Vow

VOW. - From voveo, with the meaning of a promise, the object promised, a sacrifice made to fulfill a promise, and also a gratuitous donation made to God: it is the deliberate promise, made to God of a better good that is possible to be morally realized (CIC, 1307).

I. NATURE

In the definition sketched above are contained the elements necessary to determine its nature: 1) In saying that the vow is a promise, its essentially obligatory nature is implicitly indicated, whereby it differs from the simple intention to do something in honor of the divinity. By this nature of its own, the votive promise is compared to law, whose property it is to be essentially obligatory. Therefore a vow that does not have this obligatory nature cannot be called a vow; 2) Since it is a promise directed to God, it follows that the vow is essentially an act of the worship of latria. Vows directed to the saints retain this character, if at least implicitly in the saints one intends to honor God, insofar as they are united with him and dependent on him.

Whoever makes a vow must act with full knowledge of the votive obligation and of what is promised by the vow. If this knowledge is doubtful, the existence of the vow also becomes doubtful, with the moral consequences that hold and are applied in doubtful cases. Vows made by those who do not have the perfect use of reason, such as children, the insane, etc., have no obligatory force. But even when knowledge is sufficient, the vow may not exist, if it is not made freely. For this reason, too, vows made through gravely unjust causes of violence or fear are considered null even juridically.

Regarding the object of the votive promise, it is commonly required: a) that it be physically and morally attainable. Therefore everything that exceeds physical possibilities and does not fall under the full dominion of each person could not be the matter of a vow; nor could that which morally exceeds human possibilities (as, for example, the promise to avoid any imperfection even undeliberate, except in the case of a particular privilege, as in the Blessed Virgin); b) that it be not only honest, or simply indifferent, but also better than the opposite, in the sense, that is, that, all circumstances considered, it is morally better to make that votive promise than not to make it, and that the object promised be better than the directly opposite object. For this reason a vow is not valid concerning an action whose omission is in itself morally better than its performance, and in this sense a vow to contract marriage is in itself not valid, because, as St. Paul says (1 Cor. 7:38): « Qui matrimonio iungit virginem suam, bene facit: et qui non iungit, melius facit ».

II. DIVISION

The vow is ordinarily divided: 1) with respect to its object, into: personal, if an action is promised that must be performed personally by the one making the vow himself; real, if the object of the vow-promise is a thing; mixed, if the same object comprises both an action and a thing; 2) with respect to duration, into temporary or perpetual, according as the promise is extinguished within a determined time or instead lasts for one's whole life; 3) with respect to the manner in which it is made, into: absolute, if the vow-promise is made without any restriction, and conditional, if the fulfillment of the promise is made to depend on some condition; in this connection one also customarily speaks of a penal vow, if the condition attached is a penalty to be expiated (pure, if only the penalty falls under the vow-promise; mixed, if an action is promised and also a penalty in the event of transgression of the promise); 4) with respect to the form and the juridical effects connected with it, into: public and private, according as it is accepted by the legitimate superior in the name of the Church or not (cf. also can. 1308, § 1); simple or solemn, according as it is considered simple or solemn by the Church (can. 1308, § 2); 5) with respect to the ecclesiastical authority that can dispense from it, into: reserved, if it can be dispensed only by the Apostolic See; non-reserved, if other lower prelates can also dispense from it (can. 1308, § 3).

It is always presupposed that the vow is made prudently, because if someone were morally conscious that the making of the vow would become for him a certain and continuous occasion of sin, then the vow would be for him more a harm than a good. Theologically, moreover, the goodness of the votive act is ascribed to the virtue of religion. Indeed, already in a text of Is. 19:21 the making of vows and their fulfillment is expressly placed among the ways of honoring God; and this belongs precisely to the virtue of religion (v.). The one making the vow implicitly recognizes by his vow that God has care of created things and that one must have recourse to Him in necessities; and this is already a rendering of honor to God and to His Providence.

