BOLSCEVISMO

BOLSHEVISM. — A) Theory and practice of communism in the specific form it assumed and was put into practice in Russia following the October Revolution of 1917.

I. GENERAL NOTIONS

The term b. dates back to the 1st Congress held in 1903 in London by the "Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party," during which the party split into two factions: one with a radical-revolutionary tendency, led by Lenin, and a moderate one, which approached the methods of German social democracy and had as its leaders Martov and Aksel'rod, later joined by Plekhanov. Since in the voting on the most important issues the first faction obtained the majority, its followers were called bolsheviks (from the Russian bol'she = more) and their opponents mensheviks (men'she = less).

The contrast between the two currents grew ever sharper in the following years, until in 1912 the bolsheviks separated from the mensheviks to form an independent party. From October 1917 they became the sole party in Russia. The left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries and the anarchists, considered for a time as allies, were also, after a few years, completely liquidated (for the history of b., v.: COMMUNISM; RUSSIA; U.S.S.R.).

Bolshevism clarified its features as revolutionary Marxism in the struggle waged against Western social democracy of the Second International (v.) and similar Russian movements (economists, legal Marxists, mensheviks, etc.), accused of revisionism and opportunism. This internal struggle within the socialist movement reflects the conflict that plagued Marx’s own thought, in whose writings evolutionism and revolution never fully reconcile. It is therefore no wonder that the currents appeal to the master against one another, each proclaiming itself the only true interpreter. While the evolutionist current, for which socialization should come as a spontaneous fruit of capitalist evolution, prefers to refer to Marx’s and Engels’ later works, bolshevism, preaching the necessity of revolutionary action, returns to the young Marx.

Communism as a revolutionary doctrine found in Russia the most favorable ground. Socialism had long been the dream of the Russian intelligentsia (Herzen, Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, Lavrov). The harshness of the Tsarist police regime, stifling all political and spiritual freedom, contributed to bringing together the various currents of opposition. This resulted in an increase, between 1860 and 1870, of subversive movements and allowed the formation of a revolutionary tradition (Nechaev, Tkachev), along whose path Lenin’s thought and sentiment advanced. Moreover, as rural poverty grew ever more acute due to the extraordinary population increase in the second half of the last century, and since the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 had brought little benefit, the peasants became ripe for revolution. Equally favorable conditions were found by Marxism among factory workers. Low wages, poor working conditions, inadequate labor legislation, and the housing crisis made the situation of Russian workers at the beginning of the 20th century, in many respects, similar to that of English workers at the start of the 19th century. Besides serving as a social doctrine, Marxism also found an open path here as atheistic materialism. Since, in the supporters of the existing social order, ideal and religious considerations were often used to serve far less ideal and spiritual interests, and, as Berdyaev put it, the idealism of theory served as a cloak for the materialism of practice, these new men, these "idealists of the earth," who for their idea were often ready to face exile and death with admirable spirit of sacrifice, declared, in the name of their theoretical materialism, a merciless war on the highest ideas of theoretical idealism and, as a tragic misunderstanding, on religion itself and Christianity. On the other hand, the Russian Church, which, as Vladimir Solovyov said on the occasion of the assassination of the Tsar in 1881, had been internally weakened by the particularism and caesaropapism inherited from Byzantium, was in no position to oppose the march of revolution with a social doctrine responsive to the needs of the times. Finally, one must also take into account the messianic character of Marxism, which found a parallel in the Russian Orthodox messianism that had been alive in the consciousness of the Russians for centuries (Moscow = the Third Rome).

Bolshevism thus presents itself essentially as revolutionary Marxist communism, and within these limits it is clearly defined in theory and practice.

II. THEORY

As regards theory, b. rests on the basis of dialectical-historical materialism (v.), and combats with extreme intransigence any attempt to revise Marxism or to place the socio-economic doctrine on other philosophical foundations, as various Marxists have sought to do (neo-Kantianism, empirio-criticism).

"In this philosophy of Marxism — says Lenin — which has the consistency of a single piece of steel, none of the fundamental premises, none of its essential parts can be detached without sacrificing objective truth" (Works, XIII, p. 267).

