METTERNICH, Klemens Lothar Wenzel, Prince of. - Statesman, b. at Koblenz on 15 May 1773, d. at Vienna on 11 June 1859. He studied at the University of Strasbourg and at that of Mainz (here the theory of the historian Nikolaus Vogt influenced his formation, according to which equilibrium governs the fortunes of the life of States and of humanity itself). After the entry of the French into Mainz he went to Brussels, from there to England, and finally to Vienna, where he introduced himself into high society.
He began his diplomatic career in 1801 as minister plenipotentiary at Dresden. In 1803 he moved to Berlin, where his attempt at an Austro-Russian-Prussian union with an anti-French purpose failed. After the Peace of Pressburg (Dec. 1805) he was sent as ambassador to Paris. When M. arrived in the French capital the pact of the Confederation of the Rhine had already been signed, and, once the Empire was ended, M. remained simply ambassador of Austria. Instigator of the war of 1809, after the capture of Vienna by the Napoleonic troops, the battle of Wagram and the armistice, he withdrew to Hungary with Francis I.
On 7 Oct. M. was appointed head of the State Chancellery and was the principal author of an alliance with France: the desperate Austrian situation drove him to prepare the marriage of Maria Louisa, the Emperor's daughter, to Napoleon. In the internal life of the State he reorganized the army and the finances, and centralized the political-administrative organization by instituting the Council of the Empire. At the beginning of the Russian campaign he granted Napoleon a strong contingent of Austrian troops on condition that the principle of the neutrality and inviolability of Austria be accepted. But in such circumstances M.'s policy was one of waiting so as "not to risk," and the group of Archduke John and of Joseph von Hormayr, which was contemplating a grand anti-Napoleonic uprising, was struck down. After Napoleon evacuated Moscow, the Austrian troops commanded by the prince of Schwarzenberg were made to withdraw to the frontier of western Galicia. With refined skill, as a diplomat of the first rank, M. prepared the disengagement from the compromising alliance with France: thus one arrives from the proposal of the famous Austrian "armed meditation" between Napoleon and the allies all the way to the annulment of the Treaty of 1812. After the English victory in Spain and the "treason" of Bernadotte, who passed over to the camp of the allies, M. became a fervent supporter of the anti-Napoleonic war. On 8 Aug. 1813 Austria sent an ultimatum to Napoleon (demanding among other things the end of the Confederation of the Rhine, the restoration of the ancient frontiers of Prussia, etc.), and, this not having been accepted, on 12 Aug. they were at war. Following the defeat of Leipzig (16-18 Oct. 1813) new problems arose on the political-diplomatic chessboard of Mittel-Europa. Skillfully M. limited the political power of Russia with a tactic of isolation. He initially consented to the proposal of the annexation of Saxony to Prussia on condition that Prussia show itself opposed to Russian designs on Poland. He linked his policy to the English policy of Lord Castlereagh.
Once Napoleon's star had set, M. was among the principal architects, at the Congress of Vienna (v. VIENNA, CONGRESSES of), of the "reorganization" of Europe according to that policy of equilibrium and that "paternalism" in which old Enlightenment ideals and new "organicist" demands converge, demands that feel tradition not as a dead weight but as something that can be given life on the ethico-political plane. On a technical-diplomatic plane M.'s directives centered on Austrian penetration into Italy, which was to keep the political situation stable and constituted one of the cornerstones of the "European concert." The decided opposition to liberalism or, more simply, to every shift of the "needle" of the political-diplomatic balance was confirmed by Metternichian policy at the Congresses of Aachen, Troppau, Ljubljana and Verona. M. suffered a notable setback, and he imputed it to the triumph of the deplored "liberalism," on the question of Greek independence, where he found himself opposed, among the allies, by Tsar Alexander and the English prime minister Canning. Despite the alliance with the Russian minister Nesselrode, in order to avoid worse evils he proceeded to accept the revolution of July 1830 (Louis Philip was recognized by Austria as king of the French). M. regained a political-diplomatic revenge at least by stifling the risings of 1831 in Italy and by once again binding Germany to Austria (Diet of Frankfurt, 1832; Conference of Vienna, 1834). In the face of the Viennese revolt of March 1848, owing to the opposition of the court, being unable to stifle the movement in blood, he resigned and withdrew to London.
From England and from Belgium he kept himself informed of the situation of continental Europe, incapable of understanding those things that he deemed "follies" of liberalism. He was able to return to Vienna in Sept. 1851. Always consistent in his aversion to the idea of nationality, still in 1859 he deemed the Italian problem a "specter." As for ecclesiastical policy, from the moment of the restoration M. had convoked a ministerial conference for the stipulation of a concordat with the Holy See and for the revision of the right of regalia over the Church: but because of the persistent Viennese Josephinism nothing concrete had been achieved; in 1818, however, a convention with the Holy See for religious relations in Venetia was possible. In 1814 the supervision of primary and religious instruction, and the censorship, were restored to the bishops. In 1822 the supervision over theological instruction and the appointment of examining commissioners were restored to them. In 1855 M. was favorable to the Concordat stipulated by Francis Joseph with the Holy See.