec materia defecisset, plures costae in Adam, et infatigabiles manus in Deo, sed non plures uxores apud Deum et ideo homo Dei Adam, et mulier Dei Eva, unis inter se nuptiis functi sunt. Formam hominibus Dei, de originis auctoritate, et prima Dei voluntate sanxerunt. Denique, erunt duo, inquit, in carne una; non tres, neque quatuor. Alioquin jam non una caro, nec duo in unam carnem. Tunc erunt, si conjunctio et concretio in unitatem semel fiat. Si vero rursus aut saepius, jam una esse desiit; et erunt non duo in unam carnem, sed una plane costa in plures. At quam Apostolus in Ecclesiam et Christum interpretatur, erunt duo in unam carnem, secundum spiritales nuptias Ecclesiae et Christi (unus enim Christus, et una ejus Ecclesia), agnoscere debemus duplicatam et exaggeratam esse nobis unius matrimonii legem, tam secundum generis fundamentum, quam secundum Christi sacramentum. De uno matrimonio censemur utrobique, et carnaliter in Adam, et spiritaliter in Christo. Duarum nativitatum unum est monogamiae praescriptum. In utraque degenerat, qui de monogamia exorbitat. Numerus matrimonii a maledicto viro coepit. Primus Lamech, duabus maritatus, tres in unam carnem effecit.
6 The Objection from the Polygamy of the Patriarchs Answered PL 2, 921
“But withal the blessed patriarchs,” you say, “made mingled alliances not only with more wives (than one), but with concubines likewise.” Shall that, then, make it lawful for us also to marry without limit? I grant that it will, if there still remain types—sacraments of something future—for your nuptials to figure; or if even now there is room for that command, “Grow and multiply;” that is, if no other command has yet supervened: “The time is already wound up; it remains that both they who have wives act as if they had not:” for, of course, by enjoining continence, and restraining concubitance, the seminary of our race, (this latter command) has abolished that “Grow and multiply.” As I think, moreover, each pronouncement and arrangement is (the act) of one and the same God; who did then indeed, in the beginning, send forth a sowing of the race by an indulgent laxity granted to the reins of connubial alliances, until the world should be replenished, until the material of the new discipline should attain to forwardness: now, however, at the extreme boundaries of the times, has checked (the command) which He had sent out, and recalled the indulgence which He had granted; not without a reasonable ground for the extension (of that indulgence) in the beginning, and the limitation of it in the end. Laxity is always allowed to the beginning (of things). The reason why any one plants a wood and lets it grow, is that at his own time he may cut it. The wood was the old order, which is being pruned down by the new Gospel, in which withal “the axe has been laid at the roots.” So, too, “Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth,” has now grown old, ever since “Let none render evil for evil” grew young. I think, moreover, that even with a view to human institutions and decrees, things later prevail over things primitive.
Sed et benedicti, inquis, Patriarchae non modo pluribus uxoribus, verum etiam concubinis conjugia miscuerunt. Ergo propterea nobis quoque licebit innumerum nubere? Sane licebit, si adhuc typi futuri alicujus sacramenta supersunt, quos nuptiae tuae figurent; vel si etiam nunc locus est vocis illius: crescite et multiplicamini, id est, si nondum alia vox supervenit, tempus jam in collecto esse, restare ut et qui uxores habent, tanquam non habentes agant; utique enim continentiam indicens, et compescens concubitum, seminarium generis, abolefecit crescite illud et multiplicamini. Ut opinor autem, unius et ejusdem Dei utraque pronuntiatio et dispositio est: qui tum quidem in primordio sementem generis emisit, indultis conjugiorum habenis, donec mundus repleretur, donec novae disciplinae materia proficeret; nunc vero sub extremitatibus temporum compressit quod emiserat, et revocavit quod indulserat, non sine ratione prorogationis in primordio, et pastinationis in ultimo. Semper initia laxantur, fines contrahuntur. Propterea sylvam quis instituit, et crescere sinit, ut tempore suo caedat. Sylva erit vetus dispositio, quae ab Evangelio novo deputatur, in quo et securis ad radices arboris posita est. Sic et oculum pro oculo, et dentem pro dente, jam senuit, ex quo juvenuit malum pro malo nemo reddat. Puto autem etiam in humanas constitutiones atque decreta posteriora pristinis praevalere.
