DIVERSIONS. - I. GENERAL CONCEPTS.
Etymologically, the term *d.* [divertimenti] derives from *diverto*, meaning a deviation, a digression. In reality, *d.* is the act of diverting the tension of the mind and body from habitual activities in order to enjoy a pause of quiet and rest. It is thus an interlude in human activity, but one that is joyful.
It is impossible for man to maintain body and soul in uninterrupted activity, in continuous work: nature itself warns of a sensation of fatigue and demands diversion and rest. *Relaxatio* (from *relaxare*, to slacken), as the Latins said, is rest; it is not yet *d.*, but it is its first element, to which a second must be added: enjoyment, which is like the aroma of rest and diversion, enhancing its efficacy and ensuring its fruitfulness. *D.* is achieved when rest is accompanied by a joy, whether profound or slight. *D.* is perfect when it attains that serene gladness of the soul which keeps the whole man—body and soul—healthy and youthful.
This enjoyment may involve only the higher faculties, such as the intellect—for example, reading an attractive and instructive book; or both the higher faculties and the senses, as in painting practiced not as a profession but for diversion, or music, etc. It may also involve only the external senses, such as baths, dances, sports; or the external and internal senses together, and even the higher faculties, as in the theatre or cinema, etc. (cf. SPETTACOLO [Spectacle]).
From this it is clear that *d.* itself possesses a certain hierarchy of values. *D.* that directly nourishes the culture of the spirit is evidently nobler than one that produces merely a sensible pleasure of sight, hearing, or touch. In this latter sphere, moreover, it is easier to slip from purely sensible pleasures to those inspired by a certain sensuality, which may pass from vagueness to definition and even transform *d.* into an immediate occasion of sin. One of the noblest and most valuable forms of *d.* is that produced by art.
Yet not all *d.*, even the noblest, are equally useful or profitable at all times; nor are they suited to all temperaments and ages, since certain forms of *d.* require a more refined culture of the spirit, and such refinement is not always common. For *d.* to achieve its purpose, it must therefore be suited to the tastes of the individual, to the circumstances of work and employment. Even the different epochs of history, the degree of civilization, social class, and fashion itself influence the choice of diversions. Today, theatre and cinema occupy a special place in popular recreation (cf. *v.*).
II. THE LICITUDE OF DIVERSIONS.
From what has been said, the honesty and licitness of *d.* emerges: it contains in itself nothing intrinsically evil, and, in a certain respect—at least insofar as it provides rest and is suited to certain stages of life—it is even necessary to repair the loss of strength and render the individual capable and disposed to perform other duties. Beyond this natural need, *d.* also has its moral justification in the necessity of fostering social relations. Relationships with relatives and friends provide man with occasions for diversion, while *d.* itself favors these family and friendly gatherings and offers an opportunity for the exercise of virtues such as charity.
It is therefore a groundless accusation to reproach Gospel ethics with fostering a melancholy and gloomy existence, devoid of joy and sunshine—that is, of *d.* Among the blessings promised to Jerusalem by the prophet is the sight of children and young people engaged in play (Zech. 8:4). Jesus Himself in the Gospel takes as His starting point the games and diversions of the Palestinian children (Matt. 11:16-17). And nothing prevents us from imagining, as artists have often done, the very childhood of Jesus interspersed with these interludes, especially characteristic of early years.
Moreover, it suffices to observe how much *d.* has contributed to Christian pedagogy, particularly in the case of certain saints, such as St. Philip Neri (1515–95) and St. John Bosco (1815–88), the most perfect modern educator, who declared himself an enemy of sullenness and gladly joined in the diversions of his boys.
The Church itself, in determining the use of benefices, includes in the "honesta substantia" of clerics the expenses necessary for moderate diversions (cf. can. 1473 and related commentaries). It only forbids them (and a fortiori religious) certain forms of *d.* that are too alien to the ecclesiastical spirit.
Thus, in general, it forbids them to attend spectacles, dances, and festivities that are unbecoming to their state or when their presence might give scandal—especially in public theatres (can. 140). It forbids them to take part in gambling games involving the risking of money; in noisy hunts, as were once fashionable, while recommending moderation in simple hunting outings (can. 138). Entering cafés for the purpose of diversion is likewise forbidden to them. For all other diversions, the general principle applies: "Clerici ab iis omnibus, quae statum suum dedecent, prorsus abstineant" (can. 138).
