PAPAL STATES. — The first nucleus of the Papal States was the Duchy of Rome. The duke, who represented Byzantine supremacy and resided on the Palatine Hill, disappeared during the pontificate of Stephen II, and the Duchy remained, in fact, autonomous, with the pope as its de facto head. The authentic and juridical basis of the Papal States does not rest on the Donation of the Emperor Constantine I (v.) to St. Sylvester, which is a forgery (L. Duchesne-P. Fabre, *Le Liber censum*, I, Paris 1901, pp. 366-69); rather, it rests on the promise of territorial cessions made in 754 at Querzy-sur-Oise (Aisne) by Pepin the Short, which thus satisfied a debt of gratitude owed to Pope St. Zachary. Indeed, Zachary, fearing Lombard hegemony and preferring Frankish protection, may have legitimized the assumption of power by authorizing Pepin’s consecration.
Having become master of Italy by right of conquest over the Lombards, Pepin granted to the Holy See in 756, according to the version of the *Liber Pontificalis*, Comacchio, Ravenna, the region between the Apennines and the Adriatic from Forlì to Jesi, Sinigaglia, Gubbio, Ancona, Faenza, Imola, Bologna, and Ferrara; neither the Duchy of Spoleto nor that of Benevento was included in the donation.
The Lombard king Desiderius had, it is true, restored Faenza and Ferrara, but he had failed to fulfill his other promises; later, under the pontificate of Adrian I, he reconquered the two cities and moreover threatened Ravenna. Charlemagne came to the aid of the Holy See and enlarged (6 April 774) the Papal States with the Duchies of Spoleto and Benevento, Luni, Berceto, Parma, Reggio Emilia, Mantua, Monselice, the Veneto, Istria, Tuscany, and Corsica. In 787, he further enriched the Duchy of Rome with the Lombard Tuscany and, to the south, with localities on the right bank of the Liri, such as Sora, Arpino, Arce, Aquino, Teano, and Capua. The gift was so magnificent that it aroused doubts (P. Kehr, *Die sogenannte karolinische Schenkung von 774, in Historische Zeitschrift*, 70 [1893], pp. 385-441); yet it did not reach its full implementation, although it was later confirmed by Louis the Pious (817), Otto I (13 February 962), and Henry II (April 1020; cf. the *Liber censuum*, I, pp. 363-65; 368-73, and Th. von Sickel, *Das Privilegium Ottos I. für die römische Kirche vom Jahre 962 beleuchtet*, Innsbruck 1883). It is unconvincing to exaggerate the importance of the imperial privilege, which represents a diplomatic instrument distinct from reality. Thus, the Duchy of Spoleto long remained independent of the Roman Pontiff.
In any case, after a thousand vicissitudes and thanks to the generous concessions of Countess Matilda to Gregory VII in 1077, confirmed in 1102 to Paschal II, the Papal States extended beyond the left bank of the Po di Goro, from its mouth in the Adriatic as far as Monte di Felonica, bordered the Modenese almost parallel to the Panaro, crossed the Apennines near Monte Cimone, then skirted Tuscany near Lake Trasimeno and below Chiusi, and ended below Orbetello. From there, the flat coastal region along the Mediterranean extended as far as Terracina. The terrain became mountainous, and the border, skirting the Abruzzi, ran northward to the pass of San Pellegrino, where it turned eastward and ended at Porto d’Ascoli. Pontecorvo and Benevento remained isolated within the Kingdom of Naples after it was ceded to Charles I of Anjou.
The States of the Church were divided into seven provinces: 1) the district of Benevento; 2) Campania and Marittima; 3) the Patrimony of St. Peter, enlarged by the county of Sabina, the land of Arnulphorum, and the cities and dioceses of Narni, Terni, Rieti, Amelia, and Todi; 4) the Duchy of Spoleto; 5) the March of Ancona, including the districts of Urbino, Massa Trabaria, and the land of Sant’Agata; 6) Romagna; 7) the city and county of Bologna.
