UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (U.S.S.R.). — The use of the abbreviation U.S.S.R. dates back to 30 Dec. 1926 (in Russian S.S.S.R., or in Cyrillic characters C.C.C.P., i.e. “Sojuz Sozialističeskich Sovietskich Respublik”). It denotes the vast political unit which, following the Revolution of February 1917, inherited the Empire of the Tsars, transformed into a State with a communist structure and (nominally) constituted as a federation of several units gravitating with varying degrees of attachment around the federal power. The abbreviation tends to replace the old name Russia, which, however, is still retained both for the whole of the U.S.S.R. and for its European part, and not infrequently for the R.S.F.S.R. (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic), which is the only one pre-eminent in every respect within the Federation.
The territory of the U.S.S.R. is the largest on Earth when considered as a single contiguous whole: before the last world war it extended over 21.2 million sq. km., of which more than 4/5 in Asia (37% of that continent) and 1/4 in Europe (43% of that continent), thus representing 14.3% of the emerged lands; with the annexations carried out between 1939 and 1945 (60,000 sq. km.; of which as many as 478,000 in Europe) its surface area rose to 22.8 million sq. km. (of which 5.1 in Europe), which means slightly less than 1/6 of all the continents and 2/5 of the Eurasian landmass. The territory of the U.S.S.R. is bordered for about 2/3 of its perimeter (45,000 km.) by seas, almost all of them closed or blocked by ice for a more or less long period of the year, and therefore not always favourable to navigation. The land frontiers (25,000 km.) touch in fact 11 States: 4 of the 6 European ones (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania) and 2 of the 5 Asian ones (China and North Korea) concern political units actually functioning as satellite organisms. In any case, more than for its geographical position and its dimensions (greater than those of an entire continent), the U.S.S.R. is involved in all the major problems of world politics because of its resolute and tenacious will to
| Federated Rep. | No. of | SSR-Republics | Area in sq. km. (1000) | Pop. in 1000 | Capital and population |
| Russia | 53 | Bashkir ASSR | 143.5 | 3000 | Ufa (300) |
| | | Buryat-Mongol ASSR | 351.4 | 600 | Ulan Ude (150) |
| | | Dagestan ASSR | 38.1 | 900 | Makhachkala (87) |
| | | Yakut ASSR | 3061.8 | 450 | Yakutsk (23) |
| | | Kabardin ASSR | 11.9 | 300 | Nalchik (27) |
| | | Komi ASSR | 404.5 | 450 | Syktyvkar (17) |
| | | Mari ASSR | 23.0 | 600 | Yoshkar-Ola (9) |
| | | Mordvin ASSR | 26.2 | 1200 | Saransk (200) |
| | | North Ossetian ASSR | 9.1 | 450 | Ordzhonikidze (128) |
| | | Tatar ASSR | 67.6 | 2850 | Kazan (500) |
| | | Chuvash ASSR | 18.4 | 150 | Cheboksary (16) |
| | | Tuvan ASSR | 171.2 | 150 | Kyzyl (10) |
| | | Udmurt ASSR | 42.0 | 1200 | Izhevsk (200) |
| | | Adygei ASSR | 4.4 | 300 | Maikop (67) |
| | | Jewish ASSR | 35.7 | 108 | Birobidzhan (7) |
| | | Khakass ASSR | 62.2 | 300 | Abakan (13) |
| | | Gorno-Altai ASSR | 93.0 | 150 | Gorno-Altaysk (12) |
| | | Circassian ASSR | 4.0 | 100 | Cherkessk (23) |
| Ukraine | 25 | Abkhaz ASSR | 8.5 | 330 | Sukhumi (36) |
| Byelorussia | 12 | Adzhar ASSR | 2.8 | 195 | Batumi (90) |
| Georgia | | South Ossetian ASSR | 3.9 | 120 | Stalinir (8) |
| | | Nagorno-Karabakh ASSR | 2.8 | 130 | Stepanakert (5) |
| Kazakhstan | 16 | Karakalpak ASSR | 159.5 | 435 | Nukus (11) |
| Kirghizia | | Gorno-Badakhshan ASSR | 61.1 | 45 | Khorog (1) |
Turkmenistan
play an ideological role: the spread of communism throughout the world; in Europe, moreover, it controls, by means of a military occupation now lasting more than 8 years, a large portion of Germany (107,000 sq. km., 30% of the entire State and 25% of its population) and of Austria (23.5 thousand sq. km., 31% of the State and 34% of the population), not excluding their respective capitals. Particularly noteworthy is the position of dominance assumed, after 1940, in the Baltic, with the annexations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: the entire southern basin of that sea, taking into account the occupation still in force in eastern Germany, is practically under Soviet domination.
