Cominform

COMINFORM. - The dissolution of the Comintern (May 1943) led to a new policy of the communist parties: in the international field to a policy of close collaboration with the Anglo-American allies, and within the various countries of the anti-Hitler coalition to a policy of the "broad national coalition" against "fascism" (a term under which was understood also, and above all, Nazism). This gave the communists the possibility of presenting themselves before the popular masses as a true democratic party, indeed as the most "progressive" of the democratic parties, and of occupying influential positions in certain countries. Vis-à-vis the other socialist parties, the problem of the unity of the proletarian movement was placed on the agenda, and in connection with it the communists carried out vigorous propaganda in favor of the idea of the fusion of the socialist and communist parties. For some time this idea of fusion found in the socialist parties of certain countries (France, Italy, Norway, Czechoslovakia) a considerable number of followers. The formal dissolution of the Comintern, with regard to this situation, meant nothing other than creating to a much greater extent the premises for the application of the tactic used by the Comintern, that is, the tactic of the united front and of contingent demands.

A short time after the end of the war of 1939-45, when the Allies no longer depended so much, as before, on one another, the contrasts between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, and between communists and socialists, began to reveal themselves with ever greater clarity. The policy of collaboration among the Allies of yesterday was transformed little by little into a policy of open struggle, and there came about the founding of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties, briefly called the K.

At the end of Sept. 1947 there took place in Poland, and precisely at Wiliza Gora, which the Polish government had handed over to the general secretary of the Polish Communist Party Gomulka, a council in which representatives of the following countries participated: Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, the U.S.S.R., France, Czechoslovakia and Italy. At the end of the meeting three documents were published: a communiqué, a declaration and a resolution. In the communiqué it was reported that after hearing a report by Zhdanov on the international situation and other reports by the representatives of the individual parties, it had been decided to found an Information Bureau in order to avoid the harmful symptoms produced by insufficient mutual contact among the parties of the various countries. The declaration, which briefly summarized Zhdanov's report, started from the international situation, characterized by the formation of two camps: "one imperialist and anti-democratic, whose main goal consists in the realization of American imperialism and in overthrowing democracy; and one anti-imperialist and democratic," headed by the U.S.S.R., and which had set itself as its aim "the subversion of imperialism, the consolidation of democracy" and "the defense of the independence and national sovereignty" of the individual countries. In the face of the world situation, the main task of the communist parties was understood as the struggle "against the economic and political enslavement of Europe," a consequence of the Marshall Plan, and "against the projects of the economic and political enslavement of China, Indonesia and the South American countries," as well as the struggle against "the faithful servants of the imperialists," the "right-wing socialists of the Blum type in France, Attlee and Bevin in England, Schumacher in Germany, Renner and Schurf in Austria, Saragat in Italy, etc." With this the declaration revealed the main points of the K.'s program.

In the resolution it was established that the Information Bureau was to be composed of two representatives of each central committee of the communist parties of the nine countries represented; that its task consisted in "the organization of the exchange of experiences and, if necessary, in the coordination of the activity of the communist parties on the basis of mutual consent." The publication of an organ was also decided, edited for the moment in the Russian and French languages, and at a later time also in other languages ("For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy"). As the seat of the Information Bureau, Belgrade was established. The two Western communist parties, the French and the Italian, received at this meeting a twofold reproach: because they had lost their position in the government, and because they had not noticed that the United States was obtaining hegemony in the Western world, preparing it for the struggle against the "anti-fascist" forces. Duclos and Longo recognized the error of their parties as "deviations." A twofold task was enjoined upon them: they were to seek to regain their directing position in the working class, preparing it for hard struggle, and they were to seek to hinder American policy in Europe. Their mistaken national policy was to be changed with a policy of strikes, mass agitation, sabotage, etc. Indeed, a general strike was proclaimed in Italy on 12 Nov. 1947, in France on 18 Nov.

The second meeting of the K. took place, as the communiqué of 1 Feb. 1948 announced, in the month of Jan. of that year in a locality in Yugoslavia; theme: questions of propaganda and of the press.

Despite the choice of Belgrade as the seat of the K., a few months later there came about the conflict of Yugoslavia itself with the K. To the great surprise of public opinion, there appeared, dated 20 June 1948, a communiqué of the 3rd meeting of the Information Bureau entitled "On the situation of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia," in which the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party was given a whole series of reproaches that seemed very strange and even contained contradictions, concerning the "deviation from Marxism-Leninism," as a consequence of which the Yugoslav Communist Party "had placed itself outside the communist front and therefore also outside the ranks of the Information Bureau." The true reason for the conflict was revealed, however, by the reproach of a "policy hostile toward the Soviet Union and its Communist Party." Yugoslavia was accused of having subjected "Soviet civilian specialists and even the Soviet representative in the K., Judin, as well as several other official representatives of the U.S.S.R., to a regime of control exercised by organs of the Yugoslav Security Service." This allows one to glimpse that the true reason for the conflict between Yugoslavia and the K. is to be sought in Yugoslavia's tendency to secure for itself independence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and to base its relations with it on a plane of equality.