But this is self-evident: the clerical state, freely chosen, imposes a more rigorous conduct. Moreover, certain forms of diversion that are socially dangerous are condemned even by the state itself—for example, gambling (Italian Penal Code, arts. 718–23). This does not, however, imply a condemnation of *d.* in general or for all people.
If *d.* is licit and, in a certain sense, necessary, certain professions that serve no other purpose than the organization of *d.* are also licit and, in social life, necessary (e.g., the profession of director, conductor, theatrical impresario, etc.).
Naturally, limits must be observed, for beyond them *d.* ceases to be licit. Unfortunately, today fortune-tellers exploit the uncertainty of these boundaries between the natural and the preternatural to the detriment of the naive and lovers of the marvellous. The forms in use include: divination by dreams (*oniromanzia*), necromancy (*necromanzia*), palmistry (*chiromanzia*), physiognomy (*fisiognomia*), divination by rods (*rabdomanzia*), radiesthesia, thought transference, and certain phenomena of spiritualism, etc. Insofar as these forms of inquiry are based on scientific or already verified criteria—e.g., *rabdomanzia*—or are still under experimental verification—e.g., thought transference—the appearance of *d.* is excluded. Beyond that measure, as long as there remains at least a doubt that the manifestation of hidden things is attributable to natural factors, even if unknown and accidental, one cannot yet speak of tacit divination (*d. tacita*); only the express invocation of the demon could bring these cases within the prohibited realm of divination. They are therefore, from this point of view, entirely licit, and only dishonest, unjust, or more or less deviant purposes could render them sinful subjectively. For tacit divination to be constituted, two essential elements must concur: a serious intention to know hidden things by unsuitable means, and the certain knowledge of their unsuitability.
It is evident that divination is an injury to God, since it transfers to the worst of creatures the honor due only to God, on account of His omniscience and providence. Such an injury is always present and grave in expressed divination. This is not the case with tacit divination. In the latter, either the intention is more playful than serious, or there is a lack of trust in the responses expected, or even difficulty in perceiving the moral malice that subtly hides within it, so that the fault is rarely grave. Apart from this specific malice, which is against the virtue of religion, divination may, under particular circumstances, involve other moral deviations against other virtues: for example, it may offend justice if divination is practiced for the sake of gain; it is against charity by exposing one's neighbor to scandal or the danger of serious harm; it may be against the virtue of faith if it supposes or leads to the negation or wavering of revealed truths; and so forth.
One also sins against religion by consulting a diviner, at least because one cooperates in his sin: this is on the condition that one knows of it and to the extent that one knows of II. One may also sin against charity toward oneself if, not only does one consult the diviner, but positively directs one's life according to the responses received; however, one would not sin if, after consulting the diviner, one were to refrain from certain actions out of fears conceived, even if those actions had previously been deliberated but were not obligatory.
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Leonardo Azzollini
**In non-Christian religions.** Divination is the knowledge of the will of superior Powers, both through symbolic signs perceptible to the senses and through direct revelation to the soul by inspiration and psychic emotion of a supernatural origin. It is the prediction of future and hidden things that escape ordinary investigation.
Originally, it was a branch of ordinary magic, according to which like causes produce like effects and which, unlike science, was based on superficial and apparent similarities established arbitrarily and fantastically. Thus the diviner claims to foresee certain effects from supposed causes; or, from observed effects, to infer the unknown cause, such as the author of a crime or the cause of diseases, etc. From magic, divination passed into the realm of religions, where it considered certain facts as signs or symptoms (*omnia*) through which the divinity makes known its will. In a special way, however, the gods gave their response (*oraculum*) in some famous temple, where the faithful came from all parts to consult them, as in Greece at the temple of Apollo at Delphi, of Zeus at Dodona, of Asclepius at Epidaurus. Naturally, not everyone was capable of interpreting the language of the divinity, whether *omnia* or *oracula*; for this purpose, priests attended to it, among whom there were sometimes specialized classes, such as the augurs and auspices among the Romans and among the Babylonians the seers, headed by an archivist, who handed down the art from father to son both orally and in writing. In the Hellenistic period, divination sought a philosophical foundation, and especially the later Stoics, with Posidonius, attempted to justify this superstition with their principle of the sympathy running through the various parts of the universe. Cicero’s treatise *De divinatione* probably depends on Posidonius. On the contrary, Iamblichus, or perhaps a disciple of his, the author of the Neoplatonic treatise *De mysteriis*, bases the practice of divination on the light that the soul receives in its union with the divinity.
