Family

FAMILY. - It is the institution that brings together the spouses and the children born of their union or assimilated to them.

I. NATURAL AND BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF THE FAMILY.

The theories on the consistency of associated forms are various and of different nature. In Darwin one finds only hints of a sociological character which bring the problem back into the essentially naturalistic field. However, he recognizes that, even in the earliest times, man must have lived in family aggregates, and he maintains that, as soon as marriage becomes common, whether it be monogamous or polygamous, jealousy leads to inculcating feminine virtue, which, being honored, will tend to extend to all unmarried women. Darwin, however, does not go

(from M. Gusinde, Anthropologie der Feuerland-Indianer, Mödling, 1920)
FAMILY - A Selk-nam family - Tierra del Fuego.

too far, which is instead found in the sociologists who extend the evolutionary principle to human social organization. H. Spencer, precisely, sets up his famous parallelism between organic evolution and the evolution of associated forms, which he defines as superorganisms. In this the sociologist takes an arbitrary step from Darwinian naturalistic conceptions to those of family aggregates, attempting to reveal an evolution in these as well. Except that Spencer's followers have even more thoroughly falsified his analogical parallelism at its foundations, thinking of human society as a true organism (J. Novicow, R. Worms, A. Schäffle, P. Lilienfeld). But modern criticism has indeed demonstrated the groundlessness of these attempts. Nevertheless a merit must be acknowledged to such precedents: that of illuminating man's social manifestations by considering their naturalistic aspects, which are deduced from the analogies of behavior of other animals. Some, extending certain behaviors of mammals to the human species, have even asserted the existence of a primitive stage of promiscuity (or the "poiudoso" state of J. Bachofen). Others conversely, always drawing inspiration from nature, have advanced the more realistic conception of the solidity of the family nucleus from its very beginnings (E. Westermarck, 1891).

Subsequently one falls into the opposite error of forgetting nature and stopping at the facts currently observable in the social field. Only more recently have works oriented themselves toward a more organic and pondered consideration of the problem, while on the whole the ancient theories of evolutionist organicism have left their traces. Indeed, for some authors, they have come back to life, even if under another guise, as in the case of H. Driesch and other supporters of so-called neo-organicism. Human social organization must instead be interpreted according to a principle of objective investigation of its causes, and among these one must certainly consider those of a naturalistic order inherent in the characteristics of the species.

Among the biological characteristics most influential on social forms are first of all the duration of life and the duration of development, while premising that they must not be considered individually, but as a whole and in their simultaneous coexistence.

The duration of life in man is preferably deduced from the normal duration, which is given by the mature age at which the greatest number of deaths is observed.

For Italy it oscillates (in 1930-32) around 76 years, in 1881-82 around 70. The increase observed over time is mainly due to sanitary progress, but in general it is found to be much slowed, if not entirely nullified, once certain favorable conditions of environment and hygiene of the population have been reached. Therefore today the immovability that the aforementioned value seems to have reached, in the face of further progress in mortality, indicates its coincidence with a typical biological value. The other characteristic, given by the duration of development, must be specified in order to study the age at which the individual reaches full autonomy. A vague age, but one that certainly oscillates between the end of puberty and the end of organic growth. There are racial differences: nevertheless the differences between man and the other animal species, in the ratio between normal duration of life and duration of development, are so strong as not to diminish in the least the demonstrative value of the conclusions that one is today able to formulate.

In the strictly biological and relative sense, the time that man takes to grow to autonomous life is much greater (three, four, up to ten times) compared with all other mammals. This difference is then even more noticeable if one thinks of the time required for man truly to become fit for reproduction (not only physiological) and for the defense of his offspring, without which one cannot properly speak of autonomy. As for the modalities of growth, one may add that, even with equal time, in man it occurs much more slowly than in other mammals. In these, among other things, newborns manifest their psychic progress with independence of movement and action much sooner than in man. This also holds for the anthropomorphic apes, for which the task of rearing and protecting the offspring is much lighter, whereas in man the newborn remains for a long time in a state of complete helplessness. If one then thinks of the succession of multiple births while the burden of the previous one is not yet finished, one realizes that for the human species the protection of children constitutes a singular commitment.

Another characteristic of the species influencing the type of association is given by the long duration of human senescence, understood in the sense of unfitness for work and material uselessness for the f. Conversely, in animals the working capacity useful to their life extends autonomously for a very long time relative to the normal duration of existence. It is certain that the duration of working life is much shorter in the human species. Moreover, since the age of menopause marks the maximum limit to procreative capacity, one sees how in woman the duration of fertile life is relatively very short in comparison with the animal world. The consequences of this can be found with regard to the size of domestic nuclei and their continuity and solidity over the course of time. The numerical equilibrium of the sexes then justifies, together with the other circumstances, the human union in its monogamous, continuous and stable form. For this reason one must affirm that f. and society have a single origin and cannot have followed a hypothetical evolutionary process general, if they are necessarily dependent on the physical constitution of the species, as such, from the very beginning of its appearance. All the factors that in any way disturb these biological presuppositions have an unfavorable effect on the strength of social cohesion, which at times finds no other defense than in the supreme ethical principles. But precisely for this reason, that harmonious concordance of basis which exists between morality, ethics and the most intimate nature of the organism must be restored to value. Every dislocation in one in fact normally reverberates also in the other, as if by an ineluctable necessity of equilibrium inherent in the profound nature of the human person.

On the whole, even the study of social tendency in animals leads to the conclusion that there is a natural law which wills the procreators to be the more united the weaker the offspring. There are exceptions, but these only demonstrate that we cannot fully control all the factors determining the phenomenon.

Given the premises on the biological foundation of monogamous family organization, inquiry has been made to see how much the result of colonizations depends on the form of demographic transplantation into new territories. The serious drawbacks that scholars of colonial matters have repeatedly pointed out are well known, arising, for example, from the numerical surplus of males over females: the lack of attachment to the family, the most varied social disorders, the serious increase in criminality, immorality and the most unbridled individualism. It is for this reason that such drawbacks have been lesser for agricultural colonizations (that is, when the demographic equilibrium of the group had been less disturbed), and greater instead in the case of industrial, commercial or merely military colonies. In this sense colonizations have been true scientific experiments which have confirmed once again the human value of the monogamous family institution. The lasting results of many Greek and Roman colonizations are due precisely to their agrarian character and to the balanced stability of their political-demographic settlement for the development of the land. But the clearest proofs of the success of colonization in relation to the demographic structure of the group are provided by modern history. In particular, mention must be made of the grandiose colonization experiments carried out in Canada and Australia. Both became, in time, true successes and are based on a good biodemographic structure of the populations, so much so that they record a high birth rate even in comparison with their countries of origin.

