FILOPONO, GIOVANNI

FILOPONO, Giovanni. - Philosopher and Monophysite theologian of the 6th century, also called John the Grammarian, born in Alexandria toward the end of the 5th century, died after the year 566. The surname F. (ὁ Πλάτωντος) corresponds to the name given to members of certain associations of ascetics and zealous Christians that flourished in the early centuries (cf. S. Petridés, Spondeo et Philopones, in Echos d'Orient, 7 [1904], pp. 341-48, and also 4 [1901], pp. 225-31). As a young man, John almost certainly belonged to one of these associations.

A pupil of the Neoplatonist Ammonius, son of Hermias, he distinguished himself especially as a philosopher and commented on the following works of Aristotle: the Categories, the two Analytics, Physics, Meteorology, On Generation and Corruption, On the Soul, and Metaphysics. These commentaries have come down to us, published by various authors from the 16th century to the present. They have been included in the Corpus of Aristotelian commentaries edited in Berlin (1887-1901), occupying volumes XIII-XVIII. In them F. reveals himself as a philosopher and an eclectic; at times he even abandons Aristotle to follow Plato and historical theories, especially in physics.

As a theologian, F. played an enormous role in the christological controversies of the 6th century. He was the first to introduce into these controversies the notion of abstract or universal nature, common to all individuals of the same species: the ὁμοούσιος and the γονεά of Aristotle, and this terminology was used by F. to contradict Catholics who upheld the definition of Chalcedon on the two γονεαί of Christ, to sow confusion even among the Monophysites themselves, and to give rise to new factions. The controversy extended beyond the christological field and spread to the theology of the Trinity.

By giving to the word γονεά the same sense as the words ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον (ὁ πάσχων, πρόσωπον), F. logically arrived at attributing to the Trinity three γονεαί and ὁμοούσια, but this word was not used by F. for realities. F. did not deny the numerical unity of the divine essence, but wished to affirm the trinity of persons or hypostases, each of which is really identical with the divine essence (v. TRITHEISM).

Besides his commentaries on Aristotle, F. wrote many treatises on grammar, philosophy, the sciences, and theology. The last are the most important. We may recall: 1) The Arbitrator (ὁ δικαστής), i.e., the "Arbiter," in which the author expounds his christological terminology. This work, preserved in a Syriac translation, has been published in Latin together with other theological opuscula by A. Sanda, Opuscula monophysitica Ioannis Philoponi (Beirut 1930). St. John Damascene cites a long passage from it in the original text in De haeresibus liber, VII: PG 94, 745-53; 2) The Six Days, a work edited by G. Reichardt, Ioannis Philoponi de opificio mundi libri VII (Leipzig 1897); 3) Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World, published by H. Rabe, Ioannes Philoponis, de aeternitate mundi contra Prochum (ib. 1899), a work in which the author refutes the 18 arguments of Proclus in support of the thesis of the eternity of the world; 4) On the Resurrection, a lost work in which F. denied the identity of the resurrected bodies with our present bodies, basing himself on Aristotelian philosophy; 5) A Short Treatise on Easter, edited by C. Walter (Jena 1899). The author maintains that Jesus instituted the Eucharist on the 13th of Nisan, with fermented bread, and that He did not celebrate the Jewish Passover; 6) Against the Fourth Ecumenical Council, a lost work, divided into 4 parts, as we are informed by Photius in his Bibliotheca.

II. Object

The object of philosophy is precisely this determination of being as being, in which all philosophies ultimately converge; they then diverge and oppose one another in the second moment, that of content and the respective structure which this being acquires in reflection. Being as being, which for Aristotle constitutes the proper object of "first philosophy" or metaphysics (Met., IV, 1, 1003 a 21-32; cf. XI, 3, 1061 b 31 ff., especially IV, 1061 b 26-27; ἠ φιλοσοφία... τελεί τὸ ὄν ἢ ὄν τῶν ἑκουμῶν ἔκαστον, ἑκουμῶν), is being in its consistency or definitive determination by which it truly exists. It is such a being, "grounded in itself" as being, that philosophy has always sought and continues to seek; for example, Hegel when in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (A, 1; ed. Hoffmeister, Leipzig 1937, p. 79 ff.) effects the transition from the abstract and improper being of the first stage of immediate consciousness to being in the proper sense, which is that of self-consciousness, up to the completed form of "absolute knowing" (cf., for a comparison in this sense between these two peaks of Western thought: M. Heidegger, *Holzwege*, Frankfurt a.M. 1950: *Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung*, pp. 103-92, especially pp. 117, 121, 134, 170 ff.).

