KOMINFORM. - The dissolution of the Komintern (May 1943) led to a new policy for the communist parties: in the international field, a policy of close collaboration with the Anglo-American allies, and within the various countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, a policy of the "broad
national coalition » against « fascism » (a term under which nazism was also, and above all, understood). This gave the communists the opportunity to present themselves to the popular masses as a true democratic party, indeed as the most « progressive » of the democratic parties, and to occupy influential positions in some countries. In relation to the other socialist parties, the problem of the unity of the proletarian movement was placed on the agenda, and in connection with it, a vigorous propaganda campaign was carried out by the communists in favor of the idea of merging the socialist and communist parties. For some time this idea of a merger found a considerable number of followers within the socialist parties of certain countries (France, Italy, Norway, Czechoslovakia). The formal dissolution of the Komintern, with regard to this situation, meant nothing other than creating to a much greater degree the preconditions for the application of the tactics used by the Komintern, namely the tactics of the united front and of contingent demands.
Shortly after the end of the 1939-45 war, when the Allies no longer depended on one another as much as before, the conflicts between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, and between communists and socialists, began to reveal themselves with ever-increasing clarity. The policy of collaboration between yesterday's Allies gradually transformed into a policy of open struggle, leading to the foundation of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties, briefly called the K.
At the end of September 1947, a council took place in Poland, specifically in Wiliza Gora, which the Polish government had handed over to the secretary-general of the Polish Communist Party, Gomulka. Representatives from the following countries participated: Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, U.S.S.R., France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. At the end of the meeting, three documents were published: a communiqué, a declaration, and a resolution. The communiqué reported that after listening to a report by Zhdanov on the international situation and other reports by the representatives of individual parties, it had been decided to found an Information Bureau to prevent the disadvantageous symptoms produced by insufficient mutual contact between the parties of the various countries. The declaration, which briefly summarized Zhdanov's report, started from the international situation, characterized by the formation of two camps: « one imperialist and antidemocratic, whose main goal consists in the realization of American imperialism and in the overthrow of democracy; and one anti-imperialist and democratic », led by the U.S.S.R., which had set as its goal « the subversion of imperialism, the consolidation of democracy » and « the defense of the independence and national sovereignty » of individual countries. In view of the world situation, the main task of the communist parties was understood as the struggle « against the economic and political enslavement of Europe », a consequence of the Marshall Plan, and « against the projects for the economic and political enslavement of China, Indonesia, and South American countries », as well as the struggle against « the faithful servants of the imperialists », the « right-wing socialists of the Blum type in France, Attlee and Bevin in England, Schumacher in Germany, Renner and Schurf in Austria, Saragat in Italy, etc. ». With this, the declaration revealed the main points of the program of the K.
In the resolution it was established that the Information Bureau was to be composed of two representatives from each central committee of the communist parties of the nine represented countries; that its task consisted in the « organization of the exchange of experiences and, if necessary, in the coordination of the activity of the communist parties on the basis of mutual consent ». The publication of an organ, edited for the time being in Russian and French, and subsequently in other languages (« For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! »), was also decided. Belgrade was established as the seat of the Information Bureau. The two Western Communist Parties, the French and the Italian, received a twofold rebuke at this meeting: because they had lost their position in the government, and because they allegedly failed to notice that the United States was attaining hegemony in the Western world, preparing it for the fight against « antifascist » forces. Duclos and Longo acknowledged their parties' error as « deviations ». A twofold task was enjoined upon them: they were to try to regain their leading position in the working class, preparing it for a hard struggle, and they were to try to obstruct American policy in Europe. Their erroneous national policy had to be changed to a policy of strikes, mass agitation, sabotage, etc. In fact, a general strike was proclaimed in Italy on November 12, 1947, and in France on November 18.
The second meeting of the K. took place, as announced by the communiqué of February 1, 1948, in January of that year in a locality in Yugoslavia; the topic was questions of propaganda and press.
Despite the choice of Belgrade as the seat of the K., a few months later a conflict broke out between Yugoslavia itself and the K. To the great surprise of public opinion, on June 20, 1948, a communiqué of the 3rd meeting of the Information Bureau was released, entitled « On the Situation of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia », in which a whole series of rebukes—which seemed very strange and even contained contradictions—were addressed to the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party concerning the « deviation from Marxism-Leninism », as a result of which the Yugoslav Communist Party « had placed itself outside the communist front and therefore also outside the ranks of the Information Bureau ». The real reason for the conflict, however, was revealed by the rebuke regarding a « hostile policy toward the Soviet Union and its Communist Party ». Yugoslavia was accused of having subjected « Soviet civilian specialists and even the Soviet representative himself in the K., Yudin, as well as several other official representatives of the U.S.S.R., to a regime of control exercised by organs of the Yugoslav Security Service ». This suggests that the real reason for the conflict between Yugoslavia and the K. is to be sought in Yugoslavia's tendency to ensure its independence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and to base its relations with it on a footing of equality.
