Love

LOVE. - An inclination to take delight in the good that has been chosen as fitting.

I. CONCEPT

We distinguish sensitive love and love of the will. The first, common to man and beast, comes from the sensitive appetite or sensibility, and aims at the sensible good. The second comes from our spiritual will, enlightened by the intelligence (rational appetite): it could be called spiritual love, were it not often inordinate, as happens when it aims unreasonably at sensible goods, preferring them to spiritual ones.

Sensitive love is the movement of the sensitive appetite, the first among the passions; thus the beast is moved toward the food it needs; there follow desire, joy, hope, daring, or else hatred for what is contrary, aversion, sadness, despair, fear, anger. Cf. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. 1ª 2ªe, qq. 22-28.

In our will we must distinguish love of concupiscence or of craving, with which we desire a good, from love of benevolence, with which we wish good to another person. Love of concupiscence is not necessarily disordered; we are permitted to desire the bread necessary for our sustenance, subordinating it to ourselves; and we may also desire God, the supreme good, subordinating ourselves to him: Christian hope, which makes us desire to possess God eternally, although it is inferior to charity, is not in the least disordered. Love of benevolence deserves the name of friendship (v.), when it is reciprocated and manifested with thoughts, will and common activities.

In one of his finest dialogues (Symposium, 211 c), Plato says that we must raise ourselves from the love of sensible beauty to that of supreme beauty, through the following ladder: from a single beautiful body to two, from two to all others, from beautiful bodies to beautiful actions, to beautiful principles, and from these then to the beautiful sciences, until, from science to science, we shall have arrived at the science par excellence, which is the science of beauty in itself, which we shall contemplate as it is in itself, that is, subsisting eternally.

These concepts, explained by Plato and by Aristotle (Eth. Nic., IX, 9), give a glimpse of a great problem, that of disinterested love and of its relations with our primordial inclination. The study of the problem of love and of the principal solutions proposed by philosophers and theologians will help in understanding the Christian doctrine of charity (v.), that is, of disinterested love of God and of neighbor.

II. THE PROBLEM OF LOVE AND ITS DIFFICULTIES

This problem is formulated by St. Thomas (Sum. Theol., 2a-2ae, q. 26, a. 3, 2nd objection) in the following difficulty concerning our love of God: "Everything that is loved by us is loved in the manner of our own good; now that which is the reason for the love is loved more than the object of this love, just as the principles by which we know conclusions are more known than these. Man therefore loves himself more than any other good loved by him, and for this reason cannot arrive at loving God more than himself." The same difficulty is proposed in another form: "Nature always returns upon itself" (1a, q. 60, a. 5, 3rd objection). The problem of love thus presents itself as follows: is truly disinterested love possible, and if it is possible, in what relation does it stand to the love of ourselves?

This problem is analogous to that of knowledge. After having asked in what way the knower can reach, beyond his own impressions, realities distinct from himself (adquidi aliud a se), that which is true in itself and universally, independently of us, we seek to know how we can love that which is good in itself independently of us, and in what way we can love others with a love that is not subordinated to the desire for our own good. Is pure love for others, and first of all for God, possible, and, if it is, in what relation does it stand to our desire for personal happiness? Thus the problem was well formulated by the Jesuit P. Rousselot, Pour l'histoire du problème de l'amour, p. 1.

III. SUBJECTIVISM AND PANTHEISM

Two diametrically opposed philosophical solutions were given to the problem defined above, both of them extreme: the subjectivist one and that of pantheistic realism. Subjectivism, which denies or calls into doubt the objective value of our intelligence and therefore also of its object, that is, of extra-mental being or of the real, likewise fails to recognize the rights of the object of the will, that is, the good, and in particular the right of the Supreme Good to be loved more than anything else. In antiquity the sophists and the skeptics represented this tendency, which is proper to modern subjectivists.

It leads, as is obvious, to utilitarianism, such as that of Stuart Mill, or at least to a certain love of human dignity, which claims to have no special obligation toward God, as if he were not the Creator of every good and the Supreme Good. Kant, while maintaining that morality presupposes absolute disinterestedness and has nothing to do with the desire for happiness, which he wrongly reduces to what, together with Rousseau, he calls "sensibility," does not rise to the idea of the love of God for God, because he does not admit that man has special duties toward God. This is the cult of the human person. While he formulates the principle of the autonomy of the will, Kant maintains that man must prescribe to himself the law he obeys. With subjectivism, man remains enclosed within himself and cannot go beyond respect for his own personal dignity, which aspires to be prolonged into the future life.

The radically opposite and equally erroneous solution is that of absolute realism, which confuses the being of things or universal being with the being of God, the universal good with the divine good, and thus leads to pantheism: everything is absorbed in God and is identified with God; the proper existence of created things is denied.