The problem of philosophy can indeed be viewed in the direction of a twofold convergence or demand: either, starting from the diversity and multiplicity in which consciousness moves, one seeks to find the unity that is its foundation or intrinsic principle; or else, beginning from the unity in which spirit finds itself, one proceeds from it to declare the multiplicity and diversity and to recognize them as intrinsic to that very unity. It is therefore in the determination of the content and structure of such unity that the various philosophies contend with one another, whether it be a question of an unity as a point of arrival or as a point of departure. The object, then, of philosophy is being in this its unity within multiplicity and variety, and this object must manifest itself evidently as awareness and hence also as a kind of "presence" of such unity that is comprehensive and definitive of being as being, without further reference. The object of philosophy, in its own ultimate determination, can only be absolute, and therefore there is only one ultimate determinant: how the Absolute relates to being that presents itself as multiplicity and variety is what constitutes the "proof" to which every philosophy must submit and in which the value of its method and the "truth" of its object are deduced. Only in this way is that "truth of being" attained, beyond which all forms of experience become mute and reduce to mere insignificant occurrences incapable of emerging from the flux of existence that makes them vanish. For this reason, St. Thomas rightly defends the rational structure of being as the foundation of man's very salvation: "Oportet ultimum finem totius universi, esse bonum intellectus: hic autem est veritas. Oportet igitur veritatem esse ultimum finem totius universi et circa eius finem et considerationem principaliter sapientiam inchoare" (C. Gent., I, 1; with reference to Aristotle, Met., II, 1, 993 b 21). Hegel expresses himself no differently—on this point regarding the essence of the pure theory of being—when he affirms that the Absolute in the supreme science which is philosophy must present itself in knowledge as such, and not as if knowledge were its instrument or means, with absolute truth remaining outside common truth (cf. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Introduction: ed. J. Hoffmeister, Leipzig 1937, p. 63 ff.).

The object of philosophy is this absolute truth, which has the meaning of "ground" (Grund) both from the side of being and from that of knowing; for every thing, every appearance of things, derives its intimate reality from the Absolute, and every knowledge is expressive of being as being, inasmuch as it precisely "unveils" its constitutive absolute and its relation to the Absolute. At this point, realist philosophies have clarified that being, as such, does not resolve itself into knowing, and that the forms of knowing may indeed correspond to it but do not identify with it; for human knowing "circumscribes" being with gradual approaches and does not grasp it all at once: in realism, therefore, it is being that grounds knowing, of which it consequently provides the criterion of truth. Phenomenist philosophies (of empiricist or idealist type), on the other hand, affirm the identity of being with the forms of appearance or of consciousness or of knowing: thus being is within knowing, and the forms of being are determined in function of knowing. For this reason, D. Hume placed in impression the character of reality, both for the external world ("impressions of sensation") and for the internal world ("impressions of reflection"), and attributed the criterion of reality to the feeling of liveliness (feeling) or conviction (belief) as the source of our persuasion of reality (cf. *Treatise on Human Nature*, I, 1, sect. 7; and esp. III, sect. 1, ed. Selby-Bigge, Oxford 1928, p. 169 ff.).

III. METHOD AND DIVISION

Being presents itself in its truth when it becomes accessible in its structure: the method of philosophy is the itinerary that reflection follows to grasp and determine the value of truth of being as being. Such a method will necessarily correspond to the type of object upon which a philosophy concentrates the reality of being; for the method is nothing other than the movement of being itself and its articulation into forms, in the manner in which these forms present themselves in philosophical reflection.

The "intuitive method" predominates in those philosophies in which being as absolute is immediately given, apprehended, or posited in a particular form of knowledge; this may be intellectual intuition as in systems with a rationalist background (Platonism, Augustinian illumination, the rationalism of Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, Schelling’s intuition of the Absolute, Schleiermacher’s "feeling of dependence" [Abhängigkeitsgefühl], etc.). Other more recent intuitive philosophies resort to vital intuition (Bergson’s "élan vital," Maine de Biran’s "je veux donc je suis," German Lebensphilosophie of Nietzsche, Simmel, Spangen, Klages, Max Scheler’s emotional Wesensschau understood as Einführung, etc.). On the other hand, "rational" philosophies may be called those which are not intuitive, and which therefore do not begin immediately with the Absolute, but place possession or contact with the Absolute at the end of the philosophical journey, so that the determination of the truth of being occurs through a "process" or development of human reason: this begins with a "demand" for the truth of being that must be satisfied through the very path of inquiry. To this type belong the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysical realism, in which sense collaborates with intellect and the affirmation of the Absolute requires a demonstrative process (e.g., proofs of the immortality of the soul, the existence of God, etc.). Hegel’s idealism also belongs to this type, inasmuch as (at least from a methodological standpoint) it admits as the first beginning of thought the phenomenological stage of immediate perception from which consciousness must rise to Absolute Knowing. Contemporary existentialism employs a method that might be called "phenomenological-dialectical analysis," in that it investigates the structures that human freedom assumes in relation to the objects it encounters in its situation (e.g., anxiety is the being of human consciousness in the face of empty finitude that offers no support; choice is the breaking or overcoming of anxiety by freedom, etc.). Empiricism has sought to subject philosophy to the method of experimental science or to mathematical precision, reducing philosophy either to a kind of logic of the sciences or to a compendium of their general results; Kant himself fell into this error, at least in part, when in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Hirudoz.: the problem of synthetic a priori judgments) he imposed upon philosophy demands proper to science, thereby depriving philosophy in advance of its autonomy and originality. The distinction of method into a priori and a posteriori is less proper than that between an a priori approach and a posteriori data, and the same applies to rational philosophies. The requirement of rational method is the establishment of a precise schema of laws governing the exercise of thought, and this is what constitutes Logic (a notable example is Aristotle’s *Organon*), regarded as propaedeutic to philosophy and to scientific thought in general. A common requirement of every philosophical method is the process of "reduction," by which, from the various aspects of a problem, the principal one is determined, and in relation to this, the meaning of secondary aspects is established. However, in philosophy every method has no value in itself and for itself, antecedently to its conceptualization, but lives, so to speak, and "proves" itself continually in its application to its object, which is precisely being in its ultimate instance of truth in function of the original movement of human consciousness.

