DIVERTIMENTI. - I. GENERAL NOTIONS
Etymologically, the word d. from diverto means deviation, digression. And in reality d. consists in diverting the tension of the soul and body from their habitual activities, in order to allow them to enjoy a pause of quiet and rest. It is therefore an interlude in human activity, but a joyful one.
It is impossible for man to keep body and soul engaged in uninterrupted activity, in continuous work: nature itself gives warning of a sensation of weariness and demands recreation and rest. Relaxatio (from relaxare, to slacken), as the Latins called it, is rest; it is not yet d., but it is its first element, to which there must be added
a second, enjoyment, which is like the aroma of rest and recreation: it increases their efficacy and ensures their result. Thus d. exists when rest is accompanied by a more or less profound joy. D. is perfect when it attains that serene gladness of soul which keeps the whole person sound and young, in soul and body.
This enjoyment may involve only the higher faculties, intelligence, for example, as in reading an attractive and instructive book; or the higher faculties together with the senses, as in painting, practised not as a profession but for d., music, etc. It may also involve only the external senses, as in baths, dancing, sports, or the external and internal senses together, as well as the higher faculties, for example, the theatre, cinema, etc. (v. SPETTACOLO).
From this it is clear that within d. itself there is a certain hierarchy of values. D. which directly nourishes the culture of the spirit as well is evidently nobler than d. which produces a purely sensory pleasure of sight, hearing, or touch. In this latter sphere, moreover, it is easier to slip from purely sensory pleasures to those inspired by a certain sensuality, which, from vague, may become well defined and perhaps transform d. into a proximate occasion of sin. One of the noblest and most precious forms of d. is the enjoyment produced by art.
On the other hand, however, not all d., even the noblest, are at every moment the most useful and beneficial; nor are all of them suited to every type of person and every age, also because certain forms of d. require a more refined culture of the spirit and gifts that are not always common. For d. to achieve its purpose, it must therefore be suited to the person’s taste and to the circumstances of work and employment. The different periods of history, the degree of civilization, social class, and fashion itself also influence the choice of d. Today the theatre and the cinema (v.) have a very special importance for popular recreation.
II. THE LAWFULNESS OF D
From what has been said, the honesty and lawfulness of d. are evident: it not only has nothing intrinsically evil in itself, but in a certain respect, at least insofar as rest is concerned and at certain ages of life, it is necessary to repair the loss of strength and to make the individual capable and willing to undertake further tasks. Beyond this natural need, d. also has its moral justification in the necessity of fostering social relations. Relations with relatives and friends themselves provide man with opportunities for recreation, while d. encourages these family and friendly encounters and offers an occasion for the exercise of certain virtues, such as charity.
The accusation often levelled against the ethics of the Gospel—that it promotes a melancholy and gloomy existence, without joy and without sunshine, that is, without d.—is therefore gratuitous. Among the blessings promised by the prophet to Jerusalem is the sight of boys and girls intent on amusing themselves (Zac. 8:4). Jesus himself in the Gospel takes his cue from the games and d. of Palestinian children (Mt. 11:16-17). And nothing prevents us from imagining, as artists have often done, Jesus’ own childhood interspersed with these interludes, characteristic above all of early age.
It would in any case suffice to observe how large a part d. has played in Christian pedagogy, especially that of certain saints, such as s. Filippo Neri (1515-95) and s. Giovanni Bosco (1815-88), the most perfect modern educator, who declared himself an enemy of moroseness and willingly joined in his boys’ d.
The Church herself, in determining the use of benefice goods, includes among the honesto substantatio of clerics the expenses required for moderate d. (cf. can. 1473 and the relevant commentaries). She merely forbids them (and with even greater reason religious) certain forms of d. that are too foreign to the ecclesiastical spirit.
Thus, in general, she forbids them to attend entertainments, dances, and festivities unsuitable in themselves to their state, or when their presence might be a cause of scandal: this applies above all to public theatres (can. 140). She forbids them to take part in games of chance played with money at stake, and in noisy hunts, such as were once customary, while recommending moderation in the sport of ordinary hunting (can. 138). Entering cafés, bars, etc., purely for d. is likewise forbidden to them. For all other d., the general principle applies: « Clerici ab iis omnibus, quae statum suum dedecent, prorsus abstineant » (can. 138).
But this is obvious: here the clerical state, freely chosen, imposes more serious conduct. Moreover, the State itself condemns certain forms of d. that are dangerous from a social point of view: games of chance, for example (Italian Penal Code, arts. 718-23). But this does not signify a condemnation of d. in general or of every form of d.
If d. is lawful and in a certain respect necessary, then certain professions that serve no other purpose than the organization of d. are likewise lawful and necessary in social life (e.g., the profession of film director, orchestra conductor, theatrical impresario, etc.).
Here too, if the Church has found and continues to find fault, it is the abuse that she condemns, not the profession itself. When Roman law itself regarded certain professions as infamous (the practice of theatrical and gladiatorial art; D. 3, 2, 1), because practising them entailed violating so many norms of civil life—or, as we should say, of natural law—it is logical that the Church should have considered them incompatible with the profession of the Christian religion and sought to dissuade Christians from such spectacles, necessarily mixed with idolatry and immorality (cf. Atenagora, Supplicatio pro christianis, 34-36: PG 6, 967-72; Tertulliano, De spectaculis: PL 1, 627-62; s. Agostino, Confesiones, III, 1-4, ed. P. H. Wangnereck, Torino-Roma 1928, pp. 65-68).
In the Middle Ages, by contrast, the Church found nothing objectionable in the profession of the jester, and through radical changes sought to replace the ancient spectacles with performances of her own (v.). Even in the traditional d. Carnival (v.), the Church condemns and has condemned nothing but abuse.
For we can abuse anything, especially those things or objects that are a means within the order willed by God but that, through the egoism of our senses, tend to become an end (entertainments and sensory pleasures). It is the Christian’s duty to place d. within the elevated conception he has of life as well: d. must fit into the ordering of human life, both individual and social. The virtue that governs this integration is eutrapelia (εὐτραπέλια), which falls within the more general virtue of modesty. Its moderating function is expressed first of all in preserving for d. the purpose it has, namely, that of a means, an interlude in the succession of human activities.
Non può nello scritto mutarsi la funzione di una virgola, in quella di una lettera o magari di una parola o di un assieme di parole: sarebbe la confusione babelica. Così nella vita non può il d. occupare il posto che compete al lavoro od alle occupazioni del proprio stato: altrimenti diventa immorale. E ciò appena l'uomo è in grado di una qualche attività (s. Agostino, op. cit., 1, 10; ibid., p. 21). La parola « d. », almeno nel senso parziale di riposo, non ha senso, se non quando lo si sia meritato mediante un lavoro.
Inoltre il d. che l'uomo ragionevole consente a se stesso deve sempre sottostare all'impero della riflessione, dell'autogoverno e contenersi nella durata e del luogo e tempo debito, nell'ambito del piacere lecito.
Dal punto di vista etico poi non si possono trascurare le ripercussioni che una determinata forma di d. avrà sulla vita dello spirito. Perché sia lecito dunque il d., è necessario: a) che il d. non si cerchi in azioni e parole turpi o nocive; b) che il d. non
sommerga completamente la gravità dell'anima e l'armonia delle proprie occupazioni e delle opere buone (s. Ambrogio, De officiis, I, 20); c) che il d. sia « tempore et homine dignus » (Cicerone, De officiis, I, 29).
Questa la misura, seguendo la quale si può trarre dal d. ciò che vi è di sano, di morale e di educativo, ripudiando quanto vi è di malsano e di morboso.