7 Even the Old Discipline Was Not Without Precedents to Enforce Monogamy. But in This as in Other Respects, the New Has Brought in a Higher Perfection PL 2, 921
Why, moreover, should we not rather recognise, from among (the store of) primitive precedents, those which communicate with the later (order of things) in respect of discipline, and transmit to novelty the typical form of antiquity? For look, in the old law I find the pruning-knife applied to the licence of repeated marriage. There is a caution in Leviticus: “My priests shall not pluralize marriages.” I may affirm even that that is plural which is not once for all. That which is not unity is number. In short, after unity begins number. Unity, moreover, is everything which is once for all. But for Christ was reserved, as in all other points so in this also, the “fulfilling of the law.” Thence, therefore, among us the prescript is more fully and more carefully laid down, that they who are chosen into the sacerdotal order must be men of one marriage; which rule is so rigidly observed, that I remember some removed from their office for digamy. But you will say, “Then all others may (marry more than once), whom he excepts.” Vain shall we be if we think that what is not lawful for priests is lawful for laics. Are not even we laics priests? It is written: “A kingdom also, and priests to His God and Father, hath He made us.” It is the authority of the Church, and the honour which has acquired sanctity through the joint session of the Order, which has established the difference between the Order and the laity. Accordingly, where there is no joint session of the ecclesiastical Order, you offer, and baptize, and are priest, alone for yourself. But where three are, a church is, albeit they be laics. For each individual lives by his own faith, nor is there exception of persons with God; since it is not hearers of the law who are justified by the Lord, but doers, according to what the apostle withal says. Therefore, if you have the right of a priest in your own person, in cases of necessity, it behoves you to have likewise the discipline of a priest whenever it may be necessary to have the right of a priest. If you are a digamist, do you baptize? If you are a digamist, do you offer? How much more capital (a crime) is it for a digamist laic to act as a priest, when the priest himself, if he turn digamist, is deprived of the power of acting the priest! “But to necessity,” you say, “indulgence is granted.” No necessity is excusable which is avoidable. In a word, shun to be found guilty of digamy, and you do not expose yourself to the necessity of administering what a digamist may not lawfully administer. God wills us all to be so conditioned, as to be ready at all times and places to undertake (the duties of) His sacraments. There is “one God, one faith,” one discipline too. So truly is this the case, that unless the laics as well observe the rules which are to guide the choice of presbyters, how will there be presbyters at all, who are chosen to that office from among the laics? Hence we are bound to contend that the command to abstain from second marriage relates first to the laic; so long as no other can be a presbyter than a laic, provided he have been once for all a husband.
Cur autem de pristinis exemplis non ea potus agnoscamus, quae cum posterioribus communicant, de disciplina et forma vetustatis ad novitatem transmittunt? Ecce enim in veteri lege animadverto castratam licentiam saepius nubendi. Cautum in Levitico: Sacerdotes mei non plus nubent . Possum dicere, etiam illud plus esse quod semel non est. Quod non unum est, numerus est. Denique, post unum incipit numerus. Unum autem est, omne quod semel est. Sed Christo servabatur, sicut in caeteris, ita in isto quoque legis plenitudo. Inde igitur apud nos plenius atque instructius praescribitur, unius matrimonii esse oportere qui alleguntur in ordinem sacerdotalem. Usque adeo quosdam memini digamos loco dejectos. Sed dices: Ergo caeteris licet quos excipit. Vani erimus, si putaverimus quod sacerdotibus non liceat, laicis licere. Nonne et laici sacerdotes sumus? Scriptum est: Regnum quoque nos et sacerdotes Deo et Patri suo fecit . Differentiam inter ordinem et plebem constituit Ecclesiae auctoritas, et honor per ordinis consessum sanctificatus. Adeo ubi ecclesiastici ordinis non est consessus, et offers, et tinguis, et sacerdos es tibi solus. Sed ubi tres, Ecclesia est, licet laici. Unusquisque enim sua fide vivit, nec est personarum acceptio apud Deum; quoniam non auditores legis justificantur a Deo, sed factores, secundum quod et Apostolus dicit . Igitur si habes jus sacerdotis in temetipso, ubi necesse est; habeas oportet etiam disciplinam sacerdotis, ubi necesse sit habere jus sacerdotis. Digamus tinguis? digamus offers? Quanto magis laico digamo capitale est agere pro sacerdote, cum ipsi sacerdoti digamo facto auferatur agere sacerdotem! Sed necessitati, inquis, indulgetur. Nulla necessitas excusatur, quae potest non esse. Noli denique digamus deprehendi, et non committis in necessitatem administrandi quod non licet digamo. Omnes nos Deus ita vult dispositos esse, ut ubique sacramentis ejus obeundis apti simus. Unus Deus, una fides, una et disciplina. Usque adeo, nisi et laici ea observent, per quae presbyteri alleguntur, quomodo erunt presbyteri, qui de laicis alleguntur? Ergo pugnare debemus ante laicum jussum a secundo matrimonio abstinere, dum presbyter esse non alius potest, quam laicus qui semel fuerit maritus.