The administration of each province belonged, with few exceptions, to a rector appointed by the pope or, occasionally, by a legate. Under his presidency, irregularly held assemblies—parlements—met as needed, in which delegates of the communes discussed matters concerning their districts, apportioned extraordinary subsidies for military expenses, contracted obligations, and took note of papal decisions. The rectors fixed prices, authorized or prohibited the export of agricultural products, and even struck a special coinage, the *papalino*, whose value they set. A treasurer and deputy treasurer managed finances and tax collection, which came from multiple sources. A court of justice heard appeals from sentences rendered by local magistrates. A marshal directed police services, and a captain general commanded the army, recruited from feudal and communal militias. The communes provided arms and provisions, bore the costs of constructing or repairing city walls, and ensured the safety of roads. Fortresses scattered throughout each province were held by castellans. The administrative framework, though not complex, sufficed to ensure the proper management of local interests; yet, like all medieval institutions, it left room for arbitrariness, though the subjects of the Holy See could appeal to it against sentences handed down by rectors.
In the political sphere, however, the situation was extremely confused, depending on whether individual territories were directly or indirectly subject to the Church. In some, the Holy See exercised power in a feudal manner: there were communes that enjoyed a kind of semi-liberty and could not elect their podestà, while others, the larger ones such as Bologna, Ancona, and Perugia, could do so. Added to this was a profusion of exemption privileges, granted too liberally by the Holy See, which made it difficult for rulers to carry out their duties. No less serious difficulties arose from partisan passions and struggles for predominance between barons and communes. Beginning in the 12th century, the communes asserted a jealous independence in their regard; by the end of the 13th and throughout the 14th centuries, barons and successful adventurers established tyrannical regimes—
PAPAL STATES — Coat of Arms of the Papal States. Miniature from the end of the 14th century, from the second volume of the Bible belonging to the Duke of Berry, as indicated by the following note on fol. 437v: “Cette bible est au duc de Berry et Dauvergne conte di Poitou.” Vatican Library, cod. Vat.
— in the hands of Giovanni Cerroni, while Giovanni di Vico sought to seize control of the Patrimony of St. Peter.
In 1353, Innocent VI entrusted the difficult task of remedying this wretched state ALBINO (v.). This man of genius succeeded in bringing all the rebels to obedience, reconquered Bologna, and provided the Italian people with a legal code that, apart from later additions, remained in force until 1816. Instead of crushing the vanquished with arms, he generously pardoned them and bound them to the Church with real and advantageous ties. Urban V was then able to make his entry into Rome (16 October 1367), only to return to Avignon (September 1370).
The restoration of the papal monarchy, later accomplished by Gregory XI, as well as the influence gained by the Pope from the successful outcome of the war waged against Bernabò Visconti (1375), aroused the jealousy of Florence, which aspired to seize control of Tuscany. The cities and towns of the Papal States, resentful of the delayed return of the Pontiff to Italy and the conduct of his officials, did not resist the intrigues of Florence and raised the banner of revolt. When the war, known as the War of the Eight Saints, broke out, the Church lost the territories it had so painstakingly reclaimed (November 1375–76). Breton bands, hired by Gregory XI, eventually reduced the rebels to impotence, and Florence, struck by the interdict that ruined its commerce, signed the Peace of Sarzana (1378).
With the Great Western Schism, the conflicts intensified: Urban VI and Clement VII sought to settle their dispute by force of arms. To the Breton and Gascon bands commanded by Louis of Montjoie, Urban VI opposed the Italian company, led by Alberico da Barbiano (April 1379). On April 17 and 20, Clement VII, sacrificing the States of the Church, granted to Louis I, Duke of Anjou, the Ferrarese, the Bolognese, Ravenna, the Romagna, Massa Trabaria, the Marca of Ancona, Perugia, Todi, and even the Duchy of Spoleto, with the obligation to conquer them within two years. He retained for himself only the Patrimony of St. Peter, Campania, the Marittima, the County of Sabina, and Rome. However, the agreement with Louis of Anjou did not materialize, and the kingdom of Adria did not come into being due to the failure to execute its essential clause, which was to conquer it against Urban VI.