III. VOTIVE OBLIGATION

As has been mentioned, there can be no vow without the existence also of the votive obligation. This is evident from Sacred Scripture (cf., e.g., Eccl. 5:3-4) and from theological tradition. It is also customarily taught that such an obligation admits of lightness of matter, inasmuch as God, who is a Father and not a tyrant, cannot gravely punish the transgression of a votive obligation that is of small importance in the matter promised. Nevertheless, the gravity or otherwise of the votive obligation is deduced not only from the gravity or otherwise of the matter, but also from the intention of the one making the vow. For this reason the votive obligation will be light which has as its object light matter, inasmuch as this, as such, cannot give rise to a grave obligation, to such a point that not even the one making the vow can intentionally bind himself sub gravi, when the matter of his vow is light. On the other hand, through the influence of the intention of the one making the vow, the votive obligation will not be grave in the case where, although the matter is grave, the one making the vow intended to bind himself only sub levi; except where a prohibition of ecclesiastical authority intervened to prevent this. With regard to the matter, it is not always easy to discern when the matter of the vow must be called grave. Theologians customarily consider as such everything that notably contributes to the utility of the one making the vow or of the neighbor; or that is ordinarily prohibited sub gravi by the natural, divine and ecclesiastical law. According to this criterion, the votive promise would be grave which had as its object a fast, a Holy Mass, a Communion, a Confession (cf. B. H. Merkelbach, Summa theologiae moralis, II, Paris 1932, p. 731, n. 719), or which notably contributes to the worship of God (cf. J. Teodori, in Apollinaris, 6 [1933], p. 101). A comparison with sacramental penance, according to the practice of good confessors, can also serve as a rule for judging gravity with regard to personal vows; and in real vows, the relation to matter reputed grave in matters of justice.

The obligation of a real vow can also be fulfilled by means of a third person. The real vow made by a parent does not pass as such to the heirs; but the obligation to which he was bound can pass to the heir by reason of justice or by precept of the Church (can. 1320, § 2). Since it is then said in can. 1310, § 1 that a vow does not bind «ratione sui nisi emittentem», it follows that a vow, however it may be, as such, does not bind others who have not made the vow. For this reason subjects who did not consent are not bound to vows emitted by superiors except by force of some precept; and similarly successors are not bound in themselves to the vows of predecessors. If, then, an entire community consents in the emission of a vow, and afterward the same moral body does not fulfill it, then the individual members are not obligated as such, because the obligation had been assumed collectively and therefore binds collectively and not individually also in its execution.

With regard to a conditional vow, moralists and jurists customarily teach that there is an obligation that arises immediately with the emission of the conditional vow itself, and that consists in having the intention of fulfilling the vow, should the condition be verified, and in not placing oneself, before the verification of the condition, in the impossibility of fulfilling the vow. But the one making the vow can, by reason of the vow, not prevent the verification of the appended condition, if this depends totally on his will or on natural causes in cooperation with his will; when instead the verification or non-verification of the condition depends on the will of another, then the one making the vow is bound at least not to violate by force or by deceit the free exercise of another's will. Nevertheless, the one making the vow who culpably prevented the verification of the condition by deceit, if on the one hand he sins against the vow for having rendered vain the connected obligation, on the other hand, since the vow was tied to that condition, the vow itself remains dissolved; and in this case he is obliged to repent of the sin of having prevented the verification of the condition, but he is not obliged to compensation.

IV. EXTINCTION OF THE VOW

A vow can be extinguished: 1) ab intrinseco, that is, when the time appointed ad finiendam obligationem has elapsed, or the condition attached is fulfilled, as in conditional vows; or through the substantial change of the matter promised (can. 1311); or also when the final cause for which the vow had been made ceases. Thus the vow to enter religion would cease, or at least be suspended, if the parents of the person making the vow have fallen into such extreme necessity that they cannot do without his help. Similarly the vow is extinguished when the object promised becomes, through supervening circumstances, either useless or indifferent or an impediment to a greater good; or when it becomes physically or morally impossible. 2) ab estrinseco, through irritation, dispensation and commutation (can. 1311).