8 If It Be Granted that Second Marriage is Lawful, Yet All Things Lawful are Not Expedient PL 2, 923
Let it now be granted that repetition of marriage is lawful, if everything which is lawful is good. The same apostle exclaims: “All things are lawful, but all are not profitable.” Pray, can what is “not profitable” be called good? If even things which do not make for salvation are “lawful,” it follows that even things which are not good are “lawful.” But what will it be your duty rather to choose; that which is good because it is “lawful,” or that which is so because it is “profitable?” A wide difference I take to exist between “licence” and salvation. Concerning the “good” it is not said “it is lawful;” inasmuch as “good” does not expect to be permitted, but to be assumed. But that is “permitted” about which a doubt exists whether it be “good;” which may likewise not be permitted, if it have not some first (extrinsic) cause of its being:—inasmuch as it is on account of the danger of incontinence that second marriage, (for instance), is permitted:—because, unless the “licence” of some not (absolutely) good thing were subject (so our choice), there were no means of proving who rendered a willing obedience to the Divine will, and who to his own power; which of us follows presentiality, and which embraces the opportunity of licence. “Licence,” for the most part, is a trial of discipline; since it is through trial that discipline is proved, and through “licence” that trial operates. Thus it comes to pass that “all things are lawful, but not all are expedient,” so long as (it remains true that) whoever has a “permission” granted is (thereby) tried, and is (consequently) judged during the process of trial in (the case of the particular) “permission.” Apostles, withal, had a “licence” to marry, and lead wives about (with them). They had a “licence,” too, to “live by the Gospel.” But he who, when occasion required, “did not use this right,” provokes us to imitate his own example; teaching us that our probation consists in that wherein “licence” has laid the groundwork for the experimental proof of abstinence.
Liceat nunc denuo nubere, si omne quod licet bonum est. Idem Apostolus exclamat: omnia licent, sed non omnia prosunt . Quod non prodest, oro te, bonum potest dici? Si licita sunt et quae non pro salute, ergo et quae non bona sunt, licita sunt. Quid autem magis velle debebis, quod ideo bonum est, quia licet, an quod ideo quia prodest? Multum existimo esse inter licentiam et salutem. De bono non dicitur, licet, quia bonum permitti non exspectat, sed adsumi. Permittitur autem quod, an bonum sit, in dubio est, quod potest etiam non permitti, si non habeat aliquam sui caussam primam. Propter incontinentiae periculum permittitur nubere secundo; quia nisi licentia alicujus non bonae rei subjaceret, non esset in quo probaretur qui divinae voluntati, et qui suae potestati obsequeretur; quis nostrum utilitatis praesentiam sectetur, et quis occasionem licentiae amplexetur. Licentia plerumque tentatio est disciplinae, quoniam disciplina per tentationem probatur, tentatio per licentiam operatur. Ita fit, ut omnia liceant, sed non omnia expediant; dum tentatur cui permittitur, et judicatur dum in permissione tentatur. Licebat et Apostolis nubere, et uxores circumducere ; licebat et de Evangelio ali. Sed qui jure hoc usus non est in occasionem, ad exemplum nos suum provocat, docens in eo esse probationem, in quo licentia experimentum abstinentiae praestruxit.
