EUROPEAN UNION. – The need to create a European union became practically relevant after the First World War. The existence of a “European spirit” and a “European sentiment” before the First World War is a rather complex question; today it is asserted that European unity existed as a widespread sentiment and rested upon the great strength of Latinity and Germanism, which encountered and at times clashed with each other like two vital fluids of a living organism, since both were founded upon the great Roman and Christian tradition, even though the original common Roman Catholicism had fragmented in some regions into different Churches.
Despite this common foundation, the Anglo-Saxon force had begun a drive toward European hegemony; having defeated Spanish and French hegemony, it would not tolerate German hegemony, which had asserted itself with increasing decisiveness since 1870 and had nevertheless repeatedly retreated into acceptance of an Anglo-German diarchy (also proposed by Hitler), likewise founded upon substantial racial unity. But a third force was rising in Eastern Europe: the massive empire of all the Russias (so called after a dominant race), which had been compelled to conquer all of northern Asia in an unrestrained imperialism and in the name of defending Russia, poorly protected by the Urals, and which, nonetheless, oscillating between “Westernism” and “Eurasianism” (v.), was wearing itself down in numerous internal nationalist-revolutionary struggles. The First World War ended with the defeat of Germany’s attempted hegemony, but the decisive impetus toward that defeat was supplied by the new Anglo-Saxon world, that of the USA, while Russia broke apart in the effort undertaken against Germany, giving birth to a new “Eurasia” which, deprived of its westernmost territories, from Finland to Bessarabia, and becoming increasingly Asian, embarked upon a policy of a new Community, essentially Asian in character, in the new imperial formula of the Bolshevik revolution. It was under this pressure that Europe fell to pieces and its divisions became more pronounced, giving rise to talk of the decline and defense of the West, since Europe neither defends itself alone nor had defended itself alone, but thanks to American assistance. However, the USA, having emerged from its isolationist policy during the First World War, decisively returned to it, leaving Europe to its own devices.
1. FROM THE PAN-EUROPE PROJECT TO THE BRIAND PLAN
Only when Europe felt isolated, with the Bolshevik threat to the East, did it truly become aware of the danger of its situation; and thus the general idea of pan-Europe appeared, an avant-garde and romantic idea in its tendency, too radical for those times, while more modest projects emerged through the general initiative of the Federal Committee for European Cooperation (Emile Borel) and the more limited initiative of the European Customs Union (Yves La Trocqueur). On the practical level, the problem of a European union was posed in 1929 by Aristide Briand. The deficiencies League of Nations (v.) had become apparent after the defection of the USA, once again shut within their isolationism, as has been said, and repudiating Wilson, who had been the Pact’s principal promoter and author. According to Briand, however, the initiative had to be framed within the Pact, which permitted the creation of regional agreements; hence the organization of a European union aimed at making the larger organization, into which it would be concentrically incorporated, operate more effectively, thereby attempting to restore unity of spirit to Europe, divided after the failure of the Pact of Locarno and the Four-Power Pact. Briand’s project was less advanced than those advocating a European federation; it did not touch upon the sovereignty of the States. For the purpose of periodically examining their particular interests jointly, the European States would form a European Conference and, as executive organs, a Permanent Committee and a Secretariat, always within the framework of the League of Nations. In the memorandum sent to the various Governments, Briand, when he had to give examples, confined himself to economic and social questions (customs, industrial unions and cartels, public works, communications, labor, hygiene, finance, intellectual cooperation), mentioning in the political sphere only interparliamentary relations, which already had some tradition. Thus, it may be said that the Briand proposal sought to arrive at political construction through an economic coalition, thereby overcoming the observations made by certain States in their replies concerning the need to begin with economic questions. Italy and Germany raised a territorial objection: namely, that the exclusion of Russia and Turkey from Europe was inadmissible. Germany itself and Hungary pointed out that, in order to reach European union, it was necessary to eliminate the inequalities created by the peace treaties. More serious and indeed prohibitive objections came from Great Britain, Switzerland, and other States, which observed that this would create a useless duplicate of the League’s organs; Great Britain even suggested that the European union, rather than promoting unity of spirit, might intensify, or actually provoke, new hostilities. When the Briand project, eloquently defended by its author, was discussed in Geneva (Sept. 1930), Scialoja pointed out the difficulties of immediate implementation, so that it would be advisable to begin with a study commission. Motta was more radical, while Brüning (Germany) and Schober (Austria) insisted that the new Union should concern itself solely with economic problems. The Assembly accepted Scialoja’s viewpoint and appointed a Study Commission for the European union. It met in January 1931 under Briand’s presidency, with the participation of 27 States, and in its meetings agreed on the need to invite the USSR and Turkey, but continued to speak of the economic crisis. When the problem of organizing the European union was addressed at the Assembly of the League of Nations in Sept. 1931, it was decided to create only a Study Commission, also with the participation of non-European States, and with this decision the Union was buried.The immaturity of the problem was therefore evident in a Europe that felt itself morally divided. The new attempt at German hegemony was crushed with the cooperation of two extra-European forces: the Eurasian force of the USSR and that of the USA, compelled once again to abandon isolationism by Roosevelt’s policy. When the time came to settle the accounts of victory, Roosevelt and Churchill accepted Stalin’s thesis of dividing Europe into two zones, leaving to the influence of the USSR the area east of the Stettin–Trieste line.