Such was, in antiquity, the doctrine of Parmenides, and, in modern times, the pantheistic ontologism of Spinoza, which implies the denial of personal beatitude and is content with impersonal immortality, entirely different from that of which the Christian faith speaks. For Spinoza the intellectual love of oneself and the love of God are one and the same thing; indeed this love would be identified with the uncreated love that God has for himself; God is to be loved in us with a necessary love, which excludes free will, and therefore also sin and merit (cf. Ethica, V, prop. 36). In this pantheism the reasonable love of oneself turns out to be an inferior form of the love of God, while the love of God is a superior form of the love of oneself.

In Hegelian pantheism, on the other hand, which does not absorb things in God but rather absorbs God in the universal evolution, and maintains that God is making himself in the world and in us, the love of oneself, when it is fruitful, is likewise identified with God who is becoming; the accomplished fact is thus identified with right, success with morality, which is always in evolution.

IV. HERESIES: PSEUDO-NATURALISM AND PELAGIAN NATURALISM

Catholic theologians have not gone so far astray as to accept the two solutions above, although the nominalists of the 14th century came quite close to subjectivist principles (cf. Denz-U., n. 553 ff.), and Master Eckhart (v.) seems to have reached almost the limits of pantheism (ibid., n. 526 ff.). But, from the theological point of view, there are two opposite errors to be avoided.

If we admit that the primordial tendency of every created nature is the love of its own good, this tendency will always stain our love of God with egoism; this love will in fact not be sufficiently pure, nor will it be able to become so except through the destruction, in some way, by grace, of our nature, and the demand for the sacrifice of our personal happiness. This theory appears in a certain affective subjectivism, affirmed by Fénelon (Denz-U., nn. 1328-36). In that case grace, which would so to speak destroy nature, would be a remedy very harsh for its deficiencies, as Baius and the Jansenists affirmed (Denz-U., n. 1038). One thus arrives at "pseudo-supernaturalism."

If, on the other hand, we admit that our nature impels us to love God in himself more than ourselves, grace does not appear absolutely indispensable for attaining this, and thus one inclines toward Pelagian naturalism, which recalls the pantheistic confusion of our nature with that of God. Grace would then be necessary only in order to fulfill more easily the precepts that the love of God above all things and more than ourselves imposes, an affirmation that is precisely that of the Pelagians (Denz-U., nn. 105, 178 ff.).

What, then, is the primordial inclination that is essential to our natural will? Would it be the love of our personal beatitude, or the natural love of God, or at least that of truth and justice, loved in themselves more than ourselves and more than the particular perfection they give? The true solution to this problem, examined by the great medieval theologians, and later by Bossuet and Fénelon, would contain, if we were able to formulate it adequately, the entire theology and metaphysics of love.

Here the solution given, in mystical form and with often metaphorical words, by St. Bernard and by Richard of St. Victor is set forth, and then that of St. Thomas is examined. In truth they do not differ substantially, the first being rather a sketch, the second instead a definitive treatment on account of the precise terms with which the Angelic Doctor replaces the metaphors.

V. DOCTRINE OF ST. BERNARD AND OF RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR

These two great mystics, in their commentaries on the Song of Songs, the Psalms, and the Epistles of St. Paul, gave a description of ardent love, of its disinterestedness, of its violence and its holy follies, affirming that it suffices by itself, even without the personal joy of possessing the beloved object. Both insist more particularly on pointing out that the only perfect love, truly worthy of the name, is the love of friendship, with which one loves another person not for one's own sake, but for that person's sake. Therefore love of self becomes perfect only when one loves oneself for God, going out, so to speak, from oneself in order to go toward God.

Love of neighbor, and above all love of God, is such as to draw us outside ourselves; as it intensifies it becomes violent and demands with holy madness the elimination of all self-love, while it satisfies us more than all other things in the world, since it unites us to God. This love "wounds" the one who loves and "makes him die to himself," causing him at the same time to live for others, and impelling him to "go out of himself" and to give himself generously. It requires interior immolation, the martyrdom of the heart, which all the saints have known, as well as the mystical death of which the Gospel speaks in the parable of the grain about to germinate. Love is so strong as to bring about this blessed death, by destroying everything that is contrary to it: "Fortis est ut mors dilectio" (St. Bernard, De diligendo Deo, ch. 15: PL 182, 998; In Cantica Cantic., sermo LXXXIII, 4-5: PL 183, 1183; VIII, 8: ibid. 814; LXXIX: ibid. 1163).

Richard of St. Victor develops this thought in his famous little work De quattuor gradibus violentae caritatis (PL 196, 1196 ff., 1213-15: "At the first degree of love the soul cannot resist its own desire; at the second degree it thinks of it without cease; at the third it no longer takes pleasure in anything else; at the fourth and supreme degree its desire can no longer be satisfied. In other words, at the first degree love is invincible, at the second it is tormenting, at the third exclusive, at the fourth insatiable... These four degrees of love differ from one another according as it is a matter of love toward God or of human affections... As regards spiritual desires, the stronger the love, the better it is. In carnal desires it becomes worse as it increases...; love is then transformed into hatred, because nothing can satisfy the mutual passion. Therefore hatred becomes implacable in the measure in which love had seemed ardent... On the contrary, as regards our feelings toward God, the fourth degree is the most praiseworthy."