9 Second Marriage a Species of Adultery, Marriage Itself Impugned, as Akin to Adultery PL 2, 924
If we look deeply into his meanings, and interpret them, second marriage will have to be termed no other than a species of fornication. For, since he says that married persons make this their solicitude, “how to please one another” (not, of course, morally, for a good solicitude he would not impugn); and (since), he wishes them to be understood to be solicitous about dress, and ornament, and every kind of personal attraction, with a view to increasing their power of allurement; (since), moreover, to please by personal beauty and dress is the genius of carnal concupiscence, which again is the cause of fornication: pray, does second marriage seem to you to border upon fornication, since in it are detected those ingredients which are appropriate to fornication? The Lord Himself said, “Whoever has seen a woman with a view to concupiscence has already violated her in his heart.” But has he who has seen her with a view to marriage done so less or more? What if he have even married her?—which he would not do had he not desired her with a view to marriage, and seen her with a view to concupiscence; unless it is possible for a wife to be married whom you have not seen or desired. I grant it makes a wide difference whether a married man or an unmarried desire another woman. Every woman, (however), even to an unmarried man, is “another,” so long as she belongs to some one else; nor yet is the mean through which she becomes a married woman any other than that through which withal (she becomes) an adulteress. It is laws which seem to make the difference between marriage and fornication; through diversity of illicitness, not through the nature of the thing itself. Besides, what is the thing which takes place in all men and women to produce marriage and fornication? Commixture of the flesh, of course; the concupiscence whereof the Lord put on the same footing with fornication. “Then,” says (some one), “are you by this time destroying first—that is, single—marriage too?” And (if so) not without reason; inasmuch as it, too, consists of that which is the essence of fornication. Accordingly, the best thing for a man is not to touch a woman; and accordingly the virgin’s is the principal sanctity, because it is free from affinity with fornication. And since these considerations may be advanced, even in the case of first and single marriage, to forward the cause of continence, how much more will they afford a prejudgment for refusing second marriage? Be thankful if God has once for all granted you indulgence to marry. Thankful, moreover, you will be if you know not that He has granted you that indulgence a second time. But you abuse indulgence if you avail yourself of it without moderation. Moderation is understood (to be derived) from modus, a limit. It does not suffice you to have fallen back, by marrying, from that highest grade of immaculate virginity; but you roll yourself down into yet a third, and into a fourth, and perhaps into more, after you have failed to be continent in the second stage; inasmuch as he who has treated about contracting second marriages has not willed to prohibit even more. Marry we, therefore, daily. And marrying, let us be overtaken by the last day, like Sodom and Gomorrah; that day when the “woe” pronounced over “such as are with child and giving suck” shall be fulfilled, that is, over the married and the incontinent: for from marriage result wombs, and breasts, and infants. And when an end of marrying? I believe after the end of living!
Si penitus sensus ejus interpretemur, non aliud dicendum erit secundum matrimonium, quam species stupri. Cum enim dicat, maritos hoc in sollicitudine habere, quemadmodum sibi placeant; non utique de moribus (nam bonam sollicitudinem non sugillaret); et de cultu, et ornatu, et omni studio formae, ad illecebras movendas sollicitos intelligi velit; de forma autem et cultu placere carnalis concupiscentiae ingenium sit, quae etiam stupri caussa est: ecquid videtur tibi stupri adfine esse secundum matrimonium, quoniam ea in illo deprehendo quae stupro competunt? Ipse Dominus: Qui viderit, inquit, mulierem ad concupiscendum, jam stupravit eam in corde suo . Qui autem eam ad ducendum viderit, minus an plus fecit? Quid, si etiam duxerit? quod non faceret. nisi et ad ducendum concupisset, et ad concupiscendum vidisset. Nisi si potest duci uxor, quam non videris nec concupieris. Multum sane interest, maritus an caelebs aliam concupiscat. Omnis mulier etiam caelibi alia est, quamdiu aliena; nec per aliud tamen fit marita, nisi per quod et adultera. Leges videntur matrimonii et stupri differentiam facere per diversitatem illiciti, non per conditionem rei ipsius. Alioquin quae res et viris et foeminis omnibus adest ad matrimonium et stuprum? commixtio carnis scilicet, cujus concupiscentiam Dominus stupro adaequavit. Ergo, inquis. jam et primas, id est, unas nuptias destruis. Nec immerito, quoniam et ipsae ex eo constant, quo et stuprum. Ideo optimum est homini mulierem non attingere, et ideo virginis principalis sanctitas, quia caret stupri adfinitate. Et cum haec etiam de primis et unis nuptiis praetendi ad caussam continentiae possint, quanto magis secundo matrimonio recusando praejudicabunt! Gratus esto, si semel tibi indulsit Deus nubere; gratus autem eris, si iterum indulsisse illum tibi nescias. Caeterum, abuteris indulgentia, cum sine modestia uteris. Modestia a modo intelligitur. Non tibi sufficit de summo illo immaculatae virginitatis gradu in secundum recidisse nubendo; sed in tertium adhuc devolveris, et in quartum, et fortassis in plures, postquam in secunda statione continens non fuisti: quia nec prohibere plures nuptias voluit, qui de secundis provocandis retractavit. Nubamus igitur quotidie, et nubentes ab ultimo die deprehendamur tanquam Sodoma et Gomorra: quo die, Vae illud super praegnantes [adimplebitur], id est, super maritos et incontinentes: de nuptiis enim uteri, et ubera, et infantes. Et quando finis nubendi? Credo post finem vivendi.
