BATTLE OF MENTANA. - This locality gave its name to the engagement with which, on Nov. 3, 1867, at the twilight of the Papal State, there came to an end the bitter guerrilla warfare unleashed by the Garibaldians from Sept. 28 of that same year on the borders and within the surviving patrimony of St. Peter, not without covert aid from the royal government and in violation of the Convention of Sept. 1864.
The firmness of the Roman government, seconded by the indifference of the populations, by the diplomacy of Cardinal Antonelli (v.) and of the French chargé d'affaires Armand (v.), and by the effective resistance that for a month the pontifical troops, organized and led by Gen. Kanzler (v.), had been offering everywhere, prevented the repetition, at the hands of the clumsy Rattazzi, of the Cavourian game of 1859-60, consisting precisely in provoking, through the more or less ill-advised machinations of the Party of Action, the hoped-for royal intervention. And it forced, in the end, on the one hand the Menabrea cabinet to reveal itself by occupying certain points of the territory, and on the other the Emperor Napoleon III to pass from platonic protests to a new dispatch of troops to protect the Pontiff.
At the preludes of the royal intervention (Oct. 30), the pontifical command had promptly acted, in accordance with pre-established plans, initiating a broad movement along interior lines, which yielded the concentration of all mobile forces (about 8,000 men) around Rome and Civitavecchia, both to offer the ultimate defense and to pass to the attack after the eventual landing of the French. From this had resulted both the definitive repression of the pseudo-insurrectional Roman disturbances (Oct. 22-25) and the epilogue of the exploits of the Cairoli (Oct. 22-23), and still more the complete failure of the adversary's extreme offensive, which, unleashed by Garibaldi with 11,000 men on Oct. 23, went to shatter itself against the staunch resistance of a weak pontifical outpost at Monterotondo (Oct. 24-26), only to exhaust itself thereafter along the line of the Aniene between Ponte Salario and Ponte Nomentano (Oct. 29-31). So that, thanks to Kanzler's strategy, precisely while the French were unexpectedly landing at Civitavecchia (Oct. 29-30), and pontifical columns were preparing to move toward the provinces of Frosinone and Viterbo held by forces of Nicotera and Acerbi (Oct. 31), the center of the Garibaldian deployment was forced to fall back on Monterotondo and Mentana, a few kilometers from the border (Oct. 31 - Nov. 1).
It was not too easy on Nov. 2 for Gen. Kanzler, who was eager to attack the bulk of the enemy columns with his own men before they slipped away across the border, to convince, as the Roman government wanted for evident reasons of political order, the French, who for reasons equally political did not intend to commit themselves fully against the Garibaldians, to take some part in the prepared and already begun counteroffensive (Oct. 26 - Nov. 6). And only the feared realization that the pontifical troops were, if necessary, ready to act even alone, induced Gen. De Failly to abandon his attitude by attaching for the following day to the column of about 3,000 pontifical troops a French reserve of about 2,000 men.
Thus shortly after noon on Nov. 3 the Franco-pontifical troops commanded by Kanzler struck by surprise, along the Via Nomentana two km. from M., the right flank of the enemy battalions (about 7,000 men), which, under Garibaldi's orders, were withdrawing toward Tivoli in order then to reach the Abruzzo. The pontifical chasseurs and the foreign carabinieri of Gen. De Courten (v.) were immediately engaged, and by dint of repeated attacks, which the adversary withstood with great valor, they succeeded in driving him from the strong positions of Colle Santucci and Monte Guarnieri. At two in the afternoon the combat front changed: the Garibaldians, having lost the first and second lines of resistance, pressed back against the village, took position in the baronial Castle on the extreme right, on the road to Monterotondo on the left, holding the center at Villa Cicconetti and the Pagliai. But once again, albeit with notable losses, the pontifical troops, supported by the forces of the Roman legion and by the precise fire of the artillery, managed to envelop its wings and to force its center, almost reaching the road to Palombara, taking possession of the Pagliai locality, and closing M. in a circle of fire. It was three-thirty in the afternoon: Garibaldi, resolved to free himself from the vise, ordered a final general counterattack in a pincer movement with the manifest intention of in turn closing in on the pontifical troops and crushing them against the still lively rifle fire of the village. Kanzler was quick to react, and availing himself of a pontifical column which, coming from the Via Salaria, threatened the Garibaldians from the rear between M. and Monterotondo, and developing the action in regular fashion by throwing the French reserve into the fray on the left and on the right against the enveloping prongs, while his men in the center continued to press hard and to advance toward the built-up area. Having thus broken the well-conceived Garibaldian maneuver, the fortunes of the combat, which lasted until sunset, were sealed: the enemy line fell back in confusion along the entire front.
The following day, while the Franco-pontifical troops occupied M. and Monterotondo, Garibaldi withdrew with the rest of his men across the border near Corese.
Thus M. was a notable victory disputed by both sides with skill and with valor. There fell, between dead and wounded, 133 pontifical troops and 39 French, no fewer than a thousand Garibaldians; another 1,398 were taken prisoner, and more than 4,000 were able to reach the territory of the Kingdom. The historical importance of the battle of M. lies not only in having definitively ended the guerrilla warfare in Rome and Latium, but also and above all in having put an end forever in the Kingdom to the now outdated phase of the voluntarist and pseudo-revolutionary adventures of the left; in having finally prolonged for another three years the now precarious life of the old Papal State, thus allowing, among other things, Pius IX to give free course, despite the obstacles placed in the way by all the powers, to the memorable labors of the Vatican Council.
Bibliography11 works
Paolo Dalla Torre