The U.S.S.R. extends from 35° 48' (Afghan frontier) to 77° 37' N. (Cape Chelyuskin) and from 19° 32' (Frisian Nehrung) to 169° 50' E. (Cape Dezhnev on the Bering Strait); which is to say for about 9700 km. from W. to E. and at least 4000 km. from S. to N. It follows, obviously, a great variety of conditions and natural features, and likewise of climatic environments. From the depressions surrounding the Caspian (whose level is 26 m. below that of the open sea) and from the cryptodepressions of Lake Baikal (which, with its 1280 m. below the same open sea level, is the deepest on earth) one rises to 7600 m. on Mount Stalin in the Trans-Alai (the highest peak of the Federation); and so from the icy wastes of the extreme north-eastern Asian coasts — where, at Oymyakon on the Indigirka, the cold pole is located (absolute minima of –70°) — one passes to the tropical heat of Central Asia, where summer temperatures sometimes approach 70°. Marked differences also occur in precipitation: to maxima of over 2 m. as in western Transcaucasia, there is opposed the aridity of the great deserts to the E. of the Caspian (Kara and Kizil Kum), where, over areas as large as or larger than continental Italy, not a drop of water falls for summers and years on end.
Despite all this, the immense territory does not lack a certain geographical unity of its own. In the aspect of the landscape, due to the absolute predominance of plateaus, or rather highlands, and therefore of vast plains or gently sloping surfaces over the corrugated regions, which occupy almost all peripheral sectors; in the relative arrangement of the different natural units, which succeed one another from north to south according to a gradual and generally regular climatic differentiation; and finally in the climate itself, characterized by a continental nature that dominates, so to speak, the entire territory of the U.S.S.R., even where it is close to the peripheral seas, due to the substantial uniformity of thermal and pluviometric regimes over vast areas. Corresponding to the much greater east-west extension of this territory is the latitudinal arrangement of the typical landscape zones of the U.S.S.R.: the Arctic tundra in the sector near the Glacial Ocean; the wide forested belt (the Siberian taiga) that follows it, first entirely coniferous (to the north) and then increasingly mixed (to the south) with broadleaf trees, interspersed with large patches of heathland or peat bogs; the cereal-growing lands (Chernozem) that replace the original steppe vegetation in Ukraine and in west-central Siberia; and finally the arid, saline steppes, which gradually merge into true desert (Central Asia). In the peripheral sectors, as mentioned, but sometimes also intermingling with the zones just described, the reliefs vary from sector to sector: the high and compact Caucasian wall to the southwest; the reinforced mountainous enclosures of Central Asia (from the Alai to the Sayan Mountains) and eastern Asia (partially still rather imperfectly known); and the Urals, which, although extending from north to south for over 2,000 km, form in reality only a modest swell between entirely similar flat sectors.