The fortunes of war turned in favor of the Roman Pope; the garrison of Castel Sant’Angelo surrendered by starvation (April 27, 1379), and Alberico da Barbiano, victorious at Marino (April 30), entered Cisterna, Rocca di Papa, and Marino. But Onorato Caetani, Count of Fondi, confirmed by Clement VII as rector of Campagna and Marittima, sought only to expand his sphere of influence. Giordano Orsini occupied the Alban Hills; Francesco di Vico repelled the troops sent against him to wrest Viterbo from him and prepared to extend his dominions in the Patrimony of St. Peter. In Ravenna, Cesena, and Ancona, the castellans openly or secretly negotiated with Clement VII. The most formidable adversary of Urban VI, Rinaldo Orsini, Count of Tagliacozzo, fought successfully for six years with the aid of condottieri until his tragic end (April 14, 1390) allowed the recovery of Orvieto and the Duchy of Spoleto. In 1408, the fate of the Papal States was gravely compromised by the entry into the Vatican (April 25) of King Ladislaus of Durazzo of Naples, ostensibly to uphold the cause of Gregory XII but in reality for purely political motives. The capture of Perugia revealed his true intentions and subdued him. Florence, alarmed by his advances and bound to the obedience of Alexander V, the Pope of the Council of Pisa, organized a punitive expedition, with the assistance of Louis II of Anjou, to drive Ladislaus from Rome. Once the enterprise succeeded, it had to be
**PONTIFICAL STATE – Papal Galleys.** Fresco from the "Sistine Hall" of the Vatican Library, executed by Giovanni Guerra and Cesare Nebbia (1588–89).
shared between the communes and the Papacy. In short, around 1300 and throughout the 14th century, a state of anarchy prevailed in the States of the Church, whether continuously or sporadically.
No less grave was the external danger: the Republic of Venice, the Visconti of Milan, Florence, openly or covertly, sought to usurp the lands of the Church; and one also had to reckon with the ambitions of the King of the Romans and the Angevins of Naples.
In 1308, Venice, which aspired to exploit for its exclusive advantage the river transit routes to northern Italy, occupied Ferrara with the consent of Francesco d’Este. But through the intervention of Clement V, it was forced to abandon the conquest (February 17, 1313).
If the expedition of Emperor Henry VII to Italy (1311–13) brought nothing but material damage to Rome, where his troops and those of the King of Naples, vicar of the Holy See, clashed in bloody battles, the attempt by Louis of Bavaria in the city of (January 7, 1328) caused the defection of its inhabitants, an example followed by numerous cities in the Patrimony of St. Peter and the Marches. The retreat of the German army (1330) enabled John XXII to triumph over the schism of the antipope Peter of Corbaro, and Benedict XII to eliminate it entirely. Yet the political pacification proved far more difficult to achieve. Benedict XII, as he himself declared, abhorred war and believed he could restore order, especially in Romagna and the Marches, through conciliation and suppression of abuses perpetrated by papal officials. But while the constitutions issued to promote sound administration of the States of the Church undeniably bore the mark of wisdom, the remonstrances, reproaches, and threats of spiritual or temporal penalties against the Romagnol nobles proved ineffective.
What remained now of the supremacy of the Holy See? Giovanni de’ Manfredi was master of Faenza; the Malatesta tyrannized Rimini, Pesaro, Fano, Fossombrone, Ancona, Osimo, Senigallia, Jesi, and Ascoli. Francesco Ordelaffi boasted of his capture of Cesena, Bertinoro, and Meldola. Worse still, the Pepoli sold Bologna to Giovanni Visconti (October 16, 1350). The numerical inferiority of the papal troops forced Clement VI to cede their vicariate for twelve years to the powerful lord of Milan (April 28, 1352). In Rome, the revolution of May 20, 1347 had brought Cola di Rienzo to power; that of December 26, 1351 led to the establishment of a republic with the concession of the Romagna (April 22, 1410) and, on June 25, 1412, to a treaty with the King of Naples that granted him Perugia, Ascoli, Viterbo, and Benevento. Neapolitan troops occupied Rome for a long time, so much so that Martin V (November 11, 1417), the uncontested pope, had to reside for two years in Florence.
