Sin

SIN. - Here it means the moral fall or ruin, the evil human act, indicated in the Greek of the New Testament by various other expressions: ἀμαρτία or ἀμάρτημα, that is, the act by which man turns away from the attainment of his end (Rom. 5:12; 7:7; 8:3); παράβασις or ἀνομία or παρενημία, that is, transgression of the law, which man is bound to observe (2 Pt. 2:16; Rom. 4:15; 1 Jn. 3:4); παράπταμα, that is, the state of one who has fallen from his dignity or moral perfection (Mk. 11:25-26).

1. METAPHYSICAL ASPECT

The primary concept of sin is that of a free violation of the moral order (Wircburgenses, De peccatis, d. 1, c. 1, a. 1, n. 2, Würzburg 1762). Every free violation of the moral order, however it occurs, is a sin, whether by the positing of something that ought to be avoided (sin of commission) or by the omission of something that ought to be done (sin of omission), whether in thoughts, in words, or in deeds, whether against ourselves or against others, etc.

For one to be able to speak of sin, therefore, there is required: a) a free act; b) a norm of conduct; c) an opposition between the first and the second. It is clear that the sin will be all the more grave the more the first and third elements are present, the greater the degree of advertence and consent and the degree of opposition to the norm of conduct. As regards the first, one goes from a minimum, barely sufficient for one to be able to speak of a conscious and willed opposition, to a maximum in which consciousness and consent are perfect. To this point must be traced the very frequent distinction between sin of ignorance or of weakness and sin of malice. The former are those that presuppose a lesser knowledge or a lesser consent, or even an ignorance, but in some way responsible. The latter presuppose a perfect, or nearly perfect, knowledge of the mind and adherence of the will. To this is also traced the group of sins against the Holy Spirit. They involve a particular knowledge and a fuller consent, whereby they lead to obstinacy, and while this persists they are irremissible.

At this point the question immediately arises as to what more precisely that violation of the moral order is, that lack of conformity to the norm of conduct. This is what is usually called the metaphysical problem of sin.

Two currents are usually distinguished in scholastic theology and philosophy. According to some, in fact, the essence of sin would consist in the positing of an act out of conformity with the norm of conduct, in the tendency toward an object irreconcilable with the moral order. The essence of sin would therefore consist in something positive. According to others, on the other hand, the essence of sin would consist rather in the lack of ordering to the norm of conduct, in the absence of conformity to duty, in the privation of conformity to the moral order. It would therefore consist essentially in something negative.

To the first current are habitually traced Cajetan (In 1-2, q. 18, a. 2; q. 71, a. 6; q. 79, a. 1), the Salmanticenses (Cursus theologiae moralis, De vitis et peccatis, tr. 13, disp. 6, Venice 1728), C. Billuart (De peccatis, diss. 1, a. 2 ff., Lyon 1864, p. 278 ff.) and, recently, L. Billot (De personali et originali peccato, 5th ed., Rome 1924), Th. Deman (Péché, in DThC, XII, col. 150 ff.). To the second current are habitually traced Scotus (I. II, dist. 34, a. 1, q. 7), Durandus (In II, dist. 34, a. 1, q. 2), etc.

Without fully confronting the question, one may say that the two opinions are perhaps less far apart than at first sight it might seem. Perhaps it would be appropriate to distinguish between the essential constituents of sin and the formal constituent. Even the body, for example, according to the scholastic conception, is an essential constituent of man, but it is not the formal constituent. The same should be said of sin: both the positive and the negative are essential constituents; only the negative would be the formal constituent (Sum. Theol., 3a, q. 86, a. 4, ad 1ᵘᵐ).

II. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT

It is now necessary to define more precisely the concept of the norm of conduct. It is well known that this consists fundamentally in one's own nature or one's own being. Just as in the theater a person does well when he behaves according to the character or the part he is playing, so in life each person does well when he acts according to his own being or his own nature.

Consequently, sin can be defined as a free act against one's own nature. Every time a person sins he freely violates his own nature, and every time a person freely violates his own nature he sins. There are no "supernatural" sins. All this allows us to see more deeply the meaning of the widely used distinction between sins against nature and sins according to nature. By such expressions it is not intended to indicate that some sins violate man's nature and others do not, but that some sins go against man's spontaneous tendency, so that, in order to sin, a notable presence of the will is required; others, on the other hand, are merely a following of the tendencies of our being, so that it is easier for man to be their victim. The former are more serious than the latter, at least subjectively, because they involve a greater presence of free human decision. For the latter, precisely because they conform to the tendencies of our being, particular vigilance and particular attention will be required.

The being or nature that has been said to be the fundamental norm of conduct is not the concrete being in its actual mode of presenting itself at a given moment, but the ideal type to which each person corresponds, the "perfect," "finished" being that each person has potentially within himself. In this sense one can also say that the norm of conduct is perfection, or, what amounts to the same thing, the end.

Sin, therefore, is a free action against one's own end, a free act that impedes it, a decision of the will contrary to one's own perfection and therefore to one's own happiness. Such a concept of missing an end, of not reaching a goal, is moreover quite clear in the Hebrew and Greek term usually used to indicate sin (ἁμαρτία = to fail, to miss the mark: cf. Is. 65:20, Ps. 25:8, where the delinquentius in via are not those whom a sin stops along the way, but those who miss the goal).

