COLOSSIANS, EPISTLE TO THE. — One of the "prison epistles," addressed by St. Paul to the faithful of Colossae (v.).
SUMMARY:
I. The content
II. The errors refuted
III. The occasion, place, and date of composition
IV. Authenticity.I. THE CONTENT
The prologue (1:1–14), in the customary greeting, introduces, with the expression "brothers who are faithful in Christ," a fundamental note of the letter: life in Christ, the Head of the mystical Body (1:1–2). This is followed by a thanksgiving to God, which is also a commendation of the community, which walks according to the teachings of Epaphras, "a beloved fellow servant" and "minister of Christ" (1:3–8); a wish for constant progress in the knowledge of God, in the second holiness of life, and in gratitude toward the Father, who has willed us to share in wonderful gifts through His "beloved Son" (1:9–14).The body of the letter can be divided into three parts: doctrinal exposition (1:15–25); refutation of the errors creeping into the community (2:6–3:4); moral application to the life of the Christian as a member of the mystical Body and of society (3:5–4:6).
1) The final remarks of the prologue introduce the doctrinal section (1:15–25), which illustrates the person and work of the Son, Head of all creation, and in particular of redeemed humanity. Following the exposition of these points comes a practical application, which allows St. Paul to touch on the mission entrusted to him: to proclaim the "mystery" revealed in Christ (1:21–25, 5).
The excellence of the Son (1:15–19) is first considered inasmuch as He is the perfect image of God and Head of creation (v. 15 ff), then inasmuch as He is Head of the Church and in Him dwells the fullness (πλήρωμα) of divine gifts (18 ff.).
The work of the Son is universal reconciliation, accomplished through the Cross (1:20). The recipients, who once were estranged from the divine economy, are now fully partakers of it, called by that gospel message of which Paul is the bearer (1:21 ff.). He, who contributes to the realization of God’s salvific plan through his own sufferings (1:24–27), has shown every solicitude even for the faithful of Colossae, Laodicea, and for all who, in general, have not benefited from his direct apostolic activity, aimed at making known to all the divine treasures hidden in Christ (1:28–2:3).
2) Moving to the second part (2:6–3:4), which is polemical, Paul warns against deceivers. He exhorts, in general, to adhere scrupulously to the doctrine received, without being misled by those who preach human traditions in place of the genuine teaching of Christ (2:6 ff.). In Him dwells the fullness of the Godhead, of which we have become partakers; not through useless carnal circumcision, but through Baptism, which is a mystical dying and rising with Christ; by virtue of the Cross, to which the handwriting against us, which was hostile, has been nailed (2:9–15).
In particular, the readers must not allow themselves to be deceived by those who insist on empty legalistic observances ("shadows" of things to come) or superstitious cults of angels, forgetting the Head, from which the whole body derives life and growth (2:16–19).
The Christian must regulate his conduct by the fact that he is dead, with Christ, to the "elements of the world" (2:20–23), and, with Christ, is risen to new life: hidden now, but destined to be manifested one day, glorious with Him (3:1–4).
3) The moral applications (3:5–4:6), derived from the doctrine of Christ as Head and of our life in the mystical Body, begin with a call to avoid vices that the Christian must shun by virtue of his vocation. From the metaphor of "putting off the old man" and "putting on the new" (3:9b–10), St. Paul moves on to positive exhortations, preceded by the solemn declaration that in the life in Christ every distinction of race, nationality, and culture is abolished (3:11). Above all, charity is recommended as the soul of Christian life. This must be lived joyfully, with the gaze fixed on Christ, in thanksgiving to the Father (3:12–17).
This is followed by teachings regarding the social conditions of the Christian (3:18–4:1): duties of wives toward husbands and of husbands toward wives (3:18 ff.), of children toward parents and vice versa (3:20 ff.). Slaves are exhorted to dignified obedience as servants of God, not of men; masters are reminded that they too have a Master in heaven (3:22–4:1).
Finally, persevering prayer is urged (also as cooperation in Paul’s apostolate) and exemplary wisdom, especially in speech (4:2–6).
In 4:7–18 there are personal notices and greetings. Tychicus and Onesimus will give the readers more detailed information (4:7 ff.). After the greetings of Paul’s collaborators and those addressed to the most prominent among the recipients (4:10–15), there follows the injunction to exchange letters between Colossae and Laodicea, the admonition to Archippus, the personal greeting, and final exhortations (4:16 ff.).