The natural regions of the U.S.S.R. therefore generally assume considerable dimensions; over large areas, local differences, though not absent, appear almost imperceptible. In general, the following can be distinguished: a) the great Eurasian plain, consisting of two vast tabular blocks on either side of the Urals: the general flatness is barely disturbed here and there by small hill ranges (along the Volga, Don, and Dnieper), which rarely exceed 250–300 m in height, while only in the north, in the Kola Peninsula, do elevations reach 1,000 m. The Urals do not constitute a barrier, except in the north; railways and roads cross them everywhere with ease. This region extends about 400 km from west to east and at least 2,000 km from south to north; it contains nearly 85% of the U.S.S.R.’s population. b) The highlands of central Siberia, beyond the Yenisei, rising 500–800 m over an area of more than 2,000,000 km². To the south, the highland gives way to a series of elevations exceeding 2,000 m (Yablonovy, Stanovoy), which overlook more or less depressed basins, the largest of which, occupied by Lake Baikal, descends to more than 1,600 m below sea level. This is a rugged country with a harsh climate and varied elevations, still in the process of development. c) The territories of the Far East, bounded on the west roughly by the 125th meridian east and extending to the Pacific. Great mountain arcs (Khingan, S.-Khotan Alin, Chersky, Verkhoyansk) with their concavity facing north rise to over 4,000 m, dominating, in the intervals between them, internal basins, the most important of which, from an economic standpoint, are the more southerly ones (50° N) of Blagoveshchensk and Khabarovsk, connected by the broad valley of the Amur. This is a region still very sparsely populated, even along its cold, humid maritime fringe, with the exception of the narrow border zone near Korea. d) Central Asia, that is, the flat or depressed tract that opens east of the Caspian; an arid and partly desert territory, but one that benefits from the waters of numerous high or very high mountain ranges (4,000 to over 7,000 m) that frame it from south to southeast (Alai, Alatau, Tien Shan, Pamirs). This is one of the districts where the economic transformation brought about by the Soviet regime has been most decisive: nomadic origins and persistent seasonal migrations are gradually giving way to the formation of stable settlements, fostered by industrial development. e) The Caucasian sector, which includes a vast complex of mountain ranges extending from the Black Sea to the Caspian for over a thousand kilometers and culminating at more than 5,500 m in Mount Elbrus. On either side of the axial line, the mountains open into a labyrinth of valleys that have given rise to a complicated ethnico-political mosaic, characterized by strong conservatism in the north (Ciscaucasia), while in the south (Transcaucasia) the contrast remains vivid between the humid Colchis (Georgia), facing the Euxine, and the bare, thirsty Kura plain (Azerbaijan), both enclosed toward Iran by the Armenian plateau—a wild complex of mountains, basins, and highlands, yet not lacking in resources.
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
The 16 Federated Republics of the U.S.S.R.
| Republic | Area in sq. km. (000) | Population 1950 (millions) | Density per sq. km. | Capitals (population in 000) |
|------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|
| Russia | 16,922.0 | 116.4 | 7 | Moscow (4,500) |
| Ukraine | 576.6 | 40.8 | 71 | Kiev (900) |
| Byelorussia | 207.6 | 9.3 | 45 | Minsk (230) |
| Estonia | 45.1 | 1.2 | 27 | Tallinn (196) |
| Latvia | 64.5 | 2.1 | 33 | Riga (390) |
| Lithuania | 65.2 | 3.0 | 46 | Vilnius (163) |
| Moldavia | 33.8 | 2.7 | 80 | Kishinev (110) |
| Karelo-Finnish | 178.5 | 0.6 | 3 | Petrozavodsk (70) |
| Armenia | 29.8 | 1.5 | 50 | Yerevan (255) |
| Georgia | 76.2 | 3.6 | 47 | Tbilisi (540) |
| Azerbaijan | 85.7 | 3.3 | 39 | Baku (800) |
| Kazakhstan | 2,753.8 | 6.6 | 2 | Alma-Ata (300) |
| Kirghizia | 196.9 | 1.5 | 8 | Frunze (440) |
| Uzbekistan | 407.5 | 6.0 | 15 | Tashkent (600) |
| Tadzhikistan | 142.6 | 1.5 | 11 | Stalinabad (110) |
| Turkmenistan | 484.8 | 1.2 | 2 | Ashkhabad (120) |
| U.S.S.R. | 22,270.6 | 201.3 | 9 | |
Such a combination of environmental conditions could not fail to give rise to anthropological and economic differentiations, even apart from the particular historical evolution that the various countries have experienced. Nor is it surprising that the Slavic expansion, which began as early as the 16th century in the conquest of its immense domain, has not yet succeeded in achieving everywhere conditions of civilization comparable to those attained in other regions, even those not so anciently colonized. An index of this same fact is the weak overall density of settlement, although the figure that expresses it (less than 10 inhabitants per km²) must also be related to the large portion (about one-third) of the surface area of the U.S.S.R. occupied by frozen (tundra) and desert (Central Asia) terrain. Moreover, regional densities vary within rather wide limits: while almost the entire Asian sector north of the 50th parallel has indices below or near 1 inhabitant per km² (but with vast stretches in which, in reality, there is no more than 1 inhabitant per 10, 50, or even 100 km²), in the regions near Moscow or the industrial centers of Ukraine, densities exceed 100 and even 200 inhabitants per km², albeit over modest areas. To understand properly the notable mobility of the Soviet population, one must take into account the large number of nomads and semi-nomads living in Central and Northern Asia, the ever-active rhythm of internal migrations, and the production crises (characteristic) that have until recently determined mass movements or settlement phenomena unknown in our countries.