The end, moreover, that constitutes the discriminating criterion between good and evil is the true end of our humanity, that is, the supernatural end. We are no longer destined for a purely natural development, that is, for that full unfolding of ourselves which results from the analysis of pure nature, but for a supernatural unfolding that will find its crowning in the immediate possession of God.

Sin, therefore, constitutes an obstacle not only to natural happiness, but also to supernatural happiness, of which grace is the seed and the pledge. It has been seen in the first part what this entails in concrete terms: loss of Grace, increase of concupiscence, of ignorance, of disorder and of death here below, and an eternal punishment in the next life.

One can here give another definition of sin: sin is that which gives death to the soul. Every sin is therefore a diminution of one's own being, an attack on one's own perfection and therefore on one's own happiness. One understands therefore why the Bible is accustomed to connect the idea of sin with that of death and the idea of virtue and good with that of life.

At this point another very serious problem arises: the psychological problem of sin. How is it possible to sin? How is it possible to tend freely toward something that impedes one's own perfection and one's own happiness? For we necessarily tend toward both the one and the other. Hence it seems one must say: if one acts against one's own happiness, it is only because one is ignorant of it; but if one is ignorant of it, there is no sin.

To set about solving this difficult question, it seems necessary to recall briefly two orders of considerations. First of all, in the sinful act there is not only the aspect of violation of the moral order; there is also some aspect of good. It will be a merely material good or even only an immediate one: but it exists. Let us analyze, for example, the sins against temperance, chastity, property, obedience, etc. Furthermore, and this is the second order of considerations, one must bear in mind that historical man, although knowing that, of the two parts of which he consists (soul and body), the first is objectively far more important than the second, at least subjectively feels the second far more than the first. The lack or loss of bodily goods affects us far more deeply than the lack or loss of spiritual goods. At least each of us feels the lack of immediate goods far more deeply than that of distant goods, even if the latter are objectively far more important. Between the renunciation of the satisfaction of an immediate pleasure and the renunciation of eternal joy, more than once the renunciation of immediate pleasure seems harder to us.

One can therefore conclude: sin is psychologically possible because an apparent or inferior good deceives the will. The tendency toward the good remains, but it settles upon something partial or momentary (A. Vermeersch, Theol. Moralis, I, Rome 1924, n. 371, p. 368; cf. also Sum. Theol., 1ª-2ᵃᵉ, q. 73, a. 1).

With this the psychological problem of sin is not yet completely resolved. There always remains the fact that one freely chooses a lesser good. Historically the problem arises especially for the angels and for the first parents. How could they sin, favored as they were with a special light of cognition and a particular equilibrium of will?

Some answer can be derived from the fact that sometimes the affirmation of one's own autonomy, of one's own independence, can be preferred to any other good. Nor are examples lacking even among men of obstinacy in one's own point of view and in one's own decision, even at the cost of any sacrifice. Precisely something similar would have happened in the rebellious angels and in our first parents.

In this sense sin would appear above all as a disordered search for self, an absurd and unhealthy attempt at self-divinization. It was already in this sense that the tempter introduced himself when he insinuated to the first parents that, by sinning, they would become "sicut di" (Gen. 3:5). It was especially around this theme that St. Augustine developed his City of God, in which, among other things, a group of men seeks love of self to the point of contempt for God.

Leaving aside further developments, which are in any case easily intuited, it will suffice here to fix a few points: 1) the ability to sin is not a perfection of the will, but a weakness of it; it is like the ability to fall ill or the ability to die. God, therefore, cannot be said to be less perfect than we are because he cannot sin; 2) the genesis of sin always involves some struggle and some suffering: the free choice against one's own end, however much solicited by a good that is subjectively more felt because it is more bodily or more immediate, cannot be separated from some inner laceration, from some struggle with oneself. This aspect of drama seems undeniable even in Adam's fault. However the biblical narrative is understood, one must admit that our first parents did not arrive at the fatal decision without some internal suffering and some form of struggle.

III. THEOLOGICAL ASPECT

It must further be said that the divine will is also a norm of conduct. For God wills our good and our perfection far more than we do; he therefore wills that we observe the moral order which is the presupposition of and the way to attaining it. Indeed, to make the attainment of perfection easier for us, he has intervened positively, giving us certain norms and manifesting them to us infallibly in Revelation.

Consequently sin can be defined as: factum vel dictum vel concupitum aliquid contra legem aeternam (St. Augustine, Contra Faustum, 20, 27: PL 42, 418). This is indeed the aspect of sin most frequently recalled in Revelation (cf. Gen. 39, 9; 13, 13; 38, 10; Ex. 33, 23; Jud. 10, 7; 19, 25; Rom. 5, 19; 2, 29; 4, 16; etc.). Thus we pass from the idea of an order violated to that of a person offended. To Potiphar's wife, who tempts him, Joseph replies that he does not wish to sin against his God (Gen. 39, 9), and the prodigal son cries out to his father: Peccavi in coelum et coram te (Lk. 15, 21), and in the Miserere it is affirmed: Tibi soli peccavi. Indeed, Scripture adds, this is not a matter of an ordinary person, for God is he who can do all things and knows all things, he who alone can love. He is a person particularly powerful, particularly knowing, particularly loving.