10 Application of the Subject. Advantages of Widowhood PL 2, 925
Renounce we things carnal, that we may at length bear fruits spiritual. Seize the opportunity—albeit not earnestly desired, yet favourable—of not having any one to whom to pay a debt, and by whom to be (yourself) repaid! You have ceased to be a debtor. Happy man! You have released your debtor; sustain the loss. What if you come to feel that what we have called a loss is a gain? For continence will be a mean whereby you will traffic in a mighty substance of sanctity; by parsimony of the flesh you will gain the Spirit. For let us ponder over our conscience itself, (to see) how different a man feels himself when he chances to be deprived of his wife. He savours spiritually. If he is making prayer to the Lord, he is near heaven. If he is bending over the Scriptures, he is “wholly in them.” If he is singing a psalm, he satisfies himself. If he is adjuring a demon, he is confident in himself. Accordingly, the apostle added (the recommendation of) a temporary abstinence for the sake of adding an efficacy to prayers, that we might know that what is profitable “for a time” should be always practised by us, that it may be always profitable. Daily, every moment, prayer is necessary to men; of course continence (is so) too, since prayer is necessary. Prayer proceeds from conscience. If the conscience blush, prayer blushes. It is the spirit which conducts prayer to God. If the spirit be self-accused of a blushing conscience, how will it have the hardihood to conduct prayer to the altar; seeing that, if prayer blush, the holy minister (of prayer) itself is suffused too? For there is a prophetic utterance of the Old Testament: “Holy shall ye be, because God is holy;” and again: “With the holy thou shalt be sanctified; and with the innocent man thou shalt be innocent; and with the elect, elect.” For it is our duty so to walk in the Lord’s discipline as is “worthy,” not according to the filthy concupiscences of the flesh. For so, too, does the apostle say, that “to savour according to the flesh is death, but to savour according to the spirit is life eternal in Jesus Christ our Lord.” Again, through the holy prophetess Prisca the Gospel is thus preached: that “the holy minister knows how to minister sanctity.” “For purity,” says she, “is harmonious, and they see visions; and, turning their face downward, they even hear manifest voices, as salutary as they are withal secret.” If this dulling (of the spiritual faculties), even when the carnal nature is allowed room for exercise in first marriage, averts the Holy Spirit; how much more when it is brought into play in second marriage!
Renuntiemus carnalibus, ut aliquando spiritalia retractemus. Rape occasionem, etsi non exoptatissimam, attamen opportunam, non habere cui debitum solveres, et a quo exsolvereris: desiisti esse debitor. O te felicem! dimisisti debitorem; sustine damnum. Quid si, quod diximus damnum, lucrum sentias? Per continentiam enim negotiaberis magnam substantiam sanctitatis; parcimonia carnis, spiritum adquires. Recogitemus enim ipsam conscientiam nostram, quam alium se homo sentiat: cum forte a sua foemina cessat, spiritaliter sapit. Si orationem facit ad Dominum, prope est coelo. Si scripturis incumbit, totus illic est. Si psalmum canit, placet sibi. Si daemonem adjurat, confidit sibi. Ideo Apostolus temporalem purificationem orationum commendandarum caussa adjecit; ut sciremus, quod ad tempus prodest semper nobis exercendum esse, ut semper prosit. Quotidie, imo omni momento oratio hominibus necessaria est, utique et continentia, postquam oratio necessaria est. Oratio de conscientia procedit. Si conscientia erubescat, erubescit oratio. Spiritus deducit orationem ad Deum. Si spiritus reus apud se sit conscientiae erubescentis, quomodo audebit orationem ducere ab illa, de qua erubescente et ipse suffunditur sanctus minister? Etenim est prophetica vox veteris Testamenti: Sancti eritis, quia Deus sanctus ; et rursus: Cum sancto sanctificaberis, et cum viro innocente innocens eris, et cum electo electus . Debemus enim ita ingredi in disciplina Domini, ut dignum est, non secundum carnis calentes concupiscentias. Ita enim et Apostolus dicit, quod sapere secundum carnem mors sit; secundum spiritum vero sapere vita aeterna sit in Christo Jesu Domino nostro. Si haec obfusio, etiam cum in unis nuptiis res carnis exercetur, Spiritum Sanctum avertit, quanto magis cum in secundo matrimonio agitur?