One of the consequences of Yugoslavia's infidelity was an action of radical purging within the various communist parties, the victims of which were Gomulka for Poland, Koci Xoxe in Albania, Rajk in Hungary, and Kostov in Bulgaria—the first of whom was arrested in 1949 and disappeared, while the others were hanged.
In November 1949, a new meeting of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties took place in Hungary, in which the same countries as in 1947 were represented, except for Yugoslavia. Three resolutions were adopted there. While the documents published during the first meeting mainly reveal the program of the K., these three documents are of particular interest as they provide an understanding of its tactics. In the first resolution: The Defense of Peace and the Fight against Warmongers, the sharpening of the contrast was first of all noted between
the two camps, the imperialist and the democratic one, which had taken place over the previous two years, as well as a febrile preparation for war in the imperialist camp, opposite which the Soviet Union stood as a bulwark of peace and the main support of the peace front. Exactly in the sense of the tactics of contingent demands (v. INTERNAZIONALE), the mobilization of all forces "without distinction of religious convictions and political opinions" was invoked for the struggle in favor of peace under the leadership of the communist parties. For an effective fight against the danger of war under the direction of the communist parties, the absorption of as many proletarian masses as possible was also requested, a problem particularly addressed by the second resolution: The unity of the proletarian class and the tasks of the communist and proletarian parties. Here, renewed emphasis was placed on the famous tactics of the "united front," which would require waging a ruthless struggle against right-wing socialists and the reactionary leaders of the trade unions, attempting to "unmask them without mercy" and "isolate them from the masses." As a means of creating this "unity of the working class organized from below," it was recommended, among other things: the founding of committees for the defense of peace in individual enterprises, the organization of mass demonstrations, and similar initiatives. "Special attention must be paid, in the struggle for the unity of the working class, to the masses of Catholic workers and laborers and to their organizations. It must be taken into account that religious convictions do not constitute an impediment to the unity of the workers, especially if this unity is necessary for the salvation of peace. Common concrete actions in the field of economic demands, the coordination of the struggle of class trade unions and Catholic trade unions, etc., can be effective means of drawing Catholic workers into the common front of the struggle for peace." Taking into account the tactics of contingent demands, it is evident that here the "front of the struggle for peace" was conceived as a preparation for entering the communist party. In the third resolution: The Yugoslav Communist Party in the hands of assassins and spies, the leaders of the Party itself were reproached for having passed into the camp of capitalism and for lending themselves as servants of the warmongers. The struggle against the "Tito gang" was presented as the international duty of all communist parties. Not only the communist parties outside Yugoslavia were urged to participate in this struggle, but also the faithful within the Yugoslav Communist Party itself, as well as all the proletarian masses of Yugoslavia.
Some believed they could see in the K. simply a repetition of the Komintern. But on the Soviet side this is firmly denied, inasmuch as the Komintern is considered an outdated form of connection between the various communist parties. This form, according to Soviet opinion, had its positive importance as long as the individual communist parties were still weak, while unitary tactics were unorganized and well-trained leaders were also lacking; today, however, the individual communist parties in many countries have become mass parties, and direction exercised by a single center would be impossible and inappropriate (it should be noted here that the fact of the direction of the individual communist parties being carried out by the Komintern, and thus by a center situated outside the country of the respective communist party, is implicitly confirmed). Therefore, new forms of international collaboration would become necessary. At the same time, the dissolution of the Komintern would have put an end to the calumny according to which Moscow interferes in the internal affairs of other countries (Zhdanov).
Indeed, it cannot be denied that important formal differences exist between the K. and the Komintern: the K. does not include the communist parties of all countries, but only those of eight European countries; furthermore, Asia is not represented there. Regarding organization, it is no longer a unitary world party governed by an "iron discipline," but the principle of "mutual consent" is expressly insisted upon. All this makes it evident that the main goal of this "new form of connection between communist parties" is the fight against the Marshall Plan, which is aimed primarily at Europe and against which the reproach is leveled that it signifies a partial renunciation of national sovereignty.
Despite these purely external and formal differences, there exists, as has been seen, in the essential character, purposes, program, and tactics, a continuity between the two "forms" of international communist collaboration. As for the fact that in place of the once "iron discipline" the principle of "mutual consent" has been put, the very example of Yugoslavia clearly demonstrates that too independent an attitude of individual parties vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R., "bulwark of the peace front," is under no circumstances tolerated.
Gustavo A. Wetter