Still more: according to Scripture, it is not merely a matter of opposition to a person who has loved us and loves us, but to one to whom more than once we have freely promised love. This holds undoubtedly for the chosen people, but it holds also for the other peoples; furthermore it holds certainly for the priest and for religious persons, but it holds also, albeit in lesser forms, for every soul. For every soul, at least in some part or at least at some moment, has freely promised fidelity to God. Sin therefore assumes, according to Revelation, an entirely particular aspect: it is like the breaking of a promise made, of a faith sworn, the violation of a quasi-spousal relationship, wherefore Scripture sometimes likens sin to adultery (Jer. 3, 20).

At this point another very difficult question arises, the question usually called that of philosophical sin and theological sin.

The history of the question is by now well known. In June 1686 the Jesuit François Musnier publicly defended at Dijon the thesis that one who is ignorant of God or does not actually think of him and acts against right reason commits a sin, called philosophical sin, but not an offense against God, that is, not a theological sin. The thesis did not go unnoticed, especially at Louvain. In July 1689 Arnauld denounced it to the world with a short work entitled La nouvelle hérésie dans la morale, denoncée au Pape et aux évêques, aux princes et aux magistrats. Arnauld was answered by Father De Reulx with the pamphlet Le janséniste dénonciateur de nouvelles hérésies convaincu de calomnie et de falsification, minimizing the matter; for he reduced the possibility of sinning philosophically to the very brief time in which one is inculpably ignorant of God's existence. Arnauld did not desist: he replied with his Seconde dénonciation de la nouvelle hérésie du péché philosophique. The Society then intervened, maintaining in substance that the doctrine denounced by Arnauld was truly unacceptable, but that it was foreign to the Jesuit of Dijon. Arnauld replied again, attacking the distinction made. Immediately afterward the polemic became further complicated by the entry of other elements and other contenders (Dominicans, sufficient grace, Jansenism, etc.), until the well-known proposition condemned by Alexander VIII was reached (namely « *Peccatum philosophicum... quantumvis grave, in illo, qui Deum vel ignorat vel de Deo actu non cogitat, est grave peccatum, sed non est offensa Dei, neque peccatum mortale dissolvens amicitiam Dei, neque aeterna poena dignum ») as « scandalosa, temeraria, piarum aurium offensiva, et erronea » (Denz-U, 1290).

Undoubtedly in the objective order every sin is also a theological sin. For every sin is also a violation of the divine will, an offense against his person, a disregard of his dispositions: « quacumque continentur sub ordine rationis continentur sub ordine ipsius Dei » (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃc, q. 72, a. 4 c). Can the same be said for the subjective order? Here a second distinction imposes itself, namely: between those who place the authority of God as the foundation, even the immediate foundation, of obligation (for example, L. Billot, De Deo uno, Rome 1931, p. 50; V. Cathrein, Filosofia morale, I, Florence 1913, p. 424, etc.) and those who place human nature as the proximate foundation of duty (for example, E. Elter, Norma honestatis ad mentem Dei Thomae, in Gregorianum, 8 [1927], pp. 337-57; L. Taparelli, Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale, I, Rome 1950, nos. 93-98). For the former, a sin that is not also a theological sin is impossible. For them, indeed, one cannot speak even proximately of a true and proper obligation except when one apprehends that God commands. Consequently, as long as one is not aware of opposing a divine order, one cannot speak of sin. Every sin therefore either is theological or is not. Indeed, precisely from this some (for example, Billot) reach the conclusion that many adults do not sin; whence they are adults only in age but not in reason, and therefore are assimilable, despite everything, to children who die before the use of reason. For the others, that is, for those who hold that the proximate foundation of obligation is nature or the connection between acts and the end of man, the question is far more complicated. For these it is necessary to distinguish further between the theoretical formulation of the question and the practical formulation, and, in the practical field, between habitual cases and some exceptional case.

Theoretically, one does not see why there cannot be an act that is perceived as a violation of the moral order without being perceived as opposition to the divine will. For one does not see why it cannot happen that a person knows that an act is incompatible with his own nature or with the attainment of his own perfection and at the same time is ignorant that it opposes the divine will, either because he is ignorant that God exists or because he is ignorant that God forbids him to behave as he is doing. Practically, however, the idea of God is so easily attainable and in fact so widespread that one does not see how that case could occur, at least normally. Perhaps in some exceptional case this can happen; but normally not. Thus hold several authors (cf. F. Girerd, Péché, in Dict. pratique des connaissances religieuses, V, col. 398 ff.; E. Génicot, Institutiones Theol. mor., I, Brussels 1946, no. 154).

With these qualifications one may certainly hold that every sin is also subjectively an offense against God. If the Bible distinguishes a special group of sins that cry out for vengeance in the presence of God, it is not because the others do not contain an offense against him, but because they perhaps do not contain so grave an opposition. Thus when sins are divided, for example, into sins against God, against neighbor and against oneself, this does not mean that there are sins that do not offend God, but only that there are acts that oppose the moral order in the part concerning our attitude toward neighbor or toward ourselves.

Evidently, when one studies the theological aspect of sin, one must guard against facile anthropomorphisms. The offense against God is not to be conceived like the offense we commit against creatures from whom we take something away and whom we therefore reduce to a state of suffering or disturbance. For from God nothing can be taken away, not even his inner tranquillity and beatitude. On the other hand, it is not to be thought of as something purely external that does not touch him at all: for by sinning we go against his will, we neglect the indications of his love. We must then strive to conceive of something that contravenes his will and therefore offends him, without diminishing his beatitude in any way. Some care is therefore needed when one speaks of sin as the evil of God or of the sorrow we cause him by sinning. The matter changes, evidently, when one refers to Christ, who in his human nature truly suffered.

Furthermore, the principle is by now traditional (cf., e.g., L. Lessius, De perfectionibus divinis, Antwerp 1620, bk. 13, n. 193) that the gravity of the offense grows with the dignity of the person offended, while the dignity of the homage increases with the increasing dignity of the person who renders it. From this it follows that, since God — the person offended — is of infinite dignity, the gravity of sin ought to be infinite. In fact it is not, because man is always a finite being. Even in the most perfect act there remain the conditions of limitedness and finiteness proper to a created being.

IV. THE DISTINCTION OF SIN

Of the many distinctions that can be made and are made among sins (deliberate and indeliberate; against God, against neighbor and against ourselves; of malice, of infirmity and of ignorance; sins of the heart, mouth, deed; sins of omission and of commission; one's own and those of others; personal and original; etc.) we limit ourselves here to the theological, specific and numerical distinction.

1. Theological distinction

From the point of view of the entity of the opposition to the moral order and therefore of the offense against God, sins are distinguished into mortal and venial. The former is the fully free violation of the moral order, or, what is the same, a fully conscious and deliberate disobedience to the will of God. It therefore requires: a) an action or a behavior irreconcilable with the moral order, or a manner of acting reducible to it, b) performed with full advertence of the mind and c) full consent of the will. It constitutes a true and proper rupture of the moral order; it deprives one of sanctifying Grace and precludes the way to the attainment of one's end (whence the qualification of "mortal"). The venial sin, on the other hand, is only not referable to the moral order; it weakens it without destroying it. And this can happen either a) by the very nature of the thing that is done (when, for example, I take a small sum from the legitimate owner, I perform an action that is not referable to the moral order, but does not destroy it by the very nature of the action I perform; the same may be said of idle words, of joking lies); or b) by the lack of complete advertence or c) of complete assent (since it cannot be admitted that insufficient advertence and incomplete assent can totally destroy the moral order founded essentially on free decision). Consequently it does not preclude the way to the attainment of the end; nor does it deprive one of sanctifying Grace. For this reason it is called venial; not because in fact it can be remitted and is remitted (which happens or can happen to any sin in this life), but because it is almost by its nature reparable, apt to be forgiven (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 72, a. 5).

The terms "mortal sin" and "venial sin" are not found in Sacred Scripture. The distinction, however, between mortal and venial sins and, in particular, the existence of the latter is clearly affirmed in it and is confirmed by reason for the considerations just set forth.

For these reasons the Church has always opposed those who denied the distinction between mortal and venial sins, and, in particular, the existence of the latter. See, for example, her attitude toward the Pelagians (Conc. Milevit., can. 7), toward the Protestants (cf. Conc. Trid., sess. VI, c. 11) and toward Baius (the 20th of the propositions condemned by Pius V: Denz-U, 1020), as well as the whole doctrine on purgatory.

From what has been said thus far it appears at once that mortal sin and venial sin are not two specifications of a single indeterminate reality, nameable as sin, more or less as the brute and man are further determinations of the single generic reality that is the sentient living being. The true sin is the mortal one; venial sin is only an imperfect form of mortal sin, which does not remove us from the end, but only delays its attainment (L. Billot, op. cit., p. 9).

Consequently, by multiplying venial sins one does not thereby obtain a mortal sin. When it is said that many small thefts continued and in some way connected give a mortal sin, it is affirmed only that by uniting small quantities one removes what makes the sin venial, that is, light matter.

Theologians commonly distinguish mortal and venial sins into mortal or venial ex toto genere suo and ex genere suo: mortal sins ex toto genere suo are those whose object always includes a substantial violation of the moral order; venial sins ex toto genere suo are those whose object never includes a substantial violation of the moral order; whereas mortal sins ex genere suo are those that usually constitute a violation of the moral order, but also admit exceptions. It is also said that mortal sins ex toto genere suo do not admit parvity of matter, the others do admit it.

At this point the question arises of the nature of imperfection; that is, whether there can be "free transgression, or free omission of a divine counsel" without there being even a venial sin. Some theologians answer no (for example, D. M. Prümmer, Man. theol. mor., I, 8th ed., Freiburg i. Br. 1931, n. 131; E. Hugueney, Imperfection, in DThC, VIII, coll. 1286-98); others, on the other hand, answer yes (De Lugo, De Poenitentia, dist. III, sectio 1ᵃ, capp. 9-10; E. Génicot, Theol. mor., I, n. 149; J. Aertins, - C. A. Damen, Theol. mor., I, n. 233 bis) basing themselves on the motive that a sin without transgression of some law is repugnant; but also observing how there can sometimes be sin by reason of the "evil end," for which one transgresses or omits the practice of that counsel.

From the criteria given above and from the observations made, the application to practical cases must be distinguished. It is not always easy to establish whether a determined matter is always gravely injurious to the moral order or not. Even more so it is not always easy to determine in practice when there is full advertence and full consent and when there is not. The first part constitutes the torment of casuistry and explains the numerous divergences among the different authors; the second constitutes the whole torment of individual life and of confession. Often even the most acute and most prepared moralist remains uncertain and the most refined psychologist remains perplexed: "Quae sint... levia, quae gravia peccata, non humano, sed divino sunt pensanda judicio" (St. Augustine, Enchiridion, cap. 78).

2. Specific distinction

Another problem that arises is whether there is a specific distinction between mortal sins and mortal sins (and, respectively, between venial sins and venial sins) and whence it draws its origin. For the first part there are no difficulties. Already Sacred Scripture alludes to different sins (for example, Rom. 1:29-31; I Cor. 6:9; Gal. 5:19) and reason shows with evidence that blasphemy and theft, for example, cannot be of the same species.

More difficult is the second part. There are in this regard two main currents among Catholic moralists. According to the first, the specific distinction of sins is to be derived from the object to which one tends; in sin indeed there are as it were two aspects: one of good that is sought directly by our will and one of evil (the violation of the moral order) that is willed only indirectly; now the specification is born from what is willed directly; consequently the root of the specific distinction lies in the object. Thus St. Thomas (cf., for example, Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 72, a. 1), many of his commentators and followers (cf. Cajetan, In I-II, q. 72, a. 1; L. Billot, op. cit., p. 46; A. Verneersch, Theol. mor., I, n. 372, p. 369; L. Deman, Péché, in DThC, XII, col. 159 ff.). According to another current, on the other hand, the distinction is drawn from the privation that is found in every sin. Thus, for example, Scotus (In II Sent., d. 37, q. 1): sin formally is constituted by its opposition to the moral order: it will therefore be distinguished according to that opposition. The divergence between the two currents is perhaps less strong than it might appear externally, since the various hypotheses can be reduced to various aspects of a single "ratio distinctionis" (D. M. Prümmer, Man. Theol. mor., I, Freiburg in Br. 1931).

3. Numerical distinction

Finally, one problem that arises is that of the numerical distinction of sins and whence it is derived. The question had a late development and was at the same time influenced as a consequence of the prescription of the Council of Trent to confess omnia et singula peccata mortalità (sess. XIV, C. 7). Commonly moralists derive the numerical distinction from the plurality of acts and of objects; that is, they admit that there are as many distinct sins as there are distinct acts, or as there are distinct objects.

V. THE SUBJECTIVE ASPECT OF SIN

Taking up again the analysis of sin, it is known that the immediate norm of conduct is conscience, that is, the judgment one has about the morality of one's action.

Sin is therefore a free act against one's own conscience. Except that conscience can also be at variance with the objective norm of conduct (end, divine will). In that case we have an act that is good, because it conforms to the subjective norm, and bad, because it is at variance with the objective norm. Theologians say that there is an act that is formally good but materially bad. Thus we arrive at the distinction between material sin and formal sin.

Here the question arises whether such a rupture can last a long time or even a whole lifetime, or whether one who follows his own conscience, at least in the long run, will certainly arrive at the knowledge of the objective order.

While refraining from delving fully into the question, it seems impossible that one who strives to follow his own conscience should not arrive, at least substantially and in the long run, at glimpsing the demands of the objective order. If in fact sin is also a darkening of the intellect, virtue cannot but be light or an increase of light, whence Christ says that whoever follows him non ambulat in tenebris, without adding that we could not picture a God the Father who does not offer his help to one who seeks him sincerely. For the same reason, however, we must admit that one who does not follow his own conscience, even if objectively he acts in conformity with the moral order, will end up detaching himself also from the objective order. Here lies the whole tormented problem of the salvation of one who does all that is in his power, and of the impossibility of losing the faith without fault, as also of the possibility of detaching oneself from the Church without committing a sin in the decision to leave it. This makes clearer the importance for each person of acting according to his own conscience and of striving to form it more and more each day. In this lies the whole moral value of man and therefore the only universal basis for salvation (cf. His Holiness Pius XII, Radiomessaggio sulla coscienza cristiana come oggetto della educazione, 23 March 1952, in AAS, 44 [1952], pp. 270-78; and COSCIENZA, II, 7. Educazione della c., in Enc. Catt., IV, coll. 681-82).

One who has unhappily detached himself from it always has in this life a possibility of salvation. It is enough that he break the will with which he sinned and strive to restore the universe to the situation in which it would be, had his sin not been committed (v. RIPARAZIONE). On this condition, by approaching the minister of Christ (v. CONFESSIONE) he will have the sensible assurance of having been forgiven.

Giovanni Battista Guzzetti

VI. INTERNAL SINS

The moralists' distinction between internal and external sin is analogous to that between internal and external act (v. HUMAN ACT). Internal sins are therefore those bad human acts that are carried out with the spiritual faculties alone, namely the intellect and the will. This does not mean that they are not complete sins, and of the same nature and gravity as the corresponding external sin; for of itself the external act neither adds nor removes any special malice: only under a certain aspect (per accidens) can the external act increase the malice or the goodness of the internal act, inasmuch as external execution ordinarily brings with it a greater intensity and vehemence with which the will moves toward the object; greater is the duration of the will, which continues until the action is completed; and further, in carrying out the act externally, the will renews, often many times, the internal act, which in this way becomes better or worse.

Theologians distinguish three different kinds of internal sins: morose delectation, sinful joy, and evil desire.

1. Morose delectation

It is the voluntary complacency of the free will in a bad action or thing that the subject creates with his own imagination and thinks of as present, yet without any desire to commit it in fact. But such imagination, even if only intellectual, is a true sin because it is equivalent to approval of and affection for the bad thing.

It is called morose because the will, as soon as it perceives it, does not withdraw from it; in other words, morose means known and voluntary. The malice of morose delectation is a sin of the same species and gravity as the bad action mentally represented, because, like every other human act, it derives its morality from the object as it is formally. Therefore if the thing deliberately thought of and approved is base, the morose delectation is a base sin, that is, against chastity; if the complacency is in the harm of someone who is robbed of his goods, or offended in his honor, the morose delectation is a sin against justice, etc. The gravity of the internal sin, considered in itself, is equal to that of the corresponding external sin. Usually morose delectation probably does not contract the special malice of the circumstances that accompany the object of the complacency, unless with full knowledge and advertence the will determines itself precisely because of those circumstances.

The complacency can be directed to the knowledge of the sinful object; such complacency not only can be lawful, but is sometimes even obligatory. Thus, for example, for the doctor or the confessor, for the right exercise of their office, knowledge about bad deeds is necessary: they must therefore study them; and a complacency in this knowledge would not be a sin. In reality knowledge is a perfection of the intellect, hence a good (St. Thomas, Quaest. disput., de veritate, XV ad 4; Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 74, a. 8). The study of such persons has a proportionate reason, and will be lawful even if (when one studies with a right intention) disturbance in the senses should involuntarily follow from it.

Likewise, morose delectation can concern the ingenious manner in which a theft, or even a base action, was carried out; it can refer to the brilliant, witty style in which certain stories are written. These complacencies are not forbidden, because the object is not the evil, but the cunning, the skill, the art with which the bad action was carried out: therefore they are not of themselves a sin. They can be (at least venial) if the complacency were sought exclusively out of curiosity or for frivolity; for if it derived from a bad intention, it can become a mortal sin at least because of the grave danger to which one would expose oneself, without sufficient reason, of disturbance of the senses or of consent to sin. In this regard it should be noted that morose delectation is distinct from sensual delectation, which is always a grave, external sin against the sixth commandment.

2. Sinful joy

It is the intellectual, deliberate complacency in a bad action already performed, either by the subject himself or by others, which is vividly recalled to memory and anew approved by the will. In joy it is certain that the internal sin assumes the malice not only of the object, but also of the circumstances, because the memory recalls the act such as it was performed.

Reduced to sinful joy are: 1) boasting with others of one's internal complacency; with this an external sin of scandal is added; 2) being inwardly sorry for not having performed a bad action, which, given the occasion, could have been done. In sinful joy, when the complacency is in the ingenious manner in which the bad deed was performed, the same principles set forth for morose delectation apply. One can moreover rejoice in a good effect that has resulted from a bad deed: the good effect, in fact, taken in itself, contains no disorder. Thus it is lawful to rejoice in an inheritance that comes about through a violent death: the complacency concerns the goods and not the death (cf. on this point the proposition condemned by Innocent XI, decr. of the Holy Office, 2 March 1679; Denz-U, 1165).

3. Evil desire

It is the will to commit some illicit action. It therefore differs from morose delectation, which dwells on the bad action imagined as present, and from sinful joy, which takes delight in the memory of a past sin. It can be efficacious if it is a true resolve to do the evil, and inefficacious (some then speak of a conditioned desire), if it is a mere velleity. The efficacious or unconditioned desire of a forbidden thing is always a sin of the same species and gravity as the action to which the desire tends. And moreover it touches, like joy, not only the malice of the object, but also that of the circumstances that accompany it, if they fall within the sphere of the things desired, inasmuch as it refers to the action as it will be in its concrete reality and therefore circumstantiated. The Gospel itself emphasizes this responsibility (Mt. 5:28).

For the inefficacious or conditioned desire, one must see whether the condition is such as to empty the desired action, illicit in itself, of its malice or not. Culpability can be removed, by means of the added condition, in all actions that are forbidden only by a positive law (for example, if it were lawful, I would eat meat on Friday); and also in actions forbidden by the natural law, which however in certain situations can be lawful (for example, if for a legitimate defense it were necessary to kill a man, I would kill him). However, such conditioned desires are for the most part idle and often dangerous; therefore they are to be avoided. On the other hand, culpability is not removed in those actions forbidden by the natural law that are intrinsically so bad that not even God could permit them (for example, if it were not a sin, I would blaspheme). It is true, however, that often these desires remain in the sphere of instinctive feelings and indicate only that the natural inclination is so strong that it would lead to the action, if it were not forbidden; in this recognition there is no sin.

The question is asked whether it is lawful to desire a physical evil, even death, for someone for a good end, for example, for a wayward son so that a scandalous life may be eliminated, which in no other way one has succeeded in removing. Absolutely and theoretically speaking, the answer is that it would be lawful; because one would not desire the temporal evil, but the spiritual good, which is of a higher order (cf. propositions 13, 14 and 15 condemned by Innocent XI [Denz-U, 1163-65]). In this sense the Church exclaims in her liturgy of Holy Saturday: O certe necessarium Adae peccatum. O felix culpa! In practice, however, the desire of evil for a good that comes from it is not considered lawful, because of the serious danger that the desire for evil prevails over the desire for good, and a sin is actually committed. Thus it is not commonly admitted that a wife may lawfully desire the death of a husband by whom she is very harshly mistreated, without any hope of amendment appearing; nor is it lawful to desire one's own death in order to escape so many distresses and vexations, because in such desires self-love almost always prevails over love of neighbor, and the great spiritual good that lies in the exercise of holy patience is hindered.

A practical question is that of determining the number of internal sins. This is not easy; here, however, is the fundamental criterion: there are as many numerically distinct sins of the same nature as there are morally interrupted acts of the will; whoever, for example, interiorly and voluntarily rejoices over a sin already committed is in a state of sin until, repentant, he interrupts and retracts that interior voluntary act. Voluntary detestation is the surest means of interruption. But in purely internal sins (morose delectation and evil delight) a natural interruption may also occur, an almost unnoticed destruction: if this is of brief duration, it is regarded as a moral continuation of the preceding act, so that the will, after that brief interval, returns almost spontaneously, without a new deliberation, to the sin, which therefore continues and remains numerically one. How long, however, the spontaneous interval (for example, sleep) must last for the act to cease is not equally precisely determined.

Nevertheless there are internal acts that the will deliberates almost as definitive, for example, adherence to an error against the faith, that is, to heresy. It is in fact held that the heretic intends to remain such until an explicit retraction, so that an interval of hours, of sleep for a whole night, and even of months and years does not interrupt the act: the sin remains numerically one. Even the intention to kill an enemy can remain single for several days or weeks (notwithstanding the natural interruptions of sleep), in the preparation of poison, weapons, etc. For capital sins, v. VIZI CAPITALI. For irremissible sins, v. PENITENZA.

Gennaro Moretti

VII. SIN AMONG PRIMITIVE PEOPLES

1. Sin according to the evolutionists

It is probable, according to Frazer, that at first men had no notion of sin in the religious sense, but only in the magical sense: that is, originally sin would have been conceived as an almost physical thing, a kind of morbid substance hidden in the sinner's body, which could be driven out by physical agents: fire, water, fasts, purgatives, fumigation, sacrifices. Men, progressing slowly in the moral life, would later have conceived the idea of sin as a transgression of the will of a wise and beneficent God, to erase which and avert its consequences the sinner had to repent of his fault and confess it (v. CONFESSION among primitive peoples).

2. Sin according to the latest research of ethnology

Modern ethnology has rejected these evolutionist theories, firmly demonstrating the contrary, namely that, among the etymologically most ancient primitive peoples, there exists an ethical monotheism, from which one may rightly deduce what the primordial one was. The Supreme Being is conceived as good and moral in himself and as the guardian of morality. Reward and punishment are not limited to this world, but in all the most archaic civilizations there is talk of a reward after death for those who in life followed the laws of the Supreme Being, and of a punishment for those who transgressed them. This belief is so widespread among the most archaic populations that it undoubtedly belongs to the core of the most ancient religion of humanity (v. MONOTHEISM, II. Ethnology).

Primitive peoples generally distinguish sins according to their gravity. For certain kinds of sin, e.g., the Andamanese, the Semang and the Pygmies of the Ituri in Africa believe that God punishes them with storms, the flood, fire, or by striking with lightning, or by making thunder heard, or by making the rainbow appear, all manifestations of the wrath of the Supreme Being for a great sin committed. There are indications, such as the expiatory sacrifice made with one's own blood among the Semang and the African Pygmies, from which one can affirm that, according to them, the sinner who has committed a grave sin renders himself liable to death. Moreover, this belief also appears from their legends on the origin of death. In them it is narrated that the Creator, who at that time lived in the company of the first men, happy and immortal, punished them with death and sorrow when they transgressed his precept. Therefore all their descendants are mortal and subject to sorrow.

Malinowski, speaking of incest among the inhabitants of the Trobriand Islands (Melanesia), distinguishes seven degrees of aversion to incest and expressly notes that incest with one's own mother and with one's own daughter or sister arouses a moral indignation incomparably greater than incest with a cousin, whereas incest with a "classificatory" mother or with a "classificatory" sister is easily condoned.

The effects of sin are individual, but they can also be social, as when God sent the flood or fire to punish the sins of the impenitent. In the magical conception of sin one can escape its consequences if, as is believed among the Igulic Eskimos (banana) and in almost all of northern and north-eastern Asia as far as the heart of Siberia, the Shaman pacifies the offended deity and if the sin is confessed. In this magical conception sin is held to be a transgression of a universal cosmic law, which entails automatic vengeance. The non-observance of such a law, though unconscious, has as its consequence that the sinner becomes bad, mortifies or disfigures the deity, automatically causes himself an individual or collective penalty, such as illness, famine, death.

It has been noted, e.g., among the Andamanese, that primitive peoples understand that a transgression of justice entails the duty of repairing the damage. Man observed among the said Andamanese that, for things stolen from the English, they spontaneously offered equivalent things in compensation. Primitive peoples further recognize that one of the main characteristics of sin is the freedom of the human will. The same explorer Man, e.g., established that when the Indian convicts first landed in the Andamans, the natives, seeing them in chains, immediately understood that the landing was forced and not voluntary, and therefore did not shoot arrows at them, but at the members of the escort, considering them unjust invaders of their lands. The ancient Mexicans held as a fundamental principle that no one could be punished unless he was guilty. The same Mexicans punished the crime not committed, but attempted. Their laws, e.g., distinguished the case of evident attempt on another's life from that of clear premeditation, and likewise with regard to sodomy, imposing penalties of different degrees (death penalty in the first case; threat of the death penalty for the second). All primitive peoples recognize that every man has his own moral conscience, by which he distinguishes good and evil and has the freedom to do good or evil and therefore merits or demerits. Like the idea of good, so the idea of evil is received first from the family environment, or from the environment of one's own social group (from the clan, or from the extended family, Sippe), then officially in the initiation of the young. The right, which the tribe or clan has, to teach the moral law, is justified by the public good, by the protection of offspring and of the weak, but originally by the will of the Supreme Being, because he is believed to be the ultimate judge, the origin and root of every moral idea. Therefore God is the first source of the moral law. The individual is not conscious of this in his every act, but acts in conformity with the good because he has been so taught. The tribe, on the other hand, in transmitting its traditional moral law, explicitly appeals to the authority of God, as legislator who imposes his will.

3. Sin, morality and religion among primitive peoples

To form an idea of what sins the primitive is capable of, one must consider his moral ideal. This ideal has been judged very differently by various authors. Setting aside the authors who have judged primitive peoples simply as amoral, lowering them to the rank of beasts or nearly so, according to Tylor the moral principles of savages are quite good, but are more relaxed and weaker than ours.

It is clear that this assessment of Tylor sins against a fundamental canon of modern ethnology, namely against the rule of the twofold interpretation of cultural facts: the present one and the remote one. One must then distinguish, as for the individual so for a people, the moral ideal and its practical realization, because the latter, although the ideal is high, can turn out to be much lower, owing to a state of temporary decadence of the entire people itself. Thanks to the great development of modern ethnology, different groups of primitive peoples must today be distinguished, also under the moral aspect. Today one can say that primitive peoples, particularly the more archaic ones, despite certain anomalies and a great irritability of temperament, have a moral code that is quite good and elevated.

It is not possible here to deal in detail with the moral ideal of the primitives of the various cultures. We shall limit ourselves to the Acciuabo, a people of Portuguese Angola, studied by Fr. Schulien. The latter, treating of sin and its reparation among them, according to their language and living tradition, distinguishes six groups of sins, also mentioning the penalties connected with them. a) He who is always discontented, contradicts, grumbles, and even he who emits bodily sounds that are troublesome to others, is against the moral ideal. Lying too is considered by the whole tribe as a bad thing, although they lie a great deal among themselves. But others no longer believe the liar, except when he confirms his word with an oath. It is against good social conduct for a woman to be quarrelsome and capricious toward her husband. b) Bad actions are laziness, sleeping long, vanity, gluttony, boasting, particularly the boasting of a man who wants to be admired by a woman, as well as a woman's jealousy. c) Bad actions are failures of respect toward superiors, parents, the old and the infirm. d) Sin is whatever is against a person's good name and against his property. e) Sin is every sorcery that brings harm to one's neighbor: killing newborns to obtain riches; asking the demons to kill other people; performing magical actions against the vegetation of the products of the earth; drawing medicines from the dead; the desecration of corpses, which is believed to be a powerful magical medicine, etc. f) Adultery, abortion, violence and the abduction of a young woman are forbidden. It is forbidden for a man to know his wife in childbed until the eighth day. Even more direct offenses against God are denying food to the hungry and water to the thirsty. The Acciuabo consider sin to be not only saying and doing bad things, but also thinking them. Indeed, it is forbidden, for example, among them to fantasize about sexual matters. In their language, thinking dreamily about obscene things is called area viabure.

4. Conclusioni

Undoubtedly there exists a twofold conception of sin: the religious or theistic or theological one, and the magical one. These two conceptions concern the same subject, but they are irreconcilable; historically, moreover, they are independent; the con-

Magic moreover is of recent origin compared with religious [practice]. Modern ethnology has demonstrated that, as was said above, among ethnologically older peoples religion and morality are intimately united, that is, morality is founded on religion.

Luigi Vannicelli