II. THE DEFENCE OF THE WEST AND THE REALIZATION OF THE NEW E. U. — Once Eastern Europe had fallen under Soviet domination, the whole of Europe west of the Yalta line remained indefensible, and it was more appropriate to speak of the West than of Europe; hence the paramount need arose for the defence of the Atlantic, to which the USA ultimately had to give an American stamp, also undertaking to conclude agreements on their own behalf with Spain, which had been excluded from the defence of the West thanks to the anti-Franco policy of certain States. Under these conditions the movement for European unity reappeared, with a marked tendency towards a federal solution. Nevertheless, as in the decade 1920–30, there were no lack of contrary considerations from those who asserted that present possibilities were limited, both territorially and morally. Morally, Europe was at the culmination of its divisions, especially as a result of the decisions of Yalta and the peace treaties of 1947. Territorially, because very few States were willing to constitute themselves as a Union; indeed, the latter arose on a far more limited basis than the Europe participating in the Atlantic defence, being reduced to Italy, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and western Germany (provided that the latter could overcome the opposition), while the two Iberian States remained outside, although they formed an integral and fundamental part of western Europe. This second attempt at E. U. came into being with the support of America and also of Great Britain, which, however, limited itself to the role of guarantor, once again asserting its character as a British Commonwealth with a worldwide basis and interests. In its practical achievements, too, the Union followed a new method. The Council of Europe collaborated with the Atlantic Community, of which it was essentially an episode, especially in the field of defence. It therefore began with a basic agreement of an economic-industrial nature and another of a defensive nature, in the awareness that Europe would be constituted through «concrete achievements».
The European Coal and Steel Community, established by the Treaty of Paris of 18 April 1951, aimed to create a common market, supplied and directed by a Community, an autonomous legal person organized with a High Authority (9 members), assisted by a Consultative Committee (from 30 to 51 members), under the control of an Assembly (18 members each for Germany, France and Italy; 10 for Belgium and Holland, and Luxembourg), with a mediating organ between the High Authority and the governments, represented by the Council of Foreign Ministers, and a Court (7 members) ensuring respect for the law in the interpretation and application of the treaty and the implementing regulations.
The European Defence Community (EDC) was established by the same States through the Treaty of Paris of 27 May 1952, in the spirit of the United Nations Charter and with purely defensive aims against any aggression. The EDC had a supranational character and comprised common institutions, a common budget and common armed forces (European defence forces). Powers of action and control were entrusted to a Commission (9 members). For purposes of control, the same Community Assembly of Coal and Steel was used, while coordination of the Commission’s action with that of the Governments was entrusted to a Council of representatives of the participating States. The Court of Justice was common to it and to the Community, and was to perform, in the relations governed by the EDC pact, the same functions. The pact of the Community ultimately became a basic pact for the future development of the Organization; indeed, it was considered appropriate to entrust the two bodies created with the drafting of the general structure of the Union as well. The latter currently operated in a provisional form through the representatives of the members of the participating States and of the Council of Foreign Ministers, so that it is pointless to dwell on the present situation. This was therefore an initial construction, limited both territorially and institutionally, arising within the framework of the UN, of which four of the unionist States were members; Italy and Germany lay outside II.
The relationship linking the EDC with the Atlantic Community was conventionally determined by a series of protocols extending the guarantees against aggression to Great Britain and linking European defence to Atlantic defence through coordination between the EDC and NATO. These protocols clearly revealed the nature and the episodic defensive scope of European defence in relation to Atlantic defence, despite the tendency—advocated by the U.S.A.—to make the defence of Europe autonomous.
The two complex Paris agreements represented only the beginning of the regulation of the E. U., which was to find further developments in the consortium for agriculture (the so-called «green pool»), whose structure was under discussion (Paris Conference, March 1953), and above all in the Treaty for the European Community, submitted on 9 March to the Council of the six Foreign Ministers for examination by the six governments.
Amedeo Giannini
UNIONE GIURISTI CATTOLICI ITALIANI (U. G. C. I.): V. OPERE CATTOLICHE COORDINATE ALL'AZIONE CATTOLICA ITALIANA.