METTERNICH, KLEMENS LOTHAR WENZEL, Prince of. — Statesman, b. at Coblenz on 15 May 1773, d. at Vicenza on 11 June 1859. He studied at the Universities of Strasbourg and Mainz (where the historian Nicolaus Vogt’s theory, that equilibrium governs the fate of states and of humanity itself, influenced his formation). After the entry of the French into Mainz, he went to Brussels, thence to England, and finally to Vienna, where he entered high society.
He began his diplomatic career in 1801 as minister plenipotentiary at Dresden. In 1803 he was transferred to Berlin, where he failed in his attempt to form an Austro-Russian-Prussian union against France. After the Peace of Pressburg (December 1805), he was sent as ambassador to Paris. When Metternich arrived in the French capital, the Confederation of the Rhine was already a fait accompli, and, with the fall of the Empire, Metternich remained simply as ambassador of Austria. Instigator of the war of 1809, after the capture of Vienna by Napoleonic troops, the battle of Wagram, and the armistice, he retired to Hungary with Francis I.
On 7 October Metternich was appointed head of the State Chancellery and was the principal author of an alliance with France: Austria’s desperate situation drove him to arrange the marriage of Maria Louisa, the Emperor’s daughter, to Napoleon. In domestic affairs, he reorganised the army and finances, and initiated political-administrative organisation by establishing the Council of the Empire. At the beginning of the Russian campaign, he granted Napoleon a strong contingent of Austrian troops on condition that the principle of Austrian neutrality and inviolability be accepted. Yet in these circumstances Metternich’s policy was one of waiting “so as not to risk” anything, and he struck at the group of Archduke John and Joseph von Hormayr, who were advocating a grand anti-Napoleonic rising. After Napoleon evacuated Moscow, the Austrian troops under Prince Schwarzenberg were withdrawn to the frontier of Western Galicia. With refined diplomatic skill, Metternich prepared the disentanglement from the compromising alliance with France: thus he advanced from the proposal of Austria’s famous “armed mediation” between Napoleon and the Allies to the annulment of the Treaty of 1812. After the English victory in Spain and the “treachery” of Bernadotte, who had gone over to the Allied side, Metternich became a fervent advocate of the anti-Napoleonic war. On 8 August 1813, Austria sent an ultimatum to Napoleon (demanding, among other things, the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine and the restoration of Prussia’s ancient frontiers, etc.), and, this not being accepted, war was declared on 12 August. Following the defeat at Leipzig (16–18 October 1813), new problems arose in the political-diplomatic arena of Central Europe. Metternich adroitly limited Russia’s political power by a tactic of isolation. He initially consented to the annexation of Saxony by Prussia on condition that Prussia oppose Russia’s designs on Poland. He aligned his policy with that of England under Lord Castlereagh.
With the eclipse of Napoleon, Metternich was among the principal architects, at the Congress of Vienna (v. VIENNE, CONGRESS OF), of the “reorganisation” of Europe according to that policy of equilibrium and “paternalism” in which old Enlightenment ideals and new “organic” exigencies converged, viewing tradition not as a dead weight but as something capable of being revitalised on the ethical-political plane. On a technical-diplomatic level, Metternich’s directives centred on Austrian penetration into Italy, which was to stabilise the political situation and constituted one of the cornerstones of the “Concert of Europe.” His resolute opposition to liberalism—or, more simply, to any shift in the “needle” of the political-diplomatic balance—was confirmed by Metternichian policy at the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Laibach, and Verona. Metternich suffered a notable setback, which he attributed to the triumph of the detested “liberalism,” over the question of Greek independence, where he found himself opposed, despite his allies, by Tsar Alexander and the English Prime Minister Canning. Despite his alliance with the Russian minister Nesselrode, to avoid worse he proceeded to recognise the July Revolution of 1830 (Louis Philippe being acknowledged by Austria as King of the French). Metternich gained a political-diplomatic revenge, at least, by suppressing the uprisings of 1831 in Italy and by reaffirming Austria’s hold over Germany (Diet of Frankfurt, 1832; Conference of Vienna, 1834). Facing the Viennese revolt of March 1848, and opposed by the court, unable to suppress the movement by force of arms, he resigned and retired to London.
From England and Belgium he kept abreast of the situation on the Continent, unable to comprehend what he deemed the “madness” of liberalism. He was able to return to Vienna in September 1851. Ever consistent in his aversion to the idea of nationality, even in 1859 he regarded the Italian question as a “spectre.” As regards ecclesiastical policy, from the time of the Restoration Metternich had convened a ministerial conference for the stipulation of a concordat with the Holy See and for the revision of the rights of regalia over the Church:
but owing to the persistent Josephinism in Vienna nothing concrete was achieved; however, in 1818 a convention with the Holy See was concluded for religious matters in Venice. In 1814, supervision of primary and religious education, and censorship, were entrusted to the bishops. In 1822, supervision of theological education and the appointment of examination commissioners were likewise entrusted to them. In 1855, Metternich favoured the Concordat concluded by Francis Joseph with the Holy See.