The very cities of Russia—at least the traditional ones—are also markedly different from ours, having to a greater or lesser extent escaped the leveling influence exerted by the socio-economic transformation wrought by communist class ideology. Among the most significant results of the revolution must be counted the increased number and demographic importance of urban centers: in 1950, the Union counted more than a hundred large cities (i.e., each with a population exceeding 100,000 inhabitants), of which two surpassed 3,000,000 (Moscow, with over 5 million, and Leningrad), a dozen had half a million (Kiev, Baku, Kharkov, Gorky, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk, Tashkent, Tbilisi, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Rostov-on-Don, and Stalino), and at least sixteen had a quarter of a million.
A characteristic of the population of the U.S.S.R. is its great ethnic heterogeneity: at least 170 distinct groups belonging to a wide variety of ethnic stocks. Although the Indo-Europeans still predominate absolutely, the Russians (or more precisely, the Great Russians) now constitute less than half of the total population of the U.S.S.R. (100 million souls in 1951), whereas they made up 53% before the last world war; numerically, they are followed by the Ukrainians (36 million), the Byelorussians (10 million), and fourteen other groups each numbering more than one million individuals. After the Indo-Europeans, the Turkic-Tatar peoples form the largest group (15% of the total), led by the Uzbeks (5 million), the Tatars (4.3 million), and the Kazakhs (3.1 million), and are spread, in addition to Asia, also through European regions. At least seventeen other groups consist of populations each numbering less than one million but more than 100,000, and about ten consist of even smaller numbers. This results in a veritable Babel of languages, which the Soviet regime has itself encouraged by fostering the preservation and development of local idioms as peculiar to the politico-administrative units in which they are spoken, while at the same time decreeing the predominance of Russian (which, with its 220 million speakers, ranks second in the world after English) as the official language of the U.S.S.R.
In terms of population, on the eve of the world war the U.S.S.R. held third place among sovereign states; almost exactly two-thirds of its population lived in the European sector. Thus, while the Union contained 8% of the world’s population, it alone accounted for nearly one-quarter of Europe’s total, surpassing in this respect any other state. With the conclusion of the Second World War, this situation became even more pronounced. By 1948, the Soviet domain contained 8.7% of the world’s population; the share belonging to the European sector represented 26% of Europe’s total inhabitants, far exceeding the corresponding share of any other state.
Despite its recent, spectacular industrial development and its tendency to shift the economic center of gravity ever further eastward in order to exploit more fully the immense resources of every kind found in the Asian sector, the U.S.S.R. remains essentially an agricultural country (57% of its population is rural) and derives the overwhelmingly largest part of its production from the European sector. In the field of agricultural activity, this fact is all the more evident in that more than four-fifths of the cultivated territory still lies west of the Urals. The new regime, however, has not only spurred the development of all economic production but has also advanced the exploitation of the soil in the traditionally agricultural zones themselves, especially in Ukraine, both by reorganizing labor (in state farms, or *sovkhoz*, and collective farms, or *kolkhoz*) and by increasingly extensive mechanization (agricultural machine stations, tractors), and by regulating the distribution of different crops according to plans that take into account the specific properties of the soils and the needs of the community. In cereal production (wheat, rye, oats, barley), the U.S.S.R. has thus reinforced its world leadership, though without regaining its former role as the leading exporter, owing to increased domestic consumption and growing competition from other producers. It is not easy to provide entirely reliable figures for Soviet agricultural production—and the same caveat applies to other statistical data. With reasonable approximation, however, it may be stated that the agricultural area represents 10% of the world’s total, and the percentages of the principal crops (the first figure refers to cultivated area, the second to yield) are as follows: wheat 13–14.5 (450 million quintals in 1950); rye 68.5–62.5 (162 million quintals in 1950, compared with 255 million in 1935–38); oats 28–23; barley 18–14; potatoes 40–36. As can be seen, the production figure is generally lower than that for cultivated area, indicating that unit yields are rather low (that for wheat, for example, is about half the corresponding Italian figure).