The division of philosophy varies from school to school and from system to system, inasmuch as it concerns the forms according to which, in the various types of philosophy, the search for the truth of being may be conducted. As regards the nature of the object in general, there are spiritualist and materialist philosophies. As regards method, as has been said, there are intuitive and rational philosophies. As regards the modalities of the object, there are the various parts or branches of philosophy: while Plato’s dialogues focus on topics or aporias concerning principal problems, Aristotle gave philosophy a rigorous scientific aspect that served as the model for systematic philosophies of the following centuries, including modern philosophy and Hegel. The principal parts of philosophy in Aristotelianism are: logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, and politics. Among the Stoics and the Peripatetics, the principal parts were logic, natural philosophy, and ethics; while the Neoplatonists developed especially metaphysics and mathematics (Proclus). But for Aristotle, the principal division of philosophy is into theoretical and practical (Eth. Nic., VI, 3, 1139 b 16 ff.): the former seeks the structures of the real, the latter determines the principles of human action. For the Neo-Kantians, opponents of metaphysics, philosophy is divided into aesthetics, logic, and ethics (Windelband, Cohen).

IV. OUTLINE OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Greek philosophy. — Western thought has had its origin and its principal core in Greek philosophy: its merit lies in having conceived the truth of being in terms of rationality and concept, thus securing the presuppositions for a valid conception of man and his freedom against the Eastern invasion of mysticism: the cosmic thought that nourishes the religions of idols and the politics of tyranny. Greek philosophy, from its very beginnings, has appeared as the “education of man” to the freedom of the spirit; hence, just as it has its centre in a metaphysical interpretation of the real, so it shows its apex and fulfilment in an ethics intended to give rational structure to human action according to virtue. Greek philosophy, with the truth and richness of its problems and even with the discordance of its schools, has displayed the most imposing deployment of reason.

It was natural to clarify the enigma of existence, and in this sense Greek philosophy, by asserting the pure nature of man, prepared the way for Christianity and responded to the acceptance of Revelation and Grace as the fulfilment and salvation of nature. The commonly accepted division of Greek philosophy into three epochs—namely, the pre-Socratics, the great Socratic systems (Plato, Aristotle), and the post-Socratic systems (Stoicism, Skepticism, Epicureanism, Neoplatonism)—seeks to grasp the most relevant forms of the determination of the “concept” (ἀνθρός) which, though polemically enslaved in Socrates, was also glimpsed by earlier philosophers. The fervour, more intense than in our own day, that animates the study of the fragments of pre-Socratic philosophy has its reason in the intrinsic richness of those remarkable thinkers who often display, not merely a beginning, but a notable degree of maturity in reason.

The dawn of Greek philosophy is already glimpsed in the declarations of Hesiod at the beginning of his poem, when he makes the Muses, symbol of human ingenuity, say: “We know how to speak many falsehoods that are altogether like the truth; but we can also, when we wish, speak the truth” (Works and Days, 26-33). In contrast to Homer, who manipulates “myth,” Hesiod proposes to speak the “truth” and not to be satisfied with the “verisimilar”: a protest that is taken up with renewed vigour by Parmenides in the prologue to his poem, when the goddess (Wisdom) warns him that it is not bad fortune but justice and love of truth that must impel him to seek II. Therefore “he must know all things so as to be able to distinguish the pure truth from the deceptive opinions of men in which there is no truth”: γράω δὲ σε πάντα πέρ-οὖσαι - ἡμέν' Ἀλήθειος εὐκύκλειας ἀτρειέν ᾔτορ - ἡδὲ βροτῶν δέξας ταῖς οὐκ ἕνι πίστις ἀλήθης (Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. Diels-Kranz, I, 230 B, 22 sig.).

