Bolshevism

BOLSHEVISM. - A) Theory and practice of communism in the specific form it assumed and implemented in Russia following the October 1917 Revolution.

I. GENERAL NOTIONS

The term bolshevism dates back to the II Congress held in 1903 in London by the "Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party," during which the party split into two factions: one with a radical-revolutionary tendency, led by Lenin, and a moderate one, which adhered to the methods of German social democracy and had its leaders in Martov and Aksel'rod, later joined by Plechanov. As in the voting on the most important issues the first faction obtained the majority, its followers were called bolsheviks (from the Russian bol'še = more) and their adversaries mensheviks (men'še = less).

The contrast between the two currents grew increasingly acute in the following years until, in 1912, the Bolsheviks separated from the Mensheviks to form an independent party. From October 1917 onward, they have been the sole party in Russia. The left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries and the anarchists, briefly considered as allies, were also entirely liquidated after a few years (for the history of Bolshevism, v.: COMUNISMO; RUSSIA; U.R.S.S.).

Bolshevism clarified its features as revolutionary Marxism in the struggle waged against Western International (v.) and analogous Russian movements (economists, "legal Marxists," Mensheviks, etc.), accused of revisionism and opportunism. This internal struggle within the socialist movement reflects the conflict that tormented Marx's own thought, in whose writings evolutionism and revolution never fully reconcile. It is therefore no surprise that the currents appeal to the master against one another, each proclaiming itself his sole and true interpreter. While the evolutionist current, for which socialization should come as a spontaneous fruit of capitalist evolution, refers primarily to the later works of Marx and Engels, Bolshevism, preaching the necessity of revolutionary action, instead harks back more to the young Marx.

Communism as a revolutionary doctrine found the most favorable terrain in Russia. Socialism had already been the dream of the Russian intelligentsia for many years (Herzen, Belinskij, Černyševskij, Lavrov). The harshness of the Tsarist police regime, stifling all freedom of political and spiritual movement, had contributed to bringing the various currents of opposition closer together. This had the consequence of increasing subversive uprisings between 1860 and 1870 and allowing the formation of a revolutionary tradition (Nečev, Tkačev), in whose footsteps Lenin's thought and sentiment moved. Moreover, as the misery of the countryside became increasingly felt, a consequence of the extraordinary population growth in the second half of the last century, and the abolition of serfdom in 1861 having brought little benefit, the peasants became ripe for revolution. Marxism found an equally favorable situation among factory workers. Low wages, poor working conditions, insufficient labor protection by the relevant legislation, and the housing crisis made the situation of Russian workers at the beginning of the 20th century, in many respects, similar to that of English workers at the beginning of the 19th. In addition to being a social doctrine, Marxism also found the way open as atheistic materialism. Since, in fact, among the supporters of the existing social order, ideal and religious considerations were often used in the service of far less ideal and spiritual interests, and, to use Berdjaev's words, the idealism of theory served as a cloak for the materialism of practice, these new men, these "ideals of the earth," who for their idea were often ready to face exile and death with admirable spirit of sacrifice, declared, in the name of their theoretical materialism, a ruthless war on the highest ideas of theoretical idealism, and, as a result of a tragic misunderstanding, on religion itself and Christianity. On the other hand, the Russian Church, which, as Vladimir Solov'ev said on the occasion of the Tsar's assassination in 1881, was internally weakened due to the particularism and Caesaropapism inherited from Byzantium, was not at all capable of opposing the march of revolution with a social doctrine that responded to the needs of the times. Finally, one must also consider the messianic character of Marxism, which found a parallel in the Russian-Orthodox messianism that had been alive in the consciousness of Russians for centuries (Moscow = the third Rome).

Bolshevism thus presents itself essentially as revolutionary Marxist communism, and within these limits, it is clearly defined in theory and practice.

II. THEORY

As regards theory, Bolshevism rests materialism (v.), and combats with extreme intransigence any attempt to revise Marxism or to place the socio-economic doctrine on other philosophical foundations, as various Marxists have sought to do (neo-Kantianism, empiriocriticism).

