KOMINFORM. – The dissolution of the Comintern (May 1943) led to a new policy among communist parties: internationally, a policy of close collaboration with the Anglo-American allies, and within the various countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, a policy of the “broad national coalition against fascism” (a term under which, above all, Nazism was also understood). This gave the communists the opportunity to present themselves to the masses as a truly democratic party, indeed as the most “progressive” of the democratic parties, and to occupy influential positions in some countries. Before the other socialist parties, the question of the unity of the proletarian movement was placed on the agenda, and in connection with it, the communists launched vigorous propaganda in favor of the idea of the merger of socialist and communist parties. For a time, this idea of merger found a considerable number of adherents in the socialist parties of some countries (France, Italy, Norway, Czechoslovakia). The formal dissolution of the Comintern, in view of this situation, amounted to nothing more than creating, to a much greater extent, the prerequisites for the application of the tactics used by the Comintern, namely, the tactics of the united front and of contingent demands.
Shortly after the end of the 1939–45 war, when the Allies were no longer as dependent on one another as they had been before, the contrasts between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, and between communists and socialists, began to become increasingly evident. The policy of collaboration among the former Allies gradually turned into a policy of open struggle, and the founding of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties, briefly known as the K., took place.
At the end of September 1947, a meeting was held in Poland, specifically at Wiliza Gora, which the Polish government had turned over to the general secretary of the Polish Communist Party, Gomułka. The meeting was attended by representatives of the following countries: Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, the U.S.S.R., France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. At the end of the meeting, three documents were published: a communiqué, a declaration, and a resolution. The communiqué stated that, after hearing a report by Zhdanov on the international situation and other reports by representatives of the individual parties, it had been decided to found an Information Bureau to counteract the adverse symptoms produced by the influential reciprocal contacts among the parties of the various countries. The declaration, which briefly summarized Zhdanov’s report, began with the international situation, characterized by the formation of two camps: “one imperialist and antidemocratic, whose main goal consists in the realization of American imperialism and in the overthrow of democracy; and one anti-imperialist and democratic,” led by the U.S.S.R., and which had set itself the goal “of overthrowing imperialism, consolidating democracy,” and “defending the independence and national sovereignty” of the individual countries. In view of the world situation, the main task of the communist parties was understood as a struggle “against the economic and political enslavement of Europe,” a consequence of the Marshall Plan, and “against the projects of economic and political enslavement of China, Indonesia, and the South American countries,” as well as the struggle against “the faithful servants of the imperialists,” “right-wing socialists such as Blum in France, Attlee and Bevin in England, Schumacher in Germany, Renner and Scharf in Austria, Saragat in Italy, etc.” With this, the declaration revealed the main points of the program of the K.
In the resolution, it was established that the Information Bureau was to be composed of two representatives from each central committee of the communist parties of the nine represented countries; its task was to consist in “organizing the exchange of experiences and, if necessary, in coordinating the activity of the communist parties on the basis of mutual agreement.” It was also decided to publish an organ, initially in Russian and French, and later in other languages (“For a Lasting Peace, for a People’s Democracy”). Belgrade was chosen as the seat of the Information Bureau. The two Western communist parties, the French and the Italian, received a twofold reproach at this meeting: because they had lost their position in the government, and because they had not realized that the United States was achieving hegemony in the Western world, preparing it for the struggle against the “anti-fascist” forces. Duclos and Longo acknowledged the error of their parties as “deviations.” They were given a twofold task: they were to try to regain their leading position among the working class, preparing it for a hard struggle, and they were to try to hinder American policy in Europe. Their erroneous national policy was to be replaced by a policy of strikes, mass agitation, sabotage, etc. Indeed, a general strike was proclaimed in Italy on 12 November 1947 and in France on 18 November.
The second meeting of the K. took place, as announced in the communiqué of 10 February 1948, in January of that year in a location in Yugoslavia; the topic was questions of propaganda and the press.
Despite the choice of Belgrade as the seat of the K., a few months later a conflict arose between Yugoslavia itself and the K., to the great surprise of public opinion. On 20 June 1948, a communiqué of the 3rd meeting of the Information Bureau, entitled “On the Situation of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,” was published. In it, the central committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party was subjected to a series of reproaches that seemed very strange and even contained contradictions, concerning the “deviation from Marxism-Leninism,” as a result of which the Yugoslav Communist Party “had placed itself outside the communist front and therefore also outside the ranks of the Information Bureau.” The true reason for the conflict, however, was revealed in the reproach of “a hostile policy toward the Soviet Union and its Communist Party.” Yugoslavia was accused of having subjected “civilian Soviet experts and even the Soviet representative in the K., Yudin, as well as several other official representatives of the U.S.S.R., to a regime of control exercised by organs of the Yugoslav security service.” This reveals that the true reason for the conflict between Yugoslavia and the K. is to be sought in Yugoslavia’s tendency to secure its independence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and to base its relations with it on a plane of equality.
