Reincarnation

REINCARNATION. - Term used to indicate the passage of the soul from one human body to another. It has a narrower meaning than metempsychosis (from Gk. μετὰ, in the sense of "passage," and ἐμψυχίω "I animate"), which indicates the transmigration of the human soul through various bodies of men, animals, plants, etc. The word "metensomatosis" (σῶμα = "body," and παλιγγενεσία "rebirth") is also used with the same meaning.

I. IN NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS

The idea that the soul can, after death, inform other bodies belongs to the common heritage of primitive peoples, among whom the phenomena of hallucination and dream suggested the possibility for the soul to leave the body temporarily; while the unclear awareness of the distinction between human and animal nature, inasmuch as both are animate and living, as is found in totemistic beliefs (v. TOTEMISM), made possible the belief that the soul, especially of the dead, can go to inform individuals of a given animal species. Naturally in this passage there is, originally, no concept of moral sanction; nor, at first, even among the Indians, who have, like other primitive peoples, considered the moon as the dwelling place of the souls of the dead and rain as the vehicle of their return to fecundate and reanimate the earth.

Brahmanic speculation, in its final evolution contained in the Upanishads, added to this primitive animistic concept that of reincarnation (samsara), considered as the penalty for not having attained, through liberating meditation, the understanding of the substantial identity of the self with the world, in which liberation consists. Buddhism, which marks the final term of Brahmanic speculation, accepts the postulate of reincarnation but considers it, with its developments according to the law of karma (v.), as a consequence of not having attained the knowledge, not of the identity of the self with the cosmos, but of the empirical reality of suffering and of the means to annihilate it, taught by the Buddha.

The doctrine of reincarnation is also found in Greece, where the primitive animistic conception was developed by a contribution, not from Egypt as Herodotus would have it (II, 123), but from the Indian East through Asia Minor, where Persia dominated from the borders of India to the shores of Ionia. The Orphic movement, which developed in Greece in the 6th century, considered reincarnation as a means of expiation to restore to the soul the purity of its divine origin, darkened by having descended to inhabit the human body, following a primordial fault; the breaking of this cycle of rebirths (ὁ κύκλος τῆς γενέσεως, ὁ τῆς μοίρας τροχός) is described as the joy of the bird that breaks the snares that hold it prisoner (v. ORPHICS, MYSTERIES).

Pythagoras is indebted to Orphism, whose doctrine on this point is therefore called Orphic-Pythagorean (cf. Xenophanes, in Diogenes, VIII, 36; Ovid, Met., XV; Empedocles, De nat., I, 3-20 and Pindar, Ol., 2, 62 ff.). Plato too, in his psychology, depends on Orphism, inasmuch as he also (Cratyl., 400 BC; Phaedr., 246 BD; Phaedo, 113 D; Tim., 41 A; cf. Proclus, In Tim., 5, 300 A; Simplicius, De caelo, 2, 61 b; Olympiodorus, In Phaedon., II 6 a) teaches that the human soul first lived in the stars, where the natural and moral laws were revealed to it; then by force of a fatal law (by which philosophically one must understand the necessary union of soul and body to form the human individual, and mythically the fault of the Titans who devoured Dionysus) it descended into the body, which for it is a prison (σῶμα-σῆμα). In the wake of Plato move Neopythagoreanism (v.) and Neoplatonism (v.). Plotinus explains the fatal law that induces the soul, of divine origin, to become embodied, by the desire it feels to possess itself better, individuating itself in a body. Only with the exercise of an ascetic and purifying life (κάθαρσις) that shortens the cycle of rebirths can it, through ecstasy, reunite with the One that attracts and absorbs it, forming with it a single being, making it lose the sense of its individuality, which is the principle of its inferiority.

Nicola Turchi

II. CATHOLIC DOCTRINE

The ancient pagan doctrines on metempsychosis have been revived in most recent times by the followers of spiritualism and theosophy, who, however, prefer to replace the term metempsychosis (as well as the others: ensomatosis, metensomatosis, palingenesis) with that of reincarnation, in order to stress that they limit the transmigrations of the soul to human bodies alone, whereas metempsychosis can extend to animals and even to plants.

In the Christian world the position is diametrically opposed, even though traces of those doctrines are not lacking, especially in certain writers inspired by Platonism and Neoplatonism. Thus in St. Justin (Dial., 4: PG 6, 481-84) a certain pre-existence of the soul is affirmed, of which it is not conscious, just as it is not conscious of the successive existences that follow the present one. Clement of Alexandria does not seem to have admitted a form of pre-existence, notwithstanding certain inconclusive texts (Strom., IV, 26; Quis dives salvetur, 3, 26, 33, 36); while elsewhere he alludes to a transmigration of souls (Strom., III, 3: ed. Potter I, 516), but he seems to be referring to philosophical speculations, and he clearly affirms the μετανομαλίασις (transcorporation) of Egyptian theology, from which it passed into other currents (and certainly he is thinking of Pythagoras, Strom., VI, 4: ed. Potter II, 757). Nor is Origen's theory concerning the universal ἀποκατάστασις or reintegration intimately connected with metempsychosis properly so called, even though he admits the pre-existence of souls and in De Principiis (II, 8, 4: PG 2, 224) seeks to reconcile Christianity with Platonic theories. A strong polemic flared up against Origen, especially after his death, and particularly in the 6th century, culminating in the condemnation by the patriarch Menas of Constantinople and his particular council, and in that of the Council of Constantinople in 543, with the approval of Pope Vigilius (cf. Denz-U, 211; Hefele-Leclercq, II, b, p. 1184; R. Hedde, Métempsycose, in DThC, X, coll. 1587-88).

The absence of a genuinely Christian current favorable to Origenist theories in general and to metempsychosis in particular is also evident from certain allusions found in anti-heretical works, in which at times those theories are even ridiculed (for example, in St. Epiphanius, Haeres., 21, c. 2; 66, 28; St. Basil, In Haexaemeron, hom. VIII, 2; Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, Hierar. Eccles., c. VII, 2).

Although there is no explicit definition concerning the irrevocability of the soul after death and the impossibility of a substantial change in its dispositions, there are nonetheless unequivocal declarations of the ecclesiastical magisterium, according to which the sanction takes place immediately after death and is decisive for all eternity (v. DIVINE JUDGMENT). Thus the Second Council of Lyons (1274, Denz-U, 464); Benedict XII in the constitution Benedictus Deus (29 Jan. 1336; Denz-U, 530-31); the Council of Florence in the Decretum pro Graecis (4 June 1439; Denz-U, 693).

This doctrine of the Church derives clearly from the Gospel, where the contrast of the "beatitudes" and the "woes" in the Sermon on the Mount is resolved in a reversal of positions after death, when those who "now" laugh "then" will weep, and vice versa (Lk. 6, 20-26; Mt. 5, 3-12), and this definitively, as appears from the parable of the rich man and the beggar

Lazarus (Lk. 16, 19-31) and from that of the ten virgins (Mt. 25, 1-13), in which the impossibility of a change of lot is evident, the time for decisions being over. Thus the exhortations of Jesus to vigilance, activity, perseverance make sense (Mt. 24, 42-51; 25, 13; Mk. 13, 33; Lk. 12, 35-40), since after the "night" no one can work any longer (cf. Jn. 9, 4). The same thought and the same exhortations are found in the Apostles (cf. Gal. 6, 9-10; I Cor. 9, 24 ff.; II Cor. 5, 1-10; I Thess. 5, 2-3; I Pt. 1, 3-8; II Pt. 3, 10; Jas. 4, 13-15; Apoc. 11, 10-11; 16, 15). Especially St. Paul teaches clearly (I Cor. 15, 24-28) that with the judgment the economy of salvation is closed for all, without any possibility of an "eternal return" or of a universal apokatastasis. Indeed, the affirmation of an essential and irrevocable decision entails the exclusion of any transmigration and reappearance of the soul in new lives.

The same doctrine can be gathered from numerous texts of the Fathers of the Church (cf. II Clem. 8, 3; St. Cyprian, Ad Dem., 25; St. Basil, Hom. 7, in divites, n. 8; PG 31, 301; St. John Chrysostom, De Poen. hom., 9; PG 49, 346; St. Ambrose, In Psalm., 118, 2, 14; De excess. frater., II, 48); cf. B. Bartmann, Manuale di teologia dogmatica, III, trad. it., 2nd ed., Alba 1951, p. 384. Other texts in Rouet de Journel, Enchir. Patrist., nn. 103, 487, 560, 561, 576, 578, 693, 886, 887, 966, 980, 1172, 1200, 1325, 1364, 2268, 2321.

III. THE THOUGHT OF ST. THOMAS

Scholastic theology reaffirms and rationally explains the doctrine of Sacred Scripture and of the Fathers, emphasizing the distinction between the status viae and the status termini, in which latter state one can no longer merit, given a disposition of God justified by obvious and convincing reasons. It is not said, however, that even in the period of scholasticism the Manichaean idea, already combated by the Fathers, does not echo here and there, as appears from two passages of the Summa de Catharis of Fr. Rainerio Sacconi (ed. Dondaine, in the Liber de duobus principiis, Rome 1939, p. 71). The question is still current in the times of St. Thomas, who examines it under all its aspects, and especially: 1) as regards the philosophical presupposition of the "eternity of the world" (C. Gent., II, cc. 38, 81, 83); 2) as regards the "Pythagorean" presupposition already criticized by Aristotle (ibid., II, c. 44, 73); 3) as regards the "dualistic" presupposition in the global critique of Manichaeism (ibid., II, c. 83, § Quidam autem) and of Origenism (ibid.); 4) as regards the presupposition of "pre-existence" (ibid., II, c. 83, § Item si omnes); 5) as regards the theory of "periodic return" (ibid., III, c. 144, § Privatio enim).

The firm and categorical rejection of all those elements that could justify metempsychosis is founded in St. Thomas on a basic principle, according to which "the proportion of the soul of man to the body of man is equal to the proportion of the soul of this man to the body of this man" (ibid., II, c. 73, § Praeterea Aristoteles). This metaphysical-psychological reason is the pivot of the philosophical confutation made by St. Thomas, who further demonstrates by the authority of Revelation and by metaphysical and theological reasons that the final transformation will have a definitive character (ibid., IV, c. 82), and that souls have the will immutably fixed in good or in evil, according to the state in which they found themselves at the moment of death (ibid., IV, cc. 91-93).

IV. MODERN DEVIATIONS

This doctrine, in conformity with the Church's magisterium and with the data of Revelation, is common among Catholics. Among Protestants, however, certain sects revived the theory of apocatastasis; thus the Anabaptists and some more recent ones, such as U. Janni (cf. « Ultra », Problemi relativi alla finalità del creato e alla nostra vita dopo la morte, Modena 1930). But it was especially Schleiermacher who introduced into Protestantism the idea of a possible conversion after death (cf. Bartmann, op. cit., III, p. 385).

Others too resurrected the theory of reincarnation under different forms and with different overtones: thus G. Cardano, B. Telesio, G. Bruno, Van Helmont, C. Bonnet, Bellanche, P. Leroux, J. Reynaud, Ch. Fourier, etc. But especially the followers of theosophy (v.) and anthroposophy have brought back into force the doctrine of metempsychosis, teaching the succession of lives, which they call reincarnation, with reference to Greek and Latin sources, to more recent authors, of the 15th-17th centuries, and, especially Blavatsky and Besant, to the ancient philosophies and religious speculations of India. The immense cycle of births and deaths is regulated by « Karma », according to which every soul, on leaving one body, puts on another, beginning a new life, in a better or worse state according to what it has sown in the previous life, without entirely excluding that it may be reborn in an animal, vegetable or mineral species, if the preceding life was sinful. If it is « reincarnated » in a human body and improves, there is a progressive ascent up to perfection, which is reached with entry into the universal essence, Nirvana, where man is absorbed (cf. L. de Grandmaison, Théosophie, in DFC, IV, col. 1659; id., Le lotus bleu, Paris 1910; R. Guenon, Le theosophisme, ibid. 1921). The followers of spiritism too, especially French spiritism, uphold reincarnation in place of Purgatory. The person, according to them, has many successive existences, of which he has no memory. In them he expiates the sins committed previously. When the spirit will be fully purified, the cycle will end; but the soul arrives at this complete purification fatally, by an almost automatic process, since personally, not knowing its faults, it could not expiate them (cf. L. Roure, Spiritisme, in DThC, XIV, coll. 2518-19; A. Kardec, Le livre des esprits, Paris 1857; Th. Mainage, La religion spirite, ibid. 1921).

V. CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS

The opposition between these doctrines and the Catholic one is evident, after what has been said; moreover the Holy Office declared (1919) that theosophical doctrines are not reconcilable with Catholic doctrine. But furthermore, the reasons already mentioned above militate against such conceptions, and on the basis of the thought of St. Thomas they can be summed up in the following: if the soul is the substantial form of the body (cf. Denz-U, 480 ff., 738, 1655), which gives it its specific being and therefore has with it a single substantial being, it follows that it cannot be united to any body other than this one (cf. St. Thomas, De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 9, ad 4; II Sent., d. 17, q. 2, a. 2). There is a strict proportion between such a soul and such a body (cf. Summ. Theol., 1ª, q. 76, a. 5). The soul always preserves the determinations it had in its union with this body, as its form, and cannot become the form of another body (cf. II Sent., d. 17, q. 2, in c. and ad 4).

The arguments brought in favor of reincarnation, on the other hand, do not prove it. In fact: a) its supporters appeal to the unequal distribution of evils in our present stay on earth: this would depend on the fact of other previous, sinful existences, from which one would need to be purified. But it is known that the unequal distribution of goods, with the permission or toleration of evils, depends instead on the different bestowal of God's love (cf. C. Gent., II, ch. 44), which assigns to each one a path to travel in order to prepare for eternal life. The evils of the present life serve for purification from actual sins, not from those of a previous life of which no one has any memory. b) They also appeal to the great diversity, already in native dispositions, among souls, while bodies are similar. But it is enough to point out that the whole world is made of inequalities, from inanimate nature to spiritual nature, and that the diversity of genius, of virtue, of intelligence depends both on a different divine bestowal, and on the influence of parents (heredity), and on the particular constitution of each individual in the union of the soul with a determinate body. c) They say further that for the length of the journey toward the infinite a single existence is not enough. The answer is that not even millions of existences would suffice, whereas instead we are called to carry out in the one life at our disposal the design of God, with the help of his Grace. d) They point out that here below the good are often the victims of the wicked, and yet society does not fail, but progresses: and this because the better individualities always return, maintain and develop sound traditions. The answer is that moral progress in humanity is often problematic and in any case, when it is real, is explained by quite other reasons.

Moreover there are against reincarnation irrefutable arguments: 1) the absence of any memory of one or more previous existences. Theosophists try to justify themselves by saying that between the two existences there is, as it were, a space in which everything becomes tendency, there is no longer any act of knowledge, and therefore on returning to existence it is impossible to remember: but at least a confused memory there should be; 2) the impossibility of giving reincarnation the character of a moral sanction, since it is not seen how there can be punishment if there is no memory of the fault that must be expiated; 3) the impossibility of reconciling reincarnation with the spirituality of the soul, which, if it needed such transmigrations in order to be purified, would not be spiritual, since for a spiritual being, in order to be purified, the change and reordering of the will suffices. The theory of reincarnation is therefore in contrast both with Catholic doctrine and with the principles of a sound philosophy that remains faithful to the data of experience and to the postulates of reason.

Raimondo Spiazzi