And Stalin: "Of all the Party’s ideological heritage, the most important and valuable is its ideological legacy, its essential line, its revolutionary perspective" (in Bolshevik [1947, no. 14], p. 40). This ideological legacy, whose "granite foundation" is dialectical materialism, is defended by the Party "as the apple of its eye" (M. Leonov, ibid., p. 40). When therefore in non-Russian communist circles it is openly declared that communism is not necessarily bound to dialectical materialism, this is from the Soviet point of view either a "deviation," a heresy, or a temporary concession made for tactical reasons.

Theory and practice must form an indissoluble unity. "Theory becomes purposeless if it is not linked to revolutionary practice, just as practice becomes blind if it does not illuminate its path with revolutionary theory" (J. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, Moscow 1946, p. 22; this edition is printed in Italian in Moscow). Above all, theory, especially philosophy, has for bolshevik tactics the value of a necessary means for the scientific prediction of the development of society in the future, and this gives the workers’ movement "security, ability to orient itself, and understanding of the intimate connection of surrounding events" (loc. cit., p. 22). That Lenin, and bolshevism in his footsteps, held fast to dialectical materialism (even against certain simplistic tendencies toward a vulgar form of mechanistic materialism: among the Russians in particular Minin, Stepanov, Bukharin), is due not only to veneration for the masters (Marx, Engels) but also to a certain inner elective affinity, since Lenin saw in the movement of dialectical antitheses precisely the philosophical foundation of the necessity of revolution. (For individual doctrines v.: COMMUNISM; DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM; HISTORICAL MATERIALISM).

### III. ECONOMY
It is in the field of economics that Bolshevism has its most solid ground. It is the field in which, in the proper sense of the materialist-historical conception of Marxism, the most decisive battles of the struggle for a better future must be fought (v. MATERIALISMO STORICO). Fundamental and at the base of all Marx’s thought is the idea that man’s first activity is not knowing and thinking, but “praxis,” his ability to operate on nature, adapting it to his needs in order to derive the means for his existence. On this point, he never tires of repeating that man is not alone, does not live isolated from others, but enters into social relations with them. The movement of society toward a better future is therefore not guided by religious, philosophical, or other kinds of ideas. Even though political and ideological factors have their importance in the struggle it wages to reach its goal—one of the characteristic traits of the voluntarism proper to Leninist doctrine is precisely to emphasize these factors—everything ultimately depends on the economic base of society.

Entirely in the sense of this premise, Soviet economic policy has moved, from the very first year of the Revolution, imbued as it was with the maximalism characteristic of the Russian soul, which, once it grasps an idea, wants to realize it immediately to the fullest extent. In the first period, known as “war communism,” it was believed possible to leap directly into the realm of communism and the complete socialization of the economy, and thus of society: abolition of private property and industry, elimination of private trade, substitution of a natural economy for a monetary one, the State as the sole producer and distributor of goods. The consequences were: the cessation of individual initiative, an enormous increase in bureaucracy, the resistance of the peasants, and the famine of 1921–22 (according to data from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, the victims numbered five million). This forced Lenin to introduce the “New Economic Policy” (NEP, 1922). It entailed: a return to a monetary system, the protection of small agricultural property, freedom for small-scale internal trade, and the state monopoly on foreign trade, along with the readmission of foreign private capital. The idea of complete socialization was not abandoned; it was merely acknowledged that the implementation of the theory had to be pursued with greater adherence to reality. As soon as the country, thanks to the NEP, had recovered from the wounds of external and internal war and of war communism, Stalin believed he could resume and continue the work of socialization through industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture.

The “Five-Year Plans” were meant to serve the first of these two objectives; they are something more than an effort to rationalize the economy. The solemn pathos with which they were announced by the government and extolled by propaganda, and the enthusiasm with which they were doubtless received by many, especially the young, the mystique of technology that enveloped them, showed that they had struck a “religious” chord in the popular soul. It was believed that the utopian dream had been realized, that through this “praxis” (already conceived by Marx as the extension of philosophy into life) the “truth” (in the sense of the Russian word *pravda* = truth-justice) had finally been attained, that reality itself had been seized in the realization of true life.