Facing the almost absolute predominance of cereals over other characteristic crops of the tsarist period, the present trend toward the development of specialized crops is clear, among which the oil-bearing crops (sunflower, castor bean, flax, hemp), the cotton crop (from Ukraine to Transcaucasia; considering other regions where the same crop is widespread, it is found that the U.S.S.R. participates in world production with only 6%), and the sugar beet stand out. Within the framework of Soviet agriculture, one must not forget the care with which the problem of artificial irrigation has been addressed, which has made it possible, and will make it possible in the future, to reclaim new land for human labor (it is estimated, for example, that the area reclaimed from the desert could be increased from 400,000 to 1.3 million hectares). On the other hand, hydroelectric power production (two-thirds of the available capacity is located in Europe) is still far from its potential, despite the large power plants built (Dneproges, once the largest in the world) or under construction.
The livestock sector is equally impressive: sheep (100 million head) and cattle (60 million) are in the forefront, especially in the regions of Central Asia and southern Siberia, which are well-suited for their breeding. Equally substantial are the products of fishing: for freshwater products, which are very active in the numerous rivers, the U.S.S.R. has no rivals (caviar production). No less grand are the forest resources (23% of the world's productive areas, 21.5% of accessible ones; which in turn are half of the U.S.S.R.'s forest area) — at least one-fifth of the territorial surface is now considered accessible and exploitable, placing the U.S.S.R. among the world's leading exporters of related products.
Of no lesser magnitude is the abundance of mineral resources. To ascertain their location and extent, the new regime has undertaken an intense and methodical exploration of the entire territory of the U.S.S.R., whose reserves grow year by year with the improvement of geological surveys of many still unknown or little-known regions. The results achieved so far prove that this immense domain possesses substantial quantities of almost all minerals, a necessary basis for a great economic power. The Soviet Union has iron reserves amounting to more than one-fifth of the world total; nearly as much for oil; 10-15% for coal; and substantial shares, though varying, of copper, zinc, lead, manganese, gold, platinum, nickel, asbestos, chromium, potassium, bauxite, mercury, magnesite (over one-third), etc. Even if calculated with some optimism, these resources are such as to ensure the Soviet Union substantial self-sufficiency in this regard, as well as industrial expansion that is certainly not limited by a shortage or scarcity of the raw materials needed to sustain II. It is therefore understandable that it is precisely in the field of extractive industry that the effort of economic transformation willed by the communist regime has been most vigorously applied since 1917; until World War I, Russian industry, despite its potential base, remained far too inadequate to meet the demands imposed not so much by its policy as by the very needs of its growing population.
Despite the acknowledged deficiencies of recent statistics on Soviet extractive industry, the progress made and the targets set are evident; crude iron production has decupled in the last two decades (from 2.1 to 21 million tons between 1928 and 1950), steel production has sextupled (from 4.3 to 27.6 million tons), coal production has increased (from 8.9 times between 1913 and 1950, from 29 to 250 million tons); oil production has risen from 1.5 to 37.6 million tons in the same period. It should be noted, however, that the increase in production attributable to the Soviet share of world output is not identical with the figures given above (other nations have also advanced); for example, the Soviet share of iron has risen from 3% to 12.5% between 1927 and 1939, that of steel from 3.5% to 13%, manganese from 17% to 45%, chromite from 4.5% to 15%, and so on. In any case, more important than the volume of production now achieved—which places the U.S.S.R., in almost every branch of industry, but especially in metallurgical, steel, mechanical, chemical, and textile industries, in second place in the world, immediately after and in evident competition with the U.S.A.—is the gigantic effort of such vast proportions in a country where almost all the prerequisites for such a task were lacking or entirely inadequate (skilled labor, infrastructure, transportation, foreign trade, etc.).