With the Ionian school (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes) philosophy becomes a specific search for truth, and within it appear the first philosophical writings of the West whose subject and title is nature (φύσις), but whose exigency is the determination of the “principle” (ἀρχή) of being as such. The metaphysical exigency is presented in its purity in the first fragment of Anaximander (12 B, 1), proclaimed by Heidegger as the “most ancient text of Western philosophy,” though its exact wording (since Nietzsche studied it in 1873) remains in certain particulars controversial. It nevertheless states: “Whence things have their origin, thence also their destruction is ordained according to necessity” (κατὰ τὸ χρέων), “for they must render justice and make reparation to one another for their injustice according to the disposition of time.” In figurative language, drawn from the realm of ethics, the text suggests a rational interpretation of the “becoming” of nature that is immanent to it (W. Jaeger). This text—in its logical core—can initiate both the metaphysics of becoming of the Socratic systems and that of the “eternal return” of Heraclitus, of certain forms of Neoplatonism and Neopaganism, and of Nietzsche: the former metaphysics sought a formal structure of that rationality, while the latter accepted becoming in the immediacy of its coming-to-be. Greek philosophy oscillated between these two possibilities without being able to reach a definitive solution; the solution was glimpsed by Platonism—in Aristotelianism insofar as in these systems the problem of being was oriented toward the transcendence of the supreme principle, but the meaning of this transcendence was clarified only with the advent of Christianity.

2. Christian philosophy

The Greek ideal of life was speculation, that θεωρητικός βίος which placed the philosopher outside the common throng of men to contemplate the ultimate nature of things, and this was also the supreme “virtue” (ἀρετή)—the true wisdom of which

St. Paul said: “The Jews demand signs and the Greeks seek wisdom” (1 Cor 1, 22). With Christianity the possession of the truth that confers salvation and beatitude is not limited to an intellectual catharsis reserved for a few privileged persons; it demands instead a radical purification of personal feeling and action, which is now accessible to all and must be sustained, for each person—even the most gifted—by supernatural aid. How much more evident with the Gospel message are the absolutely new aspects and tasks for man, such as the notions of sin, perdition, Redemption, Grace, the Incarnation of the Word of God, individual and immortal responsibility, and the like: all these determinations presuppose a new concept of freedom, on the part of both God and man, to which no philosophy had hitherto attained.

In the patristic age it is the greatness of God’s gift to man that the Fathers defend against its survival in every form, whether in direct opposition (Porfirio, Celso, Giuliano l’Apostata, Neoplatonism, etc.) or in the fragmentation of dogma by heresies at its cardinal points (Trinity, Incarnation, Grace…). The Fathers do not seek philosophy in itself and for itself as a guide to the truths of nature as such, but only as an “instrument” to illustrate the meaning of dogma and to defend it against hostile attacks; the majority of the Fathers therefore attribute a positive value to pre-Christian thought (though not definitive), because original sin had indeed dimmed but not extinguished the light of natural reason. From this reflection on dogma, which is provoked for the most part by polemical contingencies, there arose the admirable expansion of patristic theology of which we still live today.

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la « realtà » del finito (Assoluto dialettico). Hegel perciò accetta in apparenza tutti i dogmi fondamentali del cristianesimo, ma li trasferisce nel piano dell’immortalità ontologica della coscienza umana ed ha potuto perciò passare per paladino della f. cristiana, mentre ne ha demolito i fondamenti come ha energicamente denunciato Kierkegaard contro i compromessi della « destra » hegeliana (cf. Papirer, 1857 X 4 A 429; trad. II. di C. Fabro, II, Brescia 1950, p. 527). L’infusso di Hegel fu paragonato nella seconda metà dell’Ottocento dal proponere del positivismo scientifico, dell’irrazionalismo di Schopenhauer e Nietzsche e dal neokantismo; ma più che al neo-helenismo italiano (Spaventa, Croce, Gentile), francese e inglese, la cultura contemporanea si volge ora alla proibizione della dissoluzione dell’hegelismo. Anzitutto l’esistenzialismo rivendica la consistenza e l’ibertà del sin olo; il marxismo difende la realtà e priorità la natura e dei valori materiali (l’uomo come Natur- oder Gattungsweisen); il neopositivismo, che sviluppa i moderni strumenti semantici della logistica, disperde ogni traccia di metafisica dal linguaggio e dalla logica filosofica per fermarsi al segno o puro simbolo (cf. R. Carnap, Studies in semantics, 1: Introduction to semantics, § 38, 3a ed., Cambridge Mass. 1948, p. 242 seg. Il Carnap però è più riservato, nei riguardi della f. di altri neopositivisti. A lato di queste f., decise il conclucre sulla verità e non organizzarsi in scuole, si affermano indirizzi più radicali secondo i quali la f. si pone come ricerca pura, come affermazione del limite di ogni risposta che il pensiero umano ha dato al problema della verità (relativismo). Se ciò non esclude la possibilità di una soluzione definitiva del problema, si ammette che l’umana coscienza la deve cercare per altra via e derivare da altra fonte dalla ragione pura filosofica (problematicismo, p. es., di U. Spinoza). Ritorna allora il « dubbio » integrale della f. a cui Pascal e Kierkegaard opponevano come unica salvezza la verità esistenziale mediante il « rischio » della Fede.

