CONVENTION OF SEPTEMBER
An Italo-French diplomatic act signed in Paris on 15 September 1864, aimed at finding, if only temporarily, a resolution to the thorny Roman Question. It arose from the tortuous diplomacy of Napoleon III and the sincere desire of Italian moderates, who, following the directions already envisaged by Cavour, sought to buy time to unite the country in spirit and administration. On the other hand, the failure of the idealistic attempts of the summer of 1864 to resolve the Venetian question necessarily spurred the Minghetti cabinet to seek any *modus vivendi* concerning Rome, while Napoleon III increasingly felt the need to extricate himself from the contradictions into which he had plunged since 1849 by pursuing two contradictory policies simultaneously: one decisively liberal and the other pro-papal or Catholic.
Italy undertook not to invade the pontifical territory, reduced to Lazio alone, and to prevent by force any insurrectionary attempt there; France, for its part, agreed to gradually withdraw its troops from the Papal States within a maximum period of two years. Furthermore, the Italian government did not oppose the formation of a pontifical army, even composed of volunteers from any country; it would initiate negotiations to assume the share of the public debt of the former ecclesiastical territories annexed, and by a secret protocol of guarantee, once the Convention itself was approved by Parliament, it would transfer the capital wherever it deemed best—in effect, from Turin to Florence.
As was to be expected, the Convention satisfied no one, and its articles, which were in any case quite elastic in form, were interpreted in the manner most convenient to each party. Meanwhile, the Pope, whose great interests were at stake, was the last to learn of it and did not fail to express his justified resentment through the diplomatic steps taken by Antonelli, from which it emerges that the directives of Vatican policy in this regard were those of absolute secrecy. The ambassador in Rome, De Sartiges, received from the Secretary of State a flat refusal to take official note of the dispatch notifying the Convention and a curt end to any discussion on the matter. In a protest to the nuncios on 19 November, Antonelli then highlighted the inconsistency of the French assurances and the dangers to which the Holy See remained exposed due to the foreseeable new complications.
In France and elsewhere, many rightly suspected that the Convention was nothing more than an elegant pretext to once again leave the Pope at the mercy of Italian unifying and secularizing ambitions, as had occurred in 1859–60. In Vienna, the Convention was met with some irony, being judged likely to have no greater value than the famous Treaty of Zurich. The violent reaction of French public opinion was further fueled by the confirmations offered by too many among the more violent, less disciplined, or simply inept Italian innovators. The newspapers of the peninsula openly affirmed that Florence would be merely a stop on the way to Rome. The French government was struck by this and protested.
To avoid a scandal, both sides resorted to innuendo, but these soon dissipated when, due to the street riots in Turin provoked by grief and resentment over the transfer of the capital, the Minghetti cabinet fell and was replaced by Lamarmora; and even more so when the document had to be submitted to the Chambers for ratification. Florence increasingly appeared as a provisional capital, while in Rome it was resolved to reach the goal in every way except by open violence. Visconti Venosta, the foreign minister, was careful to state that the problem was not resolved but set on the path to a solution. Lanza, the interior minister, argued that, stripped of foreign bayonets, the temporal power could not long resist. Lamarmora observed that progress could be made slowly, but never retreat. Garibaldi, who was joined in his violent and fanciful exaggerations by Mazzini before the inflamed public opinion, rose up against the implementation of the Convention. The only voice to speak with true sense and prudence was that of Massimo D'Azeglio, who sought to demonstrate the impossibility of any forced coexistence of the two powers in Rome, but he was listened to only out of deference. Thus, despite the spirit and letter of the Convention, the country moved toward the occupation of the contested city (1870).