From the turmoil of the Great Schism there emerged a phenomenon of primary importance: the communes gained autonomy and wrested from the popes, who lacked financial resources and political authority, kinds of municipal charters that secured their independence and enabled them to deal with the Papacy as a power equal to themselves. They could elect their own magistrates, mint coinage, and hire troops. Moreover, Città di Castello, Fermo, Ascoli, Bologna, and others obtained the temporal vicariate in exchange for an annual census. Such concessions, granted only temporarily, were renewed upon their expiration, always due to financial straits.
In Campagna and Marittima, the lesser communes had to fear the interference of the barons. From their mountain strongholds, the nobles controlled the countryside and thus established principalities. In the Marca of Ancona and Romagna, there were numerous vicariates, more or less extensive, held by the Montefeltro, Malatesta, and Polenta families, among others. Alberto d’Este obtained in perpetuity the city and county of Ferrara (June 23, 1389). In short, in the 15th century the popes were no longer masters in their own States, or were so only nominally; and from Eugenius IV onward, they saw the necessity of restoring their authority. The principal architects of the restoration of temporal power were Alexander VI and Julius II.
Nepotism, which obscured the memory of Alexander VI, produced an unexpected result. BORGHESIA (v.) dreamed of creating a powerful state in central Italy; to this end it was necessary to bring about the downfall of the vassals established in the Romagna, the Marches, and the Campagna. He succeeded, in fact, by every means in subduing the vassals and proudly assuming the title of Duke of Romagna, Urbino, Senigallia, and Perugia (January 1503). But the death of Alexander VI (18 August 1503) brought about his fall, and the Church inherited his conquests. Julius II had resolved to free his States from unjust usurpers; after having, with the help of Louis XII, King of France, recovered the lands usurped by Venice, he turned against his ally and, from 1510 onwards, announced his intention of fighting him; then he placed himself at the head of a strong army and recovered Bologna.
Under Leo X, Francesco Maria della Rovere, to whom the Pope had taken away the Duchy of Urbino, campaigned again in 1517 and easily reclaimed his domains. By the end of the 16th century, with the extinction of the Este dynasty, Ferrara reverted to the direct rule of the Holy See; a few decades later the same occurred with the Duchy of Urbino upon the extinction of the della Rovere line. Meanwhile, the institution of legates and vice-legates, already outlined in the 14th century, became the general rule (v. LEGAZIONI).
In the 18th century, French travelers who visited the Papal States unanimously attested that the populations lived happily under a regime essentially paternal. Not that everything was perfect: in the confession of Pius VII, there was no administrative uniformity; judicial power was dependent on a multitude of particular or privileged tribunals whose jurisdictions overlapped and clashed; all attempts at reform had failed because of the collision of private interests and attachment to ancient customs (motu proprio of 6 July 1816, in Bullarii continuatio, XIV, Rome 1849, p. 47).
The problem of the existence of the Papal States arose with the French Revolution. Under the pretext of avenging the assassination of the Frenchman Hugo Basseville (v.), Bonaparte entered Bologna on 19 June and on the 23rd imposed an armistice that entailed the occupation of the legations of Bologna and Ferrara and the citadel of Ancona. When negotiations for a peace treaty, expected to be concluded shortly, failed due to the Directory’s fault, the Treaty of Tolentino (17 February 1797) consecrated the perpetual loss of the territories known as the legations of Bologna.