One of the consequences of Yugoslavia’s disloyalty was a radical purge action within the various communist parties, whose victims were Gomułka for Poland, Koçi Xoxe in Albania, Rajk in Hungary, and Kostov in Bulgaria; the first of these, arrested in 1949, disappeared, while the others were hanged.
In November 1949, a new meeting of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties took place in Hungary, at which the same countries as in 1947 were represented, except for Yugoslavia. Three resolutions were adopted. Whereas the documents published during the first meeting reveal above all the program of the K., these three documents are of particular interest in that they make its tactics understandable. In the first resolution, “The Defense of Peace and the Struggle
The two camps, the imperialist and the democratic, that had emerged over the past two years, as well as the feverish war preparations in the imperialist camp, against which the Soviet Union stood as the bulwark of peace and the mainstay of the peace front. Precisely in the sense of the tactic of united demands (v. INTERNAZIONALISMO), the mobilization of all forces was invoked, regardless of religious convictions or political opinions, for the struggle in favor of peace under the leadership of the communist parties. For an effective struggle against the danger of war under the direction of the communist parties, the possible absorption of all proletarian masses was also demanded—a problem addressed particularly in the second resolution: *The Unity of the Proletarian Class and the Tasks of the Communist and Proletarian Parties*. Here, the famous tactic of the united front was reiterated, calling for a merciless struggle against right-wing socialists and reactionary union leaders, seeking to expose their true stance on peace and to isolate them from the masses. Among the means recommended for creating this unity of the working class from the bottom up were: the establishment of peace defense committees in individual enterprises, the organization of mass demonstrations, and similar initiatives. Special attention was to be given, in the struggle for the unity of the working class, to the masses of Catholic workers and their organizations. It was emphasized that religious convictions did not constitute an obstacle to the unity of workers, especially when such unity was necessary for the preservation of peace. Concrete joint actions in the field of economic demands, the coordination of the struggles of class-based and Catholic unions, and so forth, could serve as effective means to draw Catholic workers into the common front of the struggle for peace. Given the tactic of contingent demands, it was evident that the peace front was conceived here as preparation for entry into the communist party.
In the third resolution, *The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Hands of Assassins and Spies*, the leaders of that party were reproached for having passed into the camp of capitalism and for serving as tools of the warmongers. The struggle against the Tito clique was presented as an international duty of all communist parties. Not only were communist parties outside Yugoslavia urged to participate in this struggle, but also the faithful within the Yugoslav Communist Party itself, as well as all proletarian masses in Yugoslavia.
Some believed they could see in the K. merely a repetition of the Comintern. But the Soviet side firmly denied this, considering the Comintern an outdated form of connection among the various communist parties. This form, in the Soviet view, had served a positive purpose as long as the individual communist parties were still weak, the united tactic was unorganized, and there was a lack of well-trained leaders. Today, however, the individual communist parties in many countries had become mass parties, and a single center directing them (it should be noted that the fact of the Comintern’s direction of individual communist parties—i.e., direction from a center outside the country of the respective communist party—is implicitly confirmed here) would be impossible and inappropriate. Thus, new forms of international collaboration were deemed necessary. At the same time, the dissolution of the Comintern had put an end to the slander that Moscow interfered in the internal affairs of other countries (Zdanov).
Indeed, it cannot be denied that there were significant formal differences between the K. and the Comintern: the K. did not include the communist parties of all countries but only those of eight European countries; Asia was not represented. In terms of organization, it was no longer a unitary world party governed by "iron discipline," but the principle of "mutual consent" was expressly emphasized. All this makes it clear that the main goal of this "new form of connection among communist parties" was the struggle against the Marshall Plan, which was directed primarily at Europe and against which the charge was leveled that it meant a partial renunciation of national sovereignty.
Despite these purely external and formal differences, however, there existed— as has been seen—continuity in essential character, objectives, program, and tactics between the two "forms" of communist international collaboration. As for the fact that the principle of "mutual consent" had replaced the former "iron discipline," the example of Yugoslavia clearly demonstrates that any overly independent stance by individual parties toward the U.S.S.R., the "bulwark of the peace front," was in no way tolerated.