"In this philosophy of Marxism — says Lenin — which has the solidity of a single piece of steel, none of the fundamental premises, none of its essential parts can be detached without sacrificing objective truth" (Works, XIII, p. 267).

And Stalin: "Of all the complex heritage of our party, the most important and precious legacy is the ideological heritage, its essential line, its revolutionary perspective" (in Bol'lenik [1947, no. 14], p. 40). This ideological heritage, whose "granite foundation" is constituted by dialectical materialism, is defended by the party "as the apple of its eye" (M. Leonov, ibid., p. 40). When, therefore,

in non-Russian communist circles it is declared that communism is not necessarily tied to dialectical materialism, this is, from the Soviet point of view, either a "deviation," a heresy, or a temporary concession made for tactical reasons.

Theory and practice must form an indissoluble unity. "Theory becomes devoid of object if it is not linked to revolutionary practice, just as practice becomes blind if it does not illuminate its path with revolutionary theory" (J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, Moscow 1946, p. 22; this edition is printed in Moscow in Italian). Above all, theory, especially philosophy, holds for Bolshevik tactics the value of a necessary means for the scientific prediction of society's future development, and this gives the workers' movement "confidence, orientation capacity, and understanding of the intimate connection of surrounding events" (id., loc. cit., p. 22). That Lenin, and Bolshevism in his wake, held firmly to dialectical materialism (even against certain simplistic tendencies toward a vulgar form of mechanistic materialism: among Russians, particularly Minin, Stepanov, Bucharin), is due not only to veneration for the masters (Marx, Engels), but also to a certain intimate elective affinity, since Lenin saw precisely in the movement of dialectical antitheses the philosophical foundation of the necessity of revolution. (For individual doctrines v.: COMUNISMO; MATERIALISMO DIALETTICO; MATERIALISMO STORICO).

III. ECONOMY

It is in the field of economics that Bolshevism finds the ground of its own consistency. This is the domain in which, in the proper sense of the materialist-historical conception of Marxism, the most decisive battles of the struggle for a better future must be fought (v. MATERIALISMO STORICO). Fundamental and at the basis of all Marx’s thought is the idea that man’s primary activity is not knowing and thinking, but "praxis," his ability to act upon nature, adapting it to his needs in order to derive the means for his existence. In this regard, he never fails to repeat that man is not alone, does not live isolated from others, but enters into social relations with them. The movement of society toward a better future is therefore not guided by religious, philosophical, or other kinds of ideas. Even if, in the struggle it wages to achieve its goal, political and ideological factors have their importance—one of the characteristic traits of the voluntarism proper to Leninist doctrine is precisely to emphasize these factors—everything ultimately depends on the economic base of society.

Entirely in the spirit of this premise, Soviet economic policy has moved since the first year of the Revolution, to which the maximalism characteristic of the Russian soul—once it grasps an idea, it seeks to realize it immediately to the fullest extent—has given a particular imprint. In the first period, that of so-called War Communism, it was believed possible to leap immediately into the realm of communism and the complete socialization of the economy, and thus of society: abolition of private property and industry, elimination of private commerce, replacement of the monetary economy with a natural economy, the State as the sole producer and distributor of goods. The consequences were: the cessation of individual initiative, an immense increase in bureaucracy, resistance from the peasants, and the famine of 1921-22 (according to data from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, the victims amounted to 5 million). This forced Lenin to introduce the "New Economic Policy" (NEP, 1922). It entailed: a return to the monetary system, the protection of small agricultural property, freedom of small-scale internal commerce and the state monopoly on foreign trade, and the renewed admission of foreign private capital. The idea of integral socialization was not abandoned for this reason: it was merely acknowledged that the implementation of the theory had to be carried out with greater adherence to reality. As soon as the country, thanks to the NEP, had recovered from the wounds of external and internal war and War Communism, Stalin believed he could resume and continue the work of socialization through industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture. To achieve the first of these two goals, the "Five-Year Plans" were to serve, which are more than just an effort to rationalize the economy. The solemn pathos with which they were announced by the government and exalted by propaganda, and the enthusiasm with which they were undoubtedly received by many, especially the young, the mystique of technology by which they were imbued, show that they had struck the "religious" chords of the popular soul. It was believed that the utopian dream was being realized, that through this "praxis" (which Marx already conceived as the extension of philosophy into life) the "truth" (in the sense of the Russian word pravda = truth-justice) would finally be attained, that with true reality the realization of true life would be grasped.