The family bond, however, also rests on other circumstances — moral, social, environmental — which contribute to shaping its characteristics and to making it more or less firm. In exceptional cases these factors can even oppose the natural union and lead back to polygamy: conversely, as a rule they contribute to the spiritual cohesion of the couple. On considerations of this kind, literature has often oriented itself also for the purpose of investigating the origins of the family in relation to the broader organization of the State (or Civitas in general). Opposing theories have been formulated on the matter, which posit the State as a successive extension, on a larger scale, of the individual families aggregated among themselves, or else establish the priority of the State, which would have subsequently given life to the smaller domestic aggregates. But more reliably, biological observations support the view that the monogamous family and the State (in a general sense, as a larger aggregate of a political character) have a common foundation, in the purposes that are always directed to the conservation and good reproduction of the species. In a naturalistic sense, therefore, the very search for a priority in time should not be posed as a general problem. The two forms of aggregate complete each other for the same end, and the one finds its necessary equilibrium in the other, so that from the biological point of view the two institutions are a unity and define the natural ordering of society. The problem of origins is therefore only a problem of individual cases, but the paleoanthropologist and the ethnologist have a far more general task to face, in the light of the above solution, in order to understand more deeply also the social aspects of human nature.

Within the sphere of individual cases, the modern life of the civilized Western world has magnified and strengthened all the factors of disintegration of the family bond. The consequences of this process are of a spiritual and moral character, but also of a biological character, because they undermine the very foundation of social coexistence. The children procreated under such conditions are progressively abandoned to themselves, and would be so to the utmost limit were there not those natural, instinctive brakes inherent in human nature which we define in the field of sentiment. It is for this reason that rampant materialism also combats sentiment, erroneously believing that it is leading man back to the path of natural laws. Conversely, the positive historical observation of human society seems increasingly to confirm a natural law according to which the social ordering of individual groups would also be governed by an internal force of re-equilibration, of a demogenetic character, so that every phenomenon of disintegration has limits of development, in time and in space, as if before a threshold of a biological nature, but whose finalism is evident.

Divorce, in particular, as a solution of continuity of the family bond, is a consequence of factors of disintegration, which unfortunately exist equally where legislation does not provide for its recognition. Divorce is therefore like a symptom of an active social disease whose therapy will have to go back to the causes, which consist in a lost biological, spiritual and moral education. Just as the symptom of an alteration of individual temperature is measurable in numbers of degrees, so the symptom of an alteration of the social organism can also be measured in numbers, in the percentage of annual divorces over marriages contracted in the same period of time. These percentages state positively how many families disintegrate in a year out of a hundred marriages celebrated. They are painful figures that are growing everywhere in the last fifty years and unfortunately do not even represent the real gravity of the evil, which is greater, also in many cases in which the legal solution of continuity of the bond is not realized.

Other means of disintegration of the family have a purely biological character, such as artificial fertilization and paradoxical maternity, which is also experimentally possible, according to which a fertilized ovum can be transplanted from one female to another. But these are aspects of human degeneration, which exploit the knowledge of biological research for a base process of falsification of life.

Alfredo Sacchetti

II. EVOLUTIONIST THEORIES ON THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY AND THE POSITIVE DATA OF ETHNOLOGY.

In 1861 Bachofen drew the attention of ethnologists to the fact that among certain peoples succession takes place not in the paternal line but in the maternal line. With the examples he had gathered and with the application of the law formulated by evolutionism — according to which the development of man's spiritual manifestations would have been characterized by a uniform and ascending line (hence by continuous progress) — he constructed the theory that matriarchy, that is, the supremacy of the mother, would have preceded patriarchy, and he extended it to all peoples.

But the classic construction of the evolutionist theory on the origin of the family was made only later by H. Lewis Morgan, who accepted and expanded Bachofen's theory by constructing other stages of social evolution, prior to matriarchy itself: group marriage, the consanguine family, and sexual promiscuity.

The "group marriage" would be that social stage in which "a group of men jointly marries a group of women"; in other words, all the men belonging to one group would have had free access to all the women of another group, and reciprocally all the men of this group to the women of the first.

The stage of the "consanguineous f." would have been characterized by marriage between brothers and sisters and by the sole exclusion of marriage between parents and children and, in general, between members of different generations. This stage would have been preceded still by "agamy," that is, by "unlimited sexual promiscuity," whereby all men would have access to all women, without any limit of incest.

Il Morgan costruì il seguente schema di evoluzione della f.:

1. fase iniziale: l'agamia, ossia la promiscuità illimitata. Non c'è alcun limite all'istinto sessuale.

Fasi intermedie:

2. la f. consanguinea : sono proibiti soltanto i matrimoni tra i genitori e i figli.

3. Group marriage: in the tribe all members of the same sex may still have conjugal relations with every member of the opposite sex, but another limitation comes into play: not only are marriages between parents and children now forbidden, but also those between brothers and sisters.

Phases 2 and 3 are characterized by the absence of any principle of individual marriage: neither the father nor the mother is yet known.

4. L'unione matriarcale : comincia il matrimonio individuale; solo la madre è conosciuta, il padre è ancora incerto.

5. The polygamous patriarchal family: the children live with their wives under the authority of the father or the elder brother. At this stage there is already a true family, in which both the father and the mother are known.

6. Fase finale: la monogamia, ossia il matrimonio individuale in tutta la sua picnizza.

This scale had been constructed on the tacit conviction — which for Morgan and for the evolutionists of his period had the value of a logical postulate that needed no proof — that the development of humanity had been a continuous progress, which had unfolded along a uniform and ascending line. In our case, between the starting point (1), characterized by the absolute absence of rules in the sexual instinct, and the opposite point of arrival (6), determined by the very precise norms on which the monogamous family is founded, it was necessary to place intermediate phases (2, 3, 4, 5), all conceived in such a way that the preceding one should prove less complex than the following. Moreover, each phase (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) was conceived as a an obligatory passage for all humanity in its development: no people could have reached monogamy (6) without having passed through the succession of phases 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

A few examples taken here and there, even from peoples of very different cultures, were enough to construct a phase of development; indeed, transitional forms were often constructed without any positive documentation, merely because they were deemed necessary to build the foundation of a particular theory or to join the links of a chain of evolution, constructed on a purely psychological criterion.

Only on the basis of these apriorisms and without the slightest attempt at a positive investigation did Morgan establish the chronological precedence of the consanguine family over group marriage: in the former he saw the first and simplest limitation on absolute sexual promiscuity, in the sole prohibition against marrying one's own parents, while in group marriage he found the prohibition extended also to the union between brothers and sisters.

For the same reason "matriarchy" — in which one saw above all a social stage in which the child knew with certainty only who his mother was, while the father was still unknown to him or at least uncertain — had to precede "polygamous patriarchy," in which the children live with their wives under the command of the father or the elder brother. In this phase there is already a true family, in which the father and the mother are both known.

"Monogamy" was placed at the apex of development because it was founded entirely on individual marriage, governed by very precise norms and therefore wholly contrary to the supposed original stage of sexual promiscuity, characterized by an absolute absence of rules.

The kinship system of the Punalua of the Hawaiian or Sandwich Archipelago (Polynesia) — who have a single term to indicate all relatives of one generation, without any distinction of their degree of closer or more distant blood relationship — was interpreted by Morgan as a remnant of the consanguine family.

In fact a Punaluan designates with the name sankua his father, his mother, his paternal and maternal uncles and aunts, and specifies only the sex with qualifying terms, which indicate "man" or "woman." The same occurs in the descending line: the father calls by the same name his own children and those of his sister, males and females. The inhabitants of central New Mecklenburg (Melanesia) have an analogous system, as can be seen from the following summary diagram, which however reproduces only a part of the kinship system of these natives (reported in full in W. Schmidt and W. Koppers, Volker und Kulturen, Regensburg 1924, p. 137): this simplicity in the kinship system, uncommon among primitive peoples, was interpreted by Morgan and the followers of his theory as a remnant of the consanguineous f. founded on marriage between brothers and sisters, and it was concluded:

1) that the father is still called by the same name as the maternal uncle because in an earlier phase both married their sisters and therefore were really fathers;

2) that the true father is not distinguished from his tribal brothers because, given the lack of rules in sexual relations, he was unknown.

To the two examples furnished by the kinship system of the Punalua and of the natives of central New Mecklenburg, others taken from different peoples were later added, which were interpreted as new proofs in favor of Morgan's theory, which, despite strong opposition and reservations even on the part of evolutionists, was for some decades the most widely accepted by ethnologists and sociologists. And the opponents, since they started from Morgan's same postulate that evolution had unfolded along a uniform and ascending line, could not make a critique founded on positive investigation, but limited themselves to constructing new groundless theories like those they wished to demolish. Thus Mc Lennan — who had defined Morgan's work as entirely antiscientific —

KINSHIP SYSTEM OF THE NATIVES OF NEW MECKLENBURG

constructed another scale of social evolution on the basis of which the family would have reached (patriarchal) monogamy only after passing successively from sexual promiscuity to polyandry and from this to matriarchy.

H. Morgan and Mc Lennan were much followed by scholars of the origin of the family, of society and of the various manifestations of law. Morgan's theory was received with particular satisfaction by Marx, Engels, Simons and popularized by Bebel. But even outside the scientific current of socialism, treatises, manuals and encyclopedia articles, even modern ones, still bear the influence of the theories of Morgan, Mc Lennan and other evolutionists which ethnology, on the basis of positive data, has long since surpassed.

All the forms of marriage (polyandry, levirate, sororate) and the customs (couvade), which the continuous but often chaotic collection of documentation supplied in an ever greater number concerning the most diverse peoples, were systematically explained with the postulate of uniform and ascending development and placed, according to the greater or lesser appearance of crudeness that they presented, in a more or less low stage of evolution, constructed with the same preconception.

"Polyandry" is the institution opposite to polygamy: the latter allows a man to have several wives, the former a woman several husbands. Polygamy has sometimes had wide development in the history of humanity; on the other hand, the absolutely certain cases of polyandry are very few; Lewis enumerates them and says with reason that they can be counted on the fingers. Polyandry presents itself with different cases and aspects, some now clear, others still obscure. However, it can be affirmed with certainty that the polyandric family is the least solid of all the family institutions found among primitives.

On the basis of this single observation, several evolutionists immediately saw in polyandry the first phase of marriage, naturally very ancient, through which humanity would have passed as soon as it emerged from the chaos of sexual promiscuity, even before reaching the matriarchal family.

Moreover, the preconception that this phase, like all the others, had been general for all peoples induced explorers, ethnologists and sociologists to see remnants of polyandry in every collective sexual disorder and in every loosely knit family institution, and it was the cause of serious errors of information and interpretation regarding the social life of primitives, errors that only the accurate and patient examination of the facts has managed little by little to correct or to eliminate completely from ethnological works.

The "levirate" is the matrimonial institution by which the brother of a deceased man has the duty — which has often become a right — to marry the widow.

The "sororate" consists in the right that a man, left a widower, has to marry the sister of his deceased wife.

These two institutions are often found associated among a considerable group of peoples, but they are by no means general.

Tylor, like all the evolutionists of his time, believes in the historical precedence of matriarchy over patriarchy and postulates between the two an intermediate stage which he calls maternal-paternal, in which he places all the institutions that present a character of transition. He sees in the levirate (and in the sororate) "a custom of substitution that belongs to the period in which marriage is a convention not so much between two individuals as between two families." Having arisen in the maternal stage, it would have reached its maximum development in the maternal-paternal one, only to disappear slowly in the paternal one.

Frazer explains the sororate as an innovation of the license that is in reality found among certain peoples, for whom the husband has the right to have marital relations with all the sisters of his wife, even if she is still alive. He gives an analogous interpretation of the levirate and sees in these two forms of marriage the remnants of an earlier stage in which the husband would have had relations, without any limitation, with all the sisters of his wife and likewise the wife with all the brothers of her husband. It would be in substance group marriage. But Frazer's explanation is absolutely aprioristic, because the author does not even inquire whether there exists a genetic and historical connection between marriage by levirate and sororate, which is only possible when one of the spouses has been left a widower, and the husband's right of access to his sisters-in-law, even if the wife is still alive.

Ethnologists call "couvade" (concode) a set of curious and often very comical practices performed, in certain populations, by the husband after his wife has given birth. The woman in childbed leaves the bed and resumes her work while the father of the newborn lies down and subjects himself to a quantity of prescriptions and diets, as if he had given birth. Hence this custom is also called the "man's puerperium."

The evolutionists (Bachofen, Giraud-Teulon, Tylor and several others) interpreted this custom as a fiction to represent the father as a second mother and traced its origin back to the period of transition between matriarchy and patriarchy, when the primitive kinship bond, founded on maternity, was replaced by the later one of paternity.

The theories of Bachofen, Morgan, Mc Lennan, Tylor, Frazer characterize the change produced by biological evolutionism in philosophy and in general in all the historical and moral disciplines. The followers of this trend admitted without further ado as a logical postulate that humanity had begun its social, moral and religious evolution starting from a phase characterized by the absolute lack of ethical and religious laws, just as the evolutionist philosophers admitted the axiom of spontaneous generation.

Positive facts have caused all the constructions of classical evolutionism on the origin of the family, of society and of religion to collapse.

1) The theory of sexual promiscuity has long been abandoned by ethnologists of all tendencies, because in no primitive population have traces been found that authorize supposing the existence of this phase.

2) The in-depth study of the kinship system of the Punalua, of the natives of New Mecklenburg, of the natives of central New Mecklenburg and of the various other peoples who in an equal or analogous way include different degrees under the same name, has shown that the denominations do not indicate blood relationship but the different degrees of age, which in primitive societies are of great importance. In them, in fact, the hierarchy is founded almost exclusively on difference in age, and the elders have privileges over the young. The term common to father and uncle, which is also given to the chief, indicates respect for greater age and means neither "father" nor "uncle," but "lord." Some ethnologist has, with subtlety, compared it to the respectful manner of address that was also in use among us: "signor padre" [dear father].

3) Marriage between brothers and sisters — which is truly found among very few peoples and always limited to the king or the aristocracy — is the expression of a particular form of pride of these social classes, which do not wish to degrade themselves by uniting with lower classes. It is practiced by the natives of the Hawaiian archipelago (Polynesia), by populations of West Africa, and was common in the great civilizations of Peru and Egypt.

The boundless dynastic or caste pride, even if it does not culminate in incest, can cause other customs that undermine the family; thus the sisters of the king of the Seilluk (Anglo-Egyptian Sudan) cannot marry, because the only person worthy of uniting with them would be the king; they may, however, have lovers. But these incestuous and disorderly forms, slowly formed, are limited to particular cultural aspects, which no longer have anything primitive about them. The people consider them natural for the king and for the aristocracy, but incestuous for themselves and do not practice them at all.

4) The truly certain cases of polyandry are very few and all belong to populations no longer primitive (Wahima of East Africa, some groups of Eskimos, the Toda of India and certain groups of Tibet).

A Wahima who is so poor that he cannot pay the dowry necessary for the purchase of a bride is helped by his brothers, who in this way acquire over the bride the same rights as the husband. But as soon as the wife has become pregnant, she belongs only to the husband and all the rights of the others cease.

Certain groups of Eskimos and the Toda often kill females as soon as they are born or shortly after and keep the males alive; this form of infanticide, which is completely absent in the most primitive societies, produces a surplus of men over women and causes polyandry.

5) The levirate and the sororate are also forms of marriage that are relatively late, arisen from particular social and economic conditions and limited to determined cultures.

6) The couvade is an expression of the extreme consequences to which the late matriarchate has come. It is intimately connected with this cultural cycle, little suited to human nature, which was not general for all humanity and arose after the patriarchate.

7) Patriarchy and matriarchy have no chronological relationship to each other; that is, the second did not develop from the first, nor vice versa. Patriarchy is characteristic of pastoral peoples and matriarchy of agricultural peoples.

8) Monogamy is the natural state of the family and as such is recognized by the most primitive populations: it is more widespread than polygamy. Careful study of still primitive populations has shown that polygamy developed later and predominantly in more evolved civilizations. The transition from the primitive monogamous family to polygamy or to polyandry was decisively aided by the economic forms proper to more recent cultures (the perfected hunting of the totemists, the beginning of agriculture and the raising of livestock). In turn, polygamy and polyandry exercised a negative influence on religion (v. EXOGAMY; ETHNOLOGY; CULTURAL EVOLUTION).

Renato Boccassino

III. THE FAMILY IN ROMAN AND INTERMEDIATE LAW.

I. IN ROMAN LAW

The Roman family was constituted by a group of persons united among themselves solely by the authority of a head (pater familias). This particular aspect of it, which makes it first of all a political organism, is visible even after a long historical evolution has largely modified its structure. The function which the family was to fulfill, especially in ancient times, was a defensive function, standing alongside in this the other groups that have relevance in the primitive order (gentes); and it naturally underwent an involution with the progressive strengthening of the authority of the State. This, however, if it soon succeeded in tearing down the barrier that separated the subject members of the family as regards public law, on the other hand respected the autonomy of the family organization from the private-law point of view, so that Roman private law can truly be considered, as long as it remained immune from extraneous influences, the law of the heads of families.

Alongside this family, whose head is living (family proprio iure), there is another (family communi iure) constituted by those who would be subject to one and the same authority, if the pater familias had not died. The bond that binds the members of the family is called adgnatio.

Subject to the power of the pater familias are: the children (patria potestas); the women who have entered the family by reason of marriage and who have completed a special transaction (conventio in manum) aimed at subjecting them to the pater familias (manus); the slaves (dominium potestas); the individuals belonging to other families, handed over for a wrong committed or as security for an obligation (mancipium). The singularity of this power of the pater familias is that it, even with regard to the children and the other free members of the family, does not come to an end upon reaching a determined age, but only with the passing away of the person who exercises the authority or with his renunciation of it.

The pater familias is, besides being the head, the priest of the family, and he is its judge. He, however, even in his primitive function and in the exercise of the faculties that weigh most heavily on those subject to him, such as those of killing, selling, exposing his children, encounters the limit, of a sacral character, of the mores; while, on the other hand, custom first and legislation afterward tend to abolish these harsher aspects of the patria potestas. In the course of time, indeed, the potestative bond weakens and the bond of blood kinship (cognatio) assumes greater relevance.