V. F., scienza e religione. — L’uomo, che si trova nel mondo, non ha all’inizio che i dati dell’esperienza interna ed esterna sui quali egli esercita la sua riflessione: quando questa riesce a formare leggi e principi di valore universale, si ha la scienza. La scienza cerca con la deduzione dei principi e con l’artificio dell’esperimento di stabilire le equazioni necessarie dei fenomeni e quel ch’essa pronuncia sulla loro natura è sempre in funzione dell’apparire dei fenomeni stessi dentro i limiti delle coordinate di spazio e tempo. Compito della religione invece nel suo momento noetico, è di trascendere la sequela dei fenomeni per portarsi al di là di tutte le determinazioni spaziali e temporali, così prospettate la prima origine e l’ultimo destino sia del mondo come dell’uomo. La f., come si distingue dall’una dall’altra, è tuttavia indispensabile per ambedue affinché ottengano il riconoscimento di un valore universale. Se lo scienziato può cogliere le leggi del divario fisico con l’esercizio del solo metodo proprio del suo campo d’indagine, il significato reale di quelle leggi dipende da un riferimento assoluto che si possa fare del divenire stesso, cioè soltanto qualora esso sia inteso come processo per l’attuarsi di strutture di valore assoluto nel loro ordine. Qui intercorre la f., la quale (a differenza di molta f. classica e moderna: si pensi alle « filosofie della natura » di Schelling e Hegel) non comanda lo sviluppo della fisica, ma ne costituisce il compimento per una coscienza che movendo dal molteplici e vario della esperienza cerca l’unità dell’essere.

La religione, intesa nel suo significato elementare come « aspirazione » della coscienza umana verso l’Assoluto, si trova in un certo senso al polo opposto della scienza e al di là della filosofia. Codesta espirazione ineffabile ch’è la coscienza religiosa sorge per una convergenza di richiesta di tutte le sfere della esperienza, esterna e interna, non nel senso di averne le leggi per contemplare il divenire dei fenomeni, ma per appagare quella sete di certezza sul proprio destino che il susseguirsi dei fenomeni non soddisfa e che nessuna scienza può dare. La f., se può essere assente nelle prime manifestazioni della religione, è indispensabile quando si tratta di precisare l’oggetto autentico (contro la mistificazione sia della scienza e della politica, come delle false religioni) e di difendere l’esigenza nel suo momento originario (contro la rapacità delle false filosofie) come l’aspirazione essenziale di giustizia e verità dell’uomo comune.

Per ciò giustamente ha scritto S. Tommaso che « fere totius philosophiae consideratio ad Dei cognitionem ordinatur » (C. Gent., I, 4). — Vedi tav. LXXXVIII.

Sui rapporti fra f. e cristianesimo: Fr. Brentano, Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand, Stoccarda 1895; A. J. Festugière, L’idéal religieux des Grecs et l’Évangile, Paris 1932; R. Jolivet, La philosophie chrétienne et la philosophie contemporaine, in 1932; H. Gibb, Die Grundlegung der abendländischen Philosophie, Griechische u. christlich-griechische Philosophie, Bonn 1934; J. Soullée, La philosophie chrétienne de Descartes à nos jours, 2 vol., Paris 1934; H. Romer, La philosophie chrétienne jusqu’à Descartes, 3 vol., in 1935; C. Fabro, La religione della f., in Problemi dell’esistenzialismo, Roma 1945, pp. 100-123; id., Coscienza filosofica e coscienza religiosa, in Archiv für filosofie, 1945, pp. 73-97; F. Frank, Philosophie und derartige und religiöse Kraft, L. Londra 1945; M. Müller, Das christliche Menschenbild und die Weltanschauung der Neuzeit, Freiburg 1945; H. 1945; A. Sertillanges, Le christianisme et les philosophes, 2 vol., Paris 1946; trad. II. di P. Sartori Treves, Brescia 1948; E. Gilson, L’esprit de la philosophie médiévale, 2a ed., Paris 1947; trad. it., di P. Sartori Treves, Brescia 1948 (cf. id., Christianisme et Philosophie, Paris 1936); Ph. Windel and R. Hofmann, Der Mensch vor Gott, Düsseldorf 1948; J. Boisser, E. Rochette, P. Arboussé-Bastide, J. Bois, P. Ricoeur, M. Necker, Le problème de la philosophie chrétienne, Paris 1949.

Per un orientamento sui rapporti fra f. e le scienze: W. Wundt, Philosophie und Wissenschaft, in Essaya, Lipsia 1885, pp. 1-23; H. Reichenbach, Ziele und Wege der physikalischen Erkenntnisse, in Handbuch der Physik, IV, Berlin 1920, pp. 1-80; A. Wenzl, Wissenschaft und Weltanschauung, Lipsia 1936; M. Planck, Religion und Naturwissenschaft, in 1938; K. Jaspers,

Filosoofia — Filosofia del diritto

Philosophie und Wissenschaft. in Wandlung. 3 (1947), pp. 721-731; W. Hoffmann. Physik und Metaphysik, in Symposion, II, Freiburg in Br. 1949, pp. 351-382.