11 The More the Wives, the Greater the Distraction of the Spirit PL 2, 926
For (in that case) the shame is double; inasmuch as, in second marriage, two wives beset the same husband—one in spirit, one in flesh. For the first wife you cannot hate, for whom you retain an even more religious affection, as being already received into the Lord’s presence; for whose spirit you make request; for whom you render annual oblations. Will you stand, then, before the Lord with as many wives as you commemorate in prayer; and will you offer for two; and will you commend those two (to God) by the ministry of a priest ordained (to his sacred office) on the score of monogamy, or else consecrated (thereto) on the score even of virginity, surrounded by widows married but to one husband? And will your sacrifice ascend with unabashed front, and—among all the other (graces) of a good mind—will you request for yourself and for your wife chastity?
Duplex enim rubor est; quia in secundo matrimonio duae uxores eumdem circumstant maritum; una spiritu, alia in carne: neque enim pristinam poteris odisse, cui etiam religiosiorem reservas affectionem, ut jam receptae apud Dominum, pro cujus spiritu postulas, pro qua oblationes annuas reddis. Stabis ergo ad Dominum cum tot uxoribus, quot in oratione commemoras? et offeres pro duabus? et commendabis illas duas per sacerdotem de monogamia ordinatum, aut etiam de virginitate sancitum, circumdatum virginibus ac univiris, et ascendet sacrificium tuum libera fronte? et inter caeteras voluntates bonae mentis, postulabis tibi et uxori castitatem?
12 Excuses Commonly Urged in Defence of Second Marriage. Their Futility, Especially in the Case of Christians, Pointed Out PL 2, 927
I am aware of the excuses by which we colour our insatiable carnal appetite. Our pretexts are: the necessities of props to lean on; a house to be managed; a family to be governed; chests and keys to be guarded; the wool-spinning to be dispensed; food to be attended to; cares to be generally lessened. Of course the houses of none but married men fare well! The families of celibates, the estates of eunuchs, the fortunes of military men, or of such as travel without wives, have gone to rack and ruin! For are not we, too, soldiers? Soldiers, indeed, subject to all the stricter discipline, that we are subject to so great a General? Are not we, too, travellers in this world? Why moreover, Christian, are you so conditioned, that you cannot (so travel) without a wife? “In my present (widowed) state, too, a consort in domestic works is necessary.” (Then) take some spiritual wife. Take to yourself from among the widows one fair in faith, dowered with poverty, sealed with age. You will (thus) make a good marriage. A plurality of such wives is pleasing to God. “But Christians concern themselves about posterity”—to whom there is no to-morrow! Shall the servant of God yearn after heirs, who has disinherited himself from the world? And is it to be a reason for a man to repeat marriage, if from his first (marriage) he have no children? And shall he thus have, as the first benefit (resulting therefrom), this, that he should desire longer life, when the apostle himself is in haste to be “with the Lord?” Assuredly, most free will he be from encumbrance in persecutions, most constant in martyrdoms, most prompt in distributions of his goods, most temperate in acquisitions; lastly, undistracted by cares will he die, when he has left children behind him—perhaps to perform the last rites over his grave! Is it then, perchance, in forecast for the commonwealth that such (marriages)are contracted? for fear the States fail, if no rising generations be trained up? for fear the rights of law, for fear the branches of commerce, sink quite into decay? for fear the temples be quite forsaken? for fear there be none to raise the acclaim, “The lion for the Christians?”—for these are the acclaims which they desire to hear who go in quest of offspring! Let the well-known burdensomeness of children—especially in our case—suffice to counsel widowhood: (children) whom men are compelled by laws to undertake (the charge of); because no wise man would ever willingly have desired sons! What, then, will you do if you succeed in filling your new wife with your own conscientious scruples? Are you to dissolve the conception by aid of drugs? I think to us it is no more lawful to hurt (a child) in process of birth, than one (already) born. But perhaps at that time of your wife’s pregnancy you will have the hardihood to beg from God a remedy for so grave a solicitude, which, when it lay in your own power, you refused? Some (naturally) barren woman, I suppose, or (some woman) of an age already feeling the chill of years, will be the object of your forecasting search. A course prudent enough, and, above all, worthy of a believer! For there is no woman whom we have believed to have borne (a child) when barren or old, when God so willed! which he is all the more likely to do if any one, by the presumption of this foresight of his own, provoke emulation on the part of God. In fine, we know a case among our brethren, in which one of them took a barren woman in second marriage for his daughter’s sake, and became as well for the second time a father as for the second time a husband.