After the Congress of Vienna, Pius VII, with a motu proprio of 6 July 1816, promulgated a Statute for the Papal States (Bull. rom. continuatio, XIV, Rome [1849], pp. 47-79, and the particular regulations required by the Edict, pp. 83-196) and established seventeen legations, divided into three classes: first class or legations: Urbino and Pesaro, Ravenna, Forlì, Bologna; second: Frosinone, Viterbo, Perugia, Macerata, Fermo, Ancona, Spoleto; third: Benevento, Rieti, Civitavecchia, Camerino, and Ascoli. The legation of Ferrara remained outside the classification. The district of Rome, with its own organization, included the environs of the city and the governments of Subiaco and Tivoli. The four legations were entrusted to cardinals or, in exceptional cases, to prelates with the title of vice-legates; the others were headed by delegates, who had to be prelates. Each delegate was assisted by a consultative council, composed of members chosen by the Pope, and had authority over all the governors of his jurisdiction, also appointed by the sovereign. Municipalities were administered by a gonfaloniere, with the help of elders. The civil and penal codes underwent profound reform. The cadastre, finances, public education, the army, and the police were reorganized. The laity deplored being excluded from the major offices, such as those of legates and delegates. Two edicts of 5 October 1824 and 21 December 1827 made modifications to the administrative division of the Roman State, which was then divided into thirteen delegations. The code of civil procedure was simplified (Bullarii Romani continuatio, XIV, Rome 1849, pp. 128-255; XVII, ibid. 1855, pp. 113-291).
The reforming work carried out by Pius VII under the inspiration of Cardinal Consalvi was partly neutralized by Leo XII. The populations deplored the suppression of some provisions of the Napoleonic Code, the poor administration of finances, the unjust distribution of land, and partiality in the judiciary. And since discontent was almost universal in Italy, secret societies such as the Carbonari developed, professing violent hostility toward absolute monarchies and drawing their members from all social classes. They also found favor in the Papal States, and on 4 February 1831 revolutionary disorders broke out in Bologna, quickly spreading to the Romagna, the Marches, and Umbria; an army commanded by General Sercognani marched on Rome. Gregory XVI, who did not have sufficient military forces, turned to Austria. General Krabowski entered Bologna on 21 March, and on the 26th the insurgents capitulated. This Austrian occupation ensured its hegemony in Italy, where it already possessed the Lombard-Venetian Kingdom. Therefore, the European courts worked to bring it to an end. On 21 May 1831, a Memorandum was presented to the Court of Rome (cf. the text in Rina del Piano, Roma e la Rivoluzione del 1831, Imola 1931, with unpublished documents, p. 343), proposing a series of administrative reforms aimed at ensuring public tranquility and the restoration of the motu proprio of 6 July 1816. The Pope did not accept the heavy-handed imposition of the Memorandum but, promising adequate reforms, induced the Austrians to withdraw from the Papal States (15 July).
These complex and important administrative reforms represented a development of Consalvi’s work and were gradually implemented throughout the entire pontificate, but too often, due to partisan passion, they pleased neither liberals nor absolutists. Meanwhile, to impose the initial application and restore authority in the legations, a papal army took the offensive (18 January 1832); but after triumphing over the rebels on the 20th, it could not prevent a general uprising of the population, and the Austrians, called to aid, re-entered Bologna on the 28th; on 23 February, some French battalions occupied Ancona. Foreign troops thus maintained order in the Papal States until 4 December 1838.
A new factor emerged: the Mazzinian propaganda of ideas of liberty, independence, and national unity, centered on the organization of Young Italy. An attempted coup in Rimini in 1845 made the imminence of the danger clear. Moderate liberals and Neo-Guelphs, who recoiled from the revolutionary acts preached by Mazzini, demanded constitutional reforms more suited to the tendencies of the time. *Gli ultimi casi di Romagna*, a pamphlet published in 1846, aroused considerable echo in Europe. Its author, Massimo d’Azeglio, declared himself in favor of a constitutional monarchy and did not hide his sympathy for King Charles Albert of Sardinia, destined, in his view, to carry out the great work of liberation from foreign yoke.
Papal States — Monsignor de Mérode, Monsignor Luquet, and Villiers de l’Isle Adam saving some French soldiers wounded during the siege of Rome in 1849. Print from a painting by Raffet. Rome, specimen in the Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento italiano.