Immediately after the introduction of the Five-Year Plans (the first began in 1928 and was concluded a few months early on December 31, 1932), Stalin turned to the socialization of agriculture, that is—contrary to Bukharin’s opinion, who believed that after the socialization of industry the peasants would gradually move toward socialism on their own—to the violent collectivization of the land. This immediately encountered the stubborn resistance of the peasants, but it was broken by the government in a brutal manner through the "revolution from above" and "organized famine."

With the industrialization of the country and the collectivization of agriculture, Russia reached the first stage of communism, socialism. For the distribution of labor and goods, the formula is used: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work," a formula sanctioned by Article 12 of the Stalinist constitution. The task of socialization is now to achieve that abundance of goods which is the premise for the second and definitive stage of perfect communism, for which the formula holds: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." After the economic regression caused by the destruction of the Second World War, all efforts are once again directed toward accumulating the wealth that is the necessary condition for reaching communism.

IV. POLITICS

If Bolshevism, as Marxism, sees in economics the decisive factor in the struggle for the transformation of society, it does not, however, await this transformation as a passive product of economic progress. In contrast with various other Marxist currents, it insists particularly on the necessity of a conscious struggle to achieve its goal. Hence, the doctrine of revolution returns to the very center of the doctrine of society (historical materialism).

1. Proletariat and Peasants. — Bolshevism, however, aims to be more than a mere repetition of the revolutionary Marxism of the last century. It arises and develops in a different stage of capitalist evolution, that of monopoly capitalism, imperialism, and the revolution of the proletariat. Its first problem, therefore, is the conquest of political power by the proletariat and the dictatorship of the same. Bolshevism is « the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, and the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular » (Stalin, in Small Soviet Encyclopedia [in Russian], I, Moscow 1928, col. 793). The concrete realization of this goal in the specific historical context of Russia gave Bolshevism its particular character. Since the proletariat in Russia was still relatively small, it had to seek an ally in the struggle for power. The choice of this ally was one of the points of contention between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. While the latter sought an alliance with the bourgeoisie, the Bolsheviks, on the contrary, believed that the proletariat, to achieve hegemony in the revolution, had to unite with the peasants. The promise of confiscating large landholdings and ending the First World War, particularly unpopular among the rural population, allowed the Bolsheviks to draw the peasants into the revolution.

The problem of the alliance with the peasants was also a source of conflict within the party itself after the seizure of power. Trotzki (v.) believed that socialism could not be realized in a single country, even less so in a predominantly agricultural economy, nor did he believe in the possibility of winning the peasant masses over to the idea of agricultural socialization. Convinced that a clash with them was inevitable sooner or later, he argued that efforts and attention should immediately turn to world revolution.

For Stalin, on the contrary, before thinking of world revolution, it was necessary to establish socialism in Russia, and to this end, he believed that alongside the socialization of industry, the socialization of land should also be achieved. In implementing this plan, BACHIARIO (v.) and his group, who advocated the peaceful conversion of peasants to socialism.

Against the « left deviation » of Trotzki and the « right deviation » of Bucharin, the party, under Stalin’s leadership, waged a « war on two fronts » during the first half of the 1930s.

2. State. — The idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat also dominates Soviet doctrine on the State. Like Marxism in general, Bolshevism sees the State not as the necessary organization of society, but merely as an instrument created by the dominant class to subjugate the others. In the future society envisioned by communism, there will be no class distinctions and therefore no State. The State is thus condemned to die. But until that day, it must be in the hands of the proletariat as the means to eliminate classes. Under communism, the State is « the proletariat organized as the ruling class ». The dictatorship of the proletariat, which aims to abolish the State, led, however, in practice—contrary to what Lenin had predicted in his work The State and Revolution (Works, XXI, p. 432)—to an even more formidable strengthening of State power. « The highest development of State power, with the aim of preparing the conditions for the abolition of State power: this is the Marxist formula » (Stalin, Questions of Leninism, 9th Russian ed., Moscow 1933, p. 566). The means for implementing the dictatorship of the proletariat is constituted by the councils (soviets), formed by members elected through universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage (according to the Stalinist constitution of 1936, not even social origin is an obstacle to the exercise of active and passive voting rights).