Scio quibus caussationibus coloremus insatiabilem carnis cupiditatem: praetendimus necessitates adminiculorum, domum administrandam, familiam regendam, loculos, claves custodiendas, lanificium dispensandum, victum procurandum, curas domesticas. Scilicet solis maritorum domibus bene est. Perierunt caelibum familiae, res spadonum, fortunae militum, aut peregrinantium sine uxoribus. Non enim nos et milites sumus? eo quidem majoris disciplinae, quanto tanti imperatoris. Non et nos peregrinantes in isto saeculo sumus? Cur autem ita dispositus es, o christiane, ut sine uxore non possis? Nunc et consors onerum domesticorum necessaria est. Habe aliquam uxorem spiritalem, adsume de viduis, fide pulcram, paupertate dotatam, aetate signatam: bonas nuptias feceris. Hujusmodi uxores etiam plures haberi Deo gratum est. Sed posteritatem recogitant christiani, quibus crastinum non est. Haeredes Dei servus desiderabit, qui semetipsum de saeculo exhaeredavit? Et ideo quis repetat matrimonium, si de pristino non habeat liberos? Habebit itaque hoc primum, ut diutius velit vivere, ipso apostolo festinante ad Dominum? Certe expeditissimus in persecutionibus, constantissimus in martyriis, promptissimus in communicationibus, temperantissimus in acquisitionibus: postremo securus morietur, relictis filiis forsitan qui illi parentent. Numquid ergo hujusmodi et reipublicae prospectu aguntur, ne civitates deficiant, si soboles non exerceantur: ne leges, ne jura, ne commercia delabantur; ne templa derelinquantur; ne non sint qui adclament: CHRISTIANI AD BESTIAS. Haec enim audire desiderant, qui filios quaerunt. Sufficiant ad consilium viduitatis vel ista, praecipue apud nos, importunitas liberorum, ad quos suscipiendos legibus compelluntur homines; quia sapiens quique nunquam libens filios desiderasset. Quid ergo facies si novam uxorem de tua conscientia impleveris? dissolvas medicaminibus conceptum? Puto nobis non magis licere nascentem necare, quam natum. Sed fortasse illo tempore praegnantis uxoris, remedium tantae sollicitudini a Deo petere audebis, quod in te positum recusasti. Aliqua, opinor, sterilis prospicietur, jam vel frigidioris aetatis. Satis consulte, et in primis fideliter. Nullam enim credidimus, Deo volente, sterilem aut anum enixam; quod adeo magis evenire potest, si quis praesumptione hujus providentiae suae Dei aemulationem provocarit. Scimus denique quemdam ex fratribus, cum, propter filiam suam, secundo matrimonio sterilem captasset uxorem, tam iterum patrem factum, quam et iterum maritum.