Patrimonial capacity also is concentrated at the origin entirely in the hands of the pater familias, and the acquisitions of those subject to him produce their effects with regard to him. However, as regards the children (it is not relevant here to speak of slaves), the pater familias was accustomed to constitute for them a small patrimony (peculium), preponderating to one branch of the administration. From this there began to develop the concept that the children too could have patrimonial capacity (in relation to acquisitions made in military service [peculium castrense] or in public offices [peculium quasi castrense]); so that at the end of this evolution the son acquired for the head of the family only if he acquired with the father's property or by his order.

II. IN INTERMEDIATE LAW

The family was constituted within a broader kinship circle (fara or sippo) aimed at ensuring, through mutual defense, the protection that was lacking on the part of the State. The power of the head of the family was replaced, in Lombard law, by the mundium, as a protective function for individuals not fully capable (women and minors); the father had faculties that could recall the power of the Roman father (the right to expose the child, to sell him, to dedicate him to the priesthood, to compel daughters to marry); but this power, limited on one side by the intervention of statutory authority, ends when the son enters into the assembly of armed men. From this moment the son also takes part in the administration of the family patrimony.

In the feudal period and in that of the Communes, in which the bond of statutory authority was still felt very weakly, the family showed a tendency to broaden its own sphere of action, giving life, principally for defensive purposes, and also in relation to Germanic customs, to other groupings (noble consorterie, mercantile associations, family communes in the countryside). Such organizations, based on autonomy, were however opposed by the princes, who, tending to level their subjects, fought these political groupings. There subsequently became established the principle of the temporariness of paternal power, the patrimonial rights of the child, the right to maintenance, the frequent practice of emancipation; so that the family assumed an organization and an appearance very close to those of today.

Rodolfo Danieli

IV. THE FAMILY IN CATHOLIC DOCTRINE.

I. CONCEPT OF THE FAMILY

For the Catholic Church the family is the institution that brings together the spouses and the children born of their union or assimilated to them.

There are therefore parents and children. The relations between the former are established by the Christian concept of marriage, that is, by the indissoluble bond, freely contracted and raised, for the baptized, to the dignity of a Sacrament (v. MATRIMONIO). The relations between the latter are fixed by birth as regulated by law. Thus one speaks of legitimate children and illegitimate children, natural children, incestuous, adulterine, acknowledged, legitimized, etc. (v. PROLE). The relations between the two groups descend from the purpose of Marriage and from the very close bond that is established as a result of generation and of the sharing of life.

The purpose of Marriage is in fact to transmit not only physical life, but also intellectual and moral life, that is, not only to beget, but also to nourish and to educate. This entails (v. EDUCAZIONE) that the means necessary for the child's development be placed ever more at his disposal, and that he be trained to use them in an ever more autonomous way, up to complete independence. It is therefore a relationship that by its very nature tends to dissolve ever more: in the first six or seven months of his existence the new creature has such need of the mother that without her he cannot live; in the other six months of uterine life the mother is already less necessary; when the new creature has come into the world, the mother is still less necessary; after some time the child begins to walk on his own; later he learns to express himself; later still to think for himself; then, subsequently, he also acquires an affective autonomy, until he detaches himself completely from his parents, concentrating his attention and his concern around a new matrimonial-familial nucleus. For this very reason the parent-child relationship is by its nature altruistic. Parents will have to remember this, so as to know how to withdraw in time, shielding themselves behind a line of loving and generous respect for the freedom and autonomy that, through their educational work, they will have assured to their children.

In this way the children will be helped to fulfill the duties that generation imposes toward parents. In fact, to the extent that, through a growing acquisition of autonomy, the parents' educational relationship becomes exhausted, an ever greater duty of affection and assistance of children toward parents is established. Now it is the children who must give to the parents, not to start them on life, but to preserve them in it.

There is therefore something constant in the parent-child relationship and something mutable: constant is the love that must unite them; variable is the form in which it is expressed. In the time of formation love must lead parents to give to their children (especially to give counsel and correction) and children to receive from their parents (especially to receive correction, counsel and guidance); later love must lead children to give to their parents (especially to give affection and assistance) and parents to receive from them.

In the light of these considerations the problem of authority and obedience in the family must be posed and resolved. The right and the duty to command derive for parents from their superiority; just as the duty to obey derives for children from their inferiority. But precisely for this reason neither the right to command in parents nor the right to obey in children can be perpetual. The one and the other evolve with the evolutions that take place in parents and in children.

To establish these evolutions with precision is not easy and perhaps not even possible. One can only say that the passage to autonomy does not happen in an instant, nor does it happen in the same way and at the same time for all. It is therefore impossible to establish with precision and in a general way when the obligation of obedience ceases for children. The juridical determinations in this field (e.g., art. 2 of the Italian Civil Code) arise from considerations of a statistical-practical character and are to be applied with the greatest judgment. Care will have to be taken to avoid giving freedom to children before they are trained to use it well, but also to avoid denying it to them when they are sufficiently formed.

This leads to considering the deviations of the parent-child relationship. On the part of the former they can be: insufficient care of the children, when they are small, or insufficient respect for their freedom, when they are adults (especially in the affective and familial sphere). On the part of the children: insufficient obedience when one is not mature and insufficient economic and affective assistance when the parents are old. Only a constant cultivation of love and a strong habit of generosity will be able to prevent the one and the other from becoming victims.

II. IMPORTANCE OF THE FAMILY

The considerations made thus far sufficiently indicate the importance of the f. in man's life. In it he finds that horizontal completeness (through marriage) and vertical completeness (through children) to which he so deeply aspires. In it man and woman complete each other and attain that diffusion and that perpetuation, including bodily, that each desires. It is the natural environment in which man's life flows and takes shape.

This explains everyone's most profound aspiration toward the f. and the very powerful affective drive to overcome all difficulties in order to establish it. The literature of every time and every country is full of it.

This also explains the attention that legislators devote to it. For example, the Italian Civil Code devotes almost the whole of Book I to it, and the new Constitution almost the whole of Title II of the first part (for a more extensive analysis, v. GENITORI; PATRIA POTESTÀ; PROLE).

III. FAMILY AND PROPERTY

The importance of the family makes it easier to understand the rights that obtain in this field. By way of example, mention is made of those concerning property and the school.

It is well known - and here it is taken for granted - that everyone has the right to use things at least to the extent necessary for the complete development of his own personality. It is also well known that, at least for human nature as it historically presents itself, the normal way of truly securing that right is the institution of private property. Even if, abstractly speaking, other ways of ordering goods are conceivable and possible, in fact, for humanity as it historically presents itself, the normal way is that each person freely dispose - as of his own thing - of what he must use. From all this it follows that among the fundamental rights of the person is that of being able to contract marriage at the proper time and to establish a family.

Everyone therefore has the right to dispose - and moreover in the form of private property - of that minimum of goods which is indispensable in order to enter upon marriage at a suitable time and to form a family. "Must not private property - says Pius XII in the Radio Message for the fiftieth anniversary of the "Rerum novarum" - assure the father of a family the healthy freedom he needs in order to fulfill the duties assigned to him by the Creator concerning the physical, spiritual and religious well-being of the family?" (AAS, 32 [1941], p. 202).

The principal way of attaining the goal recalled above is the work of the head of the family and therefore his wage. Consequently his wage cannot be called just if it does not offer the possibility of providing, besides for individual needs, also for his family needs in the sense indicated, that is, if it does not put him in a position to be able to contract marriage and to be able to form a family. This is the principle of the so-called family wage, for which Christian sociology has constantly fought and which has been repeatedly affirmed in the encyclicals of the last pontiffs. "It is indeed just - says, for example, Pius XI in Quadragesimo anno - that the rest of the family also, each according to his strength, contribute to the common support... but one must not abuse the age of childhood nor the weakness of the woman. Everything must therefore be done so that fathers of families receive a wage such as suffices to provide conveniently for the common domestic needs" (AAS, 23 [1931], p. 200).

From the principle just affirmed, one must carefully distinguish the technical question of the manner of implementing it (family allowances, etc.). For it is one thing to affirm the moral necessity of the family wage and another to ask what is the most appropriate way of having it reach the worker. Here it will suffice to recall the duty of continually studying and experimenting with ever more perfect forms. In any case one must seek to detach the worker's family relationships - and therefore burdens - from the employment relationship, otherwise one would inevitably create a condition of favor for the unmarried worker as against the married worker, and for the worker without children or with few children as compared with the others. Indeed, both in hiring and in dismissal the employer would be led to give preference to one who is not married and, among those married, to one who has no children or has fewer than the others.

It follows from the very nature of the family wage that it is directed to all the members of the family, at least to all those who are dependents. Also for this reason, besides for general motives, the head of the family - husband and father - must think of the support of his wife and children. In the event that this does not happen, the wife and children, taking their share, commit no theft: indeed they take what is theirs. For the same reason, what remains of the family patrimony at the death of the head must be devolved upon the members of the same. There is thus already outlined, at least to a minimum extent, alongside the obligations of assistance within the family, the institution of inheritance.

Another important question regarding the family and property is that of the family patrimony. For immediately or proximately the institution of private property derives its necessity from the historical condition of the human person, that is, from his egoistic and utilitarian inclinations, on account of which work is normally more strongly stimulated by the prospect of gain than by other motives, and he is practically far more inclined to the fulfillment of his duties if he has the assurance that no material disadvantages will derive from it. It follows at once that, where altruistic behavior prevails and where therefore other stimuli to action and other protections of freedom intervene, the institution of private property tends to give way to communitarian forms of possession. This is precisely what happens in marriage and in the family. When man and woman truly love each other they are led instinctively to put everything in common. The same is to be said of parents and children. On the other hand, however, when love fails (for example, to say nothing of conflicts between spouses, when the children, grown in years, set out toward the establishment of a family of their own) there arises again, equally spontaneously, the tendency to break the communitarian form, more or less openly initiating a new property. Especially on this second phenomenon one can never insist enough: all the members of the family (beginning with the parents) must be convinced of it and provide in time if they do not wish to plant the seeds of inevitable, most painful discord. Let the pastors of souls too be guided in their counsel by a sound realism, whose benefits time will render ever more evident.

The legislator has sought to give more concrete content to the indications or the demands of natural law set forth thus far. For the family wage, the provisions for family allowances are well known (v. SALARIO). For the patrimonial regime in marriage, it is well known that the Italian civil code provides for a legal regime (that of separation of goods) and conventional regimes (family patrimony, dowry, community of profits); it therefore admits, albeit with many temperings, the communitarian form toward which love inclines, but does not conceal its preferences for the non-communitarian form. Suitably the law places itself in the hypothesis that love may fail, because in the contrary case difficulties will not arise or will be resolved without recourse to the legislator. Very minutely is the question of maintenance treated. Title XIII of Book I deals with it, specifying the persons obligated (art. 433 ff.); the measure (art. 438 ff.), the forms (art. 443). Equally very minute is the legal regulation of the institution of inheritance, which occupies almost completely Book II: to be noted are the institution of the legitime and intestate succession, by which provision is made, without totally suppressing the freedom of disposition that belongs to the holder of the right of property, for the continuity of the family patrimony and for the rights arising from ties of blood or legitimate sharing of family life.

On the content and the boundaries of the right of property of the wife and of the children, the moralists speak at length (de dominio uxorum, de dominio filiorum familias), seeking to specify, often with excessively casuistic concerns, what the one or the others may legitimately acquire; consequently they occupy themselves a great deal with establishing when and to what extent the persons in question sin by subtracting something in the home, and how far they are bound to restitution. In general, for guilt in the "thefts" of the wife and of the children they require a more serious matter than for others (v. FURTO).

The community requirement, and therefore transpersonal requirement, of the goods of the family seems to demand particularly stable forms. Along this line is to be placed the affirmation of Pius XII in the Radio Message for the fiftieth anniversary of "Rerum novarum" on the family farm (AAS, 33 [1947], p. 202).

IV. FAMILY AND SCHOOL

It was recalled above that the right and duty to educate belongs originally to the family (see, however, the rights of the Church for formation in the supernatural life). Yet the family is not always in a position to attend to it directly: "in fact it is evident that most of the time parents cannot take upon themselves in every part the absorbing task of completing the work of education and instruction of the child" (Unione int. di studi sociali, Codice sociale, Revigo 1927, n. 20). First of all for lack of the knowledge and the directives to be communicated (one need only think of the accumulation of knowledge that the educator must possess, especially in an advanced society); then for lack of time (one need only think of the average worker who usually leaves the house, to go to work, early in the morning and returns there quite late in the evening, without the possibility of spending long with his children); finally for lack of the necessary tranquility (one need only reflect on how much tranquility and patience are required to educate truly, etc.). The family makes up for its insufficiency by entrusting to others what it is not directly able to do: thus the school arises. Yet parents are not always in a position to open a school themselves. Then society intervenes: thus the state school arises; with regard to which parents retain freedom of choice and the right of supervision, should they, whether from necessity or for other reasons, choose the state school (v. EDUCAZIONE; INSEGNAMENTO, libertà d').

V. FAMILY AND SOCIETY

The relations that exist between the family and society follow clearly from what has been said. Substantially they come down to three: 1) the family precedes society; 2) society must put the family in a position to be able to attend to its great mission; 3) society must compel the family to attend to its task, at least to a minimum, taking its place if necessary.

The precedence of the family over society is first of all one of time: the family was the first form of social organization, the first school and the first temple; the head of the family was the first civil superior and the first priest; whence the importance of the stocks and of the tribe. The precedence of the family over society is also one of value, since society is a means of assuring to the family, and through it to the individual, what is indispensable for attaining its own end. Let one reflect, for example, on what has been said with regard to the school. This demands that "the State must recognize the family as it has been constituted by God; protect it against all its enemies, removing from the public environment every element of perversion and creating a healthy and suitable moral atmosphere, help it in the fulfillment of its mission; impel it to the discharge of its duties... (I.C.A.S., Per una comunità cristiana, Rome 1945, no. 24). These concepts have been strongly and repeatedly affirmed by the recent Pontiffs against the dictatorial tendencies of certain governments and the pseudo-mystical conceptions of social life. Worthy of note for their importance are the encyclicals Divini illius magistri and Mit brennender Sorge of Pius XI (AAS, 22 [1930], pp. 49-86; 29 [1937], pp. 145-67, 168-88) and the Radio Message for Christmas 1942 of Pius XII (ibid., 35 [1943], p. 19). The new Italian Constitution draws inspiration from these concepts, although with expressions that are at times not sufficiently clear. Article 29 in fact says that "the Republic recognizes the rights of the family as a natural society founded on marriage"; and Article 31: "The Republic assists with economic measures and other provisions the formation of the family and the discharge of the duties relating to it, with particular regard to large families."

State intervention can go so far as to compel the family to fulfill its mission, even taking its place, in extreme cases. The child in fact "has a right to physical, intellectual, moral and religious formation" (Unione int. di studi soc., Codice sociale, Rovigo 1927, no. 19). The natural environment for obtaining it is the family; to it therefore belongs first of all the duty of providing it. But if the family, through incapacity or ill will, does not provide it, the intervention of the State becomes indispensable. Hence "a legislation protecting the rights of the child against incapable, negligent and perverse parents is necessary" (loc. cit.). Rightly Article 30 of the Italian Constitution says that "in cases of incapacity of the parents, the law provides that their duties be discharged."

A particularly delicate point in the action of society is the harmonization between the rights of the family as the only legitimate way of transmitting life and the inalienable rights of the person even if born outside the family. For if "the distinction between the legitimate and the illegitimate transmission of life is imposed upon the legislator" (op. cit., no. 15), on the other hand "even the child born outside marriage has rights, which must be protected" (op. cit., no. 18). "The juridical treatment of children procreated outside marriage has always constituted a grave problem for the sociologist, for the politician and therefore for the legislator. In fact two requirements are noted that are in clear contrast. In a certain sense, one would wish to broaden the protection owed to these unfortunates, extending to them too the benefits deriving from the recognized relationship of filiation, as if they were legitimate children, given that they are innocents who moreover more than others find themselves exposed to the moral and material difficulties of life. On the other hand, it is also necessary to discriminate clearly their position, for the prestige and honor owed to the legitimate family, which is the basis of the social fabric and from which therefore it would be desirable that the new generations come to society: one must avoid the phenomenon of filiation presenting itself to the conscience of citizens as a simply natural phenomenon, while there is connected to it a whole moral question and the social problem of the rearing and education of the beings who have been caused to be born" (A. Trabucchi, Istituzione di diritto civile, 3rd ed., Padua 1947, p. 240). From this point of view the formula adopted in the Constitution (Article 30) is good: "The law assures to children born outside marriage every juridical and social protection compatible with the rights of the members of the legitimate family."

VI. FAMILY AND POLITICS

The importance of the family-society relationship seems to demand a greater presence of the family in the conduct of public affairs. To define precisely the forms of such a presence is difficult given the current state of studies. Here it will suffice to recall point VIII of the Déclaration des droits de la famille read at Lille on 5 December 1920 by Gen. Castelnau and the position of the Codice sociale of the Union of Malines. Point VIII says: « La famille, vraie cellule sociale, a le droit d'élite des mandataires aux assemblées de la commune, du département, de la région, de la nation. Le père dispose, en sus de sa voix personnelle, d'un nombre de voix égal ou proportionnel à celui des enfants mineurs non émancipés qui sont sous sa puissance. La mère vote au nom du père mort, absent, interdit, déchu ». And the Codice sociale: "In order to guarantee the rights of the family it is important that it be able to be represented in the assemblies of the commune, of the region, of the nation. Thus, for example, the father could dispose, in addition to his personal vote, of a number of votes equal or proportional to the importance of the household of which he is the guardian" (no. 33).

Giovanni Battista Guzzini

V. THE FAMILY AND EDUCATION.

I. EDUCATION IN THE FAMILY

The family presents, in the logical order, the first environment and the first type of education. This, in fact, belongs to it by right, as does procreation (v. EDUCAZIONE); indeed it must be said that education is nothing other than the moral prolongation of the physical fact of procreation, inasmuch as the new creatures that come into the world are human persons, endowed not only with a body but also with a spiritual soul, both of which stand in need of the care and attention necessary for their development and progress.

The family, moreover, presents the first environment and the first type of human education also in the historical order; the school, in fact, comes later, when society, grown in number and in complexity of functions, will require in its citizens particular physical, cultural and moral qualities, which will demand the "flanking" or "integrating" work of others and not a "substituting" work, because nothing can overturn the logical order mentioned above, and no work of others, as experience shows, is worth the work of the family, this being founded on natural instinct, on disinterestedness, on love, on the, so to speak, felt and conscious right of ownership that parents have over "their" creatures. And even in the deplorable cases in which the work of others necessarily becomes "substituting," education will be able to make up for the absence of others the more it knows how to draw near to the form, the warmth and the affection of the education that the family knows how to impart. Witness to this is the common phrase, ever delicate and delightful, that is uttered in such cases: "I will be a father to you; I will be a mother to you."