Well informed about the legitimate ambitions of his contemporaries “tossed by the fever of reforms and innovations,” Pius IX was eager to satisfy them. He hoped in this way to isolate the Mazzinian party and prevent it from achieving a republican unity in Italy. He began with the usual act of clemency: the decree of amnesty (16 July 1848) promised pardon to those exiled by his predecessor, to deserters, and to those condemned for political crimes (cf. Atti del Sommo Pontefice Pio IX, parte 2ª, 1, Rome 1857, pp. 4–7 and A. Mercati, In margine all'amnistia concessa da Pio IX, in Aevum, 24 [1950], pp. 103–32). A whole series of useful reforms received almost universal approval, except from Metternich. Yet the Fundamental Statute for the temporal government of the States of the Holy See, which established a kind of constitutional regime—albeit a very mitigated one—(14 March 1848) proved to be a stumbling block (cf. Atti, cit., I, pp. 228–38). The prudent measures adopted disquieted the partisans of the old order, disappointed the eager reformers, and satisfied only the moderates. The refusal to take part in the war of independence against Austria worsened the situation, and even the energetic hand of Pellegrino Rossi could not restore order. The revolution that followed in Rome after the assassination of this minister (15 Nov. 1848) led the Pope to take refuge in Gaeta, in Neapolitan territory (24 Nov.), in order to safeguard his religious freedom. Thus the extremists prevailed over both the neo-Guelphs and the moderates. A constituent assembly radically resolved the Roman Question: article 10 of the decree, passed in the night of 8–9 Feb. 1849, declared that the Papacy “had in fact and in law forfeited the temporal government of the Roman State,” and in article 3 that “the form of government of the Roman State shall be pure democracy and shall take the glorious name of the Roman Republic” (cf. G. Spada, Storia della rivoluzione di Roma, III, Florence 1870, pp. 201–205).
On 18 Feb. the diplomatic corps accredited to the Holy See received a note requesting the armed intervention of Austria, France, Spain, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. On 3 July the troops of General Oudinot, after fierce fighting, took Rome; Ferrara, the Bolognese, the Marches, and Ancona were occupied by the Austrians (G. Mollat, Les débuts de l'occupation française à Rome en 1849, d'après une correspondance inédite, in Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, 30 [1934], pp. 334–60, 587–619).
Before returning to his own States, Pius IX had published an edict of reform and a decree of amnesty (12 Sept. 1849; cf. Atti, cit., I, pp. 286–94). Instead of political freedoms, there was a resumption and intensification of excellent administrative innovations, which, however, appeared as a reaction against the liberal measures adopted, more or less spontaneously, in 1848. Nevertheless, thanks also to the presence of foreign troops, calm endured in the Papal States until 1859. Many, however, thought it was only apparent calm. The true sentiments of the reformers in the legations were openly revealed at the outbreak of the war between Piedmont and Austria. As soon as the Austrians stationed in Bologna had left (12 June 1859), these reformers, in agreement with those in the Marches, Orvieto, and Perugia, sent envoys to Turin to come to an agreement with the King of Sardinia.
---
**PONTIFICAL STATE**
**Pontifical Statute – Villa Savorelli on the Janiculum (Siege of Rome, 1849), engraving by Domenico Amici.**
The offer was not immediately accepted for fear of displeasing Napoleon III. But when Cavour obtained the assurance that Europe would adopt a policy of non-intervention, removing the pretext of the disorders he himself had fomented covertly in Umbria and the Marches, he insisted on restoring order; hence the Sardinian regiments penetrated Pontifical territory, overcoming the resistance of the scant Pontifical forces at Castelfidardo (18 Sept. 1860). A royal decree of 17 Dec. made effective the annexation of the Marches and Umbria to the Kingdom of Sardinia (cf. Traitées publics de la Maison de Savoie, VIII, pp. 913–915). The Holy See retained only the delegations of Civitavecchia and Viterbo, that of Velletri and Frosinone, and the environs of Rome.
