POLYGENISM. – From the Greek πολυγονία = many and γένος = origin, it is the hypothesis that posits the present human race as deriving from multiple original pairs, whether they belong to a single already human stock (D. Rosa, G. Montandon, G. Colosi, P. Teilhard de Chardin) or to multiple already human stocks (H. Klaatsch, G. Sergi, G. L. Sera, J. Arndt). In the first case, we would have monophyletism; in the second, polyphyletism.
The pairs would have appeared simultaneously across the entire earth (ologenesis) or within a restricted area, or in clusters, or “per stirpe” (Sergi), or “a cespuglio” (A. and J. Bouvissonie). This hypothesis is attributed to Isaac de la Peyrère (1594–1676), a Marrano, Calvinist, and later Catholic, who, in order to reconcile the contradictions between biblical chronology and the literary sources of the Chaldeans, Egyptians, etc., as well as the demands of astronomy and astrology, and to explain the differences among human races—especially the American and Australian—devoted twenty years of indefatigable study to elaborating the theory of the pre-Adamites. Recently, though unknowingly, it has been followed by P. Lecomte du Noüy. Others embraced polygenism for scientific reasons: Desmoulins, Gerdy, Morton, Nott, Glidden; among moderns, Klaatsch (1910), G. Sergi (1911), Sera (1918), the ologenists, Teilhard de Chardin; and M. Calhoun for political reasons. Others, particularly among Catholics, endeavored to reconcile polygenism with the texts of Holy Scripture (J. Guitton, R. Boigelot, H. Rondet, Dubarle, A. and J. Bouvissonie, J. Bataini). However, the majority of scientists and Catholic writers oppose polygenism.
Isaac de la Peyrère (*Praeadamitae... s.l. 1655; Systema theologicum ex Praeadamitarum hypothesi, pars I, s.l. 1655*) bases his theory on Holy Scripture and finds in Genesis two distinct creations of humanity. The first, in Gen. 1:26–31, pertains to the pre-Adamites, executed together with that of plants and animals. The pre-Adamites would have been drawn from the dust by the “Word of God” simultaneously, across the whole earth, in innumerable pairs, so that they would not be brothers among themselves and are referred to in Scripture as “sons of men.” After the pre-Adamites had populated the earth, God would have created Adam “as an infant” and from Adam would have taken Eve (second creation: Gen. 2:2–25). Eve, having grown to adulthood, would have been led by God to Adam, who would not have found among the women of the pre-Adamites a helper suited to him.
The creation of Adam would differ from that of the pre-Adamites because it was made from the very earth from which Adam himself was taken and “by the hand (not by the word) of God, and subjected to his dominion.” The descendants of Adam would be called “sons of God” and “sons of Adam.” To them would belong Cain, Ham, Ishmael, Esau, and the Jews. They would be descendants of Adam in the same way that Christ is presented as the son of Adam and of God (Lk. 3:23–38). The descendants of the pre-Adamites would be the Gentiles, the Americans, the Australians, the Greenlanders, and the household slaves of Abraham (Gen. 17:22, 27). To the pre-Adamites, God would have given only the natural law without sanction or imputability; to Adam, the positive law with its corresponding sanction. Adam would have been placed in the earthly paradise to represent all men, so that his sin would be imputed to all humanity, including the pre-Adamites.
De la Peyrère derives his principal argument from Rom. 5:12–14, interpreted in a wholly arbitrary manner (see the exposition and refutation in B. Mariani, *Il P. e S. Paolo: Rom. 5, 12–14*, in *Euntes docete*, 4 [1951], pp. 126–45). De la Peyrère’s system was condemned by ecclesiastical authority, repudiated by the author himself, and opposed by all his contemporaries. Even P. Lecomte du Noüy distinguishes two creations in Genesis. According to Gen. 1:26–28, a pair would have been created possessing only human form but lacking a soul and consciousness. Indeed, God would have given them the command “Be fruitful and multiply,” from which they could not refrain. According to Gen. 2:7–25 (the eighth day, according to Lecomte), God would have formed Adam, breathed a soul into him through his nostrils, and imparted consciousness. Indeed, God would have given him a command that he was free to transgress, forbidding him, under penalty of death, to eat of the forbidden fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Scripture would concern itself only with the descendants of Adam because “he alone, by virtue of his consciousness, is capable, through his struggle against animal instincts, of ensuring properly human progress.”
This theory also lacks any biblical foundation, since Genesis speaks not of two creations but only of two accounts of the same creation. Nor can the influence of the soul and consciousness be confined to the second humanity. On the contrary, it is the first humanity of which it is said that it was created in the image and likeness of God, whereas it was the second that fell into sin! (cf. B. Mariani, cited article, pp. 132–36).