There are many kinds of divination. But, leaving aside personal and direct divination, which consists in the inspiration of seer-prophets, the most common is real or indirect divination, based on acquired signs, *omnia* and *oracula*, of which it claims to be the exact interpretation.
Real divination, in turn, is divided, according to Cicero (*De divin.*, I, 6; II, 11, 26), into natural when the signs are fortuitous; artificial when the signs are arranged by the will of the observer. The principal means employed in natural divination can be summarized as follows: celestial signs (astrology, on which astrology is based—v.); atmospheric signs, such as the strength and direction of clouds (aeromancy), hurricanes (ceratomancy), lightning and thunder, which were for the Greeks signs of Zeus, all signs which the Babylonians referred to astrology; the actions and movements of animals, especially birds (v. *augury*; *auspices*); monstrous births of men and animals (teratomancy), considered inauspicious; special signs of the hands (chiromancy) and of other parts of the body (melomancy, metopomancy, onychomancy, podomancy, etc.); the rustling of leaves as at Dodona; oneromancy or the interpretation of dreams, which were sometimes clear (direct revelation) or were sought through incubation in some temple.
In Rome, fulgural divination constituted a notable part of the *Etruscan* discipline, and the related rules, aimed at establishing whence the lightning came and whither it was directed, were contained in the *libri fulgurales*, attributed to the *infantes* Bego and Vego. On the other hand, in the *libri augurales* were listed the augural birds, divided into *oscines*, whose cries were to be observed, and *alites*, whose flight was to be noted. Account was also taken, especially in war when a quick response was needed, of the *avidity* with which chickens took food. The augural divination was dealt with by Ennius Veranius and Varro (*Antiquitates rerum divinarum*, 3).
Among the means employed in artificial divination, the following are noteworthy: lots (cleromancy), from which sortilege derived; a simple and therefore very ancient and widely used means, especially in ancient Italy, where, unlike in Greece, personal inspiration was little known. More commonly, sortilege was obtained by means of rods or plates on which a phrase was written. To ensure a more certain effect, the operation was often performed in a temple, for example, that of Praeneste (*sortes Praenestinae*). The fact that *sors* became equivalent to fate and fortune indicates the great importance assumed in Italy by this kind of divination. Also: lecanomancy, consisting in pouring and shaking in a basin or cup different liquids, such as water—which is preeminently the agent and vehicle of revelation—oil, wine, so that from the variety of their movements and the aggregation of their drops, indications for the future might be drawn; the movements produced by an object thrown into a sacred fountain (hydromancy), where if the object sinks it is a good sign; the shapes, which can be limitless, assumed by fire in a sacrifice (pyromancy); the way in which smoke rises (capnomancy); the observation of the entrails, especially the liver, of a sacrificed animal (extispicy); the various phenomena presented by corpses in putrefaction, especially in necromancy, which most often consists in the evocation of the souls of the dead so that they may reveal what is hidden or future; the judgment of God (ordeal), that is, the dangerous test to which a suspected person was subjected, a judgment considered by some as a form of divination insofar as it is believed to aim not so much at ascertaining the objective reality of facts as at knowing the divine will to save or not to save the person being judged.
Since divination is based on a mechanical conception of divine revelation, it is opposed to the prophetic conception of a personal revelation; for this reason, revealed religions are in principle opposed to the practice of divination.
In practice, the people remained very attached to means believed capable of indicating the future, whatever their origin. Hence the measures taken by both civil and religious authorities to suppress divination. The Roman emperors in particular had sought to prevent its social and political abuses. The jurist Paulus (Sententiae, 5, 21, 1.3) reports that those who consulted diviners about the life of the sovereign or merely about the welfare of the state were to be punished with death, along with those who gave the response; and that slaves who customarily inquired about the fate of their masters were to be condemned to extreme punishment.