3. Party. — In reality, political direction is determined not by the Soviets but by the Party. The doctrine of the Party is one of the central and characteristic points of Bolshevik theory. It was outlined by Lenin during his struggle against the Mensheviks. Important in this regard is his book What Is to Be Done? (1902), where he explicitly draws on the Russian conspiratorial and revolutionary tradition. According to Lenin, the Party is the vanguard of the proletariat and comprises the most conscious and active elements, who are kept under strict discipline and required to show absolute obedience. Their number is deliberately limited, yet they are connected by a thousand threads to the life of the masses. They must participate in all manifestations of workers' lives and guide them: in trade unions, cooperatives, soviets, cultural institutions, etc. Control over the State is exercised by the Party without violence, in such a way that the most important positions in government and administration are filled by Party members. Thus, the dictatorship of the proletariat is exercised not by the proletariat itself but by the Party, and within it by a relatively small group of leaders, who form a kind of new « nobility ». When, therefore, Bolshevism calls its form of regime democracy, this is possible only because Lenin gave the concept

a new content. It would be absurd, he asserts, for the greatest revolution in the world to take place within the framework of the old bourgeois democracy, « without the creation of new forms of democracy » (Works, XXIV, p. 12). And not only in form does Soviet democracy differ, according to Lenin, from bourgeois democracy, but also in content. « The proletariat needs the destruction of classes: this is the real content of proletarian democracy » (ibid., p. 398). It is clear from this that it has nothing in common with what the name suggests.

4. World Revolution; National and Colonial Question. — Stalin’s tactic of initially limiting the establishment and consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat to a single country does not, however, imply any renunciation of the ultimate goal of world revolution. Bolshevism is inherently driven toward this goal by the very nature of its aim, which is the establishment of a classless and stateless society, possible only through a transformation of the entire world. For the concrete realization of this goal, Comintern (v.) was initially created, and more recently (after the Second World War) Cominform (v.). In connection with the politics of world revolution, Bolshevism has been compelled to pay particular attention to the national and colonial question.

Bolshevism’s position on the national question is analogous to its stance toward the State: it aims for the greatest flourishing of national cultures in the present moment under the dictatorship of the proletariat, while keeping in view the future fusion of national cultures into a common culture, with a single common language. The principal merit in elaborating a Bolshevik doctrine on the national question belongs to Stalin.

The right to self-determination granted by Bolshevism to nationalities extends to the point that the Stalinist constitution enshrines for each of the Union's republics even "the right to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." That this right cannot be put into practice is ensured by other means. Since Russia, the hearth of the world revolution, cannot sustain itself without the resources provided by the border regions rich in raw materials, and since, on the other hand, these regions, without Russia's political and military support, would become victims of imperialist aggression, the interests of the working masses lead to the consequence that the desire for secession may, at certain moments, be considered a counter-revolutionary act and thus automatically fall under the case contemplated by Article 133 of the Constitution, namely "harm caused to the military power of the State," and therefore be punished as high treason. The right to secede from the Soviet Union is thus theoretically deferred to the world revolution, practically to the Greek calends.