Irritation is an act of the free will, issued by him who has dominative power over the person making the vow or over the matter of the vow; whereby the vow itself is either annulled or suspended in its obligation. The father enjoys this power to irritate a vow in regard to his children who are below the age of puberty and probably also those who are of the age of puberty but not yet emancipated (can. 1312, 88, 89); the guardian, or according to some also the mother, provided that the father or the guardian do not forbid it. It is disputed whether the husband can irritate the vows of his wife which have no direct relation to marriage as such. A religious superior can irritate all the vows of his subjects, made after religious profession; he can also irritate those of novices, but only indirectly. The same faculty belongs to the Superioresses of nuns, in regard to their own subjects. There is no doubt that this power belongs to the Bishop in regard to the religious subject to him and to the Supreme Pontiff in regard to all religious. In irritating a vow ad validitatem no cause is required, though a cause is required ad liceitatem (can. 1312 § 1).

Dispensation is the dissolution of the votive obligation, made in the name of God, by him who has the power of jurisdiction. It differs from irritation, because the latter is done in one's own name, whereas dispensation is done in the name of God; the latter requires the power of jurisdiction, whereas for irritation dominative power suffices; moreover for dispensation a just cause is required ad validitatem as well, which is not necessary in irritation, which can be done even against the will of the person making the vow, whereas in dispensation his consent is also required. It is indeed theologically certain that in the power of jurisdiction granted by Jesus to the pastors of his Church (Mt. 16, 19) there is also included the faculty of dispensing from vows for a just cause. The Supreme Pontiff, the Ordinaries and those who have quasi-episcopal jurisdiction enjoy this power; the superiors of exempt clerical religions (cf. can. 514, § 1), the delegates of the Holy See (can. 1313). But there are reserved vows, which ordinarily cannot be dispensed except by the Supreme Pontiff (can. 1309). Different from dispensation is the interpretation of a vow, which, even if made by him who has jurisdiction, is nevertheless not, as such, an act of jurisdiction, but a doctrinal and jurisprudential act.

Commutation is the substitution of one object promised for another, the votive obligation remaining firm. Every commutation in minus bonum is a dispensation secundum quid and for this reason jurisdictional power and a just cause are also necessary for such commutation; but it differs from dispensation, because while the latter removes the obligation entirely, commutation replaces it, albeit in minus, with another object. Jurisdictional power is therefore required only when the commutation reduces in minus bonum the work promised in the vow, whereas it is not required to commute it in melius or in aequale bonum. Thus the just cause must be grave in a commutation in opus minus; light if it is in aequale; none if the commutation is in melius (can. 1314). It is certain, moreover, that all those who have the power to dispense from a vow also have the faculty to commute it in minus bonum for a just cause (can. 1314). Simple confessors, as also parish priests, of themselves have no faculty to dispense from or commute vows, except in danger of death or in a perplexed case in relation to marriage (cann. 1044, 1045 § 3); and except when they have a special privilege, as the regular confessors of the mendicant orders have in relation to non-reserved vows.

BIBL. besides the manuals of moral theology and the commentators on canon law cf.: A. Vermeersch, Quæst. de virtut. relig. et pietatis, Bruges 1912, pp. 138-93; J. Creusen, Les voeux douteux, in Nov. rev. théol., 22 (1925), pp. 312-17; C. A. Damen, De irritatione et suspensione votorum, spectato iure nat. atque eccl. antiquo et novo, in Apollinaris, 1 (1928), pp. 69-476; 2 (1929), pp. 53-61; 306-18; 495-509; id., De probabili voti irritatione, ibid., 3 (1930), pp. 289-95; A. Vermeersch, De probabiliter valida voti irritatione, in Periodica de re morali, canonica et liturgica, 19 (1930), pp. 17-18; Nucerinus [pseud.], De obligatione ex voto promissorio, in Il monitore ecclesiastico, 3ª serie, 3 (1931), pp. 304-306; E. Jombart, Le voeu, in Revue des communautés religieuses, 8 (1932), pp. 185-89; I. Teodori, articoli vari sul v., in Apollinaris, 6 (1933), v. indice; H. Schaufel, Maritus valetus directe irritare uxoris vota matrimonio durante emissa?, in Per. de re mor. can. lit., 23 (1934), pp. 175-85; O. E. Dignant-E. Jombart, Annulatio de voeu, in Rev. des comm. rel., 16 (1945), p. 58-89; A. Vangheluwe, art. vari sul v. in Collat. Bruges, 42 (1946), v. indice; P. Séjourné, Voeu, in DTHC, XV, coll. 3182-3234.