II. THE ERRORS REFUTED
The entire letter clearly aims to combat erroneous opinions spreading among the faithful of Colossae. However—being the most authoritative, if not the only, source—it does not provide sufficient elements for a rigorous determination.Aside from emphasizing the prerogatives of Christ as Head—suggesting errors and issues of a Christological nature—the letter speaks of the danger of being seduced by a false wisdom, based on human traditions, which takes account of the "elements of the world" and is not according to Christ, in whom dwells the fullness of the Godhead (2:8). To "carnal circumcision" is opposed "circumcision of Christ" (2:11). Through His own Cross, Christ has triumphed over the "principalities" and "powers" (2:15). Condemned are those who would impose on the faithful useless observances regarding foods, drinks, and sacred days, which once had a shadowy function of what was to come (2:16); those who, neglecting the Head from which the whole body derives life and growth, attempt to impose a superstitious cult of angels; and finally, those who accept arbitrary prescriptions of bodily austerities, they who are already dead, with Christ, to the "elements of the world" (2:18–23).
Among the errors spreading in Colossae were, then, a misguided cult of angels and ascetic practices such as abstaining from certain foods and drinks, suggesting a Jewish influence. This is clear in the opposition between "carnal circumcision" and "spiritual" or "of Christ" circumcision. But it does not seem that Jewish influence alone suffices to explain the errors refuted here. Nor does it appear that in Colossae circumcision was held to have substantial value, unlike the Judaizers of the Letter to the Galatians, for otherwise the rather mild tone used by Paul would not be understood.
With little probability it has been claimed that this epistle contains traces of Phrygian cults and of properly so-called Gnosticism. The cult of angels, in the thought of the new preachers, was not so much part of a philosophical-theological system as a complementary and harmless addition to the cult of Christ, perhaps as a defense against the cosmic forces to which angels were thought to be set over. It was an attempt at gross syncretism.
J. B. Lightfoot (*St. Paul's Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon*, 3rd ed., London 1879, pp. 82-98) highlighted hypothetical analogies between the dissimilar errors at Colossae and the doctrines of the Essenes, who, according to Flavius Josephus, accorded a place of honor to angels. But Lightfoot himself acknowledged that the analogies are insufficient to conclude a dependence. Nor is the hypothesis of an influence from Eastern religions and philosophies, or Stoicism (for the importance it attributed to the four elements of the cosmos and the stars), or the Neoplatonic and Pythagorean theories on the intermediary beings between God and the world plausible. Cf. E. Jacquier, *Histoire des livres du Nouveau Testament*, I, 10th ed., Paris 1924, p. 316 ff.
III. THE OCCASION, PLACE, AND DATE OF COMPOSITION
The occasion for the letter was a visit by Epaphras to Paul while he was imprisoned. It is not unlikely that Epaphras himself, given the threats to the purity of the faith, solicited a clarifying intervention from Paul.The bearer of the letter was Tychicus (4:7 ff.), who was also entrusted with delivering the letter to the Ephesians (Eph. 6:21 ff.); and Tychicus was accompanied by Onesimus, who carried the note to Philemon.
But during which imprisonment was the letter written? To answer this question, it is necessary to consider all the "prison epistles" and begin with the one to the Philippians, which (it seems certain) was written in Rome during the first imprisonment. For the others, the ancients did not think differently. Now, however, the vast majority of Protestants and a few Catholics distinguished between the Epistle to the Philippians and the other three, opining that these were written from Caesarea during the two years spent under the procurators Felix and Festus.
Only for about fifty years has a third opinion been advanced, first by Deissmann (*in Licht vom Osten*, 4th ed., Tübingen 1923, p. 201, n. 4—he claims to have put forward the idea in 1898), then by H. Lisco (*Vincula sanctorum*, Berlin 1900), with the agreement of a few, which would date the Epistle to the Colossians and the other three letters to a supposed imprisonment of Paul in Ephesus during the third missionary journey. The foundations for this are very flimsy. The text most often cited is 1 Cor. 15:32, which, if it were not a metaphor (cf. St. Ignatius M., *Rom.* 5:1), would support a trial and conviction, and consequently imprisonment. But, apart from the fact that the conviction could have resulted from a popular uprising without trial or imprisonment, if Paul had truly been condemned to the beasts, he would have lost that title of Roman citizenship, of which he would later make use and which would be recognized even after his stay in Ephesus (Acts 22:25-29; 25:10 ff., 21). Moreover, the Acts of the Apostles and 2 Cor. 11:23-29 are completely silent on this point, whereas in the series of trials endured by the Apostle, such a serious event would have had to be mentioned. Furthermore, Mark and Luke would not have been with Paul (contrary to Col. 4:10, 14; Phlm. 24) in the case of an Ephesian imprisonment, because the former was probably working with Peter in Rome at the time, and the latter does not narrate in the first person the events of the stay in Ephesus (Acts 19:1-20:1), as he usually does when he is present.
The choice remains between Caesarea and Rome. The main argument in favor of Caesarea is of a negative nature: the distance between Colossae and Caesarea was less than that between Colossae and Rome, making it easier for the fugitive Onesimus to reach Paul in Caesarea than in Rome. It is argued in opposition that the capital of the empire was the meeting place for all fugitives and outlaws, offering greater possibilities of remaining unnoticed there.
Another text adduced in favor of Caesarea is Col. 4:3, in which Paul asks for prayers so that he may be granted greater freedom for his apostolate. But even the relative freedom of the *custodia militaris* in Rome was very little for the apostolic zeal of Paul!
The silence of Paul regarding the earthquake that struck Laodicea and the surrounding region around AD 60-61 is not decisive in favor of Caesarea and a date prior to the beginning of the Roman imprisonment, as it is not certain that Colossae was severely affected. Moreover, the Apostle is habitually very sparing with news concerning contemporary profane history.
Positively, it should be noted that the circle of friends and guests surrounding Paul, according to the information in the Epistle to the Colossians and the other letters written around the same time, accords much better with the type of Roman imprisonment and the house rented in Rome (Acts 28:30 ff.) than with the prison in Caesarea.
As has already been mentioned, if the Roman origin of the epistle is accepted, the approximate date of composition is fixed at AD 61-62, although nothing certain can be determined about its precedence or otherwise over the other "prison epistles." Cf. E. Percy, op. cit. in bibliography, ch. 9.
IV. AUTHENTICITY
The outright denials of the Tübingen school having been overcome, the Pauline authorship of the epistle is accepted, not only by Catholic critics but also by many Protestants and rationalists. We limit ourselves to citing the most up-to-date among the latter, E. Percy, who defends the authenticity of the Epistle to the Colossians and that to the Ephesians, albeit with some reservations that do not affect the substance.The favorable opinion of tradition (implicit citations by the Apostolic Fathers; explicit attributions by St. Irenaeus, the Muratorian Fragment, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Eusebius; by heretics such as Marcion, Valentinus, and the Docetae, who abused the letter in defense of their own errors) is confirmed by good arguments of internal criticism or, at least, by the possibility of providing a satisfactory response to the objections of adversaries. Thus, if the language and style of this letter differ from those of the other Pauline epistles in certain respects, they also offer notable similarities, not only with the Epistle to the Philippians (generally considered Pauline) but also with the vocabulary and style of the major epistles. The peculiarities are often explained by the diversity of the topics addressed, by the novelty of the concepts, some of which are only hinted at in the other letters of St. Paul.
Nor should the doctrinal development of this epistle be opposed, nor the fact that the errors it combats spread only around the middle of the 2nd century; because, among other things, it is not easy to establish with certainty the nature of the errors that provoked this writing.
The obligation to observe the law creates in each person the duty to inform themselves about the laws that concern them and to use the necessary means to observe them. These positive obligations are all the more grave the more important the object of the law and the greater the moral or material harm of its violation.
On these principles is based the division of ignorance into invincible (morally not culpable) and vincible (culpable). The latter is all the more culpable the more serious was the obligation to correct it and the more accessible to the agent were the means to do so. Hence a distinction is drawn between directly willed ignorance (ignorantia affectata) and not willed; this latter may be light, grave, or crass (v. IGNORANZA).
Undoubtedly, no one can be held responsible for the normally unforeseeable effects of his action. If, however, they were foreseeable and ought to have been avoided, responsibility corresponds to the degree of negligence in procuring adequate information and in using the means capable of producing evil and harm.
Here the moralist encounters the difficult problem of the “double effect.” Human actions are set within a very complex network of necessary external influences or of free actions of other men. Indeed, the very complexity of the human person (body and soul, different parts with repercussions of one upon another) suffices to diversify the effects of an action. What will be the responsibility for these effects, generally not immediate, foreseen or unforeseen?
When to the consequences resulting directly and solely from the agent’s activity there is added one or several others due to an external cause, necessary or free, responsibility depends on the following conditions: the lawful or unlawful character of the principal action; the degree of connection between the action and the “double effect”; the proportion between the good that results immediately from the action and the harm caused by the double effect. The double effect is not imputable to the agent if his action was lawful, while the effect was accidental and not willed in itself, though foreseen; if there was between the good that results from the action and the harm caused by the double effect such a proportion that the agent had no obligation to prevent the effect.
The obligation to make restitution for harm caused by ignorance or negligence has its foundation in the positive obligation mentioned above (knowledge of the law; use of necessary means) and is proportionate to II. Although the effect was not willed in itself, nor even foreseen, it is nonetheless imputable to the agent’s will, which is presumed to have freely neglected to acquire the knowledge or to use the means that would have prevented the harm. The harm is willed in its cause or in its conditions.
The application of this principle gives rise to very delicate and much more complex problems in the moral sphere than in purely juridical solutions. It suffices to think of the obligation of the confessor, the physician, the pharmacist, the engineer who, through culpable lack of knowledge, have given false and harmful advice or directly caused harm by their intervention.
Distinction between restitution for harm and the public character of punishment.
As every primitive law, the law of the Germanic peoples considered first of all private harm, without concern for the degree of responsibility of the author. It exercised a certain influence on canon law in Germany and on the penitential books (v. PENITENZIAIRO, LIBRI). All, however, were in turn perfected under the influence of canon law and Roman law (A. Pertile, Storia del diritto italiano, V, 2nd ed., Turin 1892-93, ch. 1).
The solutions given today by moralists and canonists on the responsibility for the foreseen or unforeseen effects of our voluntary acts are the fruit of a centuries-old development due first of all to the decretists who paved the way for the theologians of the 13th century.
To explain conflicting decisions of several decretals and of particular councils, some canonists distinguished the forum Dei (moral forum) and the forum criminale (juridical forum). Others, to whom this opposition was displeasing, sought the solution in the contrast between the effects of lawful and unlawful acts. The author of an unlawful act had to be held responsible for all the harmful consequences of that act, even if they had been unforeseeable or if the agent had taken all the requisite precautions to avoid them (cf. I. Zeiger, De mutua inter theol. mor. et ius canon. habitudine, in Periodica, 21 [1942], pp. 333-5).
The doctrine gradually evolved, through discussions on vincible and invincible ignorance, toward modern “voluntarist” solutions. Little by little there also developed the theory of the “double effect,” which is of such great importance in moral theology (v. the discussion between A. Gemelli and A. Vermeersch, in Nou. rev. theol., 60 [1933], pp. 500 ff).
The concept of juridical guilt and the principles that govern it, especially in penal law, are even today the object of lively debate among jurists.
Common doctrine still admits that the foreseeability of harm constitutes an essential element of guilt. Yet some followers of Stoppato (Evenio punibile, Padua 1938) would, without success, substitute for it a more objective criterion, namely, the use in the voluntary act of unlawful means. The dispute continues also over the criterion that must determine the degree of guilt: how is the care to be defined that a diligent man or a father of a family takes of his interests? Why is this criterion applied, which does not consider the personal psychological conditions of the guilty party?
Another question: why is guilt punishable? Is the proper motive to be sought in the will of the agent or in social harm? Finally, there is also discussion about the possibility or impossibility of correction in culpable crimes.
The CIC clearly distinguishes dolus from culpa in penal matters. “The imputability of a delict depends on the dolus of the delinquent or on his culpa in ignorance of the law or in omission of obligatory diligence” (can. 2199). The Code admits proof of ignorance of the law or of the penalty; this mitigates the gravity of the delict; that mitigation diminishes imputability to the extent to which it can be justified (can. 2202).
When the harm was foreseen, though not directly willed, but was not prevented with the requisite precautions, some jurists think that we are faced with dolus and not with culpa. The CIC sees in this a grave culpa, close to dolus (can. 2203). The criterion of guilt is different according as the effect was foreseen or not; in the first case, the Code, following Roman law, requires “the precautions that every diligent man would have used”; in the other case, the judge must evaluate the degree of guilt, taking the circumstances into account.
It is important, however, to note that no ecclesiastical penalty is incurred, nor can it be imposed, unless there is grave moral culpa on the part of the delinquent (can. 2218 § 2). It need only be noted that this constitutes an essential difference from state penal law. This moral concern is shown in the fact that in the same Book V of the Code De delictis et poenis, the word culpa is very often used in the moral sense and not in the juridical sense; this is almost always the case in the expression: “pro gravitate culpae.”