Immediately after the introduction of the Five-Year Plans (the first began in 1928 and was completed a few months early on December 31, 1932), Stalin turned to the socialization of agriculture, that is—contrary to the opinion of Bukharin, who believed that after the socialization of industry the peasants would gradually move toward socialism of their own accord—to the violent collectivization of the land. It immediately met with the stubborn resistance of the peasants, but this was brutally crushed by the government through the “revolution from above” and the “organized famine.”

With the industrialization of the country and the collectivization of agriculture, Russia reached the first stage of communism, socialism. For the distribution of labor and goods, the formula used is: “from each according to his ability, to each according to his work,” a formula enshrined in Article 12 of the Stalinist constitution. The task of socialization is now to achieve that abundance of goods which is the prerequisite for the second and definitive stage of perfect communism, for which the formula applies: “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.” After the economic regression caused by the destruction of the Second World War, all efforts are once again directed toward the accumulation of the wealth necessary to reach communism.

### IV. POLITICS
If Bolshevism, as Marxism, sees economics as the decisive factor in the struggle for the transformation of society, it does not, however, await this transformation as a passive product of economic progress. In contrast to various other Marxist currents, it insists with particular force on the necessity of conscious struggle to achieve the goal. Hence, the doctrine of revolution returns to the center of the doctrine of society (historical materialism).

1. Proletariat and Peasants
Bolshevism, however, aims to be more than a mere repetition of the revolutionary Marxism of the last century. It arises and develops at another stage in the evolution of capitalism, that of monopoly capitalism, imperialism, and the proletarian revolution. Its first problem is therefore the conquest of political power by the proletariat and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Bolshevism is “the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, and the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular” (Stalin, in *Piccola Enciclopedia Sovietica* [in Russian], I, Moscow 1928, col. 793). The concrete realization of this goal in the special historical environment of Russia gave Bolshevism its particular imprint. Since the proletariat in Russia was still relatively small, it had to seek an ally in its struggle for the conquest of power. The choice of this ally was one of the points of contention between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. While the latter sought an alliance with the bourgeoisie, the Bolsheviks, on the contrary, believed that the proletariat, in order to achieve hegemony in the revolution, had to unite with the peasants. The promise of the confiscation of large landed estates and the liquidation of the First World War, which was particularly hated by the rural population, allowed the Bolsheviks to draw the peasants into the revolution.

The problem of the alliance with the peasants was also a source of contention within the party itself after the conquest of power. Trotsky (v.) believed that socialism could not be realized in a single country, still less in a predominantly agricultural one, and did not believe in the possibility of winning the peasant masses over to the idea of agricultural socialization. Convinced that sooner or later a clash with them would be inevitable, he therefore held that thought and action should immediately be turned toward world revolution.

For Stalin, in contrast, before thinking of world revolution, it was necessary to establish socialism in Russia, and for this purpose he believed that alongside the socialization of industry, the socialization of land should also be pursued. In the execution of this plan, he came into conflict with Bukharin (v.) and his group, who advocated the peaceful conversion of peasants to socialism.

Against both Trotsky’s “left deviation” and Bukharin’s “right deviation,” the Party under Stalin’s leadership waged a “war on two fronts” throughout the first half of the 1930s.

2. State

The idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat also dominates Soviet doctrine on the State. As in general Marxism, so too in Bolshevism the State is not seen as the necessary organization of society, but only as an instrument created by the dominant class to keep the others in subjection. In the future communist society, in which class distinctions will no longer exist, there will be no State at all. The State is therefore condemned to wither away. Until that day, however, it must be in the hands of the proletariat as the means for eliminating classes. Under communism, the State is “the proletariat organized as the ruling class.” The dictatorship of the proletariat, whose purpose is to abolish the State, has in practice, contrary to Lenin’s prediction in his work *The State and Revolution* (Opere, XXI, p. 432), led instead to an even more formidable strengthening of State power. “The highest development of State power for the purpose of preparing the conditions for the abolition of State power: that is the Marxist formula” (Stalin, *Questions of Leninism*, 9th Russian ed., Moscow 1933, p. 566). The means for implementing the dictatorship of the proletariat consists of the soviets, formed by members chosen through general elections (according to the Stalinist Constitution of 1936, not even social origin is an obstacle to the exercise of active or passive suffrage), equally direct and secret.