1. Value of family education

Family education takes on greater or lesser value, greater or lesser completeness, according to the end that one intends to attain and according to the dignity that is attributed to the institution of the family. Now Christianity assigns to every individual a total end, which embraces the natural life in its physical, intellectual, moral and social aspects, and the supernatural life, bestowed by Grace, which issues at its term in eternal salvation: and to the family, through Marriage elevated to the dignity of a Sacrament, it gives a value and at the same time a strength that it would not otherwise have. Domestic education, therefore, must have in view all the ends mentioned above and must know how to strengthen the means for attaining them with the healthful sap that derives from Christianity and from its practice.

2. Didactics of family education

As for the didactic art according to which education is to be imparted and carried out, it must be observed that it differs fundamentally from the didactics of the school. The latter, in fact, requires particular environmental and technical elements; the former, on the other hand, is nothing but the spontaneous and continued fruit of that very love which gave life to the children and now intends to preserve it for them and to make it progress. A love, and therefore an art, that is not learned from the books of a school; so true is this that parents, even of little culture, have shown themselves and still show themselves, in practice, to be excellent educators. This does not at all justify the opposite excess, unfortunately alive in many families, of thinking that for a family education the spontaneous inclination of nature is enough. This inclination is not always constant, orderly, timely, ready to offer a sure hand in all the highly variable and ever-varying situations of character, temperament, age and environment. Hence the necessity, for parents, of acquiring that culture, specialized in the matter, which, allied with nature, will offer them a sure and conscientious criterion. Precisely because the psychological situations of children, even within the same family, are diverse and at times contrasting, an effective education requires an elasticity of judgment, a keenness of eye, a breadth of ideas, a ease of application, which nature does not always give by itself in full efficiency, and therefore it must be strengthened through reading, study and observation. And if the art of the educator is always difficult, it appears all the more arduous when it is a question of domestic education.

3. Aspects and means of family education

As with every other kind of education, so too for family education the aspects are two: negative (to prevent evil), positive (to form for good).

Under the negative aspect of preventing evil, the means to be employed are now imposition, now punishment: better, however, to seek, on the one hand, to prevent evil, so as not then to have to punish it, and on the other, to form strong and resolute consciences, so as not to have need of impositions. This immediately indicates the extraordinary importance that the positive aspect carries.

a) In order to form for good, the first requisite necessary in the family is the example of the parent-educators. Everyone copies one another; children, especially, are more exposed than others to modeling themselves on grown-ups and preferably on those who are near them, above all the parents, who seem to them exceptional beings in whom there is nothing to condemn; all the more so since example can precede the word and produce its effect even before the child can understand an exhortation or grasp the importance of a thing. Example must be followed by invitation, exhortation, explanations, instructions, always different according to circumstances, types and ages.

In this regard, however, one must avoid appearing importunate, heavy, oppressive, monotonous, tiresome. b) The second means is to understand youth and one's own children. A little retrospective reflection on what one would have wished when one was oneself small is of the greatest guiding efficacy. To understand also the times, which can change and bring with them particular demands. c) The third means is to love one's children. In this regard several defects must be avoided: too much indulgence on the pretext that, as they grow, children will understand by themselves; too much coddling, which soon turns the whims of the spoiled into impositions; the separation of severity from leniency; leaving, for example, severity to the father and leniency to the mother, whereas the work of both parents must be substantiated with love and authority, dosable in their fusion or tempering according to circumstances. d) The fourth means, to respect one's children, avoiding in their presence talk or displays concerning others, or sights, which, even if at that particular moment they do not understand them, nonetheless descend easily into the subconscious to surface later and disturb them. e) To watch over the development of one's children in order to furnish them, time by time, according to their age and maturity, with those explanations that are necessary for orienting themselves, understanding life, creating relationships, and thus avoiding morbid introspections, evil suggestions, false steps, which sooner or later plunge one into the abyss. f) To consider one's children under the supernatural aspect: that is, as gifts of God to be guarded and preserved for him, to be perfected and sanctified for his glory and for the well-being of society: to educate them, therefore, to frankness, to purity, to obedience, to the love of sacrifice and renunciation, to generosity, to the heroism of daily duty; of irreplaceable value in this field will therefore be the means offered by the Catholic religion with its Sacraments (Eucharistic education; formation of conscience through Confession and spiritual direction) and with its most lofty spirit of brotherhood and love (education to charity, to respect for work, for the less well-off, for the worker, for domestic servants; to benevolence toward those who suffer; to the service of one's neighbor in whatever need; to the spirit of society, which extinguishes every sense of egoism and self-centeredness in order to establish the true art of human coexistence: living for one another).

II. EDUCATION FOR THE FAMILY

From what has been briefly mentioned, it follows that the art of domestic education is, in its importance and in its consequences, very difficult. It is therefore advisable to prepare for it, because every art is learned through practice, so as not to find oneself later in the stage of novices, when the situation will demand its practice. Leaving to the entry MARRIAGE what concerns the specific pedagogical preparation for the great act, it will suffice here to mention the remote preparation necessary for all those who in a future family will have to educate. This preparation requires that the means indicated for the formation of others in the good be first of all employed for one's own formation; because only thus will one be able one day to propose them with the authority and efficacy that derive from experience. Napoleon I's answer to the question "When does the education of a child begin?" has remained famous — "Twenty years before his birth, with the education of the mother." Preparation also requires the reading and study of family pedagogy and constant reflection upon two principles, expressed in the manner of proverbs: a) "Every man is an heir and every man is an ancestor," that is, he receives, through the long series of generations from which he descends and especially from his parents, something of his ancestors, and at the same time he will give, by founding his own family, something of himself to his descendants. Heredity does not destroy, except in very special cases, free will; however, the defects of the ancestor can reverberate, sometimes in a mysterious and tragic way, in the near and remote descendants; b) "The hand that rocks the cradle directs the world," in the sense that the mother must prepare her creatures for the life of tomorrow (and among them several may tomorrow be called to direct affairs and the nation) and for the task that in any case they will have to carry out.

Celestino Testore