Catholic authors who attempt to reconcile the texts of Holy Scripture with polygenism and the dogma of original sin maintain: a) that Rom. 5:12–21 emphasizes primarily “the universal and hereditary liability of humanity and the fullness of redemption,” rather than the common origin of humanity (A. and J. Bouyssone). b) That Genesis does not deal with a strictly unique sin. More than the uniqueness of the sin, stress is placed on the decline produced by sin (Dubarle; cf. Teilhard de Chardin, Guitton, Boigelot; Ronde, Chaine). c) Original sin would have been committed by an entire hypothetical humanity contemporary with Adam (A. and J. Bouyssone, R. Seeberg). d) The Adam–Christ parallel (Rom. 5) would have merely illustrative value (Bataini). e) Others tend to minimize the historical value of the early chapters of Genesis. Yet all these authors acknowledge that their attempts depart from the obvious and traditional interpretation of the texts in question and that their motivation is the desire—
But it is possible to reconcile the sources of Revelation with the presumed findings of the sciences.
That present-day humanity descends from a single ancestor, from a single original pair, from the biblical Adam and Eve, can be demonstrated from Holy Scripture and Tradition. They firmly teach monogenism and thus exclude polygenism (v. MONOGENISM and B. Mariani, cited article, pp. 126–132, 136–45).
Genesis is polygenist with regard to inferior beings: God created them “according to their kinds.” Man, however, was created according to a most perfect, unique kind, namely “in the image and likeness of God” (Gen 1:26–27). The pair Adam-Eve is connected with the creative work of God and with the historical succession of humanity through the links of the genealogies of the Patriarchs (v.) both ante- and post-diluvian. Apart from Adam—according to Genesis—God created no other man; apart from Eve, He drew no other woman from Adam. Adam is considered “the prototype” of the “tragic” “dogma,” the only one created, the door of the earth, the seed from which all humanity descends (Wis 10:1; 7:1; Tob 8:8). From a single woman sin begins (Sir 25:24). Humanity is a conglomerate of “the sons of Adam” (Deut 32:8; Sir 3:21, etc.). The texts of the New Testament: Rom 5:12, 19; 1 Cor 15:21–22, 45–49; Acts 17:26 depend on Genesis and are more explicitly opposed to polygenism (on this see B. Mariani, cited article, pp. 137–46, 1932; F. Cueppens, *Le polygénisme et la Bible*, in *Angelicum*, 24 [1947], pp. 20–32). They exclude the collective origin of humanity and implicitly or explicitly connect it to a single man, by reason of original sin and its consequences and of the “psychic” body that is inherited through carnal descent from Adam.
The Pontifical Biblical Commission and the Vatican Council are opposed to polygenism. In *Humani generis* it is condemned only insofar as polygenism maintains that: 1) Adam would not be the ancestor through generation of all present-day mankind; and 2) it considers Adam not as a single individual but as a collectivity of progenitors. This is because it cannot be reconciled with the dogma of the universality of original sin. If indeed humanity does not descend through generation from Adam, it would not contract II. It therefore concerns itself neither with pre-Adamites extinct before Adam, nor with beings not truly human, even if introduced into present-day humanity, nor with men contemporary with Adam, except insofar as progenitors through generation of present-day humanity. The scientist is therefore free to explore that sector, guided by Holy Scripture and the doctrine of the Church.
The arguments of the sciences in favor of polygenism are drawn: 1) from the vastness of the human race: “Science itself would never (that is the least one can say) attribute so narrow a basis as two individuals to the enormous edifice of the human race” (Teilhard de Chardin, *Que faut-il penser du transformisme?*, in *Revue des questions scientifiques*, 97 [1930], p. 93). 2) From comparative anthropology: a) the similarity between animal species and human races is greater than that existing among human races themselves; b) differences among human races: a) morphological: shape of the head, nose, eyes, hair, proportions of the trunk and limbs, skin color, etc., by which, for example, Pygmies differ from Scandinavians, Australians from Eskimos, Mongols from Mediterraneans, etc.; b) physiological: a) the presence of four groups of individuals distinguished by variations in agglutinins and agglutinogens that permit or hinder mutual blood transfusions; b) pubertal periods that begin not at the same age but range from a minimum of 9–10 years to 20–21; c) psychic: quickness and type of intelligence, intensity of affectivity, eroticism, etc. Formerly, the white race was derived from the chimpanzee, the yellow from the orangutan, the black from the gorilla. Klaatsch placed at the base of the genealogical tree a hypothetical *Propithecanthropus* that would have branched out thus: 1) Australian men + related races; 2) *Pithecanthropus* + gibbon; 3) Neanderthal man + gorilla + chimpanzee + pygmies; orangutan + *Homo Aurignacensis* (cf. H. V. Vallois, *Les preuves anatomiques de l’origine monophylétique de l’homme*, in *L’Anthropologie*, 39 [1929], cited by Marcozzi, *Poligenesi ed evoluzione nelle origini dell’uomo*, in *Gregorianum*, 29 [1948], p. 348; id., *La vita e l’uomo*, Milan 1946, p. 360). Even greater differences are found in fossil man, between the type of *Homo sapiens*, *Pithecanthropus*, *Sinanthropus*, and Neanderthal man. 3) From biogeography. Biogeography would show that at a given moment human life appears everywhere, therefore not from a single pair.