On the colonial question, Bolshevism starts from the principle that the imperialist expansion of capitalist powers represents the final stage in the evolution of capitalism. "Imperialism (the highest form of capitalism) cannot exist without the political and economic subjugation of nations not yet in full possession of their rights and of the colonies" (Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question [in Russian], 1938, p. 84). On the other hand, "nations not yet in full possession of their rights and the colonies cannot be liberated without the overthrow of the power of capital" (id., loc. cit.). Consequently, in pursuing the goal of world revolution, Bolshevism has devoted particular—if not its principal—attention to the colonial problem and to supporting all movements for national independence. In this regard, the decision taken by the Second Congress of the Comintern states: "The annihilation of colonial domination and the proletarian revolution in the metropolises will overthrow the capitalist system in Europe... To ensure the final success of the world revolution, it is necessary that these two forces operate together" (Great Soviet Encyclopedia [in Russian], XXXIII, Moscow 1938, col. 426). Current events in Asia (China and Indochina), in which the fruits of many years of persistent and conscious labor are ripening, may be considered the best illustration of the effectiveness of this tactic.

V. CULTURE

The principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat finds its application not only in political doctrine but also in cultural life, in the realm of "ideological superstructures," and finds an original expression in the demand for the "party spirit" imposed on every form of spiritual creation, which constitutes the characteristic feature of Soviet culture. What Lenin demanded of the philosopher—that in "the evaluation of every event" he should place himself "directly and openly from the standpoint of a specific social group" (Works, I, 2nd ed., p. 276), namely that of the proletariat—is today required in Russia of every form of cultural work. This "party spirit" is nothing other than the extreme conclusion that the Russians, with the consistency proper to them, have drawn from historical materialism. Just as historical materialism considers "ideological superstructures" (law, morality, art, science, philosophy, religion) essentially dependent on the economic-social "base," such that their development necessarily follows the development of the economy and society, so Bolshevism after Lenin has deduced that the practice of a sound philosophical, scientific, and, in general, cultural activity is possible only if the philosopher, the scientist, and—one may add—the writer, the musician, the painter, the actor, the director, etc., stand on the ground of the proletariat and of the party that is its vanguard.

Every cultural creation is therefore essentially tied to politics. The "Central Committee" of the party "presents itself not only as the political-organizational center of the revolutionary movement but also as its theoretical center" (Mitin, Dialectical Materialism [in Russian], Moscow 1933, p. 247). With particular zeal, the Central Committee has exercised this function as the "theoretical center" of the revolutionary movement, especially after the Second World War. As the theorist of Marxist culture and defender of Soviet spiritual life, Zdanov has distinguished himself above all others. In these years, a whole series of decisive interventions by Zdanov and the Central Committee in the cultural field has been witnessed: in 1946, the critique of Soviet literature; in 1947, the condemnation of Aleksandrov’s History of Philosophy in Western Europe, with a solemn warning to philosophers; in 1948, the famous intervention of the Central Committee in the controversy among biologists, with the condemnation of the classical genetics of Mendel and Morgan in favor of the new genetic theories of the two Soviet scientists Michurin and Lysenko; in the same year, the work of the musician Muradeli, The Great Friendship, and all contemporary Soviet music were subjected to the harshest criticism. In all these cases, the accusation was always the same: a lack of the party spirit, which manifests itself in ignoring the fundamental principles of Marx and Lenin, in the absence of true Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism, in a servile admiration of the decadent bourgeois Western culture, etc. Throughout all this, an increasingly vivid sense of Soviet patriotism and even Russian nationalism has come to light, especially after the victory over Germany, declaring a decisive struggle against every "cosmopolitanism." Just as "national" and "chauvinistic" are not the same thing, so "internationalism" is not equivalent to "cosmopolitanism."

VI. RELIGION

Professing in theory an intransigent materialism; proclaiming economics as the true reality and the decisive factor for the entire historical process; seeking, in the political sphere, through the dictatorship of the proletariat, to eliminate all bearers of differing ideologies, both within the country and — through world revolution — abroad; subjecting even in the cultural sphere, with the demand for the "party spirit," every free creative spiritual activity of man to the same party dictatorship, it is evident that Bolshevism had to position itself from the outset in irreconcilable opposition to religion.

"Marxism — writes Lenin — is materialism. As such, it is no less implacable an enemy of religion than was the materialism of the eighteenth-century Encyclopédistes or the materialism of Feuerbach... We must combat religion. This is the ABC of all materialism, and thus also of Marxism" (Opere, XIV, p. 70).

