GENOVESI, ANTONIO. - Philosopher and economist, b. at Castiglione (Salerno) on 1 Nov. 1712, d. at Naples on 23 Sept. 1769. Having entered the seminary at Salerno at the age of eighteen, more by his father's wish than by his own inclination, he became a priest there and a teacher of eloquence. But already in 1738 he left Salerno for Naples, where he completed his philosophical studies and was able, through the intercession of Msgr. Celestino Galiani, prefect of studies, who would also prove afterward to be his effective protector, to teach metaphysics (1741) and ethics (1745) at the University of Naples. A relative open-mindedness of thought and the open, though watchful and critical, reception that the philosophical novelties from beyond the Alps and beyond the Channel found in him earned him the hostility of the most rigidly conservative academic circles; so much so that in 1747 he was barred from the competition for the chair of theology (his Universae Christianae theologiae elementa would be published posthumously at Venice, in 1771). On the other hand, G.'s very temperament led him to succeed far better in the practical sciences than in the speculative ones, as became evident after 1754, when, through the munificence of the Florentine Bartolomeo Intieri, a chair of Mechanics and Commerce was established at the University of Naples, the first chair of political economy in Italy, if not in Europe. Intieri endowed it with 300 ducats a year and made it a condition that the first to occupy it should be G., who, having begun teaching on 5 Nov. 1754, continued it for the rest of his life.
On G.'s philosophical formation there exerted an influence, besides the ancients, Locke, Hume, the sensists and Leibniz. Enlightenment culture entered the Kingdom of Naples chiefly through G.'s merit, for he had understood the usefulness of studying the new doctrines, if for no other reason than to combat their errors with the same logical weapons. His Elementa metaphysicae mathematicum in morem adornata (Naples 1743-47; 2nd ed. ibid. 1751, dedicated to Benedict XIV) do in fact reveal an apologetic foundation: the first part, ontosophy and cosmosophy, refutes pantheists and fatalists, especially Spinoza; the second, theology, the deists; the third, psychosophy, the Epicureans and materialists in general; the fourth, supplementary, treating of morals, combats the libertines. In 1755 the work was denounced to the S. Congregation of the Index for pantheism and Jansenism; in truth, if the first accusation was unfounded, the second seemed to have some basis. The Elementa artis logico-criticae (ibid. 1754) are of interest above all for the practical orientation, present already then, of the Genovesian conception of knowledge: an orientation that takes full shape in the Discorso sopra il vero fine delle lettere e delle scienze (1753), which marks G.'s decisive turn toward the practical sciences, although even afterward he did not cease to cultivate pure philosophy, publishing in 1758 the noble Meditazioni filosofiche sulla religione e sulla morale, in '59 the self-apologetic Lettere filosofiche and in 1766 the Logica and the Metafisica per i giovanetti. The Discorso of '53 declares vain and harmful every study that is not directed «to the solid utility of men»; here is the program of G.'s economic teaching, gathered in the Lezioni di commercio, o sia di economia civile (ibid. 1766).
The work consists of two parts, of which the first, more general, lays down the political and psychological premises («spring of pain») of economic science, treats of the social classes, of the arts (distinguished into fundamental, improving and luxury), of the utility of the non-productive classes (conditioned by the «law of the least possible») and, finally, of commerce and finance. The second part considers more technically economic concepts, such as price, money, credit, exchange and interest. G. is usually placed within the mercantilist school, and this essentially because of his concern that the balance of trade be made active through duties on imports, especially of finished products, and through encouragements to national producers. What G. accepts, however, is a tempered mercantilism, corrected on certain points, such as the belief in the intrinsic and pre-eminent value of gold: G. notes that gold and money in general are «riches of sign», while actual wealth cannot be produced except by labor. And, above all, G. does not accept from mercantilism the conception of wealth as a function of the State's military power, of which the individual would come to be a mere instrument (Troisi). Moreover, the influence of the physiocrats on G. is relevant: agriculture is considered not the only, it is true, but certainly the first source of wealth; freedom of commerce is wished for at least within the borders of the Kingdom; price controls are declared useless; the naturalness and indefeasibility of certain economic laws is clearly recognized, so that one cannot say that the economic order depends, for G., entirely on our will.
G., absorbing and elaborating the doctrines of many foreign economists (Hume, Mirabeau, Duhamel, Ulloa, etc.) also contributed to making them known in Italy; he himself prepared translations and commentaries. The Lettere collected by D. Forges Davanzati show him in continuous correspondence with friends in Italy and abroad, who supplied him with economic data and statistics useful to his studies. Many in him are the intuitions and anticipations due to his practical sense; what is lacking, instead, on the whole, is a rigorously scientific systematization. The Lezioni were placed on the Index on 23 June 1817, with the reservation donec corrigatur, for their pronounced anti-curialism, which G. derived in part from Giannone; for G. the Church must occupy itself with spiritual things and the State with temporal ones; but among the latter he includes not only ecclesiastical property, but the very persons of priests and external worship. In this, as in the struggle against mortmain, privileges, etc., the Enlightenment character of G. is revealed, tempered however by a lively ethical exigency. Voltaire and Rousseau were judged harshly by him, and against the latter are directed the Lettere accademiche sulla questione se siano più felici gli ignoranti o gli scienziati (1764). G.'s ethics, which he wants independent, but not opposed to theology, is contained in the Diceosina, o filosofia del giusto e dell'onesto (1766; vol. II, posthumous, 1777), which connects in part with the De iure et officiis of 1764.
The rule of virtue is, for G., «to recognize to each his own right»; duties arise from the fact that every man possesses, by birth, certain rights, which must be respected. Modifications of this primitive right arise from the human necessity of forming political organisms. With the social pact individuals cede to the State a part of their liberty; the State itself, however, is created with a view to the happiness of individuals. The correlation, indeed the interpenetration, that G. pursues between law and morals, causes the Diceosina to assume the appearance of a treatise on natural law and, often, to run parallel to institutional works of Roman law.
G.'s school was fruitful in talents, and its influences extended well beyond the borders of the Kingdom of Naples. From his teaching drew fruit, directly or indirectly, Galanti, Filangieri, Palmieri, Beccaria, Algarotti and Romagnosi, to limit ourselves to the most illustrious names.