Even apart from the relationship between this effort and the sacrifices it has imposed and continues to impose on the mass of the population, it is clear that Soviet production is still far from having reached the optimum of its possibilities: a clear and balanced view of this economy is further complicated, without consideration of immediate or distant objectives, by a policy aimed at asserting itself, beyond the widest borders of this domain, as an expression of universal values. To this same line of thought must be referred the complex political and administrative structure of the U.S.S.R., in which federal autonomies, although recently strengthened, are subject to a single state and ideological unity that in practice nullifies them. Restricting ourselves to the external lines of this structure, it suffices to note here that the U.S.S.R. consists of 16 Federated Republics, within which, with varying degrees of autonomy, are found Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Provinces, National Districts, and oblasts (the latter being divisions of mere administrative character), according to the annexed tables.
For history, literature, rite, and art in the European Soviet territory, improperly called Russia, V. RUTENI; RUSSIA; SLAVI; SLAVOFILIA; UCRANIA. Also V. ARMENIA; BIELORUSSIA; ESTONIA; GEORGIA; LETTONIA; LITUANIA.
II. LEGAL STATUS OF THE CHURCH
The Russian Empire (v. Russia, III. Legal status of the Church) regulated its relations with the Catholic Church according to the law governing foreign confessions (Svod Zakonov, vol. XI, 1: Code of Ecclesiastical Affairs of foreign confessions). The Soviet Union also has ecclesiastical-state legislation, but this differs from the laws of all other states, even those that proclaim the separation of Church and State.The fundamental documents still in force today are: 1) the decree of 23 Jan. 1918 “On the separation of Church and State” (13 articles), on the basis of which the 1918 Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. in art. 13 (from 1923 art. 4) guarantees: “Citizens are permitted, without distinction, religious and anti-religious propaganda.” 2) The decree of 18 Apr. 1920: “On religious associations” (68 articles), on the basis of which art. 4 of the Constitution is amended: “Freedom of religious profession and freedom of anti-religious propaganda are recognized for all citizens.” 3) Art. 124 of the Stalin Constitution (1936). The aforementioned article, still in force and based on previous decrees, further restricts freedom of conscience: “Freedom to practice religious cults and freedom of anti-religious propaganda are recognized for all citizens.” Art. 124 represents a phase, albeit a long-term one, on the path toward the liquidation of the Church. Its starting point is the materialist ideology. Therefore, in Soviet law, the Catholic Church exists only “de facto,” not “de iure.”
1) The Roman Pontiff, as head of the Catholic Church, is not considered a sovereign person, nor even a juridical one; expressions such as the Holy See, bishops, deacons, etc. do not occur. The Church is regarded as a religious community and association, but it has no rights, not even over professional and cultural organizations.
2) The Church, even as a collective entity, is deprived of ecclesiastical property and is incapable of owning movable or immovable property: places of worship (churches and chapels), rectories, seminaries, utensils, etc. All such property belongs to the people. After registration, the community of believers may conclude an agreement with the civil authorities and receive permission to use a place of worship, but it must pay taxes and maintenance costs; these taxes, now better regulated, are so high that the closure of churches is inevitable. Furthermore, registration entails greater surveillance and dependence on the civil authorities.
3) The law restricts the spread of the faith and envisages its progressive elimination: religion is banned from all schools; no religious activity is permitted for young people; the Church survives, but without printing presses, radio, films, typography, paper, libraries, etc. The expenses of worship are covered by offerings from the faithful.
4) The implementation of ecclesiastical-state legislation does not occur through the judicial system but through administrative channels, namely through the organs of the Ministry of the Interior and the police: predetermined court rulings, convictions without trials, arrests without stated reasons, deportations, and forced labor.