Sul senso del Frammento di Anassimandro (B. I; H. Diels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 1. 5a ed., Berlino 1934, p. 89, 12 sqq.; c. f.; W. Jaeger, Paideia, Die Formung des griechischen Menschen, I, 2a ed., Berlin 1936, p. 217 sqq.; O. Gison, Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie von Hesiod bis Parmenides, Basileia 1945, p. 87 sqq.; F. Wolf, Grundlagen des abendländischen Rechtsgedankens bei Anaximander und Heraklit, I, Freiburg in Br. 1948, p. 42 sqq. (bibl. aggiornata); M. Heidegger, Holsteg, Franceforte s. W. 1950; Der Spruch des Anaximander, pp. 296-343.

Filosoofia del diritto. — È la disciplina che indaga il concetto del diritto nella sua università logica, l'idea di giustizia come principio critico supremo del suo valore, e le cagioni più generali e profonde delle sue manifestazioni storiche.

Poiché il diritto è essenzialmente una regola per l'operare umano, la f. del d. è propriamente una parte della filosofia pratica o etica in senso lato. Essa è pertanto legata alla filosofia generale, e tutte le sue trattazioni, succedute nel corso dei secoli, furono sempre strettamente connesse con i presupposti teorici delle diverse scuole e tendenze speculative.

Nella realtà storica, il diritto si presenta come un complesso di norme effettivamente osservate e fatte osservare da un'autorità o da una volontà sociale preordinata, ossia come diritto positivo. Questo si ritrova ben presto ogni popolo e in ogni tempo, ma appare variamente determinato secondo le circostanze, pur se i suoi motivi fondamentali sono costanti. Così osserva, ad es. S. Tommaso: «Principia communia legis naturae non vedent modo applicari possunt omnibus, propter multam varietatem rerum humanarum, et ex hoc provenit diversitas legis positivae apud diversos» (Stamm. Theol., 7-2a).

1. 93, a. 2, ad 3; cf. ibid., q. 97). In quanto positivo, il diritto è oggetto di scienze particolari, le quali hanno appunto per proprio campo d'indagine i sistemi vigenti presso i singoli popoli. Esistono però manifestamente dalla competenza di queste scienze la considerazione del diritto in universale.

Secondo le scuole empiriche e positiviste, il concetto del diritto dovrebbe ricavarsi dallo stesso esame dei fatti fondamentali giuridici, secondo un metodo meramente induttivo (storico e comparativo). Al che si è con ragione obiettato che un sifatto esame presuppone o sottintende precisamente la nozione di cui si tratta, vale a dire il criterio per distinguere il giuridico dal non giuridico. Riconoscere che un certo fatto o fenomeno appartiene al genere logico del diritto significa invero applicare la nozione di questo genere, che dev'essere già implicita nella nostra mente. La definizione del concetto del diritto non può dunque compiere per via puramente empirica, ma richiede l'uso di un metodo razionale, rispetto al quale la raccolta dei dati storici e positivi offre solo un riscontro, ma non la base della ricerca.

L'analisi degli elementi logici del diritto, iniziata in qualche modo dalla filosofia classica, e proseguita a tratti nelle età successive, ebbe notevole svolgimento nei tempi moderni, specialmente dal Thomassio in poi. Furono così messi in chiaro, attraverso molteplici discussioni, i caratteri della bilateralità, dell'imperatività e della coerenza, come pure i diversi aspetti del diritto (obiettivo e subiettivo, ecc.); indi anche la sua distinzione dalla morale, nonostante il loro fondamento comune. Su questo argomento sono beni tuttora vivi alcuni dissensi, dipendenti in parte dal diverso significato attribuito agli stessi vocabolari. Non sembra, comunque, che possa mettersi in dubbio la natura essenzialmente etica (o deontologica) del diritto, in quanto esso esprime non una verità di fatto, ma un criterio e una norma dell'opera, che sussistono e valgano sopra il fatto o la realtà fisica.

Anche rispetto a questo argomento, si rende necessario considerare quello che è veramente il massimo problema della f. del d., e cioè il fondamento e la ragione prima del diritto, nell'ordine della natura e dello spirito umano.

Già nel pensiero greco si delineano i vari tentativi di soluzione di costato problema, specialmente nell'antitesi tra le dottrine essenzialmente negative dei sofisti e degli scettici da una parte, e quelle socratiche, piuttosto che, aristocratiche e stoiche dall'altra. Mentre per le prime il giusto non esiste in natura, il identifica con la forza, per le seconde la giustizia è un'idea che attinge il suo valore assoluto dall'ordine universale. Sopra le leggi positive, vi ha dunque – secondo questa concezione – una legge naturale, che a differenza di quelle non dipende da alcun umano arbitrio o potere, ed ha il carattere dell'immutabilità. Si può dire che, specialmente da questa classica era, la storia della f. del d. quasi NATALE (v.).

La nuova e sublime dottrina, annunziata dal cristianesimo, non significa l'abbandono dei frutti del pensiero greco e romano in questa materia: i quali anzi furono merce sua avvalorati e perfezionati, con la elevazione morale e giuridica della personalità umana, dichiarata partecipe (quantunque imperfettamente) della stessa – razionale divina sapientia» (Stamm. Theol., 1-2a).

2. 4 ed. 1; q. 93, a. 2). Le massime fondamentali del Vangelo, come la charitas e la fraternità di tutti gli uomini in Dio, esercitano un influsso potente sul diritto sociale dell'Impero romano e sulla civiltà in genere. Lo spirito della nuova era rifugge già nelle opere di Lattanzio, di S. Ambrogio e di S. Agostino; ma a. S. Tommaso si deve la più compiuta, profonda e sistematica trattazione dei problemi della f. del d., secondo gli stessi principi. Mirabile è, tra l'altro, l'acume con il quale il Santo Aquinate ha saputo fondere in un solo organismo logico le dottrine aristoteliche e quelle cristiane. La giustizia ha beni la sua fonte in Dio; ma ha pure una base nella natura umana, e cioè in quella ragione, che permette all'uomo naturale di scorgere le verità immortali che lo trascendono.

While the supremacy of natural law over positive law was thus being reaffirmed, with the consequent condemnation of all unjust laws (a condemnation openly declared by St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, I, 5, and reiterated with subtle distinctions by St. Thomas Aquinas), a vast field of inquiry opened up for the critical thought of philosophers and jurists. This occurred especially when, in the fourteenth century and thereafter—toward the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern era—profound political changes rendered the questions about the validity of laws and the legitimacy of governments more urgent and the controversies more intense.

Not only was the problem of the relations between ecclesiastical and civil power widely discussed in various ways (among others, by Giles of Rome, James of Viterbo, Dante Alighieri, Marsilius of Padua, Augustinus Triumphus, William of Ockham, Nicholas of Cusa, Richard Hooker, etc.), but the foundation of political regimes in general was investigated, almost always by resorting to the hypothesis of an original social contract. This hypothesis assumed quite different meanings (v. CONTRACTUALISM), having been used equally to demonstrate both the legitimacy of absolute governments and the inviolability of the natural rights of the individual in the face of the State. The formula of the supposed contract was, in essence, a dialectical expedient adopted to attempt a rational construction of the legal and state order.

If, on the one hand, the great Romanist tradition was continued with new and acute investigations into the essence of justice and laws, particularly through the work of the Spaniards Domingo de Soto, Luis de Molina, Juan de Mariana, Francisco Suárez, and others; on the other hand, the school that was more strictly called the jurisprudential school, which developed especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, proceeded from rationalistic premises, claiming to abstract from dogmas and instead referring to classical theories (in particular those of Aristotle, the Stoics, or Cicero). The products of this rational construction were sometimes important, but because of its methodological defects, it had to be surpassed and corrected in the subsequent age. It raised lofty problems and contributed to their possible solutions; yet it often confused factual truths with those of reason, presenting under a certain aspect theses dictated by particular political motives or discussed in historical narratives that were frequently largely inaccurate.

The works of this school—for example, those of Althusius, Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Locke, Thomasius, Rousseau, to mention only some of the most representative authors—thus almost always had a practical and polemical purpose. They were in fact more or less closely connected with the political reforms and revolutions of that age, either preparing in a certain way their programs or theorizing the oppositions and reactions against them.

Despite its considerable errors and internal contradictions, the jurisprudential school played a significant role in the theoretical foundation of the State, particularly with regard to the affirmation of individual rights to freedom and their constitutional guarantees.

At the same time, philosophical inquiry into law took on different but no less important expressions through the work of other thinkers who, free from any political concern, investigated the ideal essence of law, its relations with ethics and theology, and the great modes of its manifestations. Thus, for example, Leibniz, and with even more original insights, Vico, who attempted a synthesis of the ideal element (true) and the positive element (true) of law, uniting in a grand design the history and philosophy of humanity.

Kant’s critique led to a methodological revision of the preceding jurisprudence, though it retained its fundamental principle, namely, the inseparability of law from human nature and its value as an absolute ethical demand. The school of national law, which began precisely with Kant, developed further with Fichte and was followed by many other authors. Different was the speculative stance of Schilling and Hegel, who, against Fichte’s subjective idealism derived from Kantian critique, opposed objective idealism, for which law is a moment in the becoming of the spirit. The identity of the real and the rational, affirmed by Hegel, led to an a priori justification of history and, consequently, to a kind of worship of the fait accompli. This form of historicism, which implied the abandonment—at least partial—not only of the postulates of Christian philosophy but also of the fundamental doctrines of the *philosophia perennis* (which had always taught the distinction between the absolute and the relative and the subordination of human law to eternal law), thus practically converged with other types of historicism, such as, for example, the historical school of jurists, which even opened the door to historical materialism and economic determinism.

Meanwhile, positivism and evolutionism arose, represented chiefly by Comte and Spencer. Although the latter author, perhaps driven by his upright conscience rather than by the logic of his system, accepted the idea of an absolute ethics and natural law, the general significance of all these doctrines was the predominance accorded—even with respect to law—to historical and positive inquiry over rational and properly philosophical inquiry. And since these doctrines gained great credit and diffusion during the nineteenth century (after its first decades), it must be acknowledged that this period, with a few notable exceptions such as Rosmini’s work, was rather one of decline than of progress for the philosophy of law, if this discipline is understood in the highest and most rigorous sense of the investigation of the absolute idea of justice. On the other hand, new impetus was given to studies of an empirical and inductive nature, such as legal ethnology, comparative law, and in general research into the genesis and historical development of law in its relations with social phenomenology.

Already in the last years of the nineteenth century and in the preceding one, a critical revision of the theses of legal positivism and other related schools was undertaken—by Stammler, Píco, and others—which brought to light their radical shortcomings, especially in terms of epistemology. In this revision, Kantian critique was also utilized; yet it was improperly spoken of as a return to Kant, since in reality the most recent doctrines, while taking into account the results of that critique, did not stop at them but advanced beyond, reconnecting on many points with the preceding philosophical tradition. In general, and with due regard for the particularities of various systems, it can be said that modern philosophy of law has sought to reaffirm, through new analyses and arguments, the logical universality, rational foundation, and eternal truth of law; that is, the ethical principles and values that, already intuited by Plato, found their highest and most luminous expressions in Christianity and can never be refuted by subsequent philosophical schools, many of which, in various ways, have instead offered illustrations and confirmations of them.

Anche lo studio delle istituzioni giuridiche positive, sistematicamente esteso a tutti i popoli della terra (secondo il programma perannunziato dal Leibniz: «Ex his aliisque omnibus undecumque collectis, Deo dante, conficiemus aliquando thesaurum legale, et in omnibus materis omnium gentium, locorum, temporum placita praeexxixxixxixxixxixxixxixxixxixxixxixxixxixxixxixx ix, ha ormai permesso di riconoscere il progressivo e sia pur lento avverarsi di quelle esigenze della giustizia, che già alla mente dei maggiori filosofi erano apparse a priori come fondate e implicite nella stessa natura umana. Possono ricordarsi in questo proposito le parole del Vico: «Siccome in noi sono sepolti alcuni semi del vero che tratto tratto dalla fanciullezza si van colli-vando, finché con l'età e con le discipline provengano in ischiaratissime cognizioni di scienze; così nel genere umano per le peccato furono sepolti i semi eterni del giusto, che tratto tratto dalla fanciullezza del mondo, col più e più spiegarsi la mente umana sopra la sua vera natura, si sono ti spiegando in massime dimostrate di giustizia.».

Bnl.: F. J. Stahl, Die Philosophie des Rechts, 3 voll., 5° ed. Tubingen 1878 (trad. II. del solo vol. 1 di P. Torre, Storia della f. del d., Torino 1853). G. Carmignani, Storia della origine e de' progressi della f. del d., 4 voll., Lucca 1831; K. Hildenbrand, Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie, 1 (unico pubbl.), Lipsia 1860; A. Rosmini, F. del d., 2° ed. Inria 1865; L. Tapparelli, Saggio teorico di diritto naturale appoggiato sul fatto, 8° ed., Roma 1840; F. Toscano, Corso elementare di f. del d., 3° ed., Napoli 1869; H. Ahrens, Naturrecht oder Philosophie des Rechts und des Staates, 6° ed., Vienna 1870-71; trad. II. di A. Margheri, Corso di diritto naturale o di f. del d., 3° ed., Napoli 1885; A. Trondelbourg, Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik, 2° ed., Lipsia 1868; trad. II. di N. Modugno, Dritto naturale sulla base dell'etica, Napoli 1873; G. Prisco, Principi di f. del d., sulle basi dell'etica, 1872; A. Lassen, System der Rechtsphilosophie, Berlin 1882; J. Costa-Rossetti, Philosophia moralis seu Institutiones Ethicae et Juris naturae, 2° ed., Innsbruck 1886; F. Filonusi Guelfi, Lezioni e saggi di f. del d., ed. postuma, Milano 1949; G. Carle, La vita del diritto nel suo rapporto colla vita sociale, 2° ed., Torino 1890; A. Boistel, Cours de philosophie du droit, Parigi 1890; L. Miraghia, F. del d., (unico pubbl.), 3° ed., Napoli 1903; I. Vanni, Lezioni di f. del d., 4° ed., Bologna 1920; Th. Meyer, Institutiones Juris naturalis seu Philosophiae moralis universae, 2° ed., Friburge in Br. 1906; V. CÀTARI, Moralphilosophie. Eine wissenschaftliche Darlegung der sittlichen einschliesslich der rechtlichen Ordnung, 5° ed., ivi 1911; trad. II. di E. Tommasi, Filosofia morale. Esposizione scientifica dell'ordine morale e giuridico, 2° ed., Firenze 1900; J. Kohler, Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie, 3° ed., Berlino 1923; R. Stammler, Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie, 3° ed., ivi 1928; I. Petrone, Il diritto nel mondo dello spirito, Milano 1910; itd. F. del d., con l'aggiunta di vari saggi, ed. postuma, ivi 1950; G. Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, 3° ed., Lipsia 1923; G. Del Vecchio, Lezioni di f. del d., 7° ed., Milano 1950. V. anche CONTRASTUALISMO; DIRITTO NATURALE: GIUSTIZIA.

Giorgio Del Vecchio