The proclamation of Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy (17 March 1861) and the speeches delivered in Parliament by Cavour (25–27 March) constituted an open threat to the future of Rome. Several attempts at conciliation made from 1860 to 1862 came to nothing, while the small Papal State, reduced to a territory largely uncultivated, struggled on. The Convention of 15 Sept. 1864, signed with France, stipulated the gradual withdrawal of French troops to be replaced by Pontifical forces promptly constituted (H. von Srbik, La Convenzione segreta tra l'Austria e la Francia del 12 giugno 1862, in Rivista storica italiana, 3 [1937], pp. 1–60). These forces, later reinforced by a new French expeditionary corps, won the decisive victory of Mentana (3–4 Nov. 1867) after more than a month of fighting against Garibaldi’s columns. But in 1870 the departure of the French brigade remaining in Rome, occasioned by the outbreak of war with Germany, and the consequent defeat, left the royal government a free hand, and on 20 Sept., after five hours of determined resistance, Rome capitulated by order of the Pope. – Vedi tavv. LXXXVI–LXXXVIII.
**
BIBL.:
Papes d’Avignon, 9° ed., ivi 1950 (with abundant critical bibliography); J.-M. Vidal, Benoit XII et l’Italie. Introduction aux lettres closes et patentes de Benoît XII, ibid. 1950; Pastor, vols. I–XVI. On the period of the French Revolution and the 19th century: the bibliography in G. Mollat, La Question Romaine, de Pie VI à Pie IX, 2nd ed., Paris 1932; the following works may be added: A. Vigevano, La fine dell’Esercito Pontificio, Rome 1921; id., La campagna delle Marche e dell’Umbria, ibid. 1923; C. Vidal, Louis Philippe, Metternich et la crise italienne de 1831–32, Paris 1931; J. Brady, Rome and the Neapolitan Revolution of 1820–21, New York 1937; P. Dalla Torre, L’anno di Mentana, Turin 1938; M. Petrocchi, La restaurazione, il card. Consalvi e la riforma del 1816, Florence 1941; A. Ventrone, L’amministrazione dello S. P. dal 1814 al 1870, Rome 1942; M. Petrocchi, La restaurazione romana, ibid. 1943; P. Dalla Torre, L’opera riformatrice ed amministrativa di Pio IX dal 1850 al 1870, Rome 1943; M. Nobili-S. Camerani, Carteggio di Bettino Ricasoli, 4 vols., Rome 1945–47; P. Pirri, La missione di mons. Corboli Bussi in Lombardia e la crisi della politica ital. di Pio IX, in Riv. di stor. della Chiesa in Italia, 1 (1947), pp. 38–84; R. Moscati, Le scritture della Segreteria di Stato degli affari esteri del Regno di Sardegna, Rome 1947 (important documentary survey); D. Massé, Pio IX e il gran tradimento del ’48, Alba 1948; P. Dalla Torre, L’opera riformatrice ed amministrativa di Gregorio XVI, in Gregorio XVI. Miscellanea commemorativa, II, Rome 1948, pp. 29–121; id., Pellegrino Rossi, Il Neo-guelfismo e l’Italia, in Arch. della Soc. Romana di Storia Patria, 71 (1948), pp. 163–68; P. Pirri, La politica unitaria di Pio IX dalla lega doganale alla lega italiana, in Riv. di stor. della Chiesa in Italia, 2 (1948), pp. 183–214; E. de Levis Mirepoix, Un collaborateur de Metternich, Mémoires et papiers de Lebzeltern, Paris 1949; A. Ghisalberti, Rapporti delle cose di Roma, 1848–49, Rome 1949 (dispatches of the Dutch diplomatic agent); P. Dalla Torre, Pio IX e la Restaurazione del 1849–50, in Avium, 23 (1949), pp. 267–98; P. Pirri, Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II dal loro carteggio privato. La questione Romana, 2 vols., Rome 1951; G. Mollat, La Question Romaine sous Grégoire XVI et Pie IX, in Revue des sciences religieuses, 26 (1952), pp. 132–42. Guglielmo Mollat