3. Party

In fact, political direction is determined not by the soviets but by the Party. The doctrine of the Party forms one of the central and characteristic points of Bolshevik theory. It was outlined by Lenin during his struggle against the Mensheviks. Of particular importance in this regard is his book *What Is to Be Done?* (1902), in which he explicitly aligns himself with the conspiratorial and revolutionary tradition of Russia. According to Lenin, the Party is the vanguard of the proletariat and comprises the most conscious and active elements, who are held under iron discipline and required to show absolute obedience. Their numbers are deliberately limited, yet they are bound by a thousand threads to the life of the masses. They must participate in all expressions of workers’ life and leadership: in trade unions, cooperatives, soviets, cultural institutions, and so on. Control over the State is exercised by the Party without resorting to violence, in such a way that the most important posts in government and administration are filled by Party members. In this way, the dictatorship of the proletariat is exercised not by the proletariat itself but by the Party, and within the Party by a relatively small group of leaders who form a kind of new “nobility.” When, therefore, Bolshevism gives its own form of regime the name of democracy, this is possible only because Lenin has given the concept a new content. It would be absurd, he argues, for the greatest revolution in the world to unfold within the framework of the old bourgeois democracy, “without the creation of new forms of democracy” (Opere, XXIV, p. 12). And according to Lenin, Soviet democracy differs from bourgeois democracy not only in form but also in content. “The proletariat needs the destruction of classes: that is the real content of proletarian democracy” (ibid., p. 398). It is clear from this that it has nothing in common with the democracy that bears the name.

4. World Revolution; National and Colonial Question

Stalin’s tactic of initially limiting the establishment and consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat to a single country in no way entails a renunciation of the ultimate goal of world revolution. The Bolshevik is in any case driven toward this goal by the very nature of the end he pursues: the establishment of a classless and stateless society, which is possible only through a transformation of the entire world. From the outset, Comintern (v.) was created to achieve this end, and more recently (after the Second World War) Cominform (v.). Since Bolshevism is entirely dependent on the policy of world revolution, it has been compelled to pay particular attention to the national and colonial question.

The Bolshevik position on the national question is analogous to its stance on the State: to aim at the maximum flourishing of national cultures in the present under the dictatorship of the proletariat, with a view to their future fusion into a common culture with a single common language. The principal merit in the development of a Bolshevik doctrine on the national question belongs to Stalin.

The right of self-determination granted by Bolshevism to nationalities goes so far that the Stalinist Constitution even sanctions for each of the republics of the Union “the right to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” That this right cannot be put into practice is ensured in another way. Since Russia, as the focal point of world revolution, cannot maintain itself without the resources provided by the border regions rich in raw materials, and since these regions, without the political and military support of Russia, would fall victim to imperialist aggression, the interests of the working masses lead to the conclusion that any desire for secession can be determined by commissars to be an act not of counter-revolution but automatically falls under Article 133 of the Constitution as “damage caused to the military power of the State,” and is therefore punished as treason. The right to secede from the Soviet Union is thus theoretically deferred to world revolution and in practice to Greek chains.

On the colonial question, Bolshevism starts from the principle that the imperialist expansion of capitalist powers represents the final stage in the evolution of capitalism. “Imperialism (the highest form of capitalism) cannot exist without the political and economic subjugation of nations not yet fully emancipated and of colonies” (Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* [in Russian], 1938, p. 84). On the other hand, “nations not yet fully emancipated and colonies cannot be liberated without the overthrow of capitalist power” (ibid.). Consequently, in pursuit of the goal of world revolution, Bolshevism has devoted particular—and one might say primary—attention to the colonial problem and to supporting all movements for national independence. In this regard, the decision taken by the Second Congress of the Comintern states: “The destruction of colonial rule and the proletarian revolution in the metropolises will overthrow the capitalist system in Europe... In order to ensure the final success of world revolution, these two forces must act together” (*Great Soviet Encyclopedia* [in Russian], XXXIII, Moscow 1938, col. 426). Current developments in Asia (China and Indochina), in which the fruits of many years of persistent and conscious labor are ripening, may be seen as the best illustration of the effectiveness of this tactic.