In this struggle waged against religion, Lenin and Bolshevism attach great importance to the correct tactics. Like all ideologies (science, art, philosophy, morality...), religion for Marxism is nothing but a reflection of economic and social relations in social consciousness; as for religion, it is considered a "fantastic reflection," conditioned by the perverse social relations of a class-divided society. Therefore, according to Lenin, the struggle against religion must be conducted primarily not through ideological propaganda (in the manner of bourgeois materialists and Enlightenment philosophers), though such propaganda also has its utility and necessity; nor through police measures (in the manner of Bismarck's Kulturkampf), which would only strengthen religious sentiment. The principal role in this struggle against religion belongs to the transformation of social relations, after which religion will wither away on its own: "Marxism — Lenin continues — is not a materialism that stops at the ABC. It goes further. It says: one must know how to wage the struggle against religion, and for this it is necessary to explain in a materialist manner the source of faith and religion among the masses. The struggle against religion must not be limited to abstract and ideological preaching; rather, this struggle must be incorporated into the concrete action of the class movement, which aims to sever the social roots of religion" (Opere, XIV, p. 70).

Thus, while Engels on occasion speaks of religion as a private matter, Lenin insists that this applies only from the state's point of view, not the party's: "For the party of the socialist proletariat, religion is not a private matter" (Opere, VIII, p. 421). The new religious policy recently adopted in the Soviet Union (v. Church*) appears, in this light, as nothing more than a new edition of this Engels-Leninist principle.

VII. CONCLUSION

To formulate a judgment on Bolshevism and to determine the practical stance that Catholics must adopt toward it, one must begin by considering that the economic-social doctrines of Bolshevism are declared inseparable from the philosophy that serves as their premise. A reconciliation between Bolshevism and Catholicism is therefore, in principle, to be excluded. While dialectical materialism does not arrive at the complete negation of the activity of the spirit in man and of the formal difference by which it is distinguished from the phenomena of organic and inorganic matter, this activity is nonetheless always regarded as a property of matter. A spirit that exists independently of matter is thus excluded. With this, the existence of God and that of the human soul as a substantial spiritual principle also fall, and consequently, the entire Christian doctrine. But on a more general level, man as a person and individual is also sacrificed, and this is all the more grave given that these doctrines, considered in their historical origin, are linked to the humanistic idea of the necessity of liberating man from every form of servitude to earthly and celestial powers—an idea that was the starting point of Marx’s speculation. By reducing man to pure economic activity, conceived as a primary reality with an essentially social character, and by denying his spiritual personality, a new form of enslavement of man has been reached, the most manifest form of which is precisely found in Soviet society with its dictatorship of the proletariat, transformed into a party dictatorship, and with its demand for the "party spirit" in cultural activity.

The incompatibility of Bolshevism with Catholicism becomes even clearer when we consider it in its historical and spiritual entirety, where it reveals itself as the common product of the crisis of Christianity, both Western and Eastern.

As Marxist atheism, it carries within itself the dynamism of a centuries-long apostasy of the Western spirit from God. The Protestant Reformation broke with the Church, the Enlightenment abandoned Christ and the supernatural order of revealed positive religion, which is founded upon His person, until finally the atheistic materialism of the late 18th and 19th centuries, grafted by Marx onto the movement he unleashed, led to a complete rupture with God Himself.

As a Russian revolutionary movement, Bolshevism is intimately tied to the failure of the Russian Church, separated from the universal Church, in the face of the tasks assigned to it by history. This has had the consequence that certain negative traits of Russian Christianity, due to its separation from the unity of the Church—and among these, its anti-Catholic pseudo-messianism—have passed into Bolshevism itself. Viewed in these terms, the religious significance of Bolshevism reveals itself to be at the antipodes of the true Church of Christ.

It thus becomes understandable that Bolshevism presents itself in the guise of a pseudo-religion. Dostoevskij had already found the precise words: "our people do not merely become atheists, but believe in atheism as in a religion." It has often been observed that Bolshevism presents itself as Christianity, indeed as Catholicism in reverse. In reality, there exists between the two conceptions a whole series of points of contact, though with the opposite sign.