5) Catholic life unfolds in a hostile, indeed anti-religious environment, whose proponents control all means of dissemination: the press, radio, film, schools, subsidies, etc.
After 1945, the Russian dissident patriarchal Church nearly attained juridical personality due to the tasks it performed in favor of the Soviet state. The Catholic Church, however, will never enjoy such favors and privileges; deprived of rights, its hierarchical organization in the U.S.S.R. has now been liquidated; the number of its faithful has been greatly reduced. Yet its potential (in numbers, quality, and heroism) during the years of communism has remained more or less as it was before.
There is no religious statistics for the U.S.S.R. In the 1937 census, the Government posed the question of religion. The number of citizens declaring themselves believers was so great that the results were not published. It is certain that generations raised under Bolshevism are largely atheistic. It is impossible even to approximate the number of baptized persons in the U.S.S.R. In its Encyclopedia (vol. on the Soviet Union, Moscow 1948), cols. 1788-90, the Government lists the religions existing in the U.S.S.R. without providing statistics. According to these sources, the largest religious group is that of the “Russian Orthodox Church,” whose adherents may number between 20 and 30 million. In 1918, they numbered 98 million (including the Old Believers). Regarding the Catholic Church, it states: “The Roman Catholic Church is mainly scattered in the west of the U.S.S.R., while in the east it has only a few communities. Its hierarchy consists of Metropolitan Antonio Springovics, one archbishop, two bishops, and a large number of prelates and canons.” Within the borders of the U.S.S.R. as they existed in 1939, before the war, there were about half a million Catholics. In fact, no ecclesiastical organization exists for them—the one established in 1926 has been annihilated—and as far as is known, only one church remains open for worship, that of St. Louis in Moscow, belonging to the French embassy. In Moscow alone, there are 15,000–20,000 Catholics. The new religious policy of the Soviet Government has reopened several churches for dissidents, but none for Catholics.
After the war, in 1945, vast regions with numerous Catholics were incorporated into the U.S.S.R.: the eastern and southeastern parts (Galicia) of Poland, Lithuania, the so-called Transcarpathia, Latvia, and Estonia (with few Catholics). Thus the number of Catholics rose to about 8 million. The Greek-Catholic ecclesiastical province of Lviv was officially suppressed in 1946. The same was done in 1949 with the diocese of Mukachevo in Transcarpathia (formerly Czechoslovakia). From eastern Poland, Polish Catholics were largely deported. In Lithuania and Latvia, the struggle against the Catholic Church is ongoing. In Lithuania, only one bishop remains free, that of Panevėžys; in Latvia, the archbishop of Riga, Antonio Springovičs. The apostolic administrator of Estonia, Msgr. Eduard Profittlich, S.J., was deported as early as 1940.
The Soviet Encyclopedia lists the following Christian confessions existing in the U.S.S.R.: the Old Believers' Church, divided into three branches; the Georgian "Orthodox" Church, with its own patriarch-catholicos resident in Tbilisi; and the Armenian Church, with its patriarch-catholicos resident in Echmiadzin, head of all dissident Armenians. Also listed are Protestant sects such as the Baptists and Lutherans, among others. The number of Protestants is estimated between 2 and 3 million. Also numerous in the U.S.S.R. are Jews and Muslims.
Even during the period of the "New Religious Policy" (since 1943), anti-religious legislation remains in force; every religion must die, it must be liquidated. In the recently annexed (Catholic) neighboring countries, violent persecution still rages, while within the U.S.S.R. ideological struggle prevails. Anti-religious literature is distributed in millions of copies; however, the masses read it little and prefer the classics, because they feel the emptiness of materialist ideology. As a sign that religious life in general and ecclesiastical life in particular in the U.S.S.R. is not yet extinguished, the fact that in the Russian dissident Church there are still up to 3 million Easter communions. The number of believers, it is true, has been greatly decimated and is sometimes concealed, but it is compensated by heroism. Therefore, the potential for religious life in the U.S.S.R. is not much lower than before the revolution.