V. SOLEMN VOW

It must be distinguished from the simple vow, because the Church recognizes in it particular theological and juridical effects. This distinction and terminology (cf. Misserey, op. cit. in bibl., p. 142 ff.) are said to have been used for the first time by Peter Lombard and by Rolando Bandinelli (Alexander III).

1. Brief history of the solemn vow

From Misserey himself the following information is drawn. If the terminology is late, its existence is nevertheless earlier. In the first centuries of the Church the same religious vow of chastity did not have diriment effects with regard to Matrimony. There were subsequently conciliar dispositions on the matter, but exegetes do not agree in expounding the value and juridical consequences of those decrees. The first decree that holds invalid the marriage contracted by monks is that of Troisè of 900 (Mansi, XVIII, 288); followed by that of Pisa of 1135 (Mansi, XXI, 489); and finally by the Second Council of the Lateran of 1139 (Mansi, XXI, 528). After these decisions theologians and jurists sought to explain and reconcile the different canons and felt the necessity of distinguishing, inasmuch as not all vows had the effects of annulling marriage. Thus Hugh of St. Victor distinguishes between public vow and vow made only in secret; and he asserts that the Church can declare null only the marriages contracted by one who publicly and by a profession, outwardly manifested, was previously bound by the vow of chastity (De sacramentis, lib. II, part 11, ch. 4; part 12, ch. 3; PL 176, 483, 503, 521). Gratian (c. 8, D. 27; and c. 4, c. 17, q. 1) distinguishes between the «simpliciter voventes» and those «quibus post votum accedit benedictio consecrationis vel propositum religionis». Subsequently Rolando Bandinelli, for the first time, asserted that such is considered the vow pronounced before the assembly of the Church, or before the bishop, or before a priest, whether by depositing on the altar the written formula of the vow, or by using other sacred things such as the Cross and relics. But other circumstances too can constitute the solemn vow even if no formula has been pronounced (cf. A. M. Gietle, Die Sentenzen Rolandi, Freiburg im Br. 1891, p. 273; F. Thaner, Die Summa Magistri Rolandi, Innsbruck 1844, pp. 116, 118, 123). Peter Lombard places the essence of the solemn vow in its publicity (Sententiarum, lib. IV, dist. 58, c. 4, ed. Quaracchi 1916, p. 967, n. 350). But when Rolando Bandinelli became Pope Alexander III he declared that the mere assumption of the religious habit, without the emission of the profession, could not constitute the solemn vow (c. 4, Consuluit, X, 4, 6). Subsequently the jurist Uguccione of Ferrara sought to maintain that the distinction between simple and solemn vow was not essential, and that it was rather to be reproved (cf. J. F. Schulte,

Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des kanonischen Rechts I, Stuttgart 1875, p. 156). Nevertheless people continued to distinguish between simple vow and solemn vow, but determining the circumstances that solemnized the simple vow, until Boniface VIII categorically established that the vow was made solemn by receiving sacred orders or by the express or tacit profession, emitted in a religion approved by the Holy See (C. un. Quod votum, 3, 15 in VIᵃ).

Until the 16th century the Church approved only religions with solemn vows, and thus easily religious vow, public vow and solemn vow came to be identified. But once simple and public religious vows were introduced (though with diriment effects also with regard to marriage for the Society of Jesus), not only was the distinction between simple vow and solemn vow necessarily reconfirmed, but the question of the essential difference between the two kinds of vows was rekindled.