V. Culture

The principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat finds its application not only in political doctrine but also in cultural life, in the realm of “ideological superstructures,” and it finds original expression in the demand for the “party spirit” imposed upon every form of spiritual creation, which constitutes the characteristic feature of Soviet culture. What Lenin demanded of the philosopher—that in the evaluation of every event he should place himself “directly and openly from the standpoint of a particular social group” (Opere, I, 2nd ed., p. 276), and precisely that of the proletariat—is today required in Russia of every form of cultural work. This “party spirit” is nothing other than the extreme conclusion that the Russians, with their characteristic logical consistency, have drawn from historical materialism. Just as historical materialism considers the “ideological superstructures” (law, morality, art, science, philosophy, religion) as essentially dependent upon the economic-social “base,” so that their development necessarily follows the development of the economy and society, so too, following Lenin, it has been concluded that the exercise of sound scientific philosophical and, in general, cultural activity is possible only if the philosopher, the scientist, and, one might add, the writer, the musician, the painter, the actor, the director, etc., take their stand on the ground of the proletariat and the party which is its vanguard.

Every cultural creation is therefore essentially tied to politics. The “Central Committee” of the party “presents itself not only as the political-organizational center of the revolutionary movement but also as the theoretical center” (Mitin, Il materialismo dialettico [in Russian], Moscow 1933, p. 347). With particular zeal, the Central Committee has exercised this function as the “theoretical center” of the revolutionary movement, especially after the Second World War. Among those who have distinguished themselves most in these years as theoreticians of Marxist culture and defenders of Soviet spiritual life is Zhdanov. In these years, one has witnessed a whole series of decisive interventions by Zhdanov and the Central Committee in the field of culture: in 1946, the critique of Soviet literature; in 1947, the condemnation of Aleksandrov’s History of Western Philosophy, with a solemn warning to philosophers; in 1948, the famous intervention of the Central Committee in the controversy among biologists, with the condemnation of classical Mendelian and Morganian genetics in favor of the new genetic theories of the two Soviet scientists Michurin and Lysenko; in the same year, the work of the musician Muradeli, The Great Friendship, and all contemporary Soviet music, was subjected to severe criticism. In all these cases, the accusation was always the same: lack of party spirit, manifested in the ignoring of the fundamental principles of Marx and Lenin, in the absence of genuine Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism, in a servile admiration for decadent Western bourgeois culture, etc. In all this, there has increasingly come to light, especially after the victory over Germany, a lively sense of Soviet patriotism and even Russian nationalism, which declares a decisive struggle against every form of “cosmopolitanism.” Just as “national” and “chauvinistic” are not the same thing, so “internationalism” is not equivalent to “cosmopolitanism.”

VI. Religion

While professing in theory an uncompromising materialism; proclaiming the economy as the true reality and the decisive factor in the entire historical process; seeking, in the political sphere, through the dictatorship of the proletariat, to eliminate all bearers of different ideologies, both within the country and—through world revolution—abroad; and subjecting even in the cultural sphere, through the demand for “party spirit,” every free spiritual and creative activity of man to the same dictatorship of the party, it is evident that Bolshevism from the outset had to place itself in irreconcilable opposition to religion.

“Marxism,” writes Lenin, “is materialism. As such, it is no less implacable an enemy of religion than was the materialism of the Encyclopedists of the 18th century, or the materialism of Feuerbach... We must fight religion. This is the abc of all materialism, and therefore also of Marxism” (Opere, XIV, p. 70).

In this struggle against religion, Lenin and Bolshevism attach great importance to correct tactics. Just as all ideologies (science, art, philosophy, morality...) are for Marxism nothing but a reflection of economic and social relations in social consciousness, so too religion is considered a “fantastic reflection,” conditioned by the perverse social relations of a class-divided society. Therefore, according to Lenin, the struggle against religion must first and foremost not be conducted by means of ideological propaganda (in the manner of bourgeois materialists and Enlightenment philosophers), though such propaganda has its usefulness and necessity; nor by police measures (as in Bismarck’s Kulturkampf), which would only strengthen religious sentiment; the principal part in this struggle against religion falls to the transformation of social relations, after which religion will wither away of itself: “Marxism,” Lenin continues, “is not a materialism that stops at the abc. It goes further. It says: one must know how to conduct the struggle against religion, and to do this it is necessary to explain in a materialist way the source of faith and religion among the masses. The struggle against religion must not be limited to abstract and ideological preaching; rather, this struggle must be introduced into the whole of the concrete action of the class movement, which aims to cut the social roots of religion” (Opere, XIV, p. 70).

Thus, while Engels on occasion speaks of religion as a private affair, Lenin insists that this applies only from the standpoint of the state, not of the party: “For the party of socialist proletariat, religion is not a private affair” (Opere, VIII, p. 421). The new religious policy recently adopted in the Soviet Union (v. infra: Attitude toward the Church) appears in this light as nothing other than a new edition of this Engels-Leninist principle.

VIII. CONCLUSION

In order to form a judgment on Bolshevism and to specify what practical attitude Catholics must adopt toward it, one must begin by considering that the economic and social doctrines of Bolshevism are declared inseparable from the philosophy that serves as their premise. A reconciliation between Bolshevism and Catholicism is therefore, in principle, to be excluded. Even if dialectical materialism does not arrive at the complete negation of the activity of the spirit in man and of the formal distinction by which this activity is differentiated from the phenomena of organic and inorganic matter, this activity is nevertheless always regarded as a property of matter. A spirit that subsists independently of matter is thus excluded. With this, the existence of God and that of the human soul as a substantial spiritual principle also fall away, and in this way the entire Christian doctrine. But on a more general plane, man as a person and as an individual is also sacrificed, and this is all the more grave in that these doctrines, considered in their historical origin, are linked to the humanistic idea of the necessity of freeing man from every form of servitude to earthly and celestial powers—a notion that was the starting point of Marx’s speculation. Reduced to mere economic activity, conceived as a primary reality and essentially social in character, and with man’s spiritual personality denied, one arrives at a new servitude of man, the most manifest form of which is precisely found in Soviet society with its dictatorship of the proletariat, transformed into a party dictatorship, and with its demand for the “party spirit” in cultural activity.

The inconciliability of Bolshevism with Catholicism becomes even clearer when it is considered in its historical and spiritual entirety, where it reveals itself as the common product of the crisis of Christianity, both Western and Eastern.

As Marxist atheism, Bolshevism carries within itself the dynamism of a centuries-old apostasy of the Western spirit from God. The Protestant Reformation broke with the Church, the Enlightenment abandoned Christ and the supernatural order of revealed religion founded upon Him, until finally the atheistic materialism of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, grafted by Marx onto the movement he had initiated, arrived at a complete rupture with God Himself.

As a Russian revolutionary movement, Bolshevism is intimately tied to the failure of the Russian Church, separated from the universal Church, to meet the tasks assigned to it by history, with the result that some negative traits of Russian Christianity—owing to its separation from the unity of the Church, and among these its pseudo-messianic anti-Catholicism—have passed into Bolshevism itself. Seen in these terms, the religious significance of Bolshevism reveals itself to be diametrically opposed to the true Church of Christ.

It thus becomes understandable that Bolshevism presents itself in the guise of a pseudo-religion. Dostoevsky had already found the precise word for it: “Our people do not merely become atheists; they believe in atheism as in a religion.” It has often been observed that Bolshevism presents itself as Christianity, indeed as Catholicism, turned upside down. In reality, between the two conceptions there is an entire series of points of contact, but with the sign reversed.

Bolshevism, like Christianity, has four canonical texts: Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin; it establishes a magisterium that it considers infallible, namely the Central Committee, to whose decisions all must submit. These points of contact are found on a purely formal plane and vanish as soon as one moves from form to content. It must nevertheless be noted that in Catholicism every form of totalitarianism is excluded, since in a world conceived as the creature of a personal God, all the various orders of reality retain their relative autonomy. Thus, precisely these points of contact between Catholicism and Bolshevism constitute the best proof of their inconciliability.

The definition of the religious significance of Bolshevism that has been given here must also serve as the starting point for outlining a program of action against II. For Catholics, this cannot involve a return to that economic form which Pius XI condemned as preparatory to communism, namely liberal economy. The first task of the Catholic rather will be to commit all his energies to giving value to Catholic social doctrine, both in the sphere of public life and in that of private life.

But since the very essence of Bolshevism reveals itself as the fruit of the crisis of Christianity, both Western and Eastern, one is led to seek its deepest root in the religious division between East and West. In this regard, one may certainly accept Solovyov’s judgment regarding the Russian Church, which explains its historical weakness by the isolation it inherited from Byzantium. Yet this unfortunate schism between East and West has not only affected the East; for the entire Christian world, it has entailed a weakening and a considerable loss of efficacy in the irradiation of Christian thought and life upon the moral foundations of society. The reunion of the two would therefore result in a considerable increase in the Church’s influence in history—not only in the sense of an external and purely quantitative strengthening of the front of defense against atheism, but also in the sense of an increase in its internal vitality, which would result from the mutual fecundation of Eastern and Western spirit. This is what Pius XII has in view when, in his encyclical Orientales Ecclesias, he expresses the hope for the most abundant fruits from the restoration of full communion between East and West in the one Mystical Body of Christ. The unionist problem thus acquires, in relation to the struggle to overcome the world Bolshevik crisis, a particular importance, since the Bolshevik problem, in its deepest essence, presents itself as a religious problem.

Gustavo A. Wetter

B) THE ATTITUDE OF BOLSHEVISM TOWARD THE CHURCH —

I. The Period of Persecution (1917–1938)

Bolshevism is, in principle, opposed to every religion, which it regards as a remnant of the capitalist age. The Bolshevik party, therefore, upon coming to power, took measures against the Church, depriving it of its material basis of existence, destroying its entire organization, and restricting its activity to the mere practice of worship.

On 23 Jan. 1918 the decree of the separation of Church and State was issued, and from 2 Feb. 1918 the State ceased all its provisions to the Church. In Jan. 1919 the entire ecclesiastical real estate was confiscated; even church buildings were declared State property, though they could be left for ecclesiastical use upon the request of at least 20 faithful. A ministerial circular of 18 Feb. 1920 declared every activity of the episcopal curiae illegitimate. The State did not recognise any central ecclesiastical governing body, but only the isolated communities of the faithful in the parishes. Nor were these granted legal personality, and thus not even the right to own property. These communities and the parish priests had to be registered (decree of 10 Aug. 1922) and were thus placed in the hands of the government. The Church could practise worship, but was forbidden to engage in propaganda. Above all, religious instruction was prohibited for persons under 18 years of age (art. 121 of the Penal Code of 1922). Such instruction for those over 18, according to art. 18 of the decree “on religious associations” of 8 Apr. 1929, could be permitted exclusively in special courses of theology, i.e., in seminaries (until recently non-existent). The aforementioned decree of 8 Apr. 1929, in art. 17, forbids the Church from any social, charitable, or educational activity and any propaganda.

Article 12 of the Stalinist constitution of 1936 does indeed recognise the freedom to practise religious cults, but forbids any religious propaganda.

These are some essential points of the anti-religious legislation of the Soviets. Their practical attitude was open persecution of the Church, though not always with the same intensity. Three periods of persecution of especial violence can be distinguished: from 1922 to 1923, then 1929–30, and finally 1937–38. Numerous bishops and priests were shot, deported, or imprisoned because of their purely religious activity. It is true that in some cases this also involved anti-revolutionary activity. But it is absolutely wrong to explain the Bolsheviks’ measures against ecclesiastics solely as the suppression of counter-revolution. Patriarch Tikhon (elected in 1917) remained absolutely neutral in political matters and condemned the anti-Soviet political activity of the emigrated prelates. He was imprisoned in May 1922 and in prison signed a declaration in which he promised to restrict ecclesiastical activity to the strictly religious sphere.

The vicar of the patriarchate, Metropolitan Sergius, who after the death of Patriarch Tikhon (1925) practically governed the Church, in his proclamation of 29 July 1927 even preached a veritable Soviet patriotism, identifying the interests of the Church with those of the atheist State. Not even this extreme compliance could secure peace for the Church or obtain effective recognition of the central ecclesiastical government by the State. In 1929 a new violent persecution broke out. It was the time of the systematic socialisation of all public life in Russia. In such a system, religion seemed an anachronism. This era also marked the apogee of the activity of the Association of Militant Atheists, founded in 1925, which sought to combat religion by organising atheist museums, reading rooms, anti-religious lectures, etc.

That this was a true religious struggle in the Soviet Union is evident from the fact that the persecution raged especially against the Catholic Church, certainly not suspected of sympathy for the former Tsarist regime. In March 1923, the Catholic bishop Msgr. Cieplak was arrested along with all the Catholic priests of Petrograd. The main charge was the religious instruction given by the accused to children, contrary to Soviet law. Msgr. Cieplak and his vicar general Msgr. Budkiewicz were sentenced to death, others to long terms of imprisonment or forced labour. Msgr. Budkiewicz was in fact executed.

2. The new religious policy of the Soviet government from 1930 onwards.

Threatening war forecasts led the Soviet government to abandon its unpopular religious persecution. At the beginning of 1939 an order was given from above to cease all attempts to suppress religion by force. The Orthodox Church, at the outbreak of the Russo-German war, immediately aligned itself with absolute loyalty alongside the Soviet government. The government began to understand the importance of the Church’s influence in strengthening national unity during the war. Consideration for democratic allies also advised a more conciliatory attitude towards religion. The government then began to return a certain number of churches, permitted the reopening of some monasteries and theological schools for the training of clergy. Offensive anti-religious propaganda ceased, and the Association of Militant Atheists was dissolved. The *Bezbozhnik* (The Godless) suspended its publications.

The Soviet government finally permitted the election of a new patriarch. Metropolitan Sergius, until then locum tenens, was elected patriarch on 8 Sept. 1943. A regular central ecclesiastical government, recognised by the State, could be established; dioceses were reorganised and numerous new bishops appointed. The Russian Council of Jan.–Feb. 1945, which elected as patriarch Alexei (until then Metropolitan of Leningrad) after the death of Sergius, gave the Church a new constitution, adapting the norms of canon law to the Soviet legislation on religious associations. The government, which until then had stripped the Church of its property, began to assist it materially, for example by providing all the necessary means of transport and sustenance for the prelates who attended the council.

But all this does not mean that the attitude of the Soviet government towards religion has fundamentally changed. True religious freedom, as we understand it, cannot even now be spoken of in Russia. The Church remains, as before, restricted to the mere exercise of worship. Restrictive legislation remains in force. The Stalinist constitution, with its article 124 which forbids any religious propaganda, remains an unshakable fundamental law, as the head of the Soviet for Church Affairs declared in a speech to the Council of 1945. The prohibition of religious instruction for children remains in force, as do the restrictive norms of the decree of 8 Apr. 1929. The little more freedom that was granted, the “Orthodox” Church has had to pay for with its subservience to an atheist State which exploits it as a docile instrument for its internal and external policy. The dependence of the Church on the State was permanently fixed by the Statute accepted at the Council of 1945. The Church openly supports the social system of communism. In foreign policy it aids the expansionist plans of the Soviet government by seeking to unite all “Orthodox” Churches under its hegemony.

In recent times (1947–48) a recrudescence of anti-religious propaganda can be noted. From the official side, insistence is again placed on the necessity for a communist to be an atheist. The new religious policy is a policy and nothing more, and could be abandoned, if it seemed good to the Soviets, as was already the case with Lenin’s NEP (v. COMMUNISM).