13 Examples from Among the Heathen, as Well as from the Church, to Enforce the Foregoing Exhortation PL 2, 928
To this my exhortation, best beloved brother, there are added even heathenish examples; which have often been set by ourselves as well (as by others) in evidence, when anything good and pleasing to God is, even among “strangers,” recognised and honoured with a testimony. In short, monogamy among the heathen is so held in highest honour, that even virgins, when legitimately marrying, have a woman never married but once appointed them as brideswoman; and if you say that “this is for the sake of the omen,” of course it is for the sake of a good omen; again, that in some solemnities and official functions, single-husbandhood takes the precedence: at all events, the wife of a Flamen must be but once married, which is the law of the Flamen (himself) too. For the fact that the chief pontiff himself must not iterate marriage is, of course, a glory to monogamy. When, however, Satan affects God’s sacraments, it is a challenge to us; nay, rather, a cause for blushing, if we are slow to exhibit to God a continence which some render to the devil, by perpetuity sometimes of virginity, sometimes of widowhood. We have heard of Vesta’s virgins, and Juno’s at the town of Achaia, and Apollo’s among the Delphians, and Minerva’s and Diana’s in some places. We have heard, too, of continent men, and (among others) the priests of the famous Egyptian bull: women, moreover, (dedicated) to the African Ceres, in whose honour they even spontaneously abdicate matrimony, and so live to old age, shunning thenceforward all contact with males, even so much as the kisses of their sons. The devil, forsooth, has discovered, after voluptuousness, even a chastity which shall work perdition; that the guilt may be all the deeper of the Christian who refuses the chastity which helps to salvation! A testimony to us shall be, too, some of heathendom’s women, who have won renown for their obstinate persistence in single-husbandhood: some Dido, (for instance), who, refugee as she was on alien soil, when she ought rather to have desired, without any external solicitation, marriage with a king, did yet, for fear of experiencing a second union, prefer, contrariwise, to “burn” rather than to “marry;” or the famous Lucretia, who, albeit it was but once, by force, and against her will, that she had suffered a strange man, washed her stained flesh in her own blood, lest she should live, when no longer single-husbanded in her own esteem! A little more care will furnish you with more examples from our own (sisters); and those indeed, superior to the others, inasmuch as it is a greater thing to live in chastity than to die for it. Easier it is to lay down your life because you have lost a blessing, than to keep by living that for which you would rather die outright. How many men, therefore, and how many women, in Ecclesiastical Orders, owe their position to continence, who have preferred to be wedded to God; who have restored the honour of their flesh, and who have already dedicated themselves as sons of that (future) age, by slaying in themselves the concupiscence of lust, and that whole (propensity) which could not be admitted within Paradise! Whence it is presumable that such as shall wish to be received within Paradise, ought at last to begin to cease from that thing from which Paradise is intact.
Ad hanc meam cohortationem, frater dilectissime, accedunt etiam saecularia exempla, quae saepe nobis etiam in testimonio posita sunt, cum quid bonum, et Deo placitum ab extraneis quoque agnoscitur, et testimonio oneratur. Denique, monogamia apud ethnicos ita in summo honore est, ut et virginibus legitime nubentibus univira pronuba adhibeatur; et si auspicii caussa, utique boni auspicii est. Item, ut in quibusdam solemnibus et officiis, prior sit univirae locus. Certe flaminica nonnisi univira est, quae et flaminis lex est. Nam prior cum ipsi pontifici maximo iterare matrimonium non licet, utique monogamiae gloria est: cum autem Dei sacramenta Satanas affectat, provocatio est nostra; imo suffusio, si pigri sumus ad continentiam Deo exhibendam, quam diabolo quidam praestant, nunc virginitate, nunc viduitate perpetua. Novimus virgines Vestae et Junonis apud Achaiae oppidum, Apollinis apud Ephesos, et Minervae quibusdam locis. Novimus et continentes viros, et quidem tauri illius aegyptii antistites. Foeminas vero Cereri Africanae; cui etiam sponte abdicato matrimonio adsenescunt, aversantes exinde contactum masculorum, usque ad oscula filiorum. Invenit scilicet diabolus, post luxuriam, etiam castitatem perditricem, quo magis reus sit christianus, qui castitatem recusaverit conservatricem. Erunt nobis in testimonium et foeminae quaedam saeculares, ob univiratus obstinationem, famam consecutae: ut Dido, quae profuga in alieno solo, ubi nuptias regis ultro optasse debuerat, ne tamen secundas experiretur, maluit e contrario uri quam nubere; vel illa Lucretia quae etsi semel per vim, et invita, alium virum passa est, sanguine suo maculatam carnem abluit, ne viveret jam non sibi univira. Plura exempla curiosius de nostris invenias, et quidem tanto potiora, quanto facilius est vivere in castitate, quam pro ea mori; hoc est, animae id bonum misceri, quam non vivendo separari. Quanti igitur et quantae in ecclesiasticis ordinibus de continentia censentur, qui Deo nubere maluerunt, qui carnis suae honorem restituerunt, quique se jam illius aevi filios dicaverunt, occidentes in se concupiscentiam libidinis, et totum illud quod intra paradisum non potuit admitti? Unde praesumendum est hos, qui intra paradisum recipi volent, tandem debere cessare ab ea re, a qua paradisus intactus est.