2. Nature of the solemn vow

All now agree in admitting the difference, on the basis of can. 579 of the CIC; nevertheless many divergences still exist in establishing its nature. Certainly the solemnity of the vow is of ecclesiastical law only (can. 1308, § 2 of the CIC), therefore the Church can of itself dispense even from the solemn vow as such; in the solemn vow indeed the ceremonies of the rite are accidental and age and the other requirements are necessary conditions; but not all agree in establishing the substantial and essential element of the solemn vow (cf. P. Lumbreras, op. cit. in bibl., p. 164 f.). The ancients place the solemnity of the vow in the special consecration or blessing that accompanies the emission of the solemn vow. Others (Prümmer, Augustine etc.) make it consist in the perfect dedication of the one vowing and in the acceptance of it by the Church in the name of God, so that the one vowing becomes perpetually consecrated to the service of God. Others (Vermeersch) think that the solemn vow is the fully authentic vow before the Church. Such authenticity is the formal reason of the solemnity, which is materially manifested in the apparatus, not the vulgar and external one, but the juridical one. The proper force of this authenticity is the public tutelage of the authority of the Church in protecting the juridical effects proper to the solemn vow. Others (Wernz, Bouix, Suárez) place the essence of the solemn vow not only in the disabling force that the Church recognizes in certain vows, but also, and at the same time, in the perpetual and irrevocable dedication of the one vowing and in the corresponding acceptance on the part of the religion by the authority granted to it by law.

As is evident, it is a rather theoretical question, which has not in itself influenced the exegesis of the canons of the CIC concerning the solemn vow.

3. Juridical effects of the solemn vow

In relation to the vow of chastity, the solemn vow renders its contrary acts not only illicit, but also invalid, if they are capable of nullity. Thus the marriage contracted after the solemn vow is invalid (can. 1073). Indeed clerics in sacris, religious men and women after the solemn vow of chastity and all those who contracted marriage with them, even merely civil, incur excommunication latae sententiae, Sedi Apostolicae simpliciter reservata (can. 2388 § 1). Regarding the vow of obedience some authors think that the solemn vow adds that the one vowing cannot validly contract any stable obligation either toward God or toward men; and the Superior indeed can always invalidate such acts (cf. C. Schaefer, op. cit. in bibl., p. 605 f.). With regard to poverty the religious with the solemn vow loses not only the administration, the use and the usufruct of goods, but also the dominion; and becomes incapable of acquiring or possessing. For this reason sixty days before the emission of the solemn vow, save for particular indults, the one vowing must renounce the goods that he possesses in such a way that the renunciation has effects also civil (can. 581, §§ 1-2) and all the goods that in some way might subsequently come to the one vowing would belong to the Order, the Province or the religious house according to the Constitutions, if the Order is capable of possessing (can. 582 § 1); while in an Order incapable of possessing they would pass into the dominion of the Holy See (can. 582 § 2).

Furthermore the emission of solemn vows is recognized as canonical title (can. 982, § 1) and removes the irregularity for receiving orders that arises "ex defectu natalium" (can. 984 § 1); but it does not remove the incapacity that may exist for receiving offices of Superior in exempt clerical religious orders (can. 504), or for being promoted to the cardinalitial dignity (can. 232 § 2, no. 1) and to the episcopate (can. 991 § 3). The same profession of solemn v., in religious orders where the obligation of choir exists, obliges one who has been unable to attend choir to recite the canonical hours privately (can. 610 § 3); it brings about excardination from one's own diocese, for clerics (cans. 115, 385) and for lay religious (can. 585). Finally the v. dissolves ipso iure a marriage not consummated between baptized persons or between a baptized party and a non-baptized party (can. 1119), in the case where the spouse, with a dispensation from the Holy See, has entered a religious order (can. 542, no. 1). For these and other legal effects proper to the v. s., can. 470 § 2 (cf. also can. 576 § 2) commands the religious Superior of the one making the vow to notify the parish priest of the same of the profession of solemn v. that has taken place, so that it may be annotated in the register of baptisms.

Ermengildo Lio