According to St. Bernard and Richard, ardent love draws us outside ourselves, not without violence, commits holy follies, and satisfies us more than all the things of the world because it unites us to God. Neither the one nor the other asks us to sacrifice future beatitude; on the contrary, both affirm that the love that unites us to God aspires to an ever more intimate union with him.

This concept of love, however, involves a difficulty. It emphasizes the generosity and purity of the love of the great servants of God, but it does not sufficiently clarify the relation of this disinterested love to love of ourselves, which seems to be an indestructible inclination of our nature. The second part of the problem of love, intimately connected with the first, thus does not appear to be resolved; a more penetrating study of the problem and of the primary notions it implies is required.

VI. DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS

St. Thomas, who knew perfectly the theory of St. Bernard and of Richard, admits that the love of God, when it is intense, draws us outside of ourselves, not without violence, that it commits holy follies and that it unites us to God in this life more than any other act whatsoever. He asks, however, how this union, so restful, is to be reconciled with the violence of love, if this is substantial in the love of others and never accidental and transitory. In other words: in what way would charity procure peace and even joy, if there were no conformity, that is, harmony between it and our deepest natural inclinations and aspirations? All the more so since we must love ourselves in a supernatural way and will eternal life out of charity. And finally, is not the legitimate natural love of ourselves, in the primordial inclination of our nature, already subordinate to the natural love of God, creator and preserver of our being? This most important part of the problem, examined neither by St. Bernard nor by Richard, was explored in depth by St. Thomas (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ, q. 60, a. 5, and 2ᵃ-2ᵃᶜ, q. 26, a. 3; q. 19, a. 6).

The Angelic Doctor establishes, without any affinity with pantheism, that any created nature, first of all when it is endowed with intelligence and will, is naturally inclined to love God, its author, more than itself, just as in an organism any part naturally loves the whole of it more than itself, in such a way that, for example, the hand sacrifices itself spontaneously in order to protect the head. If it were otherwise, our primordial natural inclination would be perverse, which is not possible, since it comes from God. St. Thomas likewise illustrates the immense distance between this natural love of God, author of nature, and the supernatural love of God, considered in his intimate life, as author of grace (1ᵃ, q. 12, a. 4, 5; q. 62, a. 2; 1ᵃ-2ᵃᶜ, q. 5, a. 5; q. 62, a. 1; q. 109). In this way he raises himself above Pelagian or Semi-Pelagian naturalism, as well as above "pseudo-supernaturalism."

This is the principle of a doctrine of love founded not only on the distinction of the persons who love one another, and on the necessity of overcoming egoism, but also on our very nature, which has God as its author. Therefore St. Thomas does not set aside our natural inclinations in the problem of the order of charity, but on the contrary demonstrates that this supernatural virtue perfects them by elevating them to a higher order. There is therefore no need to ask whether pure love (v.) must sacrifice the desire for our personal beatitude, because this desire, as it exists in the essence of the primordial inclination of our nature, is not disordered, but on the contrary is initially subordinate to the love of God. This natural desire must be purified of everything that contaminates it, beginning with original sin, in order then to be sublimated, but never destroyed. The sacrifice of our beatitude would moreover be contrary even to the nature of charity, which unites us with God and desires to persevere in this union for God's own sake.

The principle, then, on which the solution of the problem of love is based is the following: by our nature we are inclined to love God more than ourselves, the creator and preserver of our being. This inclination is weakened by original sin and by personal sins, yet it subsists as does our nature.

It follows that while man duly loves the higher part of himself, he at the same time loves his Creator even more; therefore if he ceased to will his own perfection, he would come to turn away from God. While material goods, which cannot belong simultaneously to several persons, divide them, spiritual goods, on the other hand, which can belong simultaneously to all, are an element of union; therefore men ought to unite in the love of truth, of justice, in the love of God.

St. Thomas's solution is therefore the following: disinterested love is possible, indeed profoundly natural, since our nature leads us to love God more than ourselves. It must be admitted, however, that a love is impossible which would make us go completely outside of ourselves, and which would not be compatible with the primordial inclination of our nature toward the good, that is, toward our own good, subordinate to the supreme Good, loved in itself more than all other goods.

Our nature leads us to love God, not by subordinating him to us, but on the contrary by subordinating ourselves to him. One cannot duly love oneself without loving God still more, with a pure and disinterested love. On the other hand, one cannot love God without loving oneself in him (2ᵃ-2ᵃᶜ, q. 19, a. 6). Grace and infused charity perfect and elevate this natural inclination of the will, but do not destroy it, just as grafting does not destroy the vitality of the tree onto which it is done (v. CARITÀ).

François de Sales, Lyon 1941. - E. Gilson and H. D. Simonin rightly judge that there is less difference than Father Rousselot asserted between the concept of love proposed by St. Bernard and that of St. Thomas, which has remained classic in theology.

Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange