Grace

GRACE. - It derives from the Greek root χvarphi (cf. Latin gratus), which carries the sense of enjoyment and delight and gave rise to the word χvarphivarphiς (= "g."). In profane literature this term means physical and moral beauty (cf. the three Graces associated with Venus and the Muses), benevolence, favor, benefit, gratitude. The idea of g. as a divine influence on man is not absent in the mystery religions and in magic. In Sacred Scripture one finds the use of the term g. (φεη in the Old Testament, χvarphivarphiς in the New) both in a subjective sense (benevolence, gratitude) and in an objective sense (a material or spiritual gift). On the basis of the texts of the New Testament and in a particular way of St. Paul, G. is defined theologically: a gratuitous, supernatural gift conferred by God on the human soul with a view to eternal life. It presupposes the beatific vision as the supernatural end of human life, and implies the whole divine economy, which accompanies man on the journey toward that end, offering him the means adequate to attain it.

G. properly so called is a gift infused in the inmost part of the soul and of its faculties, and is divided into habitual and actual, according as it has a permanent character (in the manner of a habit) or a transient one.

To the first category belong sanctifying G., which has its seat in the essence of the soul, the virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit (v.), which are infused into the faculties of the soul; the second category (actual G.) comprises various kinds of G.: exciting and assisting, prevenient and subsequent, sufficient and efficacious. This last is the most important also because it is the object of great theological controversies.

I. EXISTENCE

Objectively, the existence of grace in general is attested by divine Revelation. But the question can be posed from the subjective point of view by asking whether man can have consciousness or direct cognition of the grace infused into his soul. Some Protestant sects (e.g., Quakers, Pentecostals) admit a vivid psychological experience of grace; the immanentists too speak of an experience of the divine. Catholic doctrine generally rejects such opinions, insofar as they compromise the supernatural transcendence of the divine gift; but it recognizes the extraordinary experiences of the great converts and of the mystics, who are elevated to an ineffable spiritual contact with God, who works in them.

A more disputed aspect of the question is the rational knowledge of grace. Against the certainty of his own sanctification boasted by Luther, the Council of Trent (sess. VI, Denz-U, 802) defined that no one can know with certainty of faith, immune from falsehood, that he has obtained the grace of God, and therefore all can fear for their own state and their own lot. But the theological schools discuss whether the sanctified man can have, by natural cognition, the certainty of being in the grace of God. The opinion of St. Thomas and of a great part of theologians admits the possibility of only a moral certainty in the broad sense.

As for objective existence, there is the twofold testimony of Sacred Scripture and of Tradition. As with other mysteries, so with grace there is no explicit and formal revelation in the Old Testament, but simple indications, which are progressively accentuated as the messianic times draw near. The first is the state of original justice in which the first parents were created, who were therefore immune from concupiscence (v.) and enjoyed the friendship of God. After sin, God restored the broken bond by establishing a covenant with Abraham and with his descendants, a covenant renewed with Moses on the basis of the concept of divine fatherhood in relation to the people considered as a son (II Sam. 7, 14), the object of the love of the heavenly Father (Ex. 4, 22; Deut. 8, 5). But the covenant, begun in the spiritual and supernatural sphere, gradually degenerated, owing to the crude mentality of the Hebrew people, into material interest, reducing religious sentiment to a banal exteriorism. God made use of the prophets to recall them to interiority (Am. 4, 11-22; 5, 14-15; Mich. 6, 8; Is. 66, 2; Jer. 4, 3-4 and 14, 7). They inculcated the relationship between the soul and God not only with the ancient concept of filial adoption, but also with the delicate image of spiritual marriage (Hos. 1-3; Jer. 2, 2; Ex. 16, 8; Canticle), of life-giving water, of light, of fire (cf. Psalms and Wisdom Books).

From the whole of the Old Testament one can easily derive these elements, in which the fundamental concept of sanctifying grace is implicit: a) an action of God in the depths of the soul (Jer. 18, 6; 17, 14; 31, 18; I Reg. 8, 58); b) a purification of the spirit (Is. 1, 18; Ps. 50); c) an interior renewal according to the forceful expression of Ez. 11, 19: « Et dabo eis cor unum et spiritum novum tribuam in visceribus eorum et auferam cor lapideum de carne eorum et dabo cor carneum ut in praeceptis meis ambulent ». One senses here the prelude of the kingdom of grace announced by the Gospel.

In the New Testament the message of the Kingdom of God dominates, which chiefly entails a new life of the spirit regenerated in the faith and charity of Christ. Already in the Synoptics the fundamental characteristics of the Kingdom are outlined: a change of spirit (μετάνους: Mt. 4, 17; Mk. 1, 4) brought about through Baptism (Mk. 1, 15 and 16, 16; cf. Io. 3, 5), interior holiness in antithesis to Pharisaic formalism (Mt. 5, 20; 23, 23), above all supreme charity toward God and toward neighbor (Mt. 22, 37).

But the full revelation of grace is found in St. Paul and in St. John. The former presents it under the soteriological light as a redemptive force from sin. A restoration begun with Baptism, which is rebirth in the risen Christ (Rom. 6, 4-11), a new life nourished by faith and charity (I Cor. 13; Eph. 3, 14-19), whereby a new creation is brought about (II Cor. 5, 17), the new man clothed in Christ (Col. 3, 9; Gal. 3, 27), living of Christ (Gal. 2, 20). The synthesis of St. Paul's thought, which vibrates in all the Epistles (Eph., first chapters) is read in Tit. 3, 5: « Secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit per laxacrum regenerationis et renovationis Spiritus Sancti, quem effudit in nos abunde per Iesum Christum Salvatorem nostrum; ut iustificati gratia ipsius heredes simus secundum spem vitae aeternae ». The life of grace is at work in the Mystical Body (v.), in which Christ the Head transfuses the regenerating sap into his members, the faithful incorporated in him, who are thereby enabled to realize the truth in love (Eph. 4, 16).

According to St. John, grace is supernatural life that Christ kindles in souls with Baptism (Io. 3), nourishes with the Eucharistic bread (Io. 6), preserves with his immanence in us and ours in him as branches in the vine (Io. 15). St. John too, like St. Paul, insists on filial adoption, which makes the faithful so many born of God (Io. 1; I Io. 3, 1), on the profound unity between Christ and those who believe in him (Io. 17). A supernatural, divine life, therefore, which implies a certain participation in the very nature of God, « consortium (κοινωνία) divinae naturae » as II Pt. 1, 4 says. So great a richness is not the fruit of human industry and efforts, but a gratuitous gift of God: « Gratia enim estis salvati per fidem et hoc non ex vobis: Dei enim donum est » (Eph. 2, 8). This grace, which commits man to collaborate with God, is viaticum for eternal life, indeed is already eternal life anticipated: « Gratia autem Dei vita aeterna in Christo Iesu Domino nostro » (Rom. 6, 22).

The Fathers have in Sacred Scripture the essential elements for constructing a theology of grace, which is then supernatural anthropology. The Apostolic Fathers, having no theological preoccupations, content themselves with echoing the concepts of St. Paul and St. John, underlining rather the fruits of divine grace in man. The passage of St. Clement of Rome (Ep. ad Cor., 35) holds for all: « Quam beata sunt, dilecti, et mirabilia dona Dei! Vita in immortalitate, splendor in iustitia, veritas in libertate, fides in confidentia, continentia in sanctitate... Unus est Deus et unus Christus et unus Spiritus gratiae, qui effusus est super nos » (ibid., 46); but it requires our cooperation, even though we are justified by virtue of faith (ibid., 33-37).

But from the end of the 2nd century, the doctrine of grace becomes in the hands of the Fathers, especially of the Eastern ones, a weapon against Gnostic and Manichaean pessimism. Starting from the idea of participation in the divine nature (cf. St. Peter) or of rebirth by virtue of the Holy Spirit (cf. St. John) or of the new creation in Christ and of divine adoption (cf. St. Paul), they express in synthesis the whole economy of grace with the term "deification" (θεοποίησις) which becomes usual in their writings. St. Irenaeus several times insists on the efficacy of the redemption wrought by Christ, who saves men by causing them to be reborn to God (Adv. haer., II, 22, 4); the Incarnation tends to divinize men: "Through his immense love he became what we are in order to make us become what he is" (ibid., prof. to bk. V). Even more vividly do the Alexandrians (Clement, Origen) speak in this sense. In the 4th-5th century, in the controversies over the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Hypostatic Union, the Fathers develop the doctrine of grace in the light of those two supreme truths of faith. St. Athanasius, in his struggle with the Arians, in vindicating the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father, gladly makes use of this argument: Christ the Redeemer makes us (by his grace) partakers of the divine nature, therefore he is truly God (Ep. de synodis, 51). He adds: "For this reason the Son of God became the son of man, so that the sons of men, that is, of Adam, might become sons of God... partakers of the very life of God... he therefore is Son of God by nature, we instead by grace" (De Incarn. Dei Verbi et c. Arianos, 8). The divinity of the Holy Spirit too is proved by the fact that the Spirit, like the Word and together with it, makes us divine (Ep. ad Serapionem, 1, 24); an argument dear also to St. Basil (De Spiritu Sancto, 9, 22 and elsewhere). St. Cyril of Alexandria emphasizes the human-divine union of the Hypostatic Union as the exemplar of the union between God and man elevated to participation in the supernatural life: "Divinam participamus naturam non solum quia gratia ad supernaturalem gloriam evolamus, verum etiam quia Deum inhabitantem possidemus" (In Io., I, 9).

In this way the Eastern Fathers presented grace rather as a state of communion with God. But in the West Pelagianism (v.) gave the occasion to bring out the dynamic and anthropological aspect of grace. To Pelagius, who exalted man's activity to the point of attaining eternal life by his own powers, St. Augustine, the doctor of grace, would oppose God's action in man, transposing the whole of human ethical activity into the supernatural sphere, where divine grace and our freedom are harmonized. From the vast work of St. Augustine it is not difficult to derive these principles, which are the fabric of his supernatural anthropology against the Stoicizing naturalism of Pelagius: a) God governs man, even in the sphere of the free will, without impairing it (De corrupt. et gratia, 14, 45; De spiritu et littera, 37, 58, and elsewhere); b) grace is not the term of human effort and merit, but is a free gift of God (Ep. 207 ad Vitalem and elsewhere); c) before original sin there was grace in man, with which he could persevere in holiness (auxilium sine quo non); after sin a stronger grace is necessary, one that acts positively upon man and inclines him to persevere (auxilium quo; cf. De corrupt. et gratia, 13, 14). St. Augustine sings the triumph of grace over the reluctances of the flesh and of the erring spirit, according to his dramatic experience, which brings him close to St. Paul.

II. NECESSITY

Man's activity can be considered in relation to the true and in relation to the good, according to his supreme specific faculties: the intellect and the will. Moreover, both the true and the good can belong to two distinct spheres, the one natural and the other supernatural, according as they are proportioned to human nature or transcend its potentiality and its demands (v. ORDINE NATURALE E SOPRANNATURALE). Against Pelagianism (v.), which concedes too much to man's natural forces, and against Lutheranism (v.), which denies him too much, Catholic doctrine teaches these points: a) Despite original sin and its consequences, man can know with his own intellect every truth of the natural order, including even the existence and the principal attributes of God (cf. Vatican Council, sess. III, De Revelatione, can. 1). But the extrinsic help of Revelation is morally necessary for the human race to attain "expedite, firma certitudine et nullo admixto errore" the whole body of ethical-religious truths (Vatican Council, sess. III, cap. 2).

b) To know truths that are absolutely supernatural, such as the mysteries (v.), divine Revelation is required (an objective help); to adhere to them with certainty and on the ground of God's authority, faith (v.) is required, which, although it has a rational foundation as credibility, is supernatural and therefore an effect of G., both as a free determination of the will and as the assent of the intellect (Council of Trent, sess. VI, caps. 6-7; Vatican Council, sess. III, cap. 3 and the corresponding canons).

c) Man, even without the help of G., can in general do natural good and avoid evil; but he cannot do all good nor observe the whole natural law, in such a way as to avoid every sin, without that help.

d) But G. is physically necessary to perform even the least salutary act, that is, one proportioned to the supernatural end, which is eternal life. Indeed, not even a positive preparation for G. is possible without G., and even for the man already sanctified the special help of actual G. is necessary in order to persevere for a long time in that state, and a most special help for final perseverance, to which eternal life is attached (Council of Carthage, Arausicanum II, Trent, sess. VI; furthermore v. the Propositions of Baius condemned by Pius V and the Propositions of Jansenius condemned by Innocent X).

Thus the Church vindicates the fundamental integrity of human nature as well as man's free cooperation with God against the ethical-religious pessimism of Luther, Baius and Jansenius; and she defends the necessity of God's supernatural intervention in the activity of man wounded by original sin, against the anthropological naturalism of Pelagius.

III. ESSENCE

Luther, starting from the concept of original sin as an intrinsic and irreparable corruption of nature, had logically to reduce the redemptive G. of Christ to an element extrinsic to the psychology of man, that is, to the mercy of God, which conceals sin and imputes to the sinner (who always remains such on this earth) the holiness of the Redeemer. Later Baius would say instead that G. is an integrative element of human nature and in concrete terms is reduced to the very activity of man insofar as it is morally good, that is, corresponding to the law of God.

Catholic doctrine is clearly summarized in the Council of Trent (sess. VI, chaps. 6-7) both for sanctifying (habitual) G. and for actual G. Sanctifying G. is the formal cause of our sanctification, in the sense that God produces in our soul the justice that renews us and makes us truly holy (chap. 7). G. and charity are poured forth by the Holy Spirit into our heart and adhere to it (can. 11). G., therefore, is a supernatural reality wrought by God in the depths of the soul, as is in any case already known from divine Revelation. Luther's extrinsicism cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of St. Paul and St. John, nor with that of St. Peter, who speaks of a participation (souvenir) in the divine nature in man. The reality of G. is proved by its formal effects, that is, by adoptive sonship and by the right to eternal life, which constitutes merit (v.).

From these certain principles theology rightly deduces that sanctifying G. is accidental in nature and is reduced more precisely to an entitative habit or habitual quality inherent in the essence of the soul, which is thus elevated to a deiform mode of being, almost to a new nature, which, integrated by the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit (v.), becomes the principle of supernatural activity proportionate to eternal life.

The richness of divine G. is not of the same degree in all, but it can grow both through the worthy frequency of the Sacraments, especially of the Most Holy Eucharist, and through the generous effort of cooperation on man's part. G. is lost, together with charity, at the moment when the soul performs an act gravely sinful, which makes impossible the coexistence of the bond of friendship and union with God. Whoever is in G. has God within himself (v. 1) (INDWELLING).

If errors and heresies have arisen concerning the essence of sanctifying (habitual) G., great theological controversies have been kindled concerning the essence of actual G. The Thomists, following in the footsteps of St. Thomas, hold that actual G. is a positive divine influence on the faculties of the soul to move them to act in the supernatural sphere. In other words, actual G. would be nothing other than physical premotion (v.) transported onto the supernatural plane. The Molinists, on the other hand, identify actual G. with the human act itself, which must be attributed at the same time to God and to the creature according to the twofold aspect of supernaturalness and freedom. Some (Billot) admit that identification only for indeliberate acts, which are like the awakening of the activity of the will, which then proceeds to act freely, without further divine influence. According to Thomistic doctrine, actual G. is a transient operative virtue, which is easily reduced to a quality that flows, distinct from God and from the soul on which it exerts influence. Indeed, in the documents of Revelation G. is called vocatio, illuminatio, pulsatio, tractio, terms that express a true action of God upon the creature. St. Thomas speaks in this sense (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃc, q. 109, a. 9): « Homo in gratia (habituale) cxsistens... indiget tamen auxilio gratiae secundum album modum, ut scilicet a Deo moveatur ad recte agendum. » Elsewhere he alludes to a gratuitous help « interius ammoni movens ».

The theological controversies hinge especially on the nature of efficacious G., and they all depend on the different way of conceiving the divine concurrence (v.) in general with regard to free human activity. Beyond all discussion is the fact or the existence of a sufficient G. and of an efficacious G., at least in the sense that divine G. sometimes produces its effect (a salutary act) and sometimes remains sterile. In Sacred Scripture there is testimony of both: « Quia vocavi et renuisti » (Prov. 1, 24); « Ierusalem, Ierusalem... quoties volui congregare filios tuos... et noluisti » (Mt. 23, 37). Therefore man can oppose a refusal to God's invitation and lose the fruits of his gift. But on the other hand we read: « Sicut divisiones aquarum, ita cor regis in manu Domini: quocunque voluerit inclinabit illud » (Prov. 21, 1); « Faciam ut in praeceptis meis ambulietis » (Ez. 36, 27); « Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle et perficere » (Phil. 2, 13). The obvious meaning of such expressions leads to the concept of an action, that is, of a divine G., that infallibly attains its effect.

The Church has defined: a) that man can resist G. (Council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 4 de justificatione); b) that there is a merely sufficient G., which is also a gift of God (against Jansenism: propositions 1 and 2 of Jansenius, Denz-U, 1092-93; and Jansenist proposition 6, Denz-U, 1296); c) that there is a G. that obtains its effect, without prejudice to human freedom (Council of Trent, sess. VI, chaps. 5-6). The efficacy of G. is connected with the question of the antecedent and consequent divine will (v.).

But a lively theological controversy arose in the 16th century concerning the nature of the efficacy of G., between the Jesuit Molina and the Dominican Bañez, who represented the Thomistic tradition. For the complex question v. MOLINISM and BAÑEZ. Here it suffices to recall what pertains strictly to the problem of g. in relation to human freedom.

Ludovico Molina, concerned about freedom compromised or denied by the Lutherans, constructed a theological system to safeguard it, notwithstanding foreknowledge, natural concurrence, G. and divine predestination. He does not admit a direct influence of God on the human will, such that the latter is determined by the former to act; but he reduces divine action to a simultaneous concurrence (more cooperating than operating). Furthermore, although he subordinates the world and man to God, he maintains that there is in things a concatenation of causes and circumstances that influence the free determination of the human will, which is therefore foreseen by God with middle knowledge but is not caused directly by the divine will, which realizes things according to the order foreseen (independently of it) in the divine essence. On the basis of these principles Molina explains the efficacy of G. extrinsically, that is, in relation to the correspondence of man's free will, to which G. is offered. One and the same G. can be merely sufficient. If God wishes to save a man, he explores his free will with middle knowledge and according to its forecasts prepares those G. to which man will certainly correspond, given his psychological dispositions and the circumstances of time and place.

The principal stumbling block of Molinism is that of attributing, as it seems, to man rather than to God the efficacy of G. and therefore eternal salvation. To avoid that stumbling block there arose the congruism (v.) of Suárez and of other Jesuits, who recognize in efficacious G. a greater benefit than in sufficient G., inasmuch as the former has in itself a congruity for obtaining more surely the consent of the free will and therefore the salutary act.

The Dominicans, represented by Domingo Báñez, following in the footsteps of St. Thomas, defend a clear distinction between the one and the other G. Consistently with their system concerning foreknowledge and divine concurrence (physical predetermination), they maintain that the free human act, like any other reality, depends on the divine will as on its own determining cause. Efficacious G. is by its nature such as to infallibly bend the human will to a determinate act. Nevertheless the act that follows from it is free, because it springs from a will that could resist (in the divided sense), although in fact it does not resist (in the composite sense). Sufficient G., on the other hand, being of an entirely different nature, does not move one to act, but only prepares the subject for action. The stumbling block of Thomism is human freedom, which seems compromised under the action of intrinsically efficacious G. To avoid this stumbling block, attenuated systems have arisen, which go under the generic name of syncretism, inasmuch as they seek to reconcile the extreme positions. Such is the theory elaborated by the Sorbonne and adopted by St. Alphonsus Liguori, such are the efforts made recently by theologians of the one and the other side (Billot, Guillermin, Marin Sola, etc.). The Church leaves the matter open to discussion. But in order to overcome the deadlock of this age-old controversy, it now seems necessary to set out on the path of a sound eclecticism, which knows how to take from each of the two opposing systems the best elements in order to attempt a solution that avoids the harshness of the extremists. Modern syncretism is on the right track and tends to reconcile human freedom with efficacious G., attenuating the divine action and harmonizing it with the demands of human psychology. Molinism eliminates the mystery from man and concentrates it in God; rigid Thomism does the opposite. It seems more correct to leave the mystery where it is, that is, at the point where the supernatural energy of G. is inscribed within the complex psychology of the human act. One must, however, avoid what seems repugnant to true human freedom, such as the physical predetermination ad unum of the Báñezians, and what seems repugnant to the supreme divine causality, such as the middle knowledge of the Molinists. But an adequate solution will never be reached, until the darkness of faith gives way to the light of the beatific vision.

IV. CAUSE AND EFFECTS

The Council of Trent determined in detail the causality in relation to grace (session VI, chap. 7): sanctification (or sanctifying grace) has its final cause in the glory of God and of Christ and, as regards man, in eternal life; its efficient cause in God who purifies and sanctifies; its meritorious cause in Jesus who redeemed us by meriting for us and by giving satisfaction to the divine justice we had offended; the instrumental cause in the sacrament of Baptism; and finally the formal cause in the justice and holiness with which God justifies us and makes us truly holy.

The one that interests us most is the efficient cause. It is God who produces grace in us, as a healing of sin and as a participation in the divine nature and life. There is discussion about the nature of the action by which God produces grace: one cannot speak of creation, because grace is not a substance but an accident, and the proper term of the creative act is substantial being. Theologians say that God draws grace from the obediential potency of the soul, which means that the soul has a (passive) capacity with respect to the grace that God infuses into it. To the Sacraments is attributed an instrumental causal influence in the production of grace, but it is debatable whether this is a matter of physical causality or of moral causality.

The distribution of grace depends on the free will of God; but since he wills the salvation of all (I Tim. 2:3-6), he grants to all at least the grace sufficient for salvation. It is a doctrine of faith that God gives grace to avoid evil and to do good to the faithful in a state of sanctification (cf. the 1st proposition of Jansenius, condemned by Innocent X: Denz-U, 1092). It is also certain that God bestows grace on sinners so that they may be converted: «Vivo ego, dicit Dominus, nolo mortem impii, sed ut convertatur impius a via sua et vivat» (Ez. 33:11). Nor are unbelievers deprived of the benefit of grace, whether positive (those who rejected the faith by sin) or negative (those who do not have the faith because they do not know divine Revelation): the Church has condemned the contrary opinion of Jansenius (5th proposition: Denz-U, 1379). The reason lies in the truth of God's salvific will and in the universality of the Redemption wrought by Jesus Christ, who «pro omnibus mortuus est» (II Cor. 5:14). But the salvation of unbelievers (v.) constitutes a separate theological problem.

The principal effects of grace are justification and merit: both are treated in particular (v. the relevant entries). Here it suffices to note that justification is an effect of grace as formal cause and consists in a real liberation from sin and in a true participation in the divine nature and life. Luther, on the other hand, reduced it to a juridical fiction, that is, to a non-imputation of sin and an imputation of the holiness of God and of the merits of Jesus Christ.

Merit is an effect of grace as efficient cause and has its root in man's free cooperation with the divine action, whereby man acquires a right to eternal life. From the whole of Catholic doctrine concerning grace, while the infinite love of God toward his creature stands out, there also emerges the value and dignity of human nature and of the human person, called to cooperate with God for his own salvation. A harmony, then, of the divine and the human, which affirms the rights and dominion of God without tampering with the psychology and dignity of man. That harmony is gravely compromised both by Pelagianism and by Lutheranism.

2. Holy Fathers: I. Habert, Theologiae Graecorum Patrum vindiciae circa universam materiam Gratias, Paris 1647; F. Wörser, Die christl. Lehre über das Verhältnis von Gnade und Freiheit von den apost. Zeiten bis auf Augustinus, Freiburg im Br. 1860; O. Koerber, S. Irenaeus de Gratia sanctificante, Würzburg 1865; E. Scholl, Die Lehre des hl. Basilius von der Gnade, Freiburg im Br. 1881; G. A. Pell, Die Lehre des hl. Athanasius von der Sünde und Erlösung, ibid. 1888; F. K. Hümmer, Des hl. Gregor von Nazianz Lehre von der Gnade, Kempten 1890; F. Holt, Des hl. Gregor von Nyssa Lehre vom Menschen, Freiburg im Br. 1890; E. Weigl,

Die Heilslehre des hl. Cyrillus von Alex., Mainz 1905; I. B. Aufhauser, Die Heilslehre des hl. Gregor von Nyssa, Munich 1910; T. Salgueiro, La doctrine de st Augustin sur la Grâce d'après le traité à Simplicien, Porto 1925; J. Rivière, Notre vie dans le Christ chez st Augustin, in La vie spirituelle, 11 (1930), pp. 71-94; N. Merlin, St Augustin et le dogme du péché originel et de la Grâce, Paris 1931; V. Capanaga, La teologia angustiniana de la Grazia y la historia de las controversias, El Escorial 1933; T. I. Mc Kugo, De relatione inter chastitatem Augustinianum et Gratiam actualem, Mundelein 1936; I. Fahy, Doctrina s. Hieronymi de Gratiae divinae necessitate, ibid. 1937; L. Janssens, Notre filiation divine d'après st Cyrille d'Alexandrie, in Ephraecides theologiae Lovanenses, 15 (1938), pp. 233-78; I. Gross, La divinisation du chrétien selon les Pires grecs, Paris 1938; J. Schmucker, Die Gnade des Urstandes und die Gnade der Auenreihlen in Augustina De correppione et gratia, Regensburg 1939; F. Di Sciaccio, Fulgenzo di Ruspe e i massimi problemi della G., Rome 1941; R. Pio, La G. abituale in s. Agostino, ibid. 1943; H. du Manoir, Dogme et spiritualité chez st Cyrille d'Alexandrie, Paris 1944, pp. 163-84 and passim.

3. Scholastics: P. Minges, Die Gnadenlehre des Duns Scotus, Mainz 1900; I. Ude, Doctrina Capreoli de influxa Dei in actus voluntatis humanae, Graz 1905; K. Heim, Das Wesen der Gnade und ihr Verhältnis zu den natürlichen Funktionen des Menschen bei Alexander Halesius, Lignia 1907; G. Božitkovicz, S. Bonaventurae doctrina de Gratia et libero arbitrio, Marienbad 1919; F. Mitzka, Die Lehre des hl. Bonaventura von der Vorbereitung auf die heiligmachende Gnade, in Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, 50 (1926), pp. 27-72 220-52; H. Doms, Die Gnadenlehre des sel. Albertus Magnus, Breslau 1929; J. Shupp, Die Gnadenlehre des Petrus Lombardus, Freiburg im Br. 1932; M.-L. Conger, Albert le Grand théologien de la Grâce sanctifiante, in La vie spirituelle, 15 (1933), 109-40; V. Doucet, Matthieu ab Aquasparta quaestiones disputatae de Gratia nunc primum editae cum introductione et citiae, Quaracchi 1935; I. Hartnett, Doctrina s. Bonaventurae de deformitate, Mundelein 1936; I. Auer, Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in der Hochschulistik, I., Freiburg im Br. 1942; A. Landgraf, Die Erhenbarkeit des eigenen Gnadenstandes nach der Lehre der Frühscholastik, in Scholastik, 20-24 (1949), pp. 39-58.

4. S. Tommaso: R. M. Schultes, Circa doctrinam s. Thomae de instificatione, in Angelicum, 3 (1926), pp. 166-75, 345-54; Th. Ohm, Die Stellung der Heiden zu Natur und Übernatur nach dem hl. Thomas von Aquin, Münster 1927; E. Neveut, Controverses récentes sur le concours divin et la promotion divine, in Divus Thomas Plac., 47 (1927), pp. 123-26; id., Etudes sur la Grâce sanctifiante, ibid., 47 (1927), pp. 656-75; id., Notion et caractère surnaturel de la Grâce actuelle, ibid., 48 (1928), pp. 362-85; id., Des actes entativement surnaturels, ibid., 49 (1929), pp. 357-82; id., De la Grâce actuelle élevante, ibid., 50 (1930), pp. 588-99; O. Lottin, Liberté humaine et motion divine, De st Thomas à la condamnation de 1277, in Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, 7 (1933), pp. 52-69; 156-73; H. Bouillard, Conversion et Grâce chez st Thomas d'Aquin, Parigi 1944 (tesi di laurea molto discutibile); H. Rondet, Nature et surnaturel dans la théologie de st Thomas d'Aquin, in Recherches de science religieuse, 33 (1946), pp. 56-91; H. De Lubac, Surnaturel, Etudes historiques, Parigi 1946, pp. 231-60 (su s. Tommaso: l'opera è molto criticata). F. Bourassa, Les missions divines et les surnaturelles chez st Thomas d'Aquin, in Sciences ecclésiastiques, 1 (1948), pp. 42-94; Th. Deman, St Thomas d'Aquin Théologien de la Grâce, in Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa, 19 (1949), pp. 66-79; G. Ladrille, Grâce et motion divine chez st Thomas d'Aquin, in Salesianum, 12 (1950), pp. 37-84.

5. Great controversies: G. Schneemann, Controversiarum de divinae Gratiae libérique arbitrii concordia, initia, progressus, Latin trans. by G. Gietmann, Freiburg im Br. 1881; Th. De Régnon, Bannes et Molina, Paris 1885; id., Bannesianisme et molinisme, ibid. 1890; A. M. Dummermuth, S. Thomas et doctrina praemotionis physicae, Responsio ad p. Schneemann aliasque doctrinae scholae thomisticae impugnatores, ibid. 1886; V. Frins, S. Thomae doctrina de cooperatione Dei cum omni creatura praesertim libero, Responsio ad p. Dummermuth, ibid. 1893; A. M. Dummermuth, Defensio doctrinae s. Thomae de praemotione physicae, Responsio ad p. Frins, Louvain 1895; A. Wagner, Doctrina de Gratia sufficienti, Graz 1911; X. M. Le Bachelet, Prédestination et Grâce efficace, Controverses dans la Compagnie de Jésus au temps d'Aquaviva (1620-23), 2 vols., Louvain 1931; P. Dumont, Liberté humaine et concours divin d'après Suarez, Paris 1936; A. Di Giovanni, La G. del primo uomo e la perdita di essa nelle controversie di s. Roberto Bellarmino, Messina 1941.

6. Autori recenti: Hanno scritto trattati teologici sulla G.: C. Mazzarella, P. Pesch, S. Schiffini, G. de San, B. Beraza, H. Lange (molinisti); N. Del Prado, E. Hugon, F. Diekamp, A. Hoffmann, R. Garrigou-Lagrange (tomisti rigidi); L. Janssens, L. Billot, I. Van der Meersch, C. Boyer, P. Parente (temperati). Nuove controversie tra A. D'Alès, Providence et libre arbitre, Parigi 1927 e R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Dieu, 5e ed., ivi 1928 (appendice: St Thomas et le néomolinisme); tra R. Gar-

Garrigou-Lagrange, De comedia banneziona et recenti syncretismo, in Angelicum, 22 (1946), pp. 3-25, and P. Parente, Causalità divina e libertà umana, in La scuola cattolica, 75 (1947), pp. 89-108; H. Rondet, Gratia Christi, Essai d'histoire du dogme et de théologie dogmatique, Paris 1948 (an essay toward a comprehensive critical synthesis, which, however, cannot be accepted without some reservation); M. J. Scheeben, I misteri del cristianesimo, edited by I. Gorlani, Brescia 1949, pp. 453-521; F. Walland, La G. divinizzante, Colle don Bosco (Avi) 1949.

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