Yet it is not difficult to answer these arguments. Indeed: 1) today the unity of origin for all human races now living is commonly admitted. According to Mendelian laws of heredity, a new phylum can originate not only from a few individuals but even from a single one, through chromosomes (P. Leonardi, in *Palestra del Clero*, 28 [1949], pp. 228–30; cf. Cuenot, J. Rostand, cited by René). 2) The similarities between human races and animal species are very limited (configuration of the lacrimal bone and adjacent facial regions, particulars of the femur and humerus). They are not complete and are found in conflict even within the same individual (cf. H. V. Vallois, op. cit.; Guy Picard, *La science expérimentale est-elle favorable au polygénisme?*, in *Sciences ecclésiastiques*, 4 [1951], pp. 68–70; Mendès Correa, cited there). The morphological, physiological, and psychic differences are quantitative rather than qualitative and do not give rise to specifically different forms or characters but show all possible forms of transition not only among different races and different individuals of the same group. For example, with regard to skin color, the leucoderms range from the white-red of Norwegians to the dark brown, almost black, of Ethiopians. The xanthoderms range from the light yellow, almost white, of northern Chinese to the yellow-brown, almost chocolate, of southern Chinese. The same can be said of hair color, eye color, head shape, nose shape, pigment spots, cranial capacity, brain structure, etc. (cf. Marcozzi, *Poligenesi ed evoluzione*, pp. 10–15). The classification of growth rhythm, puberty period, blood groups is also found within types of the same race (cf. the classification of Ottermberg cited by Marcozzi, op. cit., p. 16).
The psychic differences are less favorable to polygenism, since it is demonstrated that all races have a substantially equal psyche, that is, they possess the same principles of causality and identity, the same tendency toward the beautiful and the good, the same instinctive language, the same instinct for modesty, the same faculty of speech, etc. (in opposition: M. Canella, *Principi di psicologia razziale*, Florence 1941; but cf. Marcozzi, *La vita e l’uomo*, Milan 1946, pp. 367–68). Therefore, this is in favor of a unity of origin. So too is the proof of inter-fertility. Since all unions, even between the most disparate races, have produced fertile hybrids, for example, the Boers, a cross between Dutch and Hottentots; the Griqua, of Europeans and Bushmen, etc. Moreover, among all races there are types with all or almost all the characteristics of other racial groups, for example, negroid or mongoloid faces among European populations, European faces in Celebes, etc.
It is more difficult to pronounce on the differences among extinct races because there are not sufficient control data available. However, races from the Paleolithic onward (Grimaldi, Cro-Magnon, Chancelade, Combe Capelle, etc.) are substantially equal to present ones both morphologically and psychically (burial, weapons, religious rites). It is true that the Neanderthal race presents very primitive characteristics, but these are also found in a more attenuated form in the races of today (cf. K. Z. Jazuta, in Marcozzi, op. cit., p. 21). Their psychic manifestations are common to other races. As for the Pithecanthropus, his human nature is not certain. The Sinanthropus has a more simian form, though it presents human psychic characteristics. Moreover, the forms of the Africanthropus (Lake Niaras), the Ngandong man (Java) may be considered intermediate between the Sinanthropus and the Neanderthal type. Similarly, intermediate forms between Neanderthal and present races are the types of Steinheim, Uzbekistan, the skeletons of Carmel, and the Sacco Pastore skull (cf. H. Weinert, W. F. F. Oppenroth, F. Berckheimer, G. T. Debez, Th. D. Mc Cowan, A. Keith-Mc Cowan in Marcozzi, p. 23).
The question of polygenism assumes that living beings, appearing independently and dispersed like dewdrops, would have been of a single species and that, through evolution, they would have been transformed simultaneously and everywhere, giving rise to new species. Even the human family would have appeared with many representatives in various places. Its remains would be the oldest surviving fossils. However, paleontology shows the opposite, namely that the origin of a species is confined to a place from which it emigrates at a later time (e.g., the Camelidae and the Dugongs). Many species have never had any notable expansion. With regard to man, it cannot be established whether the Sinanthropus (Peking), the Kanam man (Africa), and the Piltdown man (England) were contemporary in the Lower Pleistocene.
The Quaternary spans periods of many thousands of years. Nor can it be established whether the Lower Pleistocene of Africa corresponds exactly to the Lower Pleistocene of England and Peking, and vice versa.
On the contrary, it is commonly admitted that humanity had a cradle of origin and a center of diffusion, like other species.
In conclusion, arguments in favor of polygenism serve as study hypotheses for the sciences. In the purely human sphere, there are for now no means to determine whether humanity had a polygenetic or monogenetic origin. Science cannot oppose anything to the monogenetic origin. The vast majority of scientists favor monogenism. Indeed, P. C. J. Carles (L'unité de l'éphèse humaine, in Archives de philos., 18 [1948], 88 ff.) goes so far as to posit a single pair. However, where human science does not reach, the guidance of Revelation intervenes: Holy Scripture and the infallible Magisterium of the Church (cf. Guy Picard, op. cit., p. 88 ff.; Marcozzi, op. cit., p. 25).