LUIGI XIV of Bourbon, king of FRANCIA. — Born at St-Germain-en-Laye on 5 Sept. 1638 to King Luigi XIII and Anna d’Austria, daughter of Filippo III, king of Spain; died at Versailles on 1 Sept. 1715. He married Maria Teresa, daughter of Filippo IV, king of Spain, and subsequently secretly married Mme de Maintenon (1683); his only legitimate son was the Grand Dauphin, who predeceased him in 1711. His childhood was a sad one, spent with parents who were little in accord; king in name from 14 May 1643, proclaimed of age at fourteen amid the flights and disorders of the Fronde, he did not exercise his authority until the death of Mazzarino (9 March 1661). Mazzarino’s disappearance enabled him to begin in peace the organization of that absolute monarchy which, modified by circumstances and by the character of his successors, endured in its principal features until 1789. In judging the work of L. XIV, it is not right to forget the responsibility of the nation which, flattered in its pride, applauded its king in projects that later proved deplorable; this was so, for example, in ecclesiastical affairs. L. XIV nevertheless sometimes moderated the excessive proposals of the Parlements.
As soon as he took the reins of government, amid the Court’s incredulous astonishment, L. XIV made it known that henceforth nothing was to be done in the kingdom without his order; the era of first ministers was over. In fact, he personally exercised power; three ministers formed the Council of State, or Conseil d’en haut: initially, the chancellor Michel Le Tellier, H. de Lionne, secretary for Foreign Affairs, and N. Fouquet, superintendent of Finances. The latter was shortly afterward replaced by Colbert, and in 1666 the chancellor was succeeded by his son, the marquis de Louvois, minister of War. With these three men of bourgeois origin, during the first decades the king made the major decisions of foreign and domestic policy.
The best-known and most censured aspect of L. XIV’s policy was certainly that directed toward creating French primacy in Europe—as had already been attempted under Enrico IV, Richelieu, and Mazzarino—but with broader means, plans, and men more highly prepared in the arts of war and diplomacy, and in the face of a Europe that was initially very weak but slowly organized resistance against this growing ambition, which would ultimately be contained and humiliated. Moreover, the Spanish marriage of L. XIV was already intended, even in the wording of the contract, to serve a probable succession; the first opportunity was offered by Flanders, which extended so deeply into the kingdom, under the pretext of the private right of devolution locally invoked. At the death of Filippo IV, in 1667, L. XIV occupied twelve cities, including Lille, which he was able to retain in the Peace of Aachen (Apr. 1668), imposed by the Anglo-Dutch-Swedish alliance, while returning Franche-Comté (Besançon), which he had easily conquered. L. XIV’s and France’s indignation then turned against Holland, the author of the league; diplomatically isolated by England and Sweden, it was invaded in 1672 in the famous crossing of the Rhine (12 June) at Toll-Huys, celebrated by poets and painters. The European reaction was extensive and, rather than against Holland, L. XIV had to fight against the Empire and a strong European coalition; Messina, which had rebelled against Spain in 1674, was occupied and then abandoned to Spanish vengeance in the Peace of Nijmegen (Aug.–Sept. 1678 with Holland and Spain), in which L. XIV retained Franche-Comté and cities in Flanders (Cambrai, Valenciennes, etc.); conquests of French territory, but ones that aroused the profound resentment of the Dutch.