Like Christianity, Bolshevism has four canonical texts: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin; it establishes an infallible magisterium, namely the Central Committee, to whose decisions all must submit. These points of contact are found on a purely formal level and vanish as soon as one moves from form to content. It is necessary to note, however, that in Catholicism every form of totalitarianism is excluded, since in a world conceived as the creature of a personal God, all the various orders of reality retain their relative autonomy. Thus, precisely these points of contact between Catholicism and Bolshevism constitute the best proof of their incompatibility.

The definition of the religious significance of Bolshevism given here must also be the starting point for outlining a program of action against II. In this regard, for Catholics, there can be no question of returning to that economic form which Pius XI condemned as preparatory to communism, namely liberal economics. Rather, the first task of the Catholic will be to engage all forces in giving value to Catholic social doctrine, both in the field of public life and in that of private life.

But since the intimate essence of Bolshevism has revealed itself to us as the fruit of the crisis of Christianity, both Western and Eastern, the thought is suggested that we seek its deepest root in the religious division between East and West. In this regard, one may certainly adhere to Solov'ev’s judgment concerning the Russian Church, which explains its weakness in history by the isolation it inherited from Byzantium. Yet not only for the East, but for all Christendom, this fateful schism between East and West entailed a weakening, a considerable loss of the efficacy of the irradiation of Christian thought and life upon the moral foundations of society. Therefore, the union of the two would result in a considerable increase in the Church’s influence in history, not only in the sense of an external and purely quantitative strengthening of the defensive front against atheism, but also in the sense of an increase in internal vitality, which would result from the reciprocal fertilization of the Eastern and Western spirit. This is what Pius XII had in mind when, in his encyclical Orientales omnes, he expressed the hope for most abundant fruits from the reestablishment of full communion between East and West in the one Mystical Body of Christ. In this way, the unionist problem, in relation to the struggle for overcoming the Bolshevik world crisis, acquires a particular importance, since the Bolshevik problem, in its deepest essence, presents itself as a religious problem.

Gustavo A. Wetter
B) ATTITUDE OF BOLSHEVISM TOWARD THE CHURCH - 1. The Period of Persecution (1917-38). - Bolshevism is, in principle, opposed to all religion, considering it a relic of the capitalist era. Therefore, as soon as the Bolshevik Party came to power, it took measures against the Church, depriving it of its material basis of existence, destroying its entire organization, and limiting its activity to the mere practice of worship.

On 23 January 1918, the decree on the separation of the Church from the State was issued, and from 2 February 1918, the State ceased all its contributions to the Church. In January 1919, all ecclesiastical real estate was confiscated; even places of worship were declared State property, though they could be left for ecclesiastical use upon request of at least 20 faithful. A ministerial circular of 18 February 1920 declared all activity of episcopal curias illegitimate. The State did not recognize any central organ of ecclesiastical government, only isolated communities of parish faithful. Yet even these were not granted legal personality, and thus not even the right to own property. These communities and parish priests had to be registered (decree of 10 August 1922) and were thus in the hands of the government. The Church could indeed practice worship, but it was forbidden to engage in propaganda. Above all, religious instruction for persons under 18 was prohibited (Art. 121 of the 1922 Penal Code). Such instruction for persons over 18, according to Art. 18 of the decree "on religious associations" of 8 April 1929, could be admitted exclusively in special theology courses, that is, in seminaries (which until recently did not exist). The aforementioned decree of 8 April 1929, in Art. 17, prohibited the Church from any social, charitable, or educational activity and any propaganda.

Article 12 of the Stalinist Constitution of 1936

indeed recognizes freedom to practice religious cults but prohibits all religious propaganda.

These are some essential points of Soviet anti-religious legislation. Their practical attitude was open persecution against the Church, though not always with the same intensity. Three periods of particularly violent persecution can be distinguished: from 1922 to 1923, then 1929-30, and finally 1937-38. Numerous bishops and priests were shot, deported, or imprisoned due to their purely religious activity. It is true that in some cases, there was also anti-revolutionary activity. However, it is entirely mistaken to explain Bolshevik measures against ecclesiastics solely as suppression of counter-revolution. Patriarch Tikhon (elected in 1917) remained absolutely neutral in political matters and condemned the anti-Soviet political activity of émigré prelates. He was imprisoned in May 1922 and, in prison, signed a declaration in which he promised to restrict ecclesiastical activity to the strictly religious sphere.

The patriarchate's vicar, Metropolitan Sergius, who after Patriarch Tikhon's death (1925) effectively governed the Church, in his proclamation of 29 July 1927 even preached a veritable Soviet patriotism, identifying the interests of the Church with those of the atheist State. Not even this extreme compliance could secure peace for the Church or obtain effective recognition of the central ecclesiastical government. In 1929, a new violent persecution erupted. It was the time of the systematic socialization of all Russian public life. In such a system, religion seemed an anachronism. This period also marked the apogee of the activity of the "League of Militant Atheists," founded in 1925, which sought to combat religion by organizing atheist museums, reading rooms, anti-religious lectures, etc.

That in the Soviet Union it was a true religious struggle is clearly deduced from the fact that persecution raged also, indeed especially, against the Catholic Church, certainly not suspected of sympathy for the former Tsarist regime. Catholic Bishop Monsignor Cieplak was arrested in March 1923 along with all Catholic priests in Petrograd. The main charge was the religious instruction imparted by the accused to children contrary to Soviet laws. Monsignor Cieplak and his vicar general, Monsignor Budkiewicz, were sentenced to death, others to long prison terms or forced labor. Monsignor Budkiewicz was indeed executed.

2. The New Religious Policy of the Soviet Government from 1939 Onward.

The threatening war prospects advised the Soviet government to abandon the unpopular religious persecution. At the beginning of 1939, orders were issued from above to cease all attempts to suppress religion by force. The Orthodox Church, at the outbreak of the Russo-German War, immediately aligned itself with absolute loyalty alongside the Soviet government. The government began to understand the importance of the Church's influence in strengthening national unity during the war. Consideration for democratic allies also advised a more conciliatory attitude toward religion. The government then began to return a certain number of churches, allowed the reopening of some monasteries and theological schools for the training of clergy. Offensive anti-religious propaganda ceased, the League of Militant Atheists was dissolved, and Bezbožnik (= The Atheist) suspended its publications.

The Soviet government finally permitted the election of a new patriarch. Metropolitan Sergius, until then locum tenens, was elected patriarch on 8 September 1943. A regular central ecclesiastical government, recognized by the State, could be established, dioceses were reorganized, and numerous new bishops appointed. The All-Russian Council of January-February 1945, which elected Alexy—until then Metropolitan of Leningrad—as patriarch after Sergius's death, gave the Church a new constitution, adapting canonical law norms to Soviet legislation on religious associations. The government, which until then had stripped the Church of its assets, began to assist it materially, providing, for example, all necessary means of transport and sustenance for the prelates convened at the council.

However, all this does not mean that the Soviet government's attitude toward religion has fundamentally changed. Even now, there can be no talk of true religious freedom in Russia as we understand II. The Church remains, as before, restricted to the mere exercise of worship. Restrictive legislation remains in force. The Stalinist Constitution, with its Article 124 prohibiting all religious propaganda, remains an unshakable fundamental law, as declared by the head of the Soviet for Orthodox Church Affairs in his speech at the 1945 Council. The prohibition of religious instruction for children remains, as do the restrictive norms of the decree of 8 April 1929. The little additional freedom granted, the Orthodox Church had to pay for with its enslavement to an atheist State that exploits it as a docile instrument for its internal and external policies. The Church's dependence on the State was firmly established by the Statute accepted at the 1945 Council. The Church openly supports the social system of communism. In foreign policy, it aids the expansionist plans of the Soviet government, seeking to unite all "Orthodox" churches under its hegemony.

In recent times (1947-48), a resurgence of atheist propaganda can be noted. Official sources once again insist on the necessity for a communist to be an atheist. The new religious policy is a policy and nothing more, and could be abandoned, if it seemed expedient to the Soviets, as was already the case with Lenin's NEP (v. COMUNISMO).