One of the consequences of Yugoslavia's infidelity was an action of radical purge in the various communist parties, whose victims are Gomulka for Poland, Kotschi Dsodse in Albania, Rajk in Hungary and Kostov in Bulgaria; the first of these, arrested in 1949, disappeared, the others were hanged.

In Nov. 1949 a new meeting of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties took place in Hungary, in which the same countries of 1947 were represented, except Yugoslavia. Three resolutions were adopted there. While the documents published during the first meeting reveal above all the program of the K., these three documents are of particular interest in that they make its tactic understood. In the first resolution: The defense of peace and the struggle against the warmongers, it was noted in the first place that the contrast was sharpening between the two camps, the imperialist and the democratic one, which had occurred in the last two years, as well as a feverish preparation for war in the imperialist camp, against which the Soviet Union stood as a bulwark of peace and the main support of the peace front. Precisely in the sense of the tactic of contingent demands (v. INTERNAZIONALE), the mobilization of all forces "without distinction of religious convictions and political opinions" was invoked for the struggle in favor of peace under the leadership of the communist parties. For an effective struggle against the danger of war under the direction of the communist parties, there was further demanded the absorption, as far as possible, of all the proletarian masses, a problem which was dealt with particularly in the second resolution: The unity of the proletarian class and the tasks of the communist and proletarian parties. Here there was renewed insistence on the famous tactic of the "united front," for which it would have been necessary to wage a merciless struggle against the right-wing socialists and the reactionary leaders of the trade unions, attempting to "unmask them without pity" and to "isolate them from the masses." As a means for the creation of this "unity of the working class organized from below," there was recommended among other things: the founding of committees for the defense of peace in individual enterprises, the organization of mass demonstrations and similar initiatives. "Special attention is to be devoted, in the struggle for the unity of the working class, to the masses of Catholic workers and laborers and to their organizations. It must be borne in mind that religious convictions do not constitute an impediment to the unity of the workers, especially if this unity is necessary for the salvation of peace. Common concrete actions in the field of economic demands, the coordination of the struggle of class-conscious trade unions and Catholic trade unions, etc., can be effective means of attracting Catholic workers into the common front of the struggle for peace." Bearing in mind the tactic of contingent demands, it is evident that here the "front of the struggle for peace" was conceived as a preparation for entry into the communist party. In the third resolution: The Yugoslav Communist Party in the hands of assassins and spies, the leaders of the Party itself were reproached for having passed over into the camp of capitalism and for offering themselves as servants of the warmongers. The struggle against the "Tito gang" was presented as an international duty of all communist parties. Not only the communist parties outside Yugoslavia were exhorted to participate in this struggle, but also the faithful who were found within the Yugoslav Communist Party itself, as well as all the proletarian masses of Yugoslavia.

Some believed they could see in the K. simply a repetition of the Comintern. But on the Soviet side this is resolutely denied, inasmuch as the Comintern is considered an outdated form of connection between the various communist parties. This form, in the Soviet opinion, had its positive importance as long as the individual communist parties were still weak, while the unitary tactic was not yet organized and well-trained leaders were also lacking; today, by contrast, the individual communist parties of many countries have become mass parties, and direction exercised by a single center would be impossible and inopportune (note that here the fact of the direction of the individual communist parties carried out by the Comintern, that is, by a center situated outside the country of the respective communist party, is implicitly confirmed). Therefore, new forms of international collaboration would prove necessary. At the same time, the dissolution of the Comintern would have put an end to the calumny according to which Moscow would meddle in the internal affairs of other countries (Zhdanov).

In effect, it cannot be denied that between the K. and the Comintern there exist important formal differences: the K. does not include the communist parties of all countries, but only those of eight European countries; moreover, Asia is not represented. With respect to organization, it is no longer a question of a single world party, governed by an "iron discipline," but express insistence is placed on the principle of "mutual consent." All this makes evident that the principal goal of this "new form of connection between communist parties" is the struggle against the Marshall Plan, which is directed in the first place at Europe, and against which the reproach is hurled that it signifies a partial renunciation of national sovereignty.

Despite these purely external and formal differences, there exists, as has been seen, in essential character, in aims, in program and in tactic, a continuity between the two "forms" of communist international collaboration. As for the fact that in place of the "iron discipline" of former times the principle of "mutual consent" has been put, precisely the example of Yugoslavia clearly demonstrates that a too independent attitude of the individual parties toward the U.S.S.R., "bulwark of the peace front," is not